Search

The article focuses on the role of Afghanistan in drug production and trafficking worldwide. Topics discussed include the Afghan government's continuous reliance on foreign donors for assistance and cooperation in addressing the drug problem, the concern expressed by the 113th U.S. Congress regarding the future of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan as the security responsibilities will be transferred to Afghan forces in 2014 and the cultivation of opium poppy in the country.

The article presents U.S. legislative research on the war in Afghanistan from the progress of the war efforts, the politics behind the war and issues before the U.S. Congress. It discusses the current state of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan in 2013 and the plans for the complete withdrawal of forces by 2014. The article also discusses other topics like the Afghan National Security Forces and the Coalition forces and the economics and governance behind sustainable campaign gains.

The article features the legislation enacted by U.S. Congress for the improvement of operational contract support used by the Department of Defense (DOD) in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Section 854 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY)2007, the DOD is directed to develop joint policies for requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting for combat operations and post-conflict operations.

The article focuses on the report "Department of Defense's Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress" by the Congressional Research Service, a public policy research arm of the U.S. Congress, as of May 17, 2013. Topics discussed include the role of contractors in the U.S. military operations, the U.S. Department of Defense initiative for armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and the efforts of the U.S. Congress for operational support.

The article presents a December 2012 Congressional Research Service report titled, "In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress." It cites the Obama administration's core goals on the war in Afghanistan and major constraints on U.S. military efforts in the country. It also examines current debates on U.S.-Afghanistan policy and the major issues that may be of interest to the U.S. Congress as it considers the strength and duration of U.S. involvement to 2014 and beyond.

The article presents several reports from U.S. presidents directed to Congress that are consisted with the War Powers Resolution. It notes that 132 reports from then President Gerald Ford to incumbent President Barack Obama have been submitted to Congress. A January 22, 2004 report concerns the deployment of combat personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of stabilization and peacekeeping measures. A December 15, 2010 report involves the deployment of combat troops in Afghanistan.

The article highlights the U.S. Congressional debates about the next steps of the government in the Afghanistan war. It outlines the evolution of U.S. troop requirements driven by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) campaign. Several questions are proposed to help inform the debates about the next steps for U.S. troop levels. It discusses the evolution of the concept of transition and change of mission for the U.S.

The article presents a report that discusses the key topics in the agenda of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit to be held in Chicago on May 20-21, 2014 and also the issues the U.S. congress is determined to raise. The topics discussed include NATO commitment to Afghanistan after the planned end of its combat operations by end of 2014, building of military capabilities necessary to meet NATO's defense and security goals, and partnerships of NATO with non-NATO member states.

The article focuses on the report titled ""Surge Recovery" and Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan: In Brief" released by the U.S. Congress policy maker Congressional Research Service (CRS) as of January 6, 2012. It mentions about the interst of the U.S. Congress in surge recovery, related to removal of U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan. It adds the national security interests of the U.S. in Afghanistan and economic conditions that need to pertain in Afghanistan with less foreign support.

The article discusses congressional concerns facing the U.S. intelligence community. It highlights the collection capabilities of intelligence agencies that gather quantities of information on a daily basis. It cites the congressional concerns regarding major technical systems especially reconnaissance satellites. It offers information on the intelligence community and Iraq and Afghanistan and also discusses international terrorism.

The article discusses the U.S. Congressional concerns in terms of collection capabilities, analytical quality, and the intelligence community and Iraq and Afghanistan. It states that there are also Congressional concerns regarding reconnaissance satellites. The intelligence community was criticized for its performance regarding to the aftermath of victory of the Operation Iraqi Freedom and the fall of the Saddam Hussein's regime.

The article discusses issues related to the war in Afghanistan of interest to the U.S. Congress. One issue cited is a reconciliation process under which individuals seeking to rejoin the Afghan society must renounce the al Qaeda group and violence as well as accept the Constitution. An area within the Afghan National Security Forces that Congress can consider is the future requirement for security forces of the Afghan government. The importance of a viable economic strategy for Afghanistan to the success of the counterinsurgency campaign is also cited.

The article presents the U.S. Congressional Research Service report "The Department of Defense's Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress," prepared on February 21, 2011. The report examines current private security contractor (PSC) trends in Afghanistan and Iraq and the impact of using PSC personnel on military operations. It includes a summary, historical background of PSC use and options for legislative action by Congress.

The article discusses the legislation on the establishment of free-mail-to-troops postage benefit. Introduced in the 109th Congress were H.R. 932 or the Mailing Support to Troops Act of 2005 and H.R. 2874 or the Supply Our Soldiers act of 2005. It mentions that in the 110th Congress H.R. 1439 was introduced in March 2007 for establishing free postage benefits to troops in Afghanistan or Iraq, the S. 1444 was introduced in June 2007 and H.R. 1585 was passed on May 2007. It also notes H.R. 704 in the 111th Congress as well as H.R. 707.

The article focuses on the report issued by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), a public policy research arm of the U.S. Congress on the political performance of Afghanistan as of January 13, 2011. Topics include elections in Afghan, electoral reformation and women's right. Also mentions an overview on the presidential elections in 2009 and 2010.

The article focuses on the report issued by the Congressional Research Service, a public policy research arm of the U.S. Congress on the post-Taliban governance in Afghanistan as of January 26, 2011. Topics include social and economic statistic of Afghanistan, efforts made by the U.S. during Taliban rule against islamism militant Al Qaeda and political issues of Afghanistan. Also mentions an overview on human rights and democracy in Afghanistan.

The article focuses on the report issued by the Congressional Research Service, a public policy research arm of the U.S. Congress on the casualties of military forces and civilians of Afghanistan as of January 14, 2011. Topics include statistics on casualties during operation enduring freedom in Afghanistan, casualty data of the U.S. military force on wounded military personnel and reports on casualty data of Afghan civilians. Also mentions the casualty figures of Afghan soldiers and police.

The limited capacity and widespread corruption of all levels of Afghan governance are growing factors in debate over the effectiveness of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, as expressed in an Administration assessment of policy released December 16, 2010. A competent, respected, and effective Afghan government is considered a major prerequisite for a transition to Afghan lead that is to take place by 2014, a timeframe agreed by the United States, its international partners, and the Afghan government. Afghan governing capacity has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but there is a broad view the Afghan government is ineffective, with many positions unfilled or filled by weak leaders, and that President Hamid Karzai has not moved decisively to reduce corruption. Karzai has agreed to cooperate with U.S.-led efforts to build the capacity of several emerging anti-corruption institutions, but these same institutions have sometimes caused a Karzai backlash when they have targeted his allies or relatives. Some of the effects of corruption burst into public view in August 2010 when major losses were announced by the large Kabul Bank, in part due to large loans to major shareholders, many of whom are close to Karzai. Some in Congress have sought to link further U.S. aid to clearer progress on the corruption issue. Purportedly suspicious that U.S. and other donors are trying to undermine his leadership, Karzai has strengthened his bonds to ethnic and political faction leaders who undermine rule of law and are often involved in illicit economic activity. These alliances, although a consistent feature of Afghan politics long predating the thirty year period of instability there, compound continuing international concerns about Afghan democracy and political transparency. In the August 20, 2009, presidential election, there were widespread charges of fraud, many substantiated by an Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). The ECC invalidated nearly one-third of President Karzai's votes, although Karzai's main challenger dropped out of a runoff and Karzai was declared the winner. He subsequently faced opposition to many of his cabinet nominees by the elected lower house of parliament, and seven permanent ministerial posts remain unfilled. Many of the flaws that plagued the 2009 election recurred in the parliamentary elections held September 18, 2010. The alleged fraud is purportedly being addressed more openly and transparently by Afghan election bodies, but Karzai and his allies appear to be trying to use their institutional powers to alter the results in their favor, provoking a degree of political crisis. Electoral competition aside, there is growing ethnic and political fragmentation over the terms of a potential settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. Some leaders of minority communities boycotted a June 2-4, 2010, "consultative peace jirga (assembly)" in Kabul that endorsed Karzai's plan to reintegrate into society insurgents willing to end their fight against the government. However, Karzai has named a senior Tajik leader as chair of the 68-member High Peace Council that is to approve any settlement, if one is reached. Women, who have made substantial gains (including appointment to cabinet posts and governorships and election to parliament) fear their rights may be eroded under any "deal" that might erode legal protections for women. For more information, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues, by Rhoda Margesson; and CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents report titled "The Department of Defense's Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress" by the U.S. Congressional Research Service as of June 22, 2010. Topics discussed include trends of private security contractor (PSC) in Iraq and Afghanistan, steps taken by the U.S. Department of Defense to improve oversight and management and the role of the U.S. Congress over the use of PSCs.

This report examines Department of Defense (DOD) logistical support contracts for troop support services in Iraq and Afghanistan administered through the U.S. Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), as well as legislative initiatives which may impact the oversight and management of logistical support contracts for the delivery of troop support services. LOGCAP is an initiative designed to manage the use of civilian contractors that perform services during times of war and other military mobilizations. On April 18, 2008, DOD announced the Army's LOGCAP IV contract awards to three companies-DynCorp International LLC, Fort Worth, TX; Fluor Intercontinental, Inc, Greenville, SC; and KBR, Houston, TX, through a full and open competition. The LOGCAP IV contract calls for each company to compete for task orders. Each company may be awarded up to $5 billion annually for troop support services with a maximum annual value of $15 billion. As of March 2010, each company has been awarded at least one task order under LOGCAP IV. Over the life of LOGCAP IV, the maximum contract value is $150 billion. The U.S. Army Sustainment Command awarded the first performance task order on September 25, 2008, to Fluor Intercontinental, Inc., for logistical support services in Afghanistan. LOGCAP, an Army program designed to manage civilian contractors, is now in transition. The current LOGCAP III contractor supports the drawdown in Iraq by providing logistical services, theater transportation, augmentation of maintenance services, and other combat support services. According to Army contracting officials, all LOGCAP requirements in Kuwait have successfully transitioned from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV contracts. The transition of requirements is continuing from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV contracts, and will be used for combat support services in Afghanistan. Twelve tasks orders have been awarded under LOGCAP IV, and a total of $1.8 billion has been obligated under LOGCAP IV contracts. Congress is concerned about the federal oversight and management of DOD contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly under programs like LOGCAP. Recent assessments from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), DOD Office of the Inspector General (DOD-IG), the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and the Defense Contract Audit Agency reveal a lack of accountability for large sums of money spent for Iraq contracts. According to the congressional testimony of Charles Williams, director of the Defense Contract Management Agency, there are more than 600 oversight positions still vacant in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress is also concerned about the size of contractor insurance premiums through the Defense Base Act (DBA); such premiums comprise significant costs under LOGCAP. The DBA requires that many federal government contractors and subcontractors provide workers' compensation insurance for their employees who work outside of the United States. The U.S. Army's LOGCAP contract covers costs for DBA insurance and includes significant overheard and other costs beyond the costs of the actual insurance claims. In March 2009, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) appointed a Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform to conduct a systematic review of the defense acquisition system. On March 23, 2010, the panel issued its final report, and provided the HASC its findings and recommendations. Largely as a result of the panel's work, H.R. 5013, the Implementing Management for Performance and Related Reforms to Obtain Value in Every Acquisition Act (IMPROVE) of 2010, was introduced on April 14, 2010. The bill seeks to improve the management and oversight of DOD's procurement of goods and services. The bill was amended by the HASC on April 21, 2010, discharged by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on April 23, 2010, and reported favorably in a HASC vote of 56-0. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the report "War Bonds in the Second World War: A Model for a New Iraq/Afghanistan War Bond?" by the U.S. Congressional Research Service as of March 1, 2010. Topics discussed include the legislative bills introduced by the U.S. Congress for issuance of wars bonds in Iraq and Afghanistan, the impacts of economic and financial market conditions during the Second World War and the role of the federal government to control treasury securities.

With a deteriorating security situation and no comprehensive political outcome yet in sight, most observers view the war in Afghanistan as open-ended. By early 2009, a growing number of Members of Congress, Administration officials, and outside experts had concluded that the effort-often called "America's other war"-required greater national attention. For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the war is both a struggle for survival and an effort to establish sustainable security and stability. For the United States, the war in Afghanistan concerns the security of Afghanistan and the region, including denying safe haven to terrorists and helping ensure a stable regional security balance. For regional states, including India and Russia as well as Afghanistan's neighbors Pakistan and Iran, the war may have a powerful impact on the future balance of power and influence in the region. For individual members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the war may be about defeating terrorist networks, ensuring regional stability, proving themselves as contributing NATO members, and/or demonstrating NATO's relevance in the 21st century. Since 2001, the character of the war in Afghanistan has evolved from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency (COIN) effort. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda's use of the territory of Afghanistan as a base of operations for terrorist activities. In that first phase, U.S. and coalition forces, working with Afghan opposition forces, quickly removed the Taliban regime. After the fall of the Taliban, the character of the war shifted to a multifaceted COIN effort aimed at smothering the diffuse insurgency by shoring up GIRoA efforts to provide security, governance, and economic development. The three areas are generally viewed as interdependent and mutually-reinforcing-security is a prerequisite for some governance and development efforts, and longer-term, sustainable security requires both functional governance and economic opportunity. As one pillar of the COIN campaign in Afghanistan, the Afghan and international military effort aims broadly at defeating the remnants of the Taliban and other insurgents, securing the population, and helping extend the reach of the Afghan government. The international military effort includes both the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to which the United States contributes troops, and the separate U.S.-led OEF mission. The U.S. government faces key strategic and operational decisions about its further engagement in the war in Afghanistan. These may include clarifying U.S. national interests in Afghanistan and the region; defining clear strategic objectives based on those interests; determining which diplomatic, economic, and military approaches to adopt, and what resources to commit to support those approaches; prioritizing "Afghanistan" versus other national security imperatives; and helping marshal a coordinated application of international efforts. Avenues available to Congress for exercising oversight include authorizing and appropriating funding for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and the region; shaping policy through directive legislation; holding oversight hearings to assess policy execution; and adjusting Administration reporting requirements. This report provides analysis of current developments and future options concerning the war in Afghanistan. It will be updated as events warrant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States is relying on contractors to provide a wide variety of services in Iraq and Afghanistan, including security. Private firms known as Private Security Contractors (PSCs) are hired to protect individuals, transport convoys, forward operating bases, buildings, and other economic infrastructure, as well as train security forces. While DOD has previously contracted for security in Bosnia and elsewhere, it appears that in Iraq and Afghanistan DOD is for the first time relying so heavily on armed contractors to provide security during combat or stability operations. As of June 2009, there were over 18,000 armed private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent contracting trends indicate that the number of such contractors may continue to increase. Many analysts and government officials believe that DOD would be unable to execute its mission without PSCs. Nonetheless, the use of armed contractors has raised a number of issues for Congress, including concerns over transparency and accountability. Much of the attention given to PSCs by Congress and the media is a result of numerous high-profile incidents where security contractors were accused of shooting civilians, using excessive force, being insensitive to local customs or beliefs, or otherwise behaving inappropriately. These actions may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some analysts and DOD officials believe that poor contractor oversight significantly contributed to contractor abuses. As a result, Congress has also focused on whether DOD is effectively managing PSCs and whether improved contractor oversight could have prevented or minimized the impact of these incidents. DOD officials have stated that the military's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with Congressional attention and legislation, has focused DOD's attention on the importance of managing PSCs. DOD has taken steps to improve how it manages and oversees such contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. These steps include tracking contracting data, coordinating the movements of PSCs throughout the battle space, issuing new policy on managing PSCs, and updating DOD doctrine to incorporate the role of contractors. However, these efforts are still in progress and could take three years or more to effectively implement. This report examines current private security contractor trends in Iraq and Afghanistan, steps DOD has taken to improve oversight and management, and the extent to which DOD has incorporated the role of security contractors into its doctrine and strategy. It also reviews steps Congress has taken to exercise oversight over the use of PSCs and includes options for Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a report related to the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Act of the U.S. Congress, concerning standards for the treatment of detainees, released by the U.S. Congressional Research Service as of January 23, 2009. Topics discussed include controversy related to the U.S. treatment of enemy combatants and terrorist suspects captured in Afghanistan and application of the DTA by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2006 version of the Army Field Manual.

The article discusses the report "NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance" by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), as of October 2008. Topics include the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on political stability of Afghanistan, the role of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to rebuild the Afghan economy and a plan of the U.S. Congress for the ISAF.

The article focuses on a report released by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CSR) for the U.S. Congress as of August 28, 2008 on government formation and its performance in Afghanistan. Topics discussed include funding by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the establishment of democracy and to assist elections in Afghanistan, poor human rights records of the country and political reform in the country under the poor leadership of its President Hamid Karzai.

The article discusses a report on the narcotics trade in Afghanistan and the policy of U.S. toward combating narcotics trade, poppy eradication and alternative livelihoods. It provides information on the statistical information, profiles of the participants in the narcotics trade, and narco-terrorist linkages. Also discussed are the roles of U.S. military in counternarcotics efforts, funding issues for the U.S. Congress, and the association between narcotics trade and national security threats.

The article focuses on the emergency supplemental request to U.S. Congress for international affairs in Iraq and Afghanistan during the fiscal year (FY) 2008. Topics discussed include the $6.897 billion of the total emergency supplemental request for international affairs spending, the supplemental funds under the administration of former President George W. Bush, and the appropriation cycle.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, CRS estimates that the Administration has allocated a total of about $361 billion for military operations, reconstruction, embassy costs, and various foreign aid programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for enhanced security at defense bases. This total includes $50 billion in "bridge" funding for the Department of Defense (DOD) provided in H.J.Res. 68 /P.L.109-77, a FY2006 Continuing Resolution, which was signed by the President on September 30, 2005. More funds will be needed by DOD to cover the rest of the year. That total includes some $330 billion for DOD and $31 billion for foreign aid programs and embassy operations. If the bridge funds are split in a fashion similar to FY2005, funding would total about $255 billion for Iraq, about $83 billion for Afghanistan, and $24 billion for base security. Iraq's total is split between $230 billion for DOD and $25 billion for foreign operations. Afghanistan's total includes $77 billion for DOD and $6 billion for foreign operations. All base security funds go to DOD. Based on a CBO estimate that assumes a gradual drawdown in U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan between FY2006 and FY2010, war-related costs could total about $570 billion by the end of 2010. DOD's current monthly average spending rate is about $6 billion for Iraq, $1 billion for Afghanistan and $170 million for enhanced base security for the first nine months of FY2005. Compared to FY2004, those averages are 19% higher for Iraq, 8% lower for Afghanistan, and 47% lower for base security. The Department of Defense has not provided an overall reckoning of these funds by mission or military operation. Gaps in the figures raise questions such as whether DOD transferred $7 billion or $14 billion from peacetime funds to meet higher than expected wartime costs. DOD also used $2.5 billion from prior year monies to prepare for the Iraq war before passage of the joint resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq in October 2002. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) also found that DOD had lost visibility on over $7 billion provided for the global war on terrorism. In this regard, Congress faces two issues -- how to get a transparent accounting by mission of all previously appropriated funds by adjusting current reporting, and how to ensure accurate accounting in the future by requiring that DOD budget and segregate warrelated spending. Congress provided about $100 billion to cover DOD's FY2005 costs -- about $35 billion more than in the previous year -- in two bills, including $25 billion in bridge funds and $75 billion in the FY2005 war supplemental for the rest of the fiscal year. In FY206, the full amount of war-related funding for FY2006 will depend on not only the $50 billion in bridge funding but also the amount provided in FY2006 appropriations and a FY2006 supplemental. This report will be updated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Afghanistan has taken the first step toward reconstruction. According to many observers, the most serious challenge facing Afghans and Afghanistan today remains the lack of security. Most experts agree on the need for substantial, long-term reconstruction with international support, but questions are raised about the funds required, the priorities, and the coordination necessary for this process. This report examines U.S. foreign aid to Afghanistan in the context of the international effort and explores the major issues for Congress. As a result of decades of violent conflict, Afghanistan is in great need of substantial reconstruction, from roads and schools to a broad range of development projects encompassing the whole country. Decades of civil war and proxy regional wars have created four intertwining and competing economies in Afghanistan revolving around war, drugs, agriculture, and humanitarian aid that drive conflicting incentives for Afghans and their neighbors. Effective reconstruction assistance could reconfigure these economies and provide incentives for viable economic growth. The international recovery and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan is immense and complicated, with the Afghan government, numerous U.N. agencies, bilateral donors, many international organizations, and countless non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working to help Afghanistan. The international community and the Afghan government have sought to establish coordinating institutions and a common set of goals in order to utilize donor funds most effectively. Officially, international assistance is coordinated through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), though there are other coordinating institutions tied to the Afghan government. Donor countries have committed $1.7 billion and, from that, disbursed $1.5 billion. Key areas of concern include whether the funding levels to Afghanistan are adequate and how much is being used for reconstruction. Some have argued that the majority of FY2002 funds-as much as 70%-went towards humanitarian aid. The next major donor conference for Afghanistan will take place in March 2003. Some of the major reconstruction programs are government capacity building, women's programs, employment generation, road construction, agricultural rehabilitation, urban reconstruction, energy, education, health, communications, and media. There is concern about creating enough momentum behind reconstruction initiatives in the short term and sustaining international focus on Afghanistan in the long term, particularly in light of a possible war in Iraq. This report will be updated as events warrant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake before the U.S. Congress on the foreign relations of Uzbekistan. It offers information on the assistance in the construction of a rail system and provision of electricity in Afghanistan. It discusses the offer of increased investments by the U.S. with the condition that Uzbekistan eliminate forced labor, reduce religious restrictions and corruption.

The article presents options for the U.S. Congress in its assessment whether legislative action could help minimize the perceived harm that armed private security contractors (PSC) could have on U.S. efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and future operations. It stresses the importance of defining the role of PSCs in supporting military operations. Options include prohibiting armed security contractors from being deployed in combat zones, restricting armed security contractors to static security, and using PSCs only in a supporting role for mobile security.