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Control banding (CB) strategies offer simplified solutions for controlling worker exposures to constituents found in the workplace. CB is a risk assessment and control process developed by industrial hygienists that is utilized primarily for reducing work-related chemical exposures and has become an important component for identifying and evaluating hazards in laboratories. This process qualitatively generates exposure scenarios according to a "banding" principle. Due to the inherent simplicity of the modern CB approaches, toolkits that address chemical use and exposure reduction with these principles have gained international support. Our question is whether the CB principles might also apply to occupational safety as an accident prevention approach. For safety, probably "barrier banding" (BB) is a better title. Although the development of injury prevention toolkits is a proper goal for BB, some research is necessary before a similar success can be achieved as CB. The excellent efforts of the Workgroup Occupational Risk Model (WORM) research team have generated a number of considerations for BB research. Among these are developing safety exposure limits and time-weighted exposure principles that can be derived for a more aggregated level industry like construction. Optimizing a singular approach for both work-related injury and illness prevention in industry requires a simplified and multidisciplinary strategy utilizing a common risk communication language that CB and BB might provide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Monitoring progress of accident scenarios, and effectiveness of control measures is a main goal of safety indicators. From an overview of scientific literature one may conclude that indicators do not logically relate to current safety theories and models, their relation with accident processes is far from perfect, and a 'silver bullet' has not been identified yet. Professional literature shows another picture, and divides indicators in leading and lagging. This distinction seems convincing. Not only companies, but also regulations adopted this division. Currently many indicators used in industry generate a number, while the relation with accident processes is questionable at least. In addition, it can be expected that regulators of major hazard companies will ask to identify and implement both lagging and leading indicators, and anchor these indicators in a safety management system. The subject 'safety indicators' will remain in the spotlight in the time to come. This presentation will focus on a review of scientific and professional literature. This article is written in 'praesens historicum', and based upon recent articles (Oostendorp et al., 2016, Swuste et al., 2010, 2014, 2016 a,b, 2018). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to control occupational accidents, it is crucial to have a clear view on the potential accident scenarios that are present in a company. The bow-tie method is a way to capture and visualise these accident processes in an integrative way. Included in the bow-tie are safety barriers (both technical as organisational and human) and management delivery systems that can intervene in these accident processes. Once bowties are composed, they are an excellent point of departure to assign indicators to the safety barriers and management delivery systems in order to control (i.e. prevent or mitigate) the accident scenarios. Two types of indicators can be distinguished. Firstly, there are general indicators that are linked to management delivery systems interrupting multiple accident scenarios, and which can yield a higher safety gain (as they intervene in multiple accident scenarios). Secondly, there are scenario-specific indicators targeting one specific accident scenario, and which can be valuable as they target a specific safety problem in the company. Some crucial aspects have to be taken into account when using indicators, such as sequentiality in follow-up and prioritization of indicators, and the focus on quality rather than quantity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • Dutch safety professionals have gone through major transformations. • From company safety inspectors in the 1920s, safety technicians in the 1950s. • In the 1970s safety officers are dealing with employee behaviour, and organisational aspects. • In the late 1990s safety services are privatized, and safety officers become to safety consultants. • There is a major gap between academic and professional developments in safety. Abstract The origin of occupational safety, as an area of main interest of the government, the industry, the unions, and scientists starts in the Netherlands at the end of the 19th century. Roughly in the same period occupational medicine becomes a separate domain. Only just after World War II are safety professionals organised in associations. Starting as a 'Club/werkgroep van veiligheidsinspecteurs' (Club/Working group of Company Safety Inspectors) in 1947, it changes in 1962 into the 'Nederlandse Vereniging van Veiligheidstechnici, NVVT' (Dutch Association of Safety Technicians). In 1978 there is another change into a professional association, and the 'Nederlandse Vereniging van Veiligheidskundigen, NVVK' (Dutch Association of Safety Professionals) is formed. In 1986 this association is transformed into a knowledge association, the 'Nederlandse Vereniging voor Veiligheidskunde, NVVK' (Dutch Association of Safety Science). Nowadays the NVVK is still a knowledge platform for and by safety experts in the Netherlands. The association is a network of 3000 safety experts in various disciplines and departments, and by far the biggest network of experts on working conditions in the Netherlands. The NVVK is actively involved in changes in legislation and regulations, and also represents the interests of members and safety experts in general. During these 71 years of organised safety professions, major changes in position and content have occurred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective Which general management and safety models and theories trends influenced safety management in the period between Three Mile Island in 1979 and Piper Alpha in 1988? In which context did these developments took place and how did this influence Dutch safety domain? Method The literature study was limited to original English and Dutch documents and articles in scientific and professional literature during the period studied. Results and conclusions Models and theories of human errors, explaining occupational accidents were still popular in the professional literature. A system approach was introduced into mainstream safety science, starting in process safety, and subsequently moving into occupational safety. Accidents were thought to be the result of disturbances in a dynamic system, a socio-technical system, rather than just human error. Human errors were also perceived differently: they were no longer faults of people, but consequences of suboptimal interactions during process disturbances. In this period quality of safety research increased substantially, also in the Netherlands. Major disasters in the 1980s generated knowledge on process safety, and soon process safety outplaced developments in occupational safety, which had been leading before. Theories and models in this period had advanced sufficiently to explain disasters, but were still unable to predict probabilities and scenarios of future disasters. In the 1980s ‘latent errors’ appeared in safety literature, and in The Netherlands the concept of ‘impossible accidents' appeared. Safety management was strongly influenced by developments in quality management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The 19th century and first half of the 20th century is one of those periods in history of rapid economical, technical and social changes. There is an ongoing mechanization, followed by a movement to rationalize production and to make it cost effective. This has created a heavy burden of occupational deaths amongst workers. In this period occupational safety is developing into a professional field. Engineers are enclosing hazards and fencing heights, shaping up safety technique, and writing very practical publications on occupational safety. These publications, predominantly published in the United States, are leading to quite some safety related metaphors, with the iceberg and the domino’s as the most famous ones. Sociologists, psychologists, and physicians are more concerned with questions related to accident causation, and these specialists are conducting research leading to two different safety theories. Causes of occupational accident are found either in the workers’ capacity to handle hazardous situations, or in external causes, like very long working hours, dangerous machines and the increased pressures of work and speed of production. The Pittsburgh survey, the first extended analysis of occupational accidents in a steel district, strongly advocated the environmental hypothesis, while the so-called ‘individual hypothesis’ is favored by the American Safety First Movement, starting as a private initiative in 1906 by US Steel, and later spreading out over Western European countries. The British Industrial Fatigue Board has given the individual hypothesis its scientific justification. Despite scientific criticism just after World War II on the concept of accident proneness and ‘unsafe acts’, its popularity is not fading. Even nowadays the famous metaphors are still part of the vocational training of safety experts, also in The Netherlands. Apparently professional and scientific developments in occupational safety are belonging to two separate worlds. Before World War II, The Netherlands is not a leading country in occupational safety but a follower, first of France and the German speaking countries. After World War I its focus is directed towards the Anglo-Saxon countries. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article focuses on a study about the Risk Level Based Management System (RLBMS), an occupational risk management (ORM) model related to occupational safety, hygiene, and health (OSHH) resources for hazardous procedures at work. The model categorizes the risk levels (RLs) and characterizes the risks for commonly performed activities. The RLBMS tracks the activities, increases OSHH work time and presents control measures to a RLs for a task.

Evidence of a managerial influence on occupational risk prevention is largely lacking. The incidence of major accidents in high-hazard sectors of industry does not show a downward trend. Also, the decline of fatal occupational accidents in industrialized Western countries may well be attributed to the growing employment in the relatively safe service sectors and to a phenomenon known as export of hazards. Looking more closely at accidents and disasters, we now believe they are not only caused by direct physical events, nor by human errors alone. They have their roots in organizational settings and in the sociotechnical system companies are active in. Whatever their cause, we know that (major) accidents almost always take us by surprise. Despite all our efforts and systems, we seem unable to foresee or predict these events. It seems our management systems are looking at the wrong items. Critics from small- and medium-sized enterprises also point in that direction; management systems are too bureaucratic and lack a focus on hazard and risk identification. Apparently, we fail to incorporate the main ingredients of accident causation in our management systems. This article will discuss current models and presentations. In reference to the title of this article, the possibility to integrate these presentations into management systems will be discussed. This article is based on the presentation given at the 4th International Conference on Occupational Risk Prevention, Sevilla, Spain, May 10–12, 2006. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Safety has improved spectacularly the last decades, and will continue to do so. • Scientific safety insights seem hardly a source of practical knowledge. • The inability to foresee safety related conflicts creates limits for design options. • A method is developed to assess time-dependant advancements of accident scenarios. • As a thought experiment, skip all safety laws, focus on accident processes. Ever since safety started to be investigated in a consistent manner, around 150 years ago, there has been a tremendous improvement, both in our understanding of accident processes, and in reduction of harm and damage caused by these occupational and major accidents. Major improvements in safety theories, models and metaphors were made after World War II, with the late 1970s till the late 1990s as the 'golden years'. But still these major accidents occur and they will keep prompting future scientific developments in safety, as they have done in the past. Reducing the frequency of major accidents remains challenging. Improving design and automation, as starting point for safety has its limits due to the complexity of processes and the inability to foresee all safety related conflicts. The modern emphasis to assure the capacity to handle unforeseen events, such as resilience promises to deliver, will become even more important in the future. Inherent safe design on the other hand make a sensible approach when designing production processes for emerging and future technologies, like nano- and biotechnology. Also, it will remain difficult for small and medium sized enterprises to adhere to complicated laws and regulations. In addition, an increased participation of stakeholder groups makes future safety decision-making even more challenging than it already is today. Yet we foresee that there may be grounds for change in which safety rules, laws and regulations are set aside, the bureaucratic approach towards safety is stopped and the focus is on dynamic accident processes detection. Today, methods are developed to automatically assess time-dependant advancement of accident scenarios and barrier degradation. This direction will contribute substantially to a future higher level of safety in different industrial sectors and might alleviate the emphasis on bureaucracy. We end with developments in two countries where safety and safety science is emerging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]