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One of the significant effects of the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York was the politics of the US-led war on terror encompassing secularism and calls for Islamic reformation. The political discourse of war on terror was not limited to the Americas but was witnessed in other Western nations, such as Australia. The discourse of "Islam needs reforming" by the Prime Minister of Australia, Tony Abbott, in response to the Lindt Café siege (labelled as "Islamic terrorism") tacitly associates Islam with terrorism and represents Muslims negatively to the wider Australian society. This paper with the research question of "How does 'Islam needs reforming' discourse perpetuate Islamophobia?" carried out critical discourse analysis on the selected speeches of Tony Abbott in response to the Lindt Café siege in 2014 to find out the context and implications of Abbott's discourse in relation to calls for Islamic revolution. The study found that Abbott through the example of al-Sisi's (Egypt's president) calls for Islamic reformation forwarded his stance of the need for change in Islam to counter terrorism. Therefore, the present paper argues that the calls for Islamic reformation in response to terrorism can associate Islam with terrorism, thus, perpetuating Islamophobia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on how pre-existing policy priorities and goals among policy elites in the US, UK, and Australia encouraged the blurring of strategic and tactical intelligence assessment as a mechanism for legitimising the Iraq invasion. Through the selective use and interpretation of sometimes vague or unsubstantiated tactical and technical intelligence and the many uncertainties it contained, proponents of the war were able to undermine existing strategic assessments on Iraq by introducing a range of possible, but largely unsubstantiated, threat scenarios as justification for military action. The paper argues that in so far as intelligence reforms are needed, they should be focused primarily on the interface between analysis and policy making, and the issue of how policy makers interpret and understand the uncertainties that intelligence assessments necessarily contain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'new' terrorism has not escaped Southeast Asia. Within this region, the Malay Archipelago has the world's largest Muslim population and Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country. In the context of the struggle between radical Islam, and the West and its allies, the region assumes great, long-term strategic significance, particularly to the USA. The threat of terrorism to Australia, as demonstrated by the terrorist attacks at Bali in 2002 aimed at its citizens, has also ensured Australia's active interest and engagement with the littoral states of the Malay Archipelago. In addition, arguably the world's most strategic waterway and chokepoint, the narrow Straits of Malacca, is located within this cauldron. More than half the world's trade and oil passes through this strategic straits. By comparison, oil flows through the straits are three times more than through the Suez, and fifteen times greater than the Panama Canal. Not surprisingly, key Western states and their allies that have a deep interest in the security of the Straits of Malacca and in the global war on terrorism have paid special attention to the Malay Archipelago. Indeed, the idea of a Trilateral Security Dialogue centred on the USA, Japan and Australia was first mooted in 2001, and has since involved discussions on Asian security between senior officials of all three countries. In 2005, it was elevated to the level of the foreign ministers of Japan and Australia, and the US Secretary of State. This dialogue process is the third leg in the triangle between the two bilateral US alliances with Japan and Australia. It is obvious that all three are key strategic partners in Asia, with a strong common interest in maritime security and terrorism issues, particularly in Southeast Asia. It is the contention of this paper that this evolving trilateral extra-regional security nexus has benefited greatly from cooperation with Singapore, which has been doing everything it can to encourage and facilitate the regional involvement of these extra-regional powers. In fact, Singapore has become a critical regional ally of all three. On Singapore's part, this represents a striking success in foreign policy as security, political and economic allies enhance its own ability to better manage the new terrorist threats that have emerged since 9-11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2001, the Australian ‘Taliban fighter’ David Hicks was captured by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Hicks was subsequently transferred to Guantanamo Bay by the US military, where he has remained for five years awaiting a military commission trial that has been roundly condemned for its partisan approach to justice. David Hicks' imprisonment as an alleged ‘terrorist’ saw him branded by both government officials and the media as a ‘rat in the ranks’: a traitor to Australia's role in the Coalition of the Willing and the embodiment of Australia's ‘new’ insecurity about the threat in ‘our own backyards’. Indeed, governmental response to Hicks' imprisonment has focussed on themes of ‘otherness’, where the allegations of Hicks' terrorist actions have served as legitimation for the apparent circumvention of his legal and civil rights. Nonetheless, subsequent media reportage has become increasingly ambivalent towards both US and Australian approaches to justice, allowing more discursive space for dissenting viewpoints in the public arena. By analysing various representations of Hicks by Australian governmental authorities and newspaper media, this paper examines the discourse of the ‘terrorist threat’ in an age of insecurity and how this discourse manipulates traditional understandings of citizenship and justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article analyses the forms of consciousness that inform Australian Muslim responses to Islamophobia in the context of the War on Terror, particularly since the emergence of Islamic State (‘IS’). As my responses cover a plethora of political action, resistance and conduct, my sites of enquiry are specifically confined to the forms of consciousness that inform the tendency for key Muslim community organisations to issue condemnations of terrorist attacks involving Muslims, on the one hand, and Muslim individual and activists’ responses to Islamophobia on the other. The essential argument I advance is that internalised Islamophobia isonedimension (among many) that works quietly in the shadows of a certain politically reactive consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reinterprets Australia's motives for its 2003 intervention in the Solomon Islands. The central argument is that considerations of Australia's international reputation have not been afforded sufficient importance in explaining the Howard government's decision to intervene. A primary concern for the Howard government was to bolster Australia's reputation in the ‘War on Terror’ vis-à-vis the USA and the international community more broadly by being seen to maintain order in its regional sphere of responsibility. The article establishes the historical basis for Canberra's claims to a special responsibility for the South-West Pacific region. It then demonstrates the close connection between Australia's responsibility for order in its region and the reputational norms that evolved during the early years of the War on Terror. These claims are substantiated through an analysis of the Solomon Islands crisis from June 2000 until the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands was deployed in July 2003. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores the relationship between language and political possibility. It is argued that John Howard's language from 11 September 2001 to mid 2003 helped to enable the 'War on Terror' in an Australian context in three principal ways. Firstly, through contingent and contestable constructions of Australia, the world and their relationship, Howard's language made interventionism conceivable. Secondly, emphasising shared values, mateship and mutual sacrifice in war, Howard embedded his foreign policy discourse in the cultural terrain of 'mainstream Australia', specifically framing a foreign policy discourse that was communicable to 'battlers' and disillusioned 'Hansonites'. Thirdly, positioning alternatives as 'un-Australian', Howard's language was particularly coercive, silencing potential oppositional voices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon marked the advent of an unprecedented preoccupation with terrorism. Although Australia's actual terrorist risk profile remains marginal in comparison with other mortality risks, in times of crisis, the reasoned negotiation of risk is marginalised. Drawing on the findings of qualitative research, this article offers an analysis of how Australians are responding to the threat of terrorism embodied in a developing discourse of the war on terror and how they construct their perceptions of terrorist risk. The findings implicate community fear as a factor that should be considered in the development of counter terrorism strategies that emphasize community engagement as a mechanism for challenging radicalisation in democratic states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Australia, John Howard's coalition government responded to the attacks of September 2001 by introducing a series of bills that would grant the executive and the security services unprecedented new powers in its 'war on terror', and by committing troops to Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. Australia governments normally dominate the lower House of Representatives whereas the Senate, with near co-equal powers, elected by proportional representation, and thus usually denying the government or opposition an overall majority, proved to be a more significant obstacle, often requiring the government to make substantial concessions in order to secure passage of its legislation. Following the 2005 General Election, however, Howard's coalition secured a rare Senate majority, which it was anticipated would curtail parliament's ability to block or amend legislation. In the event, the Senate continued to play a role, albeit a diminished one, in shaping Australia's 'war on terror'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the impact of international conflicts involving the Muslim world upon Australia's multicultural society by studying the Howard government's responses to tensions between Islam and the West since September 11. Specifically, it surveys the Howard government's participation in the 'War on Terror', other aspects of Australia's foreign and security policies, including the relationship with the United States, the emergence of immigration and refugee flows as national security issues, and the subsequent impact of all this on multiculturalism and in particular on Australia's Muslim community. At a broader level, the article challenges the argument that foreign policy is inconsequential for social policy, intercommunal, inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations. The internalization of the 'War on Terror' has reinforced a negative portrayal of Islam and Muslims in Australia by blurring the dividing line between 'Islam' on the one hand and 'extremism' and 'terrorism' on the other. The evidence suggests that government statements and policies, more generally had provoked apprehension amongst a wide cross-section of the Australian Muslim community. A major finding of this article is that unless care is taken, it is not inconceivable that the hitherto harmonious relationship between Muslims and other sections of Australia's community could be unnecessarily endangered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the foreign policy of Australia as of June 2002. Role of Australia in the war against terrorism; Information on the policy of Australia regarding refugees; Details on the relation of Australia with Africa.

The authors respond to the article "Returning to history: The ethics of researching asylum seeker health in Australia," by D. Zion and others. They suggest that although the Australian detention policy is atypical among Western countries, it is consistent with government measures taken against the "War on Terror."