Search

The local community in the Polish-Russian border area has been experiencing constant closures and openings since the delimitation of the border. Despite that, the residents used the border as a resource until the outbreak of war in Ukraine. All actions of the central authorities restricting cross-border mobility in the Polish-Russian borderland were treated by the residents as a temporary impediment, to which they were, to some extent, accustomed as they lived in a region with strong exposure to geopolitical risks. With the outbreak of war, the Polish-Russian border area became an isolated border region. Residents of the Polish-Russian borderland face the challenge of reorganizing their daily lives and counteracting the negative effects of permanent isolation. This article seeks to investigate how the Russian-Ukrainian conflict affects the daily lives of these residents through a series of expert interviews. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, has led to a significant civilian involvement in Israel, particularly among immigrants from the former Soviet Union, who began to provide humanitarian assistance, including interpreting. Highlighting the interrelation between translation and migration, I argue that the war strongly affects multiple hybrid identities of immigrant-interpreters who along with interlingual translation engage also in processes of cultural (self-re)translation. Scholarly attention for such experiences has been relatively limited, since most research on interpreting in war and conflict has prioritized interpreter experiences within war struck regions. Little attention has also been devoted to the work of (conference) interpreters who are themselves immigrants. In this autoethnographic study therefore, I present my own experience during the war as both an immigrant from Russia and a conference interpreter who works with Russian and Hebrew. I discuss several aspects pertinent to the immigrant-interpreter experience within and beyond the interpreting practice: being part of a collective of immigrants, involved in humanitarian assistance; negotiating the devaluation of Russian(ness); facing challenges to the (in)visibility, implied in the interpreter's role; and moving in-between the origin and the host countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the course of the war in Ukraine, various actors have employed a unique type of deterrence by denial: namely, the threat to deliver arms. NATO leaders have committed—through rhetoric and deeds—to continue to deliver weapons to Ukraine if Russia escalated the war in order to deny Russian success. Not only is this type of strategy undertheorized, but it also challenges the distinction between direct and extended deterrence that has been central to deterrence scholarship. In deterrence by delivery of arms, the patron deters not by threatening to fight or deploy forces, but by committing to send weapons. However, the strategy also requires the protégé's ability to fight. Studying deterrence by delivery of arms opens up understudied areas of deterrence (by denial), and provides a useful opportunity to consider how prominent concepts contribute to the research but also at times limit it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ensuring security has always been an extremely important aspect of its development and existence in every country. In order to ensure internal and external security, it is necessary to clearly understand the threats that may impede the normal functioning of the state. To this end, state so relevant international organizations always identify threats in their security concepts. However, the hybrid threat definition still lacks a clear, unifying definition and its concept acquires a new meaning in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The purpose of the article is to analyse the peculiarities and concept of temporary protection under EU law and the doctrinal approaches of researchers, as well as to analyse hybrid threats in the context of the European countries' borderless policy, considering the current situation. The authors compare the characteristics of temporary protection, as well as changes in the interpretation of hybrid threats until 2022 and after. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]