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This paper investigates the relationship between state-based conflict and entrepreneurship. From a survey of the existing literature, we formulate two hypotheses: (1) state-based conflict has a negative association with productive and opportunity-motivated forms of entrepreneurship, and (2) a positive association with unproductive and necessity-motivated forms of entrepreneurship. We test these hypotheses by drawing on several state-based conflict and entrepreneurship measures, using appropriate estimators, and employing robustness checks. The evidence supports our hypotheses. Necessity-motivated start-up entrepreneurship is, on average, almost three times higher in countries in conflict than in countries not in conflict. Development level matters. In countries with less unemployment, more finance, and higher levels of physical, human capital and GDP, entrepreneurship is more resilient, and the ratio of female-to-male entrepreneurs in opportunity-motivated entrepreneurship higher.

We survey selected parts of the growing literature on the microeconomics of violent conflict, identifying where academic research has started to establish stylized facts and where methodological and knowledge gaps remain. We focus our review on the role of civilian agency in conflict; on wartime institutions; and on the private sector in conflict. Future research requires new and better sources of data on conflict and conflict impacts, including from household surveys in conflict-affected areas. Impact evaluations can also be valuable sources of insights about how conflict impacts on people and how peacebuilding and reconstruction can be improved. We also see the need for much more detailed studies on the long-term impacts of conflict; on the linkages between agriculture, food security, and conflict; on the role of technology for peace; and on the micro-macro linkages of conflict, as well its macroeconomic costs. Finally, future research would benefit from linking analysis of large-scale violent conflict with other forms of violence, instability, fragility, and humanitarian crises.

The objective of this thesis is to understand how poor farm households in developing countries are affected by and cope with the legacy of internal war. The theoretical analysis is based on a peasant household model for land abundant countries as war can be shown to weaken markets, re-enforce household subsistence and increase overall land abundance. The empirical analysis uses regression techniques and a household survey from post-war northern Mozambique to assess the implications of the war legacy for land access, coping strategies, and household welfare. The key findings include that war can enhance the degree of land abundance while also creating barriers to land access for some households, thus re-defining land abundance as a household-level concept. Land emerges as the least war vulnerable asset thus encouraging households to shift to land-based subsistence activities during the war. The experience of war increases the number of endogenously determined land variables, which should therefore be reflected in models of African land use. The thesis advances the literature of household coping strategies by focussing on little researched post-disaster and war-induced strategies. Households are found to respond to indirect war effects and thus to rely on subsistence and non-market activities and to make selective use of markets. Surprisingly, social exchange does not play a large role for insuring incomes. Finally, the thesis finds that the war legacy continues to depress household welfare for many years after the end of the conflict, which is attributed to a variety of poverty traps. Importantly, and in contrast to other studies of post-war Mozambique, education and cotton adoption are not found to enhance household welfare significantly but a larger area farmed does. The findings indicate that post-war reconstruction policy should re-capitalise household endowments and stimulate rural markets as part of a broadly based programme of rural development.

Afghanistan, Somalia und die Demokratische Republik Kongo sind Beispiele für Entwicklungsländer, die unter den Folgen von Krieg, Armut und instabilen demokratischen Strukturen leiden. Diese Länder sehen sich in Sicherheitsfragen einer sehr schwierigen Herausforderung gegenüber und brauchen internationale Unterstützung beim Wiederaufbauprozess. Derartige Prozesse können nur dann gelingen, wenn sie Hand in Hand gehen mit politischer Mitbestimmung. Nur so können sich eine verbesserte Sicherheitslage, eine wirtschaftliche Entwicklung auf breiter Basis sowie dies unterstützende politische Institutionen gegenseitig befruchten und verstärken. Es wird besondere auf fünf Lehren hingewiesen, die helfen können, gewaltsamen Konflikt nachhaltig zu überwinden. Wenn die Geberländer bzw. -institutionen sowie die betreffenden Staaten gleich zu Beginn des Wiederaufbauprozesses die richtigen Prioritäten setzen und diese Politik weiterhin beibehalten, dann ist ein Entkommen aus der "Konfliktfalle" möglich. Wenn diese Zusammenhänge jedoch vernachlässigt werden, schließt sich die Falle. In Afghanistan könnte es zu spät sein, die gegenwärtigen wirtschaftlichen, militärischen und politischen Maßnahmen erfolgreich anzupassen. Der Westen wird wahrscheinlich alternative Modelle für sein militärisches und wirtschaftliches Engagement in Afghanistan finden müssen.

In diesem Beitrag werden die bisherigen sowie die zukünftigen Gesamtkosten der Beteiligung Deutschlands am Krieg in Afghanistan geschätzt. Es handelt sich hierbei um eine Berechnung mit zahlreichen Unsicherheitsfaktoren, die auf mehreren wichtigen Annahmen basiert. Es werden verschiedene mögliche Szenarien bezüglich Dauer und Intensität der deutschen Beteiligung am Krieg in Afghanistan berücksichtigt. In einem realistischen Szenario, in dem Deutschland noch einige Jahre in Afghanistan präsent bleibt, schätzen wir die Gesamtkosten der deutschen Beteiligung am Krieg in Afghanistan auf 26 bis 47 Milliarden Euro. Sollte sich Deutschland dazu verpflichten, das Engagement in Afghanistan auszuweiten, und mit stärkerem Widerstand konfrontiert werden, stiegen die Kosten erheblich an. Falls sich Deutschland hingegen 2011 aus Afghanistan zurückzieht, belaufen sich die Gesamtkosten der deutschen Beteiligung am Afghanistankrieg auf 18 bis 33 Milliarden Euro. Diese großen Kostenspannen sind den Unsicherheitsfaktoren zuzuschreiben, auf deren Grundlage die Kosten geschätzt werden mussten. Unseren Schätzungen zufolge kostet jedes weitere Jahr, in dem Deutschland am Einsatz in Afghanistan teilnimmt, zusätzliche 2,5 bis 3 Milliarden Euro. Dies steht im Widerspruch zum offiziellen Kriegsbudget, das für das Jahr 2010 1 059 Millionen Euro beträgt.

In this working paper we provide an overview of two recent special journal issues on violent conflict and entrepreneurship. These are the special issue of the Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship (2011) and the special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (2013), devoted to the impact of violent conflict on entrepreneurship in developing countries. In the overview we start by defining entrepreneurship and conflict, and provide a succinct summary of the existing literature. From this it is clear there is a lack of studies dealing with how violent conflict impacts at the micro-level on firms or entrepreneurs. We then assess how the papers in the two special issues address this lacuna. We find from these that violent conflict has diverse impacts on entrepreneurs, firms, their investment and production processes, and that there are many ways to overcome the legacies of fighting. In fact, the post-war peace dividend and the reconstruction of markets and economies more generally, critically depend on public policies promoting entrepreneurship. Areas for further research are noted.

The overall goal of the report is to increase the capacity of researchers and policy makers to identify comparatively, and across time, how individuals, households and communities are affected by violent conflict. The report provides an extensive overview of existing practices and datasets used in this field of research. We investigate existing methodologies and data-bases used to operationalize the variables of interest and discuss the channels linking violent conflict to individual and household welfare. Special attention is paid to methodological issues on how to design a module and operationalize variables that allow researchers to analyze the welfare effects of violent conflict across countries and across time. We develop and discuss a generic household module that can be easily inserted into future socio-economic surveys implemented in conflict-affected countries. This module will enable researchers to address specific violence-related issues comparatively across different conflict settings and systematically across time. The module proposed builds on previous experiences on survey designs in conflict-affected areas. We review existing conflict- and violence-related questionnaires, with a special focus on World Bank's Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS), and propose suggestions on how to improve questionnaires in order to deepen the understanding of the nature of violent conflict and the channels whereby conflict and violence affect the welfare characteristics and choices of individuals and households in conflict areas.

We analyse the role of mass violent conflict in influencing individual expectations. We hypothesise that individuals are likely to report negative expectations if they were exposed to conflict events in the past. We combine individual and household level data from the Northern Uganda Livelihood Survey of 2007 with a disaggregated conflict exposure index based on the Armed Conflict Locations Events Data (ACLED). We run logistic regression models to study the strength of the association between conflict and expectations. Results indicate that conflict intensity is correlated with a decrease in the probability of expecting economic recovery. The effect of conflict on general welfare however is less robust.

This paper analyzes the distributive impacts of violent conflicts, which is in contrast to previous literature that has focused on the other direction. We use cross-country panel data for the time period 1960-2005 to estimate war-related changes in income inequality. Our results indicate rising levels of inequality during war and especially in the early period of post-war reconstruction. However, we find that this rise in income inequality is not permanent. While inequality peaks around five years after the end of a conflict, it declines again to pre-war levels within the end of the first post-war period. Lagged effects of conflict and only subsequent adjustments of redistributive policies in the period of post-war reconstruction seem to be valid explanations for these patterns of inequality. A series of alternative specifications confirms the main findings of the analysis.

This paper provides a critical analysis of the possible methods, data sources and the existing results of the field of 'the economic costs of mass violent conflict' by identifying strengths and weaknesses of the existing literature. The report evaluates content, methods, and data sources of the existing studies. Regarding the content, the studies offer a broad range of tested cause and impact variables. However, their selection of considered factors is quite sketchy, and a general theoretical underpinning is missing. This warrants above all a better understanding of the channels of indirect effects of the economic consequences of mass violent conflicts. Out of the combination of findings from the different studies we can hypothesize that investment, military expenditure, sectoral shifts, and institutions and policies are key channels. To consider the economic costs, aside from accounting, most studies rely on counterfactual regression analyses. Also with respect to the methodology, an evolutionary progress has not taken place in the literature. The most prominent data sets used are the COW and the UCDP/PRIO for conflicts and the Penn World Tables and the World Development Indicators for socioeconomic data. Based on the critical survey of the literature we propose three models for estimating crosscountry costs of mass violent conflict. These models differ by complexity, ranging from standard regression analysis to computable general equilibrium models. We also discuss other forms of violent conflicts and possibilities to analyze them by using the proposed models.

This paper analyses post-war coping strategies by farm households in developing countries. The analysis is based on a portfolio model of activity choices in war-affected rural Sub- Saharan Africa. A case study using farm household survey data estimates the determinants of agricultural coping strategies in post-war Mozambique. Post-war coping strategies differ from pre- and mid-crisis coping strategies. War-affected households are forced to adopt very risky coping strategies that re-enforce their vulnerability. Households choose between market and non-market forms of exchange and even consider exiting markets entirely. Post-war reconstruction policy should focus on re-capitalizing households, providing public goods and establishing markets.

This paper analyses the effects of activity choices on farm household income and consumption in a war-affected developing country. The study uses household survey data from Mozambique and controls for the endogeneity of activity choices with instrumental variables. War-time activity choices (such as subsistence farming) are shown to enhance welfare in the post-war period. Market and social exchange induce only limited welfare gains. Cotton adoption reduces household welfare, which contradicts previous studies not controlling for endogenous activity choices. The study thus demonstrates how standard predictions of economics may become invalid in post-war economies. Furthermore, the paper identifies pro-poor reconstruction policies.

The relationship between land investment and tenure security is usually tested in land scarce but peaceful areas. This article examines instead the effects of land abundance and war for investment and tenure security. The paper demonstrates that war enhances land abundance. This implies that farm size for the analysis of land investment and tenure security. The paper formally tests for land abundance and estimates a system of equations using farm survey data from post-war Mozambique. Farm size is found to be a key determinant of both investment and tenure security. This raises important policy issues for post-war reconstruction.

Militärdienst in Kriegsgebieten prägt das Leben von Millionen von Menschen weltweit. Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, besser zu verstehen wie und weshalb junge Männer Praktiken und Strategien von Armeen ausgesetzt sind, und wie diese Erfahrungen ihr langfristiges Verhalten prägen. Die Arbeit enthält drei eigenständige Essays, die diese Themen jeweils theoretisch als auch empirisch behandeln. Die empirische Analyse nutzt selbst erhobene Umfragedaten von 760 angolanischen Veteranen, detaillierte Einblicke in den lokalen Kontext und den angolanischen Bürgerkrieg als ein natürliches Experiment um kausale Mechanismen zu identifizieren. Kapitel 2 argumentiert, dass ein nichtstaatlicher Kriegsakteur ähnlich wie ein Staatsakteur in der Lage sein kann lokal Steuern zu erheben und, dass ein solcher Akteur Wehrpflicht zur Rekrutierung einsetzt. Kapitel 3 offenbart, dass Soldaten, die mehr in lokaler `governance` mit der Armee involviert sind, in der Nachkriegszeit im Durchschnitt mehr zur Herstellung öffentlicher Gütern beitragen. Mehr Erfahrung mit sozialer Kooperation stimuliert die Teilnahme in Planungsprozessen, während eine Verschiebung der politischen Präferenzen Beiträge zur Bereitstellung der Güter fördert. Kapitel 4 zeigt, dass Erlebnisse sexueller Gewalt gegen Zivilistinnen auf lange Sicht das Risiko von Gewalttaten gegen die eigene Partnerin erhöhen. Der Grund ist eine nachhaltige Reduzierung psychologischer Barrieren gegenüber Gewalt gegen Frauen. Die Arbeit trägt zu mehreren Literaturen zu den langfristigen Ursprüngen menschlichen Verhaltens und der Mechanik und Folgen gewaltsamer Konflikte bei. Die Befunde stellen konventionelle Rekrutierungsmodelle in Frage, vorherrschende Theorien häuslicher Gewalt, sowie unser Verständnis davon, wie Krieg lokal Institutionen verändert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen neue Wege auf, wie Entwicklungspolitik kriegsbedingte Verhaltensmuster angehen und sich zunutze machen kann, um dadurch mehr Kooperation und weniger Gewalt zu schaffen., Military service in conflict zones strongly marks the lives of millions of people across the world. The objective of this thesis is to contribute to understanding how and why young men are exposed to practices and policies by armed groups, and how these experiences affect their behavior in the long run. The thesis presents three self-contained essays that all address this objective theoretically and empirically. The empirical analysis relies on primary survey data from 760 Angolan veterans, uses deep insights into the local context and exploits the Angolan Civil War as a natural experiment to identify causal mechanisms. Chapter 2 argues that a non-state armed actor may – like a state actor – have the ability to tax a local population and will choose conscription as its primary recruitment policy. Chapter 3 exposes that former soldiers who were more involved in local governance during the war are significantly more likely to participate in collective public good production more than a decade after the end of the war. Gaining experience with social cooperation increases contributions to organizing public goods, while a shift in political preferences fosters participation in their delivery. Chapter 4 shows that exposure to sexual violence by armed groups significantly increases an individual’s long-term propensity to commit violence against an intimate partner. This effect is underpinned by a reduction of psychological barriers to violence against women. The thesis contributes to several literatures on the long-run individual-level origins of human behavior and on the conduct and consequences of armed conflict. The findings challenge conventional models of rebel recruitment, dominant theories of domestic violence and existing knowledge of how war affects local institutions. The findings can also help policymakers to tackle and leverage long-run impacts of conflict on behavior, in order to devise new policies for more cooperative and less violent societies.