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Rising income inequality is taking a toll on people's subjective well-being (SWB), and many commentators have implicated the role of material possessions, and thereby marketing, in this regard. Making a more nuanced argument, this research proposes that certain material possessions—namely, favorite possessions—can mitigate the detrimental psychological effect of income inequality on SWB. In support of this proposition, experimental data from nine countries (N = 3,687) and social media posts from 138 countries (N = 31,332) converge to show that, while SWB generally declines as income inequality increases, encouraging consumers to attend to their favorite possessions can mitigate the negative effect of inequality on SWB. This is because attending to favorite possessions reduces consumers' tendency to make social comparisons related to material resources and wealth, which otherwise arise when income inequality is high. Consequently, even when they perceive high income inequality, consumers feel less deprived relative to others, which buffers their SWB. These findings have meaningful consumer welfare implications. In particular, one way consumers can feel happier with their quality of life in an unequal society is to avoid comparing their material wealth with that of others and instead attend to the material possessions most special to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: This paper evaluates the impact of quantitative easing on income and wealth of individual euro area households. We first estimate the aggregate effects of a quantitative easing (QE) shock, identified by means of external instruments, in a multi‐country vector autoregression (VAR) model with unemployment, wages, gross operating surplus, interest rates, house prices, and stock prices. We then distribute the aggregate effects across households using a reduced‐form simulation on micro‐data, which captures the portfolio composition, the income composition, and the earnings heterogeneity channels of transmission. The earnings heterogeneity channel is important: QE compresses the income distribution because many households with lower incomes become employed. In contrast, monetary policy has only negligible effects on the Gini coefficient for wealth: While high‐wealth households benefit from higher stock prices, middle‐wealth households benefit from higher house prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much effort has been devoted to exploring the consequences of inflation on income inequality. Little documented is the effect on wealth inequality, which is more important in determining economic opportunities and rewards and hence political power. To close the void, the paper empirically examines whether inflation affects wealth inequality proxied by top wealth shares, with special emphasis on potential nonlinearity as well as associated mechanisms. In a sample of developing and developed countries, we find that top wealth shares have a U process whereas bottom wealth shares follow a hump-shaped path when inflation increases. Wealth inequality first decreases and then increases with inflation and there exists an inflation threshold such that an increase or decrease in inflation will lead to a rise in wealth inequality. Similar results are reached when considering income shares. Pathway analyses highlight that entrepreneurship and asset prices are potential channels through which inflation impacts wealth inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses how economic inequality was framed by UK news media during the pandemic and, drawing from framing theory, considers the implications of the coverage for news audiences. To do so, it uses a data set of 167 articles from the following UK news publications: The Guardian, The Telegraph, the Financial Times and The Sun. There are differences between the publications in terms of salience, tone and there is a wide range of causes and solutions attributed to inequality with no consensus emerging. The coverage is framed mainly by state sources, and there is very little discussion of the finance sector and corporations as causes and solutions to tackle inequality. There are some positive trends emerging, as sustainable finance, climate change and gender equality are highlighted alongside some alternative solutions, indicating a move away from historical trends in news coverage that demonize poverty and focus simply on the individual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the financial health of racial-ethnic groups in Tulsa, Oklahoma, nearly a century after the 1921 Tulsa Massacre. We use data from the Tulsa National Asset Scorecard for Communities of Color (NASCC) survey to assess the financial health of two demographic groups that were historically the victims of racial violence - Native Americans and Black Americans. Specifically, we investigate financial outcomes a century after these groups made significant economic gains during the Tulsa oil boom in the early 1900 s and were subsequently victimized by racial violence. We find that Black households have statistically significantly less wealth and income than Whites in Tulsa. Our decomposition analysis shows household demographic differences between Blacks and Whites largely do not explain these wealth and income gaps, suggestive of historical discrimination. While in the case of the Native American tribes and Whites, the findings generally show no statistical significance. Compared to other NASCC-surveyed cities that did not experience destruction to the level of the Tulsa Massacre, the Black-White wealth and income gaps and the unexplained portion of the decompositions are the largest in Tulsa. Our results provisionally suggest that past exposure to racial violence can have long-term effects on the economic outcomes of the affected groups decades later. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "Setting the Record Straight on Racial Wealth Inequality" challenges the mainstream economic view on racial wealth inequality. It argues that the focus on human capital and earnings fails to account for the uneven transmission of resources across generations. Despite increases in median wealth among Black households, Black-White wealth inequality has remained unchanged or slightly increased over the past 50 years. The article highlights the inadequacy of closing the earnings gap as a solution and emphasizes the importance of considering intergenerational wealth transfers and gifts. It also discusses the impact of tax policies and suggests alternative proposals, such as reparations, to address the wealth gap. The article underscores the need to understand the cumulative impact of racial history and uneven resource transmission in explaining economic inequality between Black and White Americans. [Extracted from the article]

Chelwa, Maboshe, and Hamilton's paper explores the racial wealth gap in the United States and South Africa, highlighting the racialized dimensions of economic inequality that emerged from chattel slavery and apartheid. The authors argue that orthodox economic explanations for the racial wealth gap are inadequate and that education does not reduce inequality but rather reflects existing inequality. They critique methodological individualism and emphasize the role of structural constraints and white supremacy in perpetuating wealth inequality. The paper calls for structural interventions that address the role of social differences and identities in generating inequality. [Extracted from the article]

World income inequality is comprised of uneven development between states and unequal distribution within states. Recent work shows that the "between-country" component still accounts for a majority of the total, but that attention is shifting to the "within-country" portion, which is growing in both absolute and relative terms. What is less appreciated, though, is that the way income is distributed within countries also plays an indirect role in how income differences are recognized between them. When a nation's income distribution is highly unequal, its mean income is substantially larger than the income of its average person, thereby masking a depreciation in living standards for those residing in the middle. The practical effect of this distortion is that poor, unequal countries seem wealthier than they really are when using mean incomes to represent country averages, as is typically done. I address this shortcoming in prior work by estimating between-country inequality using median incomes. My analysis covers the 1990–2017 period for 123 countries that represent over 90 percent of the world's population. According to Theil's T , I find that (a) inequality in median incomes is almost 15 percent higher than inequality in mean incomes, and that (b) median incomes are converging about 7.5 percent more slowly than mean incomes. This translates to a higher level of world income inequality, which is likewise converging at a slower rate. Overall, I find that the direct and indirect effects of national inequality are now responsible for about half of the world's income inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper models wealth concentration in 11 EU members from the CEE region using official data for the period between 1995 and 2021 and applies panel econometric methods. The analysis uses the world inequality database (WID.world) for deriving wealth distribution and inequality measures. Our results suggest that inequality and wealth concentration grow at the expense of the middle class and the poorer half of the population. Regression results suggest that the main contributors to wealth inequality are the Great Recession of 2008-2009, inflation, house prices, and bond prices, while GDP per capita, equity prices and various interest rates restore a more equal net wealth distribution. Other variables are also found to have direct or indirect (instrumental variables) associations with the wealth concentration (the dependent variables). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Informacion Comercial Espanola Revista de Economia is the property of S.G.E.E.I.P.C., Secretaria de Estado de Comercio, Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We analyze the distributional effects of monetary policy on income, wealth, and consumption. We use administrative household‐level data covering the entire population in Denmark over the period 1987 to 2014 and exploit a long‐standing currency peg as a source of exogenous variation in monetary policy. We find that gains from softer monetary policy in terms of income, wealth, and consumption are monotonically increasing in ex ante income. The distributional effects reflect systematic differences in exposure to the various channels of monetary policy, especially nonlabor channels (e.g., leverage and risky assets). Our estimates imply that softer monetary policy increases income inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper decomposes the components of wealth inequality and its change in the United States during the period 2006–2016. The results show that wealth inequality in the US is extremely high. Real estate, non-housing assets and financial investments are the first three important components of equivalent wealth and overall inequality. Financial investments, real estate liabilities and non-housing liabilities have positive marginal impacts on overall inequality, while other assets' marginal impacts are negative. Financial investments changes had the largest impact on the aggregate trends of wealth inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the contradictory effects of pro-homeownership policies on inequalities through the case of Belgium. While the literature describes high homeownership rates as levellers of wealth inequalities, this paper finds, using national microdata from ECHP and EU-SILC, that different mechanisms underlying homeownership growth have had contradictory effects on economic inequalities, even in the absence of a housing crisis or increase in income inequalities. Inequalities in the weight of rental costs have risen for newly contracted rental agreements in the last decade, while wealth inequalities are rising because of an increasingly exclusive mortgage-credit market. Current measurements of wealth inequalities are based on the distribution of net wealth, thereby missing the evolution of the difference between mean wealth and no wealth and the dynamic nature of wealth accumulation. Therefore, inequalities are rising in Belgium as poorer renters are increasingly constrained by rental costs when they are increasingly excluded from accessing homeownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wealth accumulation is the result of several factors: saving behaviors, inheritance, work and marital histories. In a context of increasing diversity of marital histories over cohorts, this article examines how relationship history may shape long-term wealth accumulation and wealth inequality. It goes beyond household wealth by looking at individual wealth. Focusing on individuals above 50 and using data from cross-sectional wealth surveys conducted in France in 2004, 2009, and 2014, we evaluate the contribution of their marital histories to individual wealth across different birth cohorts of men and women. We document the existence of a couple wealth premium, observed for both married and unmarried partners who are wealthier than the divorced, separated, or always single. Accumulated wealth significantly depends on marital history. Women have smaller wealth when they have not been continuously in a relationship. This is also the case for men but only for those belonging to the lowest quantiles. Over birth cohorts, marital break-up is responsible for less accumulated wealth. This is mainly noticeable for cohorts born after WWII. If marital histories had not diversified, the wealth accumulated by women would have been greater at older ages and those of men would have been more evenly distributed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Heathcote et al. (2010) conducted an empirical analysis of several dimensions of inequality in the United States over the years 1967-2006, using publicly-available survey data. This paper expands the analysis, and extends it to 2021. We find that since the early 2000s, the college wage premium has stopped growing, and the race wage gap has stalled. However, the gender wage gap has kept shrinking. Both individual- and household-level income inequality have continued to rise at the top, while the cyclical component of inequality dominates dynamics below the median. Inequality in consumption expenditures has remained remarkably stable over time. Income pooling within the family and redistribution by the government have enormous impacts on the dynamics of household-level inequality, with the role of the family diminishing and that of the government growing over time. In particular, largely due to generous government transfers, the COVID recession has been the first downturn in fifty years in which inequality in disposable income and consumption actually declined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses administrative tax data to estimate top wealth in the United States. We assemble new data that link people to their sources of capital income and develop new methods to estimate the degree of return heterogeneity within asset classes. Disaggregated fixed-income data reveal that rich individuals earn much more of their interest income in higher-yielding forms and have much greater exposure to credit risk. Consequently, in recent years, the interest rate on fixed income at the top is approximately 3.5 times higher than the average. We value the population of U.S. firms using firm-level characteristics and apportion this wealth using firm-owner links. We combine this new data on fixed income and pass-through business returns with refined estimates of C-corporation equity, housing, and pension wealth to deliver new capitalized wealth estimates that build upon the methods of Saez and Zucman (2016a). From 1989 to 2016, the top 1%, 0.1%, and 0.01% wealth shares increased by 6.6, 4.6, and 2.9 percentage points, respectively, to 33.7%, 15.7%, and 7.1%. Overall, although we estimate a large degree of return heterogeneity, accounting for this heterogeneity does not change the fundamental story for top wealth shares and their growth—wealth inequality is high and has risen substantially over recent decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the income gender gap has been widely researched to date, less attention has been paid to the wealth gender gap. This paper analyses individual-level data taken from the Spanish tax agency between 2012 and 2017 and documents the existence of an increasing wealth gap in Spain in this period. Through a comparative analysis, we find a clear difference in wealth accumulation patterns between the two genders, especially with regards to holdings of equity in productive companies. We also find that both women and men in the highest quantiles of the wealth distribution have increased their wealth and that men hold more assets that women. With respect to income distribution, the data shows that men's income accounts for a larger share of total income, which reinforces the gender gap related to economic resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Çalışma ve Toplum is the property of Calisma ve Toplum and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We show that investors tend to hold the same securities as their parents. This intergenerational correlation is stronger for mothers and family members who are more likely to communicate with each other. An instrumental variables estimation and a natural experiment suggest that the correlation reflects social influence. This influence runs not only from parents to children, but also vice versa. The resulting holdings of identical securities increase intergenerational correlations in portfolio choice, exacerbate wealth inequality, and amplify the consequences of behavioral biases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A radically different agenda to fight inequalities is instead put forward by Silvio Gesell, who we encountered in Maumi's chapter on Wright, and who is the main subject of a chapter by Florencia Sember. Gesell's solution for tackling inequality consists of abolishing unearned income (interest and rent), which will eventually allow workers to collect the full proceeds of their labor. Inequalities and the Progressive Era: Breakthroughs and Legacies: edited by Guillaume Vallet, Cheltenham and Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020, 360 pp. [Extracted from the article]

Cost-sharing subsidies partially cover the fixed costs of water-saving technologies, promoting their adoption as one of the major irrigation water demand management tools that improve on-farm irrigation system efficiency and potentially free up more water for higher-value uses in water-scarce areas. In this study, we investigate the optimal subsidization scheme in the presence of adverse selection problems where the farmer's wealth is her private information using a theoretical model of a centralized regulatory structure. In the model, we show that the first-best investment levels can be implemented when the regulator has enough resources for subsidization. Otherwise, the outcome depends on which farmer – the high-wealth farmer or the low-wealth one – contributes more to the social welfare when confronted with their first-best investment levels. Particularly, the model's findings suggest that an optimal subsidization scheme might involve either high or low wealth farmer's investment level being downward distorted from their first-best levels. Furthermore, in some circumstances, if the wealth disparity is sufficiently large, it is optimal to subsidize high wealth farmers only. Overall, prioritizing economic efficiency may help conserve scarce irrigation water, but it may also conflict with social equity by denying some farmers access to public subsidies. [Display omitted] • We investigate the optimal subsidization scheme in the presence of adverse selection problems where the farmer's wealth is her private information. • In the regulation model, we show that the first-best investment levels can be implemented when the Water Authority (WA) has enough resources for subsidization. • If the WA has a limited budget for subsidization, the outcome depends on which farmer – the high-wealth farmer or the low-wealth one – contributes more to the social welfare when confronted with their first-best investment levels. • The results suggest that an optimal subsidization scheme could involve either high or low wealth farmers' investment levels being downwardly distorted from their levels. Furthermore, in some cases, if the wealth disparity is sufficiently large, it is optimal to subsidize high-wealth farmers only. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As households have become increasingly financialized, family scholars have considered the consequences of assets, credit, and debt for family dynamics. Previous studies that focused on labor force participation or earnings found that inequality between partners has important gendered consequences for relationship stability. We expand on this by considering within-couple financial inequality—the extent to which partners hold assets and debts unequally—and its implications for marital stability. Two competing perspectives—financial equality and financial specialization—offer different predictions. Using data from the 1996–2008 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), we find strong support for the financial equality perspective and little support for the financial specialization perspective. Couples with equal holdings have the most stable marriages. We also find that the positive association between equal financial holdings and marital stability is driven primarily by financial integration, or joint holdings. In some cases, we also find support for a modified version of the gendered institution perspective, as marriages with female partners holding most of the asset or debt are less stable than marriages with male partners holding most or partners holding them equally. We further distinguish among different types of assets and debts in our analyses, in recognition of the growing diversity of financial holdings and their varied implications for relationship quality and stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the financial crisis of 2008 and the publication in 2014 of Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century , income and wealth inequality have returned to public and scholarly interest. Most subsequent discussion has focused on the fall and rise of inequality in the twentieth century, but meanwhile another body of economic history literature has reconstructed long-run inequality dynamics in early modern Europe. This article surveys the new history of old inequality and discusses its three principal findings: first, that between about 1300 and about 1900 inequality increased continuously almost everywhere, meaning there is no clear link between economic growth and inequality. Secondly, the only phenomena that substantially reduced inequality were unprecedented catastrophes. Thirdly, although few things have decreased inequality, many strategies of elite wealth defence have increased it, motivating new comparative concepts like the 'inequality possibility frontier' and the 'extraction ratio'. Inequality will continue to be a subject of urgent political and moral attention, and this field opens up a research agenda that could bridge the methodological divide between economic history as practised by economists and by historians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper unpacks the drivers of growing intergenerational housing wealth inequality in Australia. We also account for the multidimensional nature of housing wealth divides by examining the interaction between age and other divides. We find that the Australian intergenerational housing wealth gap widened from 161% in 1997–98 to 234% in 2017–18, favouring the older cohort. This was driven by lower rates of homeownership and lower property value growth among younger cohorts, with the relative lack of homeownership access the more significant driver. However, higher rates of couple formation and tertiary education amongst the young mitigated a further widening of the gap. The intergenerational housing wealth gap is exacerbated within specific population subgroups. The growing housing wealth gap between the income-poor young and income-rich old has been particularly alarming, climbing from 532% to 1230% over two decades. We discuss implications for policies seeking to alleviate intergenerational tensions in housing markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been an upsurge in research on the politics of economic inequality in the 21st century. Discussions of popular responses to rising inequality have expanded in turn yet remain centered on support for explicit government redistribution of income from the rich to the poor. We argue that this focus may downwardly bias measurement of preferences for less inequality and propose an expanded framework that incorporates preferences regarding market institutions and policies that reduce labor market inequalities, which together can shed light on the public's adherence to free market ideology. Empirically, we use original data to examine the US case, with a comparison to Sweden and Denmark. The results offer initial evidence of (1) the need for an expanded framework and research agenda in this field and (2) potentially broad-based support for policies that address economic inequality directly in the market sphere, contrary to key tenets of free market ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Distributional information can shed new light on societies and their well-being, now and in the past. This article constructs historical wealth inequality statistics for Budweis, a large town in South Bohemia. Utilised data sources include rare detailed local tax censuses from 1416 and 1523 and a national tax register from 1654, as reported in the literature, further adjusted for the lowest social groups and processed to create social tables. If the underlying data are accurate, the wealth inequality Gini coefficient in 1416 was between 0.739 and 0.777. The estimated wealth share of the top 1% was 22.6% in 1416 and 14.2% in 1523, which is notably less than in the pre-industrial UK or France, as well as in the present-day Czech Republic. The findings support the notion of an egalitarian rather than individualistic pre-industrial Bohemian society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growth, underpinned by augmented production, has been the dominant mode of development, where the focus is to influence the ability to increase the output and income of producers. In this process, differences in economic achievement are influenced collectively by geography, culture and institutions that determine effective capabilities. Yet, disparities associated with place are still widespread. In this paper, we draw some insights on the nature of economic deprivation amongst Pakistan households using Household Integrated Economic Survey (PSLM/HIES) data and treating the residential location as a key parameter of interest. In relating to the well-known discussion on rural–urban divide, we identify some commonalities in location-specific attributes in the achievement of economic-wellbeing. The analyses confirm the existing knowledge that poverty and well-being have strong place attachments, favouring urban areas as locations of greater relative well-being due to low levels of deprivation, in particular health, education and food security. In discussing how location may predispose inhabitants to deprivations or vulnerabilities, we identify some opportunities to realign development focus towards meeting local needs and raising aspirations for self-empowerment by better focusing on the nature of economic linkages that supports livelihood diversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1923 Poland introduced an extraordinary wealth tax. I have used internal statistics of the Ministry of the Treasury to estimate wealth inequality in interwar Poland. This data source was not previously used by researchers. There are no estimates of wealth inequality in interwar Poland available in the literature. According to my estimates, the top 0.01% of wealth owners controlled 14.8% of total private wealth. The wealth share of the top 1% stood at 37.5%. The top decile owned 60.7% of total private wealth. Wealth inequality varied strongly by region. A comparison of wealth inequality in Poland with wealth inequality in other European countries in the interwar period yields a diverse picture. The wealth share of the top 0.01% was the highest in Europe, the wealth share of the top 1% was in the middle of the European ranking, and the wealth share of the top 10% was almost the lowest in Europe. The small elite of super-rich (0.01%) controlled a higher share of national wealth than their European peers, but the wealth share of the rest of the top decile was relatively low. The unequal development of former partitions may partially explain the very high top wealth shares. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracy is an essential aspect in national-level governance to safeguard human rights and provide equal distribution of wealth among citizens that are also expected to bolster more rapid economic growth. However, the extant literatures show mixed result in providing evidence of how democracy will impact economic growth. In this paper, we, therefore, empirically examine the impact of democracy on economic growth and income inequality at the regional level by studying provinces in Indonesia. A panel data estimation is employed with 335 province-year observations to test our empirical model covering 34 provinces. We find that overall democracy is a detrimental factor to regional economic growth as higher level of democracy needs substantial cost to finance. However, our study reveals that democracy help reduce inequality across provinces as it may open up the possibilities to get more education for marginalized people which then implies for higher income for those people. Several policy implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US has run a persistent current account deficit since 1982. Its growth particularly accelerated in the early 2000s, and the deficit peaked at about 6% of US GDP in 2006. Coincidentally, the distribution of income and wealth has grown progressively unequal, while the so-called financialization of the US economy has deepened. This article argues that the concomitant processes of persistent current account deficits, rising inequality, and deepening financialization are not merely coincidental but can be traced to common causes arising from the global restructuring of US production through foreign direct investment and offshoring, which has underlain the structural transformation of the US economy since the 1980s. On the one hand, the US is the world's biggest exporter of capital and recipient of foreign investment income; on the other hand, it is the biggest importer of foreign goods, often produced with the involvement of US capital. Ultimately, deindustrialization at home—a major factor behind the loss of middle-wage, middle-class jobs, and thus of rising income inequality—and the transnationalization of US production have boosted corporate profits, thereby propping up and accelerating the financialization of the US economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The boom in wealth inequality seen in recent decades has generated a steep rise in scholarly interest in both the drivers and the consequences of the wealth gap. In political science, a pertinent question regards the political behavior across the wealth spectrum. A common argument is that the wealthy practice patrimonial voting, i.e. voting for right-wing parties to maximize returns on their assets. While this pattern is descriptively well documented, it is less certain to what extent this reflects an actual causal relationship between wealth and political preferences. In this study, we provide new evidence by exploiting wealth variation within identical twin pairs. Our findings suggest that while more wealth is descriptively connected to more support for right-wing parties, the causal impact of wealth on policy preferences is likely highly overstated. For several relevant policy areas these effects may not exist at all. Furthermore, the bias in naive observational estimates seems to be mainly driven by environmental familial confounders shared within twin pairs, rather than genetic confounding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concentration of wealth is a key component of the rise in economic inequality at the beginning of the twenty-first century. While the abolition of taxes on private wealth during the 1990s and 2000s is recognized as an important institutional driver behind this development, comparatively little is known about the justification of tax cuts for the wealthy in advanced democracies. This paper investigates how the abolishment of the personal net wealth tax in Germany, a country with high levels of wealth inequality, has been debated and justified in parliament over a period of 20 years. Using a mixed methods approach that combines computational social science methods and a qualitative analysis, we examine how Germany's two major parties, the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), have variously construed the meaning and purpose of the wealth tax and justified their support for or opposition to it. While the Social Democrats debate the wealth tax primarily from a social justice perspective, the Christian Democrats rely on an efficiency frame that invokes biological metaphors, enabling them to narrate the wealth tax as a threat to the social body. Paradoxically, then, by arguing that the tax is "poison to the economy", conservative discourse succeeds in linking opposition to the wealth tax to a principle of social unity. On these grounds, we suggest that future research should scrutinize how the interrelation between political discourse and institutional architectures has facilitated the rise of wealth inequality in recent decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies often portray status as a position, but status is also a process sustained by social and cultural mechanisms. These social processes can create inequality in men's and women's economic positions. Families are key economic institutions, but the processes involved in managing family wealth are poorly understood. Drawing on in- depth interviews with twenty- five women (and eleven husbands) in families with a median net worth of $27.5 million, I find that wives report general ignorance about wealth (although, on deeper probing, women often have more expertise than it appears on first glance). Second, women state they are disengaged with the economic realm. Third, the formation of marriages where women would have vastly more economic power than their future husbands are deeply stigmatized. Despite formidable wealth, in these marriages, women emphasized their lack of economic expertise and engagement. This gender "stickiness" contributed to status inequality in the economic sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The benefits of new technologies accrue not only to high‐skilled labor but also to owners of capital in the form of higher capital incomes. This increases inequality. To make this argument, we develop a tractable theory that links technology to the distribution of income and wealth—and not just that of wages—and use it to study the distributional effects of automation. We isolate a new theoretical mechanism: automation increases inequality by raising returns to wealth. The flip side of such return movements is that automation can lead to stagnant wages and, therefore, stagnant incomes at the bottom of the distribution. We use a multiasset model extension to confront differing empirical trends in returns to productive and safe assets and show that the relevant return measures have increased over time. Automation can account for part of the observed trends in income and wealth inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Comparative Economic Research is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Lodzkiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Though the literature on perceptions of inequality and studies of 'elites' have identified the importance of meritocratic beliefs in legitimating inequality, little is known about the role of pay setting processes in sustaining ideals of meritocracy. Drawing on 30 in-depth interviews with UK-based top income earners working mainly in finance, I analyse how top income earners perceive economic inequality. My study highlights the crucial role of performance pay for perceptions that top incomes are meritocratically deserved. Participants expressed the view that performance pay, an increasingly prevalent pay-setting practice, ensures that top incomes reflect a share of economic 'value created' for shareholders, clients or investors. Focusing on narrow, economic criteria of evaluation perceived as objective, the majority of respondents ('performance pay meritocrats') justified any income difference as deserved if it reflects economic contribution. Meanwhile, a minority of respondents ('social reflexivists') applied broader evaluative criteria including distributive justice and social contributions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The modern study of economic inequality is based on the distribution of entitlements over goods and services. But social commentators at least since Rousseau have been concerned with a different aspect of economic inequality: that it implies that one person is entitled to command another person for their own personal ends. I call this inequality as entitlements over labor. I propose to measure entitlements over labor by calculating the extent to which top income groups can afford to buy the labor of others for the purpose of their personal consumption. Unlike standard inequality measures, this measure is not welfarist, but instead has its normative basis in relations of domination, hierarchy and social status between people. I estimate entitlements over labor in three high-inequality and two low-inequality countries and argue that inequality as entitlements over labor is socially and politically salient, capturing a side of inequality neglected by standard measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The available statistical information points to a growth in income and wealth inequality in the last decade, which has stimulated the debate on the most appropriate policies to reverse the process. The discussion revolves around the definition of the objective to be achieved, the most appropriate way to measure it and the instruments to be used, taking into account the collateral effects of the measures implemented. In this context, the opportunity arises for companies to strengthen their social commitment by seeking, in their field of action, distributive justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through certainty equivalent consumption (CE) measures, we show that dispersion of current earnings, expenditures, and net worth overstate welfare inequality. This is largely due to the unaccounted value of future earnings, which we call human wealth. The latter mitigates permanent‐income inequality, though its influence is diminished by the growing importance of assets in lifetime wealth. Average expenditures and CE inequality roughly doubled between 1983 and 2016 and, to weigh these offsetting forces, we decompose aggregate welfare changes into contributions from the level and dispersion of consumption, as well as uncertainty and demographic composition. Rising inequality has offset about 1/4 of the welfare gains from higher consumption, with most of the losses accruing after 2000. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like many developing countries, South Africa has persistently experienced high levels of wealth inequality since independence in 1994. Despite government policy formulated to address this problem, there has been almost no improvement to the wealth status of the country's majority population. This study thus examines how personal financial choices influenced wealth inequality in South Africa over the period 2010 to 2019 using a behavioural life-cycle model. Despite a decrease in wealth inequality over this period, the extent of this decrease is almost negligible. Results show that the majority of South African households do not possess enough wealth for household decision-making on wealth allocation to have a meaningful impact in reducing wealth inequality through more efficient use of assets. South African households should prioritise increased allocation of resources to education in labour sectors that possess and foresee a critical shortage of skills in the future. Such labour sectors are characterised by stable and higher levels of income, which then provides a mechanism for the accumulation of wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Management & Systems is the property of Business Administration Association of R.O.C. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article highlights common financial issues and concerns of affluent Black American households as they attempt to build and maintain long‐term financial stability. In so doing, we shed light on the nexus of Black families seeking professional wealth management services and Black financial planners working to meet their needs while also attempting to carve out a successful business in a profession and industry within which they are woefully underrepresented. A collaboration of a wealth inequality scholar and financial planning professionals from a wealth management company, this article outlines common planning priorities and challenges raised by African‐American families with their planning advisors. While many of these are universal, they also represent topics that are overwhelmingly prioritized by Black clients. When possible, we use information from the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances on households located in the top quintile of the Black wealth distribution, the "affluent," to complement the information provided by the analysts of their targeted clientele. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Española de Cardiología (18855857) is the property of Elsevier B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article offers information about the racial disparities in human capital and wealth, along with explores the racial wealth gap and the role of firm ownership in the U.S. It mentions the generations of Black Americans were systematically denied the opportunity to accumulate wealth throughout the history of slavery.

This article analyzes the patterns of household-level gender wealth inequality in light of financial sector transformation in the US since the 1980s. Securitization, the subprime lending expansion, and wider liberalization measures influenced wealth disparities by determining access to different types of wealth, asset values, and relative indebtedness. The evolution of the gender wealth gap in the context of these institutional changes is not yet clearly established in the literature. Using the US Survey of Consumer Finances between 1989 and 2019, the study examines changes in wealth inequality between unpartnered male-headed and female-headed households and its determinants. It finds substantial heterogeneity of the gender wealth gap, and within-group inequality for female-headed households, across different categories of marital status, family structure, race/ethnicity, and percentile of wealth distribution. Homeownership is estimated to have an equalizing impact, while differences in employment income, age, self-employment, and ownership of high-yielding assets are associated with increasing wealth disparities. HIGHLIGHTS The study examines the unconditional and conditional wealth gaps across unpartnered households. Gender wealth inequality increased in the subprime era and after the Great Recession. The highest inequality is observed across marital status, family structure, and race. The highest inequality is found among the least wealthy households. Wealth inequality can be lowered by reducing disparities in income and asset ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Research Papers of the Wroclaw University of Economics / Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wroclawiu is the property of Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wroclawiu and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Economic inequality, in terms of income or wealth, is one of the most complex and perplexing challenges of our current capitalist economic system. While the dynamic relationship between income inequality and economic growth has been extensively investigated (since the beginning of the last century), the dynamic link between wealth inequality (or wealth concentration) and economic growth has been largely ignored in the literature, taking more attention in recent years. This paper asserts that the accumulation of non-productive assets/luxury goods is an important determinant of wealth inequality, as well as a determinant of the relationship between wealth inequality and economic growth. In this paper our aim is to show that an increase in wealth inequality is associated with a slowdown in economic growth. In particular, the paper shows that there is a negative relationship between wealth inequality and economic growth in France because poor households own a relatively large fraction of non-productive luxury goods. Nevertheless, this is not the case in the US, which is what explains that such negative relationship is not observed there. We conclude that a redistribution of wealth (from the rich to the poor) is important for attaining a sustained economic growth performance. • This paper contributes to the analysis of economic growth and wealth inequality in France and the United States. • We propose a macroeconomic model that includes both productive and non-productive assets. • Economic growth slows as the aggregate stock of non-productive assets increases as wealth inequality increases. • Redistribution will enrich the poorest households and therefore decrease their propensity to own unproductive assets. • Wealth inequality and economic growth may have a non-linear relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]