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This article applies Bakhtinian dialogism and the idea of centripetal and centrifugal forces in struggle to critical discourse studies to analyse how powerful and marginalised discourses are brought into competition in political language to justify paradigm changes. I analyse German chancellor Olaf Scholz's Zeitenwende ('watershed') speech, which he gave as a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, announcing a radical armament programme and change in foreign policy, paradigm shifts that had previously been unthinkable in German politics. Based on a qualitative analysis using the Appraisal Theory strategies Attitude and Engagement, I identify how Scholz aligns himself with particular powerful discourses, centring some and marginalising others, to construct an existential threat for Germany and a 'watershed' moment, a new situation which casts his policies of armament as without alternative. I use a dialogic approach to analyse how the speech responds to and anticipates past (already-spoken) and future (not-yet-spoken) discourses, to position itself both in terms of the immediate and the historical function of a policy statement. The paper demonstrates the strength of Bakhtinian analysis of how utterances are shaped by past and envisaged future uses of particular discourses and of dialogically contractive and expansive strategies in critical discourse studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europeans are thinking more about how to respond to transatlantic uncertainty and geopolitical insecurity. The outlines of a new landscape in continental relations are emerging. There is a clear commitment to a stronger 'European pillar' within NATO. A reset in EU–UK defence relations is under way. A new, more influential and more united European Union leadership team will boost the EU's engagement on defence and security. The turnaround will still struggle to match the United States' own step change in defence-industrial production, and is still frustratingly off pace for Ukraine's requirements. There is also a danger that fiscal and populist constraints will undermine the scale and tempo of European ambitions. Nevertheless, a course correction is belatedly under way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought war back to the European continent and led to considerable change in EU member states' foreign policies. The consequential degree of EU foreign policy unity, as well as shifts in long-lasting national and collective security and defence taboos, has represented a significant departure from past practices. We use these processes of change as a starting point to set the scene for this special issue and to inform its main research question: in what manner, if at all, has the EU come of age as a foreign and security actor during Russia's war on Ukraine? This introduction situates the main question of the special issue into the wider scholarly debates on actorness and the EU's geopolitical ambitions. It conceptually develops the analogy of "coming of age" to examine a prospective maturation process of the EU as a foreign and security actor. In doing so, it not only interrogates what the EU as a mature foreign and security actor would look like, but it also develops the framework, identifies four maturation processes and reflects on necessary caveats for drawing inferences about the state of maturation of the EU as foreign and security actor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Zeitschrift für Psychodrama und Soziometrie is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

"Never again" has been a mantra of German foreign policy since the end of World War II. Together with Ostpolitik it informs its approach toward the conflict in Ukraine. The discourse moved from "never again war originating from German soil" via justifying military interventions to prevent ethnic cleansing in the Balkans in 1998 with Joshka Fischer's injunction of "never again Auschwitz" to Olaf Scholz' programmatic 2023 speech invoking "never again war of aggression in Europe." This development is interpreted in the light of Realpolitik, providing the hard security means to defend the rule of law and democratic governance. External shocks have led Germany to expand its soft security arsenal as a civilian power and to embrace military means for liberal ends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that contemporary German environmental and energy policy has been shaped by the dominance of the Rechtsstaat—or "Legal State"—tradition. Although German authorities have articulated laudable climate goals and related hopes for greater energy independence—most recently in Chancellor Olaf Scholz's 2022 declaration of a Zeitenwende in German security and energy policy—the weakness of the developmental imperative, coupled with the power of interests central to the country's export-led growth model, have undermined the investments required for achieving these aims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine marks a turning point in European security policy. Defense concepts have been altered within Europe as well as in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Russia is no longer seen as a European partner, but a threat to security and stability in Europe. The article argues that the term Zeitenwende coined by the German chancellor is not a rhetorical figure; rather, it is reshaping Germany's approach to the East and upended German and European Ostpolitik. In fact, the new foreign policy direction sheds illusions of both the classic Ostpolitik of the Cold War and the new Ostpolitik of post-unification Germany by introducing a fundamentally different approach to Eastern and Central Eastern Europe and within NATO. The article explores the critical juncture created by the Zeitenwende of 2022 and its implications for European security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2014 and especially after 2022, the German–Ukrainian relations have developed impressive depth. With over seven billion euros in military aid spent since 2022, another seven earmarked for 2024, and a long-term security agreement signed, Germany has become an indispensable and reliable partner for Ukraine. Given the dire situation on the battlefield and the prospect of a long and difficult war ahead, several factors impede the potential strategic relationship. If not addressed, those could prove a problem for the otherwise strong German support for and partnership with Ukraine. They include improper communication on the German side, especially from the chancellor who is not properly making the case to his electorate more broadly as to why Ukraine aid is in Germany's interest. While Germany has changed course and only after Russia openly invaded Ukraine, it has failed to critically examine its failed Russia policy and underinvested in addressing what scholars refer to as the country's "Ukraine-ignorance". Additionally, the cautious and fear-driven logic of German decision-making and a lingering distrust of the Ukrainian side impede the provision of much-needed weaponry and influence the bilateral relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin had hoped that Germany would stay militarily neutral, counting on Germany's politicians, who had previously expressed understanding for Russia's belligerent actions. Putin did not expect a tectonic change in Germany's foreign and defense policy initiated by the government of Olaf Scholz in response to his war on Ukraine (Zeitenwende). Meanwhile, the Kremlin borrows directly from Nazism in the theoretical justification of its actions, especially from two German scholars: Carl Schmitt and Karl Haushofer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is an introduction to the Zeitenwende discussion regarding Chancellor Olaf Scholz's announcement of a turning point of German foreign policy in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. After explaining the concept, the text reviews the prior tradition of a "civilian power" and explores the military and economic dimensions of Berlin's "policy reversal." The article then probes the conflicted "public responses" and discusses the "implementation problems" in order to assess the efficacy of the change of course. The evaluation concludes with some comments on the "future prospects" of Germany's role in what has turned into a lengthy war of attrition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022 has created a sense of urgency across Europe and thus pushed forward significant changes and readjustments of foreign, security, and defense policies. These major shifts have been referred to as Zeitenwende by the German chancellor Olaf Scholz, the turning point not only for Germany but for the whole European security architecture. Western Balkans is increasingly stated as an area of strategic importance for the European (Euro-Atlantic) security community, whereby it is the geopolitical interest of the both the EU and NATO to have the Western Balkans integrated. This is one of the regions where the interests of the West and Russian Federation collide - this factor adds to the already complex security dynamics resulting from domestic, bilateral, and regional issues that affect regional security and stability. Hence, one characteristic of the regional political and security dynamics is the long-term presence of external actors. This paper explores the effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the Western Balkans' political and security dynamics from the perspective of Regional Security Complex Theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of SIRIUS - Zeitschrift fur Strategische Analysen is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of SIRIUS - Zeitschrift fur Strategische Analysen is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This review paper aims to comprehensively analyze Germany-Ukraine relations in the context of Ukraine's pursuit of NATO and EU membership amidst the ongoing conflict. It focuses on Germany's shift from a pro-Russia stance to actively supporting Ukraine's NATO and EU aspirations. While tensions persist between the two countries, Germany has become a crucial ally, aiding Ukraine in repelling the Russian invasion and strengthening its Western ties. The article explores the factors driving these contradictions and highlights Germany's policy reevaluation in response to Russia's actions in Ukraine, including implications for Ukraine's NATO aspirations. It delves into Ukraine's historical path towards NATO and EU integration, critically assessing the Normandy format and Minsk agreements in the evolving German-Ukraine relationship. The article also examines how the war has transformed Germany's National Security System, as seen in Scholz's Zeitenwende speech. Ultimately, it underscores the importance of Ukraine's NATO and EU membership for its democratic future and security. The analysis of Germany and Ukraine's relationships regarding NATO membership and EU integration is made until September 2023. The goal of the article is to provide a comprehensive overview of the evolution of German-Ukraine relationships during the Russo-Ukrainian war, highlighting turning points from tensions to strong support while analyzing Ukraine's path to membership in NATO and the EU. To reveal this, we employed descriptive research methods commonly used by political scientists and economists, examining historical events, policy documents, and official statements to provide a nuanced understanding of this evolving relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the article is to describe the evolution of Germany's policy towards the People's Republic of China in the conditions of the emerging new international order. The text is divided into several parts. The first one characterized the main features of the emerging international order, which is moving from the stage of unipolarity to multipolarity. Its two main links are the United States and the growing China, the third - with less potential - is Russia. These changes require adjustment actions from the European Union and Germany, especially in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Then, the outline of Sino-German relations in the previous decades was described. The next part includes the most important program documents of the German authorities and economic institutions on policy towards China, as well as German diplomatic activity in relations with Beijing. The last part contains a summary and conclusions. The article uses the method of examining documents and studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The subject of this paper is to characterise the German term Zeitenwende as a “turning point in history”, which culminated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the first German national security strategy. The paper examines if and how the global Zeitenwende changed German security and defence policy through four variables: a strategic environment, the character of security policy, perceived threats, and responses. This change is examined through the use of the concept of change in international relations and methods of historical and content analysis, as well as comparative methods. The structured interview is also used for the collection of relevant data. The paper concludes that, on the one hand, the Zeitenwende proves German transatlantic and multilateral security policy identity and interests, such as a greater and more accepted influence within NATO, holding the European division line and Russian geopolitical interests away from German borders, and spreading the European security order as wide as possible. On the other side, it contributes to the further evolution of German security policy by releasing it from residual Second World War constraints. Finally, the Zeitenwende involves Germany more strongly in a global systemic rivalry, making it less dependent on other “poles” of world order and with a priority given to competing with challengers rather than changing them from within.

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Copyright of Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines statements on church policy by leading representatives of the Protestant Church in Germany and the World Council of Churches in the first year of the Ukraine war (2022/23) and places them in a church-historical perspective. Ahistorical appropriations and peculiarities become clear, such as an anachronistic use of Ostpolitik, a Russia-friendly assessment and a largely secular evaluation of the situation in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During Angela Merkel's term as Chancellor, Germany did not play a leading role in the realm of security and defense; moreover, estrangement with the German government's allies based on its attitude towards Putin's Russia slowly grew. Since Russia's war against Ukraine began, the situation has changed dramatically. This article will show the different reactions of the Visegrád 4 (V4) countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) to the Zeitenwende [turning point] in Germany, focusing on Germany´s relationship with Russia, its energy security policy, defense, and support for Ukraine. The question is whether Germany is shaping the Zeitenwende into a 180° turnaround in policy or a 360° pirouette resulting in continuity of its former policies and further mutual loss of trust. Germany is unlikely to become a pre-eminent military leader but can make positive contributions if it implements the Zeitenwende and regains the trust of its eastern partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's speech at the University of Prague should be understood as Berlin's response to French President Emmanuel Macron's speech at the Sorbonne. Pointing out the Russian attack on Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has confirmed a change of era ("Zeitenwende"), has taken the opportunity to define Europe's demands towards Russia and has declared himself in favor of a true geopolitical European Union. He has defined four spaces that, according to him, they are the foundations of a new Europe in the face of geopolitical stakes: an enlarged Europe, an economically strong and stable Europe, a Europe of common security and a Europe of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The aim of the article is to provide an overview of Germany's post-Cold War policy towards Russia, especially in the context of such epoch-making political events in Ukraine as the Orange Revolution, the Russian annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, as well as the accompanying announcements of a breakthrough in German foreign and security policy under the Zeitenwende banner. Therefore, the following research hypothesis can be put forward: Russian military actions against Ukraine in 2022 appear to mark a turning point in German policy towards Russia that signifies a major divergence from the German perception of Russia as a link promoting the stability of the global environment. They also portend a potential bigger turn in German foreign policy toward assuming more responsibility for international security matters. Although Russia's image in Germany had been undergoing gradual changes in the previous years, the new phase of the conflict (since February 2022) radically accelerated this process. The monographic method was used in the preparation of the article, which allowed for discussion of the facts cited, including their cause and effect sequence, and this in turn facilitated an analysis of the key aspects of the evolution of German policy towards Russia. Content analysis method was also employed to examine program documents, statements, selected legislative acts and studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite signs that Russia was preparing an invasion of Ukraine, the newly elected German government stayed with pre-existing approaches that involved engagement and the threat of limited sanctions. However, in February 2022, just before the invasion began, Germany blocked the Nord Stream 2 pipeline system, announced weapon deliveries to Ukraine, and massively increased defense spending. This article shows that inertia and reactiveness heavily influenced the timing, nature, and extent of this massive shift in Germany's Russia policy. German leaders continued the existing policy in part because it had been formed by still influential figures and was in line with societal views. However, at the dawn of the invasion, the failure of previous policies had become undeniable, pressure from Ukraine and nato allies peaked, and societal views finally shifted. Reacting to this untenable situation, key figures in the German elite pushed through a series of measures that nato allies and Ukraine had long demanded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

German-American relations have been impacted by the war in Ukraine for reasons that have to do with domestic and foreign policy challenges. Germany is struggling with its responsibilities to increased expectations in Washington and within the European Union. The responses in Berlin to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have resulted in tensions within Europe as Germany tries to shape its policies around what Chancellor Olaf Scholz has called the Zeitenwende (turning point) of German foreign policy. The u.s. has also signaled its expectations that Germany needs to be a partner in sharing the burden of confronting Russian threats in Ukraine and Europe. Another challenge for German-American relations is emerging around relations with China, which may generate friction across the Atlantic as the United States seeks to confront China on the global stage while Germany remains tightly connected to China as its largest trade partner. How and why Germany and the United States need each other is in transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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