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The article discusses Afghanistan as the world's leading opium producer. The author states that although Afghanistan produces ninety percent of the world's opium, the poppy cultivation trade does not seem to have translated into economic power for the nation. Topics include opium wars, political instability, the connection between war and drug production, and the dependence of the Afghan economy on drug production. The Taliban and Mujaheddin groups are mentioned.

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The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the US Government make extensive use of remote sensing to quantify and monitor trends in Afghanistan’s illicit opium production. Cultivation figures from their independent annual surveys can vary because of systematic differences in survey methodologies relating to spectral stratification and the addition of a pixel buffer to the agricultural area. We investigated the effect of stratification and buffering on area estimates of opium poppy using SPOT5 imagery covering the main opium cultivation area of Helmand province and sample data of poppy fields interpreted from very high resolution satellite imagery. The effect of resolution was investigated by resampling the original 10 m pixels to 20, 30, and 60 m, representing the range of available imagery. The number of strata (1, 4, 8, 13, 23, 40) and sample fraction (0.2–2%) used in the estimate were also investigated. Stratification reduced the confidence interval by improving the precision of estimates. Cultivation estimates of poppy using 40 spectral strata and a sample fraction of 1.1% had a similar precision to direct expansion estimates using a 2% sample fraction. Stratified estimates were more robust to changes in sample size and distribution. The mapping of the agricultural area had a significant effect on poppy cultivation estimates in Afghanistan, where the area of total agricultural production can vary significantly between years. The findings of this research explain differences in cultivation figures of the opium monitoring programmes in Afghanistan and recommendations can be applied to improve resource monitoring in other geographic areas. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Opium is the raw material for the production of heroin, and the characterization of opium seizures through laboratory analysis is a valuable tool for law enforcement agencies to trace clandestine opium production and trafficking. In this work, a method for opium profiling based on the relative content of five principal and 14 minor opium alkaloids was developed and validated. UPLC‐Q‐TOF was adopted in alkaloid analysis for its high selectivity and sensitivity, which facilitated the sample preparation and testing. The authentic sample set consisted of 100 “Myanmar” and 45 “Afghanistan” opium seizures; based on the data set of the 19 alkaloid variables in them, a partial least squares discriminant analysis classification model was successfully achieved. Minor alkaloids were found to be vitally important for opium profiling, although combined use of both principal and minor alkaloids resulted in the best geographical classification result. The developed method realized a simple and accurate way to differentiate opium from Myanmar and Afghanistan, which may find wide application in forensic laboratories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the process leading to the Afghan government's decision to implement a prohibition and eradication of opium in the northeastern province of Badakhshan. It explores why Daud chose Badakhshan, the impact of the opium ban on the people of Badakhshan and the future of opium production and trade, as well as the evolution of drug control in Afghanistan under the Musahiban dynasty. Ultimately, the ban was launched because it allowed Daud to garner international praise and financial support, while enforcing eradication in an area inhabited by ethnic minorities ensured that the Afghan government's coercive strategy would not generate resistance from rural Pashtun tribes historically opposed to these types of state intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Yearly estimates of illicit opium production are key metrics for assessing the effectiveness of the counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan. Poor security often prevents access to sample locations and puts pressure on field surveyors, resulting in biased sampling and errors in data recording. Supportive methods using aerial digital photography for improving yield estimates were investigated in the UK in 2004, 2005, and 2010. There were good empirical relationships between normalized difference vegetation index and poppy yield indicators (mature capsule volume and dry capsule yield) for individual fields. The results suggested a good generalized relationship across all sampled fields and years (R2 > 0.70) during the 3–4 week period including poppy flowering. Regression estimates using this relationship with the imagery counteracted bias in the sample estimate of yield, reduced sample error, and enabled the production of detailed maps showing the poppy yield distribution. The application of this approach using very-high-resolution satellite imagery was investigated in the context of the annual opium survey in Afghanistan. Initial results indicated the potential for bias correction of yield estimates using a smaller and targeted collection of ground observations as an alternative to random sampling. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

I develop a framework for assessing economic warfare, which describes efforts to undermine adversaries' sources of income. The ability to target adversarial market participants is a primary determinant of the success of such efforts, as is the elasticity of demand in the relevant market. An application of the framework to US efforts to suppress the Afghan opium trade yields pessimistic results. Inelastic demand and poorly targeted enforcement have led these efforts to increase the drug trade resources flowing toward the Taliban. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary terrorist movements in Afghanistan are frequently alleged to be fueled, in part, by the country's voluminous opium trade. Experts argue that terrorist groups currently active in Afghanistan, like the Afghan Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizbul Islami, and various al-Qaeda affiliates, use drug trade profits to recruit and pay cadres, acquire weapons and equipment, and bribe officials while becoming more powerful, and deadly, in the process. This study empirically examines the relationship between the opium trade and terrorism in Afghanistan by conducting a series of negative binomial regression estimations on terrorist attacks and casualties in the 34 Afghan provinces for the period 1996 to 2008. The analysis also considers various economic development, infrastructure, geographic, security, and cultural factors when examining causes of terrorism in the provinces. The study determines that, across all model specifications, provinces that produce more opium feature higher levels of terrorist attacks and casualties due to terrorism, and that opium production is a more robust predictor of terrorism than nearly all other province features. Furthermore, tests indicate that the direction of causation runs from opium production to higher rates of terrorism, not otherwise. The study concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications of the findings. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper compares two of history's largest producers of opium - Afghanistan (2000-11) and China (1917-35) - to suggest that in both cases production was facilitated by: (1) A lack of central control over the national territory; (2) The existence of local power-holders; (3) Internal violent conflict; (4) The existence of a significant domestic opium consuming population. The initial analysis is extended by introducing a successful opium production suppression intervention, The People's Republic of China (1950s/1960s), to suggest that the control of opium in contemporary Afghanistan requires the Government to: (1) Extend the state into isolated and hostile areas; (2) Facilitate a sense of self-interest in the Afghan Government and political elite towards opium suppression; (3) Facilitate a perception that suppression benefits opium farmers; (4) Strengthen the capacity to monitor opium farmers and enforce the law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Risk is a reality that has to be managed by households in rural Afghanistan. Some communities are more likely than others to experience risks and at the same time are the least likely to adapt and recover from the adverse outcomes when they arise. In rural Nangarhar many of the communities most likely to experience natural risks, as well as risks resulting from human activity, are also those who have been the most reliant on opium production. The impact of a comprehensive opium ban across the province for the third consecutive year has hit those communities who are most vulnerable to repeated and concurrent risks the hardest. Where these risks are compounded by the economic costs of illness, injury or death, or other life events such as marriage, households are left increasingly destitute, creating the conditions that foster further economic and political instability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prohibition attempts have failed for over a century, as the case of Afghanistan shows. There are many and complex reasons for this. Illicit opium production has benefited from synergies between war economies and drug economies, in Afghanistan and elsewhere. It has also thrived on economic underdevelopment and poverty. Part of the problem is that illicit opium production largely outlives war and that economic development can only occur in countries and regions where peace prevails. What is needed to reduce poppy cultivation is broad and equitable economic development. Ignoring the causes of opium production or making them worse by increasing poverty through forced eradication, will compromise antidrug policies and stabilisation efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the focus of the U.S. to reduce the flow of drug profits to insurgent groups in Afghanistan. It analyzes the U.S. military's targeting of the drug traffickers, the opium plants, and processing laboratories. It discusses the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and shows that the targeting represents a troubling policy decision for the U.S. It concludes that problems exist when narcotics traffickers take part in hostilities, difficulties exist when narcotics related items are valid military objectives and that targeting of the opium trade may be an unwise policy.

The Taliban of today bears little resemblance to the original Taliban of the 1990s. Everyone from fighters loyal to various warlords to criminals involved in kidnapping and racketeering label themselves Taliban. This makes sorting out exactly who is who a difficult task. Nevertheless, one thing is abundantly clear: the active participation of the Taliban has aided and abetted opium cultivation on a scale unmatched by anything Afghanistan has seen in the past. Papaver soniferum, or poppy, is the lifeblood of the Taliban insurgency. Once the Taliban's financial arteries linked to the poppy are cut off, the insurgency will experience a major organizational blow, unless it morphs into an entirely new animal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the increasing post-Taliban opium in Afghanistan. It discusses the actions taken by the U.S. and British government to counter the Afghan opium. It mentions that in 2005, the U.S. Congress allotted over 300 million dollars for poppy eradication however, it failed. The effect of the Afghan opium trade to the country's economy and social condition is discussed. An overview of the Senlis approach to eradicate opium crops in Afghanistan is also presented.

The article focuses on the complexity of the political and military situation in Afghanistan. The author discusses the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan since 2001, comments on the relationship between various political, ethnic and militant groups including the Pashtun tribes, the Taliban and the foreign-supported government of President Hamid Karzai. He also addresses the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the influence of the opium trade in Afghanistan.

Recent estimates suggest that in 2007, Afghan opiate production accounted for about 93 percent of the world's total. This article presents a framework for estimating the potential for source country drug control policies to reduce this production. It contains a first pass at estimating the potential for policy to shift the supply of opium upward, as well as a range of supply and demand elasticities. The estimates suggest that meager reductions in production can be expected through alternative development programs alone (reductions are less than 6.5 percent in all but one of the specifications presented). They also suggest that substantial increases in crop eradication would be needed to achieve even moderate reductions in production (reductions range from 3.0 percent to 19.4 percent for various specifications). The results also imply that, all else being equal, the cessation of crop eradication would result in only modest increases in opiate production (with estimates ranging from 1.6 percent to 9.6 percent). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Development Studies is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on Afghanistan's opium industry and how the economic growth of Afghanistan depends on this illegal growth of opium poppy. The parliamentary elections of September 2005 has made significant changes in Afghanistan's political scenario. However the drug-based economy generating 2.8 billion dollars annually makes three million Afghans dependent on poppy cultivation. Reforming the poppy industry can help Afghan economy in stepping towards stability and democracy.

This article presents a speech by journalist Ahmed Rashid presented to the Royal Society for Asian Affairs on September 7, 2005. He discusses the political progress Afghanistan since the collapse of the Taliban regime, the increase in the opium production, the ethnic divisions and the implementation of an international commitment to reconstruction.

The article focuses on the problem of heroin trafficking from Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of opium and the center of the transnational opium trade across the entire region consisting of Pakistan and Iran. It states that wartime destruction of the country's agricultural infrastructure forced the countrymen to thrive on the heroin trade. It describes the role of Taliban in Afghanistan's opium trade and discusses the difficulties that are being faced by the U.S. to establish any kind of viable democracy in Afghanistan and to establish effective control over the country's production for the global heroin economy.

Opium has been cultivated in Afghanistan since 1100 A.D., although production has steadily increased since 1979. Currently, Afghanistan produces three-quarters of the global opium supply, with injection drug use and HIV currently following the opium trade route through Central Asia. Although systematic studies are lacking, heroin use appears to be on the rise in Afghanistan. The purpose of this paper is to briefly provide historical background and current statistics for drug production and use in Afghanistan, to discuss the new government's policies towards problem drug use and available rehabilitation programs, and to assess Afghan harm reduction needs with consideration of regional trends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within a highly volatile socio-economic, political and legal environment, opium poppy has become an integral part of livelihood strategies in many rural communities in Afghanistan. Over the past decade Afghanistan has become the world's leading producer of opium. The easy availability of both opium and heroin, as well as a wide range of pharmaceutical drugs, coupled with an impoverished population traumatized by 20 years of war and conflict, has led to an increase in drug problems both in Afghanistan and refugee communities in neighbouring countries. This overview of the supply of, and demand for, drugs in Afghanistan provides insights into the complexities of drug production and consumption within the broader context of development issues and objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the recent growth of the opium economy in north-eastern Afghanistan. A detailed analysis of one village in Badakshan Province reveals profound changes in the local economy and social institutions. The paper describes two major shifts in the local economy: first, the switch from wheat to poppy cultivation; and second, the shift from the livestock trade to the opium trade. It then examines the underlying causes and impacts of the opium economy on social relations in the village. Although a case study of a community living on the margins of the global economy, it is argued that these changes have important implications for international policymakers. The emergence of the opium economy in north-eastern Afghanistan is symptomatic of new and expanding forms of trans-border trade associated with the restructuring of the global political economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers observation on the drug trade in Afghanistan. The cultivation of opium and the refining of heroin in the country ultimately contribute to the drug problem in the U.S. Afghanistan began the 1990s as the world's second largest producer of opium and hashish. Though opium has a long tradition in Afghanistan as a narcotic for consumption, usage was never widespread or as socially disabling as in neighboring Iran or China. Afghan involvement in the international drug trade commenced in the 1970s when large numbers of Westerners descended on the Asian country to drop out and turn on inexpensively.

Presents a historical analysis of Afghanistan's emergence as a major opium source country and Pakistan's role as a leading processor and exporter of heroin. Statement that the aid of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the Afghan freedom fighters in the 1980s expanded opium production in the countries.