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While the decision to invade all of Ukraine and Russia's atrocious behavior and disastrous performance in the war may seem surprising and even irrational, Russia has in fact followed patterns that it used in the recent past with the two Chechen wars of 1994–1996 and 1999–2009. In this article, we compare key similarities and differences in the two Russo-Chechen wars and the current war on Ukraine by analyzing three aspects of the wars: Russian political strategy in the territories, Russian military strategy and conduct, and the Russian state's approach to war-related information and media campaigns. By drawing these comparisons, we hope to show how Russia's past war strategies in Chechnya might shed light on outcomes in Ukraine. In addition, in showing the similarities between Russian actions in Chechnya and Ukraine we highlight the argument that Russia is treating Ukraine not as a sovereign state, but as a part of Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When states fight wars, they choose between multiple military strategies, e.g. whether to place boots on the ground or restrict efforts to an air campaign. We modify the standard crisis bargaining model to account for this by endogenizing a state's war strategy. Intuitively, states choose the more powerful strategy when the additional strength gained covers the additional costs of doing so. However, there is a counterintuitive second-order consequence of this. When stronger campaigns are expensive but still credible, states are more likely to reach a negotiated settlement to avoid the corresponding high costs. As the cost of the more powerful option increases, states substitute their actions with cheaper but weaker alternatives. Because of these lower costs, states become less likely to reach a settlement. In some cases, both parties may be worse off as a result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article delves into the impact of Chinese military strategy during the Korean War and its interplay with US intelligence at the time. It posits that intelligence analysts must grasp Chinese military strategy as a cornerstone of their training to enhance their effectiveness in estimative, current, and warning intelligence for operational gains. Drawing from an array of authoritative primary and secondary sources, it seeks to illuminate instructive insights through a juxtaposition of Chinese strategic maneuvers and US intelligence efficacy. By joining select multiservice and multiagency experiences, this article propels the performance of the US intelligence community today, offering a yardstick to gauge contemporary advancements. Intelligence analysts and operational planning teams markedly enhance their achievements by drawing from historical precedents to decipher Chinese intentions and capabilities. Embracing this paradigm equips military operations to adeptly tackle the realistic tactical, operational, and strategic challenges confronting US forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1854 and 1856 the shape of private and public collections of arms, armour, and ordnance were influenced directly by the conflict with Russia, especially from the main theatre in the Crimea and its key military engagements including Alma, Balaklava, Inkerman, and Sevastopol. While antiquities and some examples of militaria had entered private collections through personal travel during the first half of the nineteenth century, it was the outbreak of war with Russia that perhaps had the strongest influence on collections. The new theatre of war provided fresh opportunities to begin a collection or expand an existing one. Moreover, a greater number of individuals from all levels of society were given chances to acquire objects than hithertofore, from militaria to objets d'art to ordinary domestic items. Pictures and photographs were often the most highly prized, particularly of the time before war had started and the destruction of cities such as Sevastopol had occurred.1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines the complex dynamics of proxy wars and militancy driven by the geopolitical rivalries between France and Russia in Africa. Focusing on conflict zones such as the Central African Republic, Mali, and Libya, it explores how these powers use local armed groups to secure strategic interests and access to resources. The study highlights the historical context of African nations as former colonies, particularly noting how dependent policy agreements with France maintain neocolonial ties. Through a comparative analysis of French and Russian military and political strategies, the research reveals significant impacts on regional stability and governance. It also addresses the humanitarian toll, including displacement and human rights abuses, and the economic damage from resource exploitation. The study underscores the greed of both nations for Africa's natural wealth, exacerbating conflicts and impeding development. Furthermore, the research evaluates international responses, focusing on the roles of the United Nations and the African Union in conflict mediation and peacekeeping. By providing a comprehensive analysis of these geopolitical maneuvers, the study aims to shed light on the broader implications for African security and development. It offers strategic policy recommendations to mitigate conflict, enhance stability, and promote sustainable peace, guiding policymakers, scholars, and international bodies in addressing the challenges posed by Franco-Russian rivalries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The celebrated idea of Prussian war strategist Carl von Clausewitz regarding conventional warfare played a dominant role up to the First World War in the West. In his seminal work "On War", Clausewitz posits: "If you want to overcome your enemy, you must match your efforts against the power of resistance!" In a way, his idea was akin to annihilating the enemy's army in major battles. However, this idea was challenged by British military strategist Basil Henry Liddell Hart in his book, titled "The Strategy", by proposing a different military theory called "Indirect Approach". The objective of this paper is based on making a comparative analysis between Clausewitz and Liddell Hart regarding the utility of their military theories in modern warfare. While taking a methodology based on a comparative analysis of the utility of the two doctrines, this paper explores the effectiveness of those military strategies against the current asymmetries in modern warfare. To buttress the reliability of this research, the examples from the Ukrainian war and the Sri Lankan civil war between 1990 and 2009 will be examined. The main objectivity of this paper lies in creating a novel discussion on the merits and demerits of Clausewitz and Basil Liddell Hart's theories of war in contemporary warfare. The results emerging from this research will demonstrate the relevance of re-reading both Clausewitz and Liddell Hart in an era where the orthodox idea of warfare is at stake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary wars illustrate the profound challenges faced by military leaders. The dynamics of warfare have transcended traditional notions of control as the battlefield has become increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA), as noted by the military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, who proclaimed, "war is the realm of uncertainty." Faced with this reality, military organizations are compelled to adapt rapidly to the changing environment. This essay explores the applicability and potential benefits of the VUCA PRIME behavioral leadership model within the Colombian Aerospace Force, with the aim to provide this organization with a tool based on four core elements: "Vision," "Understanding," "Clarity," and "Agility," enabling it to effectively address the challenges faced by her military leaders when they dealing with volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous situations. By examining how these model components can guide decision-making and leadership qualities, this essay aims to underscore the imperative role of the VUCA PRIME model in transforming the approach of the Colombian Aerospace Force towards the complexities of the VUCA environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The celebrated idea of Prussian war strategist Carl von Clausewitz regarding conventional warfare played a dominant role up to the First World War in the West. In his seminal work "On War", Clausewitz posits: "If you want to overcome your enemy, you must match your efforts against the power of resistance!" In a way, his idea was akin to annihilating the enemy's army in major battles. However, this idea was challenged by British military strategist Basil Henry Liddell Hart in his book, titled "The Strategy", by proposing a different military theory called "Indirect Approach". The objective of this paper is based on making a comparative analysis between Clausewitz and Liddell Hart regarding the utility of their military theories in modern warfare. While taking a methodology based on a comparative analysis of the utility of the two doctrines, this paper explores the effectiveness of those military strategies against the current asymmetries in modern warfare. To buttress the reliability of this research, the examples from the Ukrainian war and the Sri Lankan civil war between 1990 and 2009 will be examined. The main objectivity of this paper lies in creating a novel discussion on the merits and demerits of Clausewitz and Basil Liddell Hart's theories of war in contemporary warfare. The results emerging from this research will demonstrate the relevance of re-reading both Clausewitz and Liddell Hart in an era where the orthodox idea of warfare is at stake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his political relations, the holy prophet (SAW) used strategies of various types, one of which was the military one. In this regard, some questions to answer concern the nature of military strategies used by the prophet and the extent to which he employed them to fulfill his aims and to adjust political relations. The outcome of this stance is evident in his political relations. The findings of the present descriptive-analytical study that surveys historical sources show that the prophet (SAW) made the least use of military attacks, and mainly benefited from defensive positions as a deterrence strategy aimed at stabilizing the Islamic government. To prove this, the present article provides evidence. The results also show that although the prophet's military actions were merely defensive, he has used his war tactics so accurately that he could alter the political relations in the Arabian Peninsula and encourage people to accept Islam. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study demonstrates the difference between contemporary Israeli military and national security operations under the 'Campaign between Wars' framework and the way Israel would wage a 'war for existence'. The paper first outlines Israeli military strategy and theory regarding an existential war, while aiming to show how Israel would use its military capabilities. The paper explains the most plausible scenario of a war between Israel and a peer competitor, namely Iran and its proxy network, and the question of using nuclear weapons. Finally, the study presents the potential effects of such war on Israel, its enemies and the region. The paper argues that the most important aspect of Israeli conventional and nuclear warfighting capabilities is that they provide such a robust deterrent that they make war extremely unlikely. However, Israeli deterrence is based on the firm belief that the preparation for the war for existence is the most significant national goal, thereby establishing Israel as a linchpin to the regional balance of power, as a regional great military power itself is incapable of becoming a regional hegemon while assertively balancing against any such contender. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking risks might be encouraged, both in business and military strategy, when the potential price of losing would not be excessive while the gains in winning, worth wagering such a bet. In military contexts, a side set on aggression and conquest might take such a risk. Chance, fortuna, determining the outcome of risk taking has been seen differently throughout history – fatalistically, as prevalent in the Middle Ages – as been something that could not be influenced, or, as in Antiquity and in more recent times, as a factor open to influence by the astute and forceful military commander, or to prudent planners. New situations could be seen as dangerous and risky, with risks against which one has to hedge. Or they could be seen as a chance to change things in one's own interest. This might be done through extensive contingency planning, or by seizing an opportunity quickly, applying the genius general's coup d'oeil to turn a new development to one's advantage, always conscious that this was a gamble and the outcome uncertain. While such a gamble could win or lose a battle and in turn a war, in the nuclear age, such a gamble would seem difficult to justify given the potential negative outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Journal on Criminology is the property of Policy Studies Organization and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In ethno-territorial civil wars, which factors influence whether rebels choose and retain conventional warfare as their primary military strategy throughout the conflict, or whether they use guerrilla warfare as a primary strategy during periods judged to be less advantageous to conventional warfare? The existing literature almost exclusively emphasizes relative power as the determining factor: rebels use guerrilla warfare because they typically lack the capability to fight conventional wars effectively against states. I find some support for this hypothesis: ethno-territorial rebels are much more likely to fight exclusively conventional wars when external states intervene conventionally on the rebel side. I also find that rebel leaders with more intense, far-reaching nationalist goals are more likely to employ guerrilla warfare as a primary war strategy. For such leaders, the higher costs of using guerrilla methods pending an eventual transition to conventional warfare are made more acceptable by a higher valuation of the far-reaching gains delivered by military victory—gains expected to be made more likely by interim periods in which guerrilla warfare is the primary strategy. Turning to other factors, I do not find that status quo conditions or a high level of state democracy have a significant influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations theory has long suggested that uncertainty during militarized crises pushes states to adopt escalatory behavior. However, the leadup to the Russo-Ukrainian War challenges this view, with Kyiv downplaying the risk of conflict and adopting a cautious foreign policy. I argue that Ukrainian behavior in the leadup to the war demonstrates the need to disaggregate between types of uncertainty. While uncertainty over an adversary's intentions and capabilities can push a state to adopt escalatory behavior, uncertainty regarding a potential adversary's military strategy and regarding the level of support it can expect from third parties incentivizes a state to assume a more cautious posture. The piece concludes with a reflection on disciplinary blind spots regarding the impact of uncertainty on state decision-making and offers suggestions for overcoming them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indian military strategy has tended to neglect the link between the conventional and nuclear domains in a nuclear weapons environment. We argue that this anomaly is evident in two broad areas: the conception of "war," and the complexity produced by new technologies that span the two domains. First, we show with empirical evidence that "limited war" in a nuclear environment is misnomer: the reality is more appropriately called "marginal conflict" owing to its extremely restricted nature. It follows that strategic planning and posture must be tailored accordingly. We then highlight the risk of escalation produced by conventional technologies that carry potential cross-domain nuclear effects, noteably with respect to cyber, artificial intelligence, missile defence and space. We note that the complex strategic effects produced also complicate military-strategic interactions traversing geographic domains, noteably South, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia. The paper concludes with some reflections on the reasons for these lacunae in Indian strategic thinking and what might be done about them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2020, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced the development of a new operational concept called Decisive Victory that aimed to change the way Israel fights wars and to redefine victory on the battlefield. The root cause of this change was the evolution in nonstate threats from armed groups in Gaza and Lebanon. The concept was to drive major reforms of the IDF in training, interoperability among the services, weapons procurement, and civil‐military relations. However, the efforts encountered significant challenges in terms of politics, financial resources, and the implications for the IDF's force structure. This article examines these developments to shed light on the evolving way of war in the Middle East and the struggle within the IDF to redefine its posture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The complications presented to international criminal justice in general and to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in particular by individuals who at one time were victims such as those abducted as 'child soldiers' who later became Warlords, deserve to be revisted and unpacked. One such character is Dominic Ongwen who is a typical example of both a victim and a perpetrator of gross violations of human rights, war crimes and genocide. The purpose of this article is six-fold. First, to explore the intersection between political and war criminality. Second, to unpack Ongwen's conviction and its implications for various stakeholders. Third, I expand on the role of spirituality in shaping the behaviour of combatants and military strategy. Fourth, I diagnose the futility of the ICC's 'distant justice' which operates by 'exporting criminality' and 'importing justice'. Fifth, I propose how to turn Ongwen from an international criminal justice liability into an asset. Lastly, I conclude by proposing a rethinking of international criminal justice by embracing 'survivors' justice' at the ICC. This way, both perpetrators and victims (survivours) can be rehumanised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Errors in ancestry prediction for historical military casework result in soldiers unable to be interred to the country they fought and died for. Australian WWII soldiers with varying degrees of European and Asian heritage are expected in the remains recovered in the Asia-Pacific, representing the greatest risk of error for Unrecovered War Casualties-Army (UWC-A). Previous research using the Ghaiyed population-specific panel (GPSP), on a modern British sample, demonstrated less variation in family-level admixture compared to four global ancestry panels. This suggested that the targeting of specific populations of interest may improve accuracy, although an evaluation using a sample of WWII-era European-Australians (W2A) with varying degrees of family-level admixture was required. This paper outlines the development of an ancestry prediction strategy using a W2A sample (non-admixed), and simulation of 4,000 genotypes representing Australian pedigrees with one Japanese ancestor (great-great-grandparent, great-grand-parent, grandparent, and parent). All great-great-grandparent to grandparent profiles were accurately predicted as W2A individuals, and although admixture at the parent level could not be resolved, no profiles were incorrectly assigned Japanese ancestry. The GPSP provided more informative predictions in contrast with the mitochondrial DNA/Y-chromosome lineage approach currently used by UWC-A as the GPSP provides an approximately 75% improvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The abduction and forced marriage of females was a key military strategy of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) during northern Uganda's civil war (1986–2007). Thousands of abducted girls became pregnant from sexual violence, giving birth to large numbers of children born of war. This article explores the experiences of 85 children born in LRA captivity, with a particular focus on the implications and meaning of both land and place. In the aftermath of the war, these children have been compelled to integrate into families and communities that often reject them because of their birth origins, identities, and former LRA affiliation. Facing multiple post-war challenges including poverty, and discrimination, many participants sought to retrace and reconnect with their paternal families to secure a better future. We highlight the important role of both land and place in the lives of children born in LRA captivity, particularly as it relates to belonging, social acceptance, and financial security. We conclude with a discussion of the potential risks and benefits of family tracing endeavors with children born of war in northern Uganda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russo–Ukrainian war has lasted longer than expected due to a combination of two reasons: security threats and military‐strategic conflicts. It turned out that through this conflict, the paradigm of war has changed rapidly enough to be called a game changer. This article aims to provide a theoretical analysis of the main factors in Russia's foreign policy that concern a security threat to the instability of the geopolitical buffer zone and Greater Eurasian military strategy, including the leadership of Putinism 4.0, which influenced the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It examines the development aspects and implications of special military Operation Z, which is regarded as Russia's defense military strategy against conflicts with NATO's eastward expansion and Eurasian pluralism. The analysis found that Russia's military strategy and foreign policy will be preemptive and proactive in seeking international security and global order, but at times, however, they show defensive and reactive characteristics. As examined, external factors such as security threats to the identity of a great power in Eurasia, instability in the buffer zone, fear of encirclement on the border, and historical and ethnic factors are expected to serve as constant variables in the decision‐making process of Russia's military strategy and foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The military career of the Marquis of Távara, a less well-known historical figure among the nobility of Early Modern Spain, deserves attention because his life-experience progressed from his local roles in particular kingdoms to culmination in major duties such as President of the Council of Orders. His career advanced from mere adventurer to maestre de campo (field commander of a tercio), thereafter he held vice-regal office in Sicily and Navarre and the captaincies-general of Aragon, Galicia, Old Castile and Extremadura, and he was involved in the wars against the Portuguese and Catalans during the crisis of the 1640s. Also, he held responsibility for the Monarchy's entire artillery, and he became an active member of the Council of War. Quite apart from his aristocratic origins, this paper explores how his meritorious military career in combination with his three strategic marriages assisted him in setting and shaping a strategy for military promotion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Deception has long been an essential component of military operations. It can be considered a tactic as old as warfare, having been used since immemorial times. From Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” to the present days, military strategists have recognized its power to turn the tide of conflict. Although, over the years, the methods, means and techniques specific to it have continuously evolved, along with technological developments, its basic principle remains the same: portraying a false reality to the adversary that leads to the materialization of operational opportunities, by causing the adversary to adopt courses of action disadvantageous to him. As the battlefield has become increasingly complex, the ability to deceive the adversary has also become an increasingly important asset to the success of military operations. Today, in an era of instant and abundant information, deception has paradoxically become more difficult to achieve and more critical to operational success. The deceptive action of the Ukrainians at Kherson last September against the Russians once again demonstrated its importance on the modern battlefield. However, many military planners tend to overlook this key aspect of military strategy despite its importance. This oversight can lead to grave consequences in the modern battlefield, where the enemy’s ability to gather intelligence can hinder operational success. For this reason, the present paper is an analysis of how deception actions can be integrated into the operational planning process at the operational level in order to maximize the chances of their success and, consequently, the military operation success. The need for such a scientific approach arises from the complexity of the deception process, which places a special emphasis not only on the thoroughness in planning these actions but also on the need to integrate and synchronize them with other military actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the gap caused by civil-military activity and its effects on strategy is essential to the practice of strategy. Based on the analysis of cases of intrinsic value, the practice of strategy is assessed to show that the discrepancy between politics and military strategy results from the fact that war, as a policy-dependent variable, assumes unpredictable variations, meaning that strategy, as an intervening variable and as an activity resulting from civil-military relations, must be defined as a theory of success. The argument is based on three explanations for the existence of that gap: (1) the nature of war influences the nature and effectiveness of military strategy, because the actors involved in the process act in an environment of great unpredictability; (2) the stability and coherence of the relationship between politics and war, embodied in the practice of military strategy, makes it necessary to consider the purpose of strategy is success; (3) the effectiveness of civil-military relations is crucial to reducing the natural tensions between politics and military action. It is concluded that military strategy because of civil-military relations follows the dynamics of the complex relationship between politics and war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Why does combat success sometimes fail to produce a stable and durable post-war settlement? In the 1965 war, India successfully defended against a Pakistani invasion, but did not improve the long-term security of Kashmir or establish deterrence against Pakistan. I argue that, to deter rivals after war, states must couple battlefield success with credible signals of resolve, such as retaining captured territory or risking a wider war. In 1965, India used both denial and punishment strategies, but both failed to establish post-war deterrence because it judged the necessary signals of resolve to be too costly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article tests the hypothesis according to which Russia’s military strategy and the ideas of the country’s main ideologists can be linked to a war waged for the sake of religion. The author also attempts to assess to what extent such a link finds practical confirmation in the current Russian-Ukrainian war. The research focuses simultaneously on the analysis of two different areas: firstly, what is expressed in words, what is declared, and secondly, what is manifested in actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last decade of colonial Portuguese Guinea (now Guiné-Bissau), the Portuguese government accelerated the process of territory occupation. While colonial administration announced to promote and improve living conditions of the Guinean population, nevertheless the population experienced a violent intrusion in their private and public life by the colonial authorities. The effective territory occupation and the clash with the rural population started during the War of Independence and especially during the government of Governor General António de Spínola (1968-1972) under the so-called “Uma Guiné Melhor” (“A Better Guinea”) plan. This plan was not only a psychological-propaganda campaign, but also a clear military occupation strategy to achieve the implementation of “strategic camps that imprison” the local population (Ledda, 1970: 119). The aim of this paper is to examine the construction of those strategic camps, to explore the housing typologies and to question the social, spatial and economic impact on the life of the rural Guinean population. This article also aims to frame the controversial messages of the integration policy acclaimed in the “Uma Guiné Melhor” plan by exploring and analysing the strategies of spatialization of people in action between 1968-1973. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper provides a discussion of various aspects of Chechen relation to the war in Ukraine, including oppositional voices as well as discourses and actions of those supporting the Russian position. The article compares and contrasts the war in Ukraine with the two wars Russia waged against Chechnya in 1994 and 1999. Commenting on the war in Ukraine, the author focuses on the phenomenon of the 'Kadyrovites' (Chechen auxiliary troops fighting on the Russian side) on the one hand and Chechen units fighting on the Ukrainian side on the other. It is argued that the silence of the international community in the Chechen war afforded Russia a sense of impunity, thus reinforcing its reckless military strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the causes of Russia's war on Ukraine, which is based on political and geopolitical interests, economic and military strategies, ambitions of individual political leaders, and mentality factors. The ontological basis of the war is the historically formed fundamental difference between the spiritual world, mentality traits of Ukrainians and Russians, which formed under the influence of a particular culture, with its ethnic, value and worldview coordinates, and under the influence of ideologies that determined the features of social and political life at different historical times. A strong spiritual system is created in the social and cultural space of the state, which preserves its values from generation to generation in the culture, forming a stable mentality and enduring attitudes. Their conceptual comprehension expands the context of cause-and-effect connections, helps to understand the situation more deeply and to choose optimal effective mechanisms for gradually successfully resolving the complex geopolitical situation that threatens the whole world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Land productivity and terrain characteristics play a critical role in determining the outcome of wars, yet this aspect is often overlooked in the academic literature on wars. This study aims to fill this gap by developing a comprehensive framework for objectively evaluating the factors contributing to military victories in historical battlespaces, focusing on land attributes. The Battle of Adwa, fought between the Ethiopian and Italian armies in 1896, was chosen as the case study. The factors identified in military literature were categorized into three groups: defining factors such as leadership, courage, army count, and artillery, limiting factors such as topographic variables, and reducing factors such as food availability. To quantify the battlespace capability of the two warring armies, a weighted scoring method was developed using historical information and environmental data. However, due to the scarcity of past environmental data, the space-for-time substitute technique was used to reconstruct and determine land characteristics from the 1890s. The results of the framework showed that the Ethiopian army outperformed the Italian army in terms of defining factors and overcoming terrain and logistic limitations. If the two armies had fought based solely on defining factors, with similar terrain and food supply conditions, the Italian army would have suffered more casualties than in history. This study's methodology can be replicated in other historical wars to objectively evaluate warring parties, which ultimately contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the interplay between land productivity, terrain characteristics, and military outcomes and can contribute to advancing military and environmental history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peter Lorge's book, "Sun Tzu in the West: The Anglo-American Art of War," explores the influence of the ancient Chinese text, "The Art of War," in Western popular culture. Lorge examines the translations and interpretations of Sun Tzu's work, tracing its impact in the Western world. He highlights the significant role played by Samuel Griffith's translation and Basil Liddell Hart's interpretation in popularizing Sun Tzu's ideas, particularly the concept of indirect strategy. Lorge's analysis also addresses the historical context and the growing interest in non-Western approaches to war during the mid-20th century. The book raises important questions about the understanding of Chinese military strategy and its relevance in contemporary times. [Extracted from the article]

The 2018 United States (US) National Military Strategy claimed that professional military education (PME) in the US had 'stagnated'. Since then the 2020 US Joint Chiefs of Staff publication Developing Today's Joint Officer's for Tomorrow's Ways of War can be seen as a direct response to such stagnation. The associated temporal positionings of war from stagnation, to today's officers, to tomorrow's ways of war, reinforce the significance of wartime in how professional military education is framed. In this paper I ask: To what extent do professional military education mission statements rely on frames of wartime for a construction of purpose, what are the implications of such framings for goals of minimizing violence and suffering, and how may such potential limitations be addressed in the classroom? A focus on wartime can help us draw out significant strategic and ethical challenges of conflict termination alongside 'forever wars', the normalization of exceptional security practices and violence, and the way in which prioritizations of either doing war 'better' or minimizing the likelihood of war are in seemingly direct epistemological competition. Given a goal of less insecurity, in an era in which fewer and fewer wars actually 'end' or 'end' with a sense of victory, I assess the extent to which engaging critical approaches in PME may help or hinder the need to challenge self-propagating dynamics of wartime that may be limiting efforts at lessening violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Taiwan Strait poses a risk of war at any time due to a combination of international political factors such as China's national strength, willingness to unify, Taiwan's independence, and the U.S.-China leadership competition. In this situation, this paper analyzed the scenario of China's invasion of Taiwan, and considered the comparison of military power on both sides and the direction of Taiwan's military power construction. In conclusion, the war in the Taiwan Strait is likely to trigger geopolitical conflicts between the United States and North Korea on the Korean Peninsula, and the ROK will have to respond to diplomatic and security challenges simultaneously. Therefore, we must face up to the fact that tensions and crises between the two sides in the Taiwan Strait are directly linked to the security crisis on the Korean Peninsula. It is necessary to closely monitor the conflict between the two sides and preemptively prepare diplomatic and security response strategies for each situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I formalize interactions between an endogenously rising challenger and a rival defender who can accept the challenger's rise, go to war before the rise comes to fruition, or degrade the challenger's growth through low-level conflict operations that I call "hassling." The novelty here is that the defender has private information about its hassling capabilities; this implies that the challenger does not know how much it can rise without provoking the defender to hassle or go to war. I find that when the defender's ability to hassle improves, it can provoke a strategic response in the challenger that undermines the defender's ability to use its private information productively and results in lower utility for the defender. This model provides insight into both Saddam Hussein's decision-making leading up to the 2003 US invasion and the stability-instability paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unrestricted war, defined as a war that exceeds limits, has been well-studied since its conceptual origin in 1999. However, in the West, it has been used mainly to analyze the balance of power strategies, ignoring its potential to study intra-state conflicts. This article analyzes how the organized armed group National Liberation Army (ELN) employs unrestricted warfare in Colombia. First, the concept of unrestricted warfare is developed. Then, the ELN is analyzed from its identity, ideology, and interaction with the setting. Finally, eight variables of unrestricted warfare are addressed, evaluating whether the ELN applies them. It is concluded that this group has changed its strategy towards omnidirectionality, and recommendations are made for the Colombian State in its fight against this threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Collegium Antropologicum is the property of Croatian Anthropological Society and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this applied research is to design the ontology of military history domain of the Iran-Iraq war, in order to represent the sources of this domain. No specialized tools such as thesaurus or ontology have been designed to organize information in the Iran-Iraq war domain. To meet the information needs of researchers in this domain, we need representation of concepts in this domain. Since ontology is currently the most accurate tool available, this tool has been designed in this research. In this study, the content analysis method and domain analysis approach were used to extract the concepts and relationships between them. Noy and McGuinness seven-way method was used to design ontology in a manual process. The research community is all written sources in the category of military history of the Iran-Iraq war. Sampling was done purposefully and 18 volumes of books from the category of military history of the Iran-Iraq war, available in the specialized library of the Hozeh Honari, were selected to analyze and extract key concepts and relations. After the initial study and extraction of key concepts and relationships, in order to confirm the accuracy of the extracted items, the opinion of military experts in this domain was applied in the research and the final approval of the experts was received. Protégé 5.5.0 software was used to formalize these concepts. Finally, the ontology of the military history of the Iran-Iraq war was designed with 880 axiom, 54 classes, 76 individuals, 32 object property, 24 data type property, and 2 annotation data type properties. The main classes of this ontology include: military strategy with 11 subclasses, military operations with 11 subclasses, commanders with 5 subclasses, military organization with 17 subclasses, and war support with 5 subclasses. Designed ontology, in addition to representing concepts and semantic relationships in the domain of military history of the Iran-Iraq war, can also be used to improve information retrieval in the process of organizing and query expansion in storage and retrieval systems. This representation provides an overview of the military history of the Iran-Iraq war to researchers and scholars, and can also be used as a tool for organizing war resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The globalization of Mao Zedong Thought has recently received increased attention from historians and political scientists. Within this growing scholarship, ideology and state repression have been emphasized. However, the military aspect of Mao's revolutionary schemata has received less attention, and it was precisely in the mountains of China where the Maoist concept of people's war took root. With its focus on political persuasion and irregular warfare, people's war was an effective strategy for anti-colonial rebels to wage armed struggle against stronger conventional militaries. Using multinational archival documents, state media sources, leader's speeches, as well as secondary sources, this paper looks at the importance of mountains in Maoist people's war and the ways this military strategy influenced armed conflicts in China, Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Peru. As a strategy that stressed mobile warfare, agitprop, and the rebellious potential of the peasantry, Mao rewrote the guidebook of revolutionary war theory for Marxism-Leninism. As a military strategy that reverberated with national liberation movements in the rural margins of the Global South, the military aspects of people's war and more specifically the role of mountains in Maoist-influenced guerilla warfare should be taken into greater account by scholars of global Maoism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a detailed archaeological analysis of the Battle of Mallorca, an impactful yet understudied aspect of the Spanish Civil War, framed within the “Espais de la Batalla de Mallorca (2017–2022)” project. Conducted in the summer of 2019, the excavation at Son Carrió focused on a key area to understand the dynamics and consequences of this significant early military defeat for the Spanish Republic. Through the integration of archaeological data, historical documentation, and ethnography, the study employs a multifaceted approach that enriches our understanding of both the military strategies employed and the everyday realities faced by individuals during the conflict. The research highlights how the combination of landscape archaeology, memory studies, and heritage studies can provide profound insights into the way battles shape physical and cultural landscapes. These theoretical frameworks help articulate how material remnants and spatial configurations from the battle contribute to ongoing cultural memory and heritage preservation efforts. By examining the material culture and defensive structures discovered at Son Carrió, the study offers new perspectives on the combatants’ experiences and the broader sociopolitical implications of the war. This comprehensive examination not only deepens the historiography of the Spanish Civil War but also advocates for the integration of diverse theoretical perspectives in reconstructing historical events. The findings demonstrate the value of archaeological studies in revealing nuanced narratives that contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of past conflicts, emphasizing the role of archaeology in bridging the gap between historical events and contemporary collective memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The environmental conditions generated by war and characterized by poverty, undernutrition, stress, difficult access to safe water and food as well as lack of environmental and personal hygiene favor the spread of many infectious diseases. Epidemic typhus, plague, malaria, cholera, typhoid fever, hepatitis, tetanus, and smallpox have nearly constantly accompanied wars, frequently deeply conditioning the outcome of battles/wars more than weapons and military strategy. At the end of the nineteenth century, with the birth of bacteriology, military medical researchers in Germany, the United Kingdom, and France were active in discovering the etiological agents of some diseases and in developing preventive vaccines. Emil von Behring, Ronald Ross and Charles Laveran, who were or served as military physicians, won the first, the second, and the seventh Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine for discovering passive anti-diphtheria/tetanus immunotherapy and for identifying mosquito Anopheline as a malaria vector and plasmodium as its etiological agent, respectively. Meanwhile, Major Walter Reed in the United States of America discovered the mosquito vector of yellow fever, thus paving the way for its prevention by vector control. In this work, the military relevance of some vaccine-preventable and non-vaccine-preventable infectious diseases, as well as of biological weapons, and the military contributions to their control will be described. Currently, the civil–military medical collaboration is getting closer and becoming interdependent, from research and development for the prevention of infectious diseases to disasters and emergencies management, as recently demonstrated in Ebola and Zika outbreaks and the COVID-19 pandemic, even with the high biocontainment aeromedical evacuation, in a sort of global health diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deterrence studies have experienced four waves. The three first ones mainly focused on nuclear deterrence and the fourth one was aimed at deterring terrorism and the so-called «rogue states». However, deterrence below the threshold of war --that is, the conflict in the gray zone-- has received little attention. This article proposes an exploratory theoretical framework to deter escalation within conflicts in the gray zone. First, and based on a review of both classical and recent literature some fundamental principles of deterrence theory applicable to gray zone escalation are presented. Then, the why and how of escalation in the gray zone are discussed. Next, the article analyzes the challenges to deterrence in the first two rungs of the scalation ladder. Finally, the article presents a series of theoretical keys for the practice of deterrence of conflicts in the gray zone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the brutality of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, support or sympathy toward Russia is shown by some actors on the international stage. This could be attributed to the multi-facet information warfare conducted by Russia and its strategic partner China. However, the analysis of information warfare during the current war remains scattered. This article, therefore, adopts a documentary analysis of relevant documents and media sources to conceptualize the forms of information warfare used by these two countries to contribute to future studies. It then proceeds to discuss that the Russia-Ukraine war implies a growing use of information warfare in present and future wars under digitalization. Facing a growing threat posed to people's cognitive understanding, the democratic community has to be aware of this increasingly dangerous military strategy and develop corresponding solutions. This article suggests that different societal stakeholders must collaborate to develop comprehensive education and thus strengthen digital citizenship. This is vital to nurturing people into critical and responsible citizens, thus equipping themselves with the resilience needed to combat information warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Complutense de Educación is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)