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In this article, we examine the demand-and-supply dynamic of security policies. We argue there are two informational shortcuts through which voters process policy alternatives and choose among them: (1) their own personal experiences with violence and (2) candidates’ profiles. We test our argument through an original survey experiment conducted in Mexico. We model voters’ decisions to support candidates campaigning over a variety of security proposals. Our survey design takes advantage of recent developments in network models to better measure the effects of crime exposure on voters’ preferences. We find that higher exposure to crime victimization is associated with increased support for only some iron-fist policies, therefore highlighting the importance of unpacking security policies instead of generalizing the results of crime exposure. We show null effects of partisan advantages and reveal the role of non-partisan heuristics, such as the candidate’s professional experience, in preferences for security policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Electoral systems affect vote choice. While a vast literature studies this relationship by examining aggregate-level patterns and focussing on the interparty dimension of electoral rules, the convenience of analyzing this phenomenon by emphasizing the role played by the incentives to cultivate a personal vote generated by the system and matching voters with the party they vote for has been traditionally overlooked. In this article, we offer new evidence that documents the impact of the intraparty dimension of electoral systems on the levels of ideological voting registered in a democracy. Using spatial models of politics and employing data from the five waves of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, we find that ideological voting in proportional representation systems is higher when lists are either closed or flexible. Moreover, the results suggest that this effect is slightly amplified in the case of high numbers of district-level candidates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The publication of electoral results in real time is a common practice in contemporary democracies. However, delays in the reporting of electoral outcomes often stir up skepticism and suspicion in the vote-counting process. This issue urges us to construct a systematic test to distinguish delays attributable to manipulation to those resulting from a limited administrative capacity. This paper proposes a method to assess the potential sorting of the electoral results given the moment at which polling stations publish their vote totals. To do so, we model the time span for a polling station to report its electoral results, to identify those observations whose reported times are poorly explained by the model, and to assess a potential bias in the candidates' vote trends. We illustrate this method by analyzing the 2006 Presidential Election in Mexico, a contest that aroused suspicion from opposition parties and public opinion alike regarding how the electoral results were reported. The results suggest that polling stations' time logs mostly respond to their specific geographic, logistic, and sociodemographic features. Moreover, those observations that took longer than expected to report their returns had no systematic effect on the electoral outcome. The proposed method can be used as an additional post-election audit to help officials and party representatives evaluate the integrity of an election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Committee chairs are key positions in legislatures. Their holders are vested with important formal and informal powers. In this article, we make a comparative appraisal of the politics of committee chair assignment in Ireland and Spain. Using an original dataset that covers the past two decades in both countries, we make a twofold contribution. Based on Cox and McCubbins's partisan theory of US Congress, we first develop a framework for parliamentary democracies by showing that party leadership assigns legislators with low electoral vulnerability to committee chairs to buy their loyalty to the party. Furthermore, results suggest that those legislators are assigned to committee chairs to heighten their willingness to work for partisan public goods. Secondly, our contribution leverages electoral systems variation to show how different institutional environments produce similar outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]