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This article argues that fiscal welfare in Europe not only forms part of the "hidden welfare state" (Howard,), but also constitutes an important yet understudied—and therefore hidden—element of welfare state reform. Using the example of France, and relying both on available data and on an exhaustive database of social tax expenditures (STEs) compiled for 2014, the article begins by providing an overview of the structure of STEs in France (section 2). It then analyzes the specific uses and effects of STEs in the fields of employment, health care, and pensions. In particular, it shows, first of all, how STEs have constituted a privileged instrument for circumventing certain institutional features such as high levels of minimum wage and of social security contributions in the field of employment (section 3). Second, it also shows that STEs have been used to quietly divert resources away from the earmarked social security funds and into collective private insurance funds, thus fueling their development, in the case of health care and pensions (section 4). Lastly, the article engages with the notion of the "social division of welfare" (Titmuss,) by considering some of the distributional effects of fiscal welfare in France (section 5), before concluding (section 6). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a reflection on how integrating fiscal welfare into welfare state research can shed light on some subtle, yet important, transformations of welfare states and social citizenship in Europe. We begin by clarifying the concepts of fiscal welfare and social tax expenditures (STEs), by reviewing and critically assessing the various related concepts found in the literature. We also map out the empirical knowledge currently available, highlighting the limitations in the available data. Then, drawing on both existing knowledge (developed especially in the context of the US welfare state) and the emerging literature on fiscal welfare in Europe, we identify a number of trends and set out some hypotheses as to why tax expenditures have become a privileged instrument in the field of social policy: not only do STEs appear as a useful instrument to build consensus across party lines in a context of budgetary austerity and strong control of public expenditures, they also enable the discreet privatization of social insurance schemes. Fiscal welfare also allows for a new mode of governing social policy through incentives, which entails a different mode of redistribution than traditional social policy instruments. Finally, we identify the remaining empirical and theoretical gaps to guide future research on the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]