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If the practice of war is as old as human history, so too is the need to reflect upon war, to understand its meaning and implications. The Pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus asserted in 600BC that War (polemos) is justice, thus inaugurating a long philosophical tradition of consideration of the morality of war. In recent times, the increased specialisation of academic disciplines has led a to a fragmentation of the thematic of war within the academy - the topic of war is as likely to be addressed by sociologists, cultural theorists, psychologists and even computer scientists as it is by historians, philosophers or political scientists. This diversity of disciplinary approaches to war is undoubtedly fruitful in itself but can lead to an isolation of respective disciplinary analyses of war from each other. In July 2002, at Mansfield College, Oxford, an inter-disciplinary conference on war (entitled'War and Virtual War') was held so as to redress some of this disciplinary isolationism and to forge an integrative dialogue on war, in all its facets. The papers in this volume were nominated by delegates as the most paradigmatic of the ethos of the original project and the most successful in achieving its aims of inter-disciplinarity and critical dialogue.

How We Fight: Ethics in War presents a substantial body of new work by some of the leading philosophers of war. The ten essays cover a range of topics concerned with both jus ad bellum (the morality of going to war) and jus in bello (the morality of fighting in war). Alongside explorations of classic in bello topics, such as the principle of non-combatant immunity and the distribution of risk between combatants and non-combatants, the volume also addresses ad bellum topics, such as pacifism and punitive justifications for war, and explores the relationship between ad bellum and in bello topics, or how the fighting of a war may affect our judgments concerning whether that war meets the ad bellum conditions. The essays take a keen interest in the micro-foundations of just war theory, and uphold the general assumption that the rules of war must be supported, if they are going to be supported at all, by the liability and non-liability of the individuals who are encompassed by those rules. Relatedly, the volume also contains work which is relevant to the moral justification of several moral doctrines used, either explicitly or implicitly, in just war theory: in the doctrine of double effect, in the generation of liability in basic self-defensive cases, and in the relationship between liability and the conditions which are normally appended to permissible self-defensive violence: imminence, necessity, and proportionality. The volume breaks new ground in all these areas.

Moderne Gesellschaften beruhen auf dem Selbstverständnis, Gewalt einzuhegen, zugleich sind das Recht und die Pflicht zur Gewaltanwendung Grundprinzipien moderner Staatlichkeit. Gewalt, Ordnung und Staatlichkeit sind demnach konstitutiv aufeinander bezogen, doch ihr prekäres Verhältnis erscheint zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts umstrittener denn je. Konzepte wie Rettungsfolter, gerechte Kriege, Ausnahme oder Sicherheit verweisen zugleich auf neue Rationalitäten staatlicher Gewalt. Der Band bietet interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf historische Kontinuitäten und Brüche staatlicher Neuordnungen von Gewalt in der Gegenwart. Mit Beiträgen von David Garland, Christian Geulen, Sven Kramer, Susanne Krasmann, Alf Lüdtke, Jürgen Martschukat, Andrew W. Neal, Günter Riederer, Ruth Stanley und Anja Feth, Frank Schumacher, Klaus Weinhauer sowie einen bisher im Deutschen unveröffentlichten Text von Judith Butler.