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Interacting to reach a shared decision is an omnipresent component of human collaboration. We explored the interaction between dyads of individuals with different levels of expertise. The members of the dyads completed a number line task privately, jointly and privately again. In the joint condition, dyad members shared their private estimates and then negotiated a joint estimate. Both dyad members averaged their private individual estimates to determine joint estimates, thereby showing a strong equality bias. Their performance in the joint condition exceeded the performance of the dyad's best estimator, demonstrating interaction benefit, only when the dyad members had similar levels of expertise and when the averaged dyad performance was sufficiently accurate. At the end of the task, participants rated their level and their partner's level of competence. Participants were accurate in classifying themselves as the expert or the novice within the dyad. Nevertheless, novices tended to overestimate their ability as they admitted to being less competent but only slightly worse than their expert partner. Experts, instead, believed themselves to be more competent but were humble and considered their performance only marginally better than their partner's. Overall, these results have important implications for settings in which people with different levels of expertise interact. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).)

Background: People with Parkinson's disease (PD) who develop visuo-perceptual deficits are at higher risk of dementia, but we lack tests that detect subtle visuo-perceptual deficits and can be performed by untrained personnel. Hallucinations are associated with cognitive impairment and typically involve perception of complex objects. Changes in object perception may therefore be a sensitive marker of visuo-perceptual deficits in PD., Objective: We developed an online platform to test visuo-perceptual function. We hypothesised that (1) visuo-perceptual deficits in PD could be detected using online tests, (2) object perception would be preferentially affected, and (3) these deficits would be caused by changes in perception rather than response bias., Methods: We assessed 91 people with PD and 275 controls. Performance was compared using classical frequentist statistics. We then fitted a hierarchical Bayesian signal detection theory model to a subset of tasks., Results: People with PD were worse than controls at object recognition, showing no deficits in other visuo-perceptual tests. Specifically, they were worse at identifying skewed images (P < .0001); at detecting hidden objects (P = .0039); at identifying objects in peripheral vision (P < .0001); and at detecting biological motion (P = .0065). In contrast, people with PD were not worse at mental rotation or subjective size perception. Using signal detection modelling, we found this effect was driven by change in perceptual sensitivity rather than response bias., Conclusions: Online tests can detect visuo-perceptual deficits in people with PD, with object recognition particularly affected. Ultimately, visuo-perceptual tests may be developed to identify at-risk patients for clinical trials to slow PD dementia. © 2018 The Authors. Movement Disorders published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of International Parkinson and Movement Disorder Society., (© 2018 The Authors. Movement Disorders published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of International Parkinson and Movement Disorder Society.)

Humans stand out from other animals in that they are able to explicitly report on the reliability of their internal operations. This ability, which is known as metacognition, is typically studied by asking people to report their confidence in the correctness of some decision. However, the computations underlying confidence reports remain unclear. In this paper, we present a fully Bayesian method for directly comparing models of confidence. Using a visual two-interval forced-choice task, we tested whether confidence reports reflect heuristic computations (e.g. the magnitude of sensory data) or Bayes optimal ones (i.e. how likely a decision is to be correct given the sensory data). In a standard design in which subjects were first asked to make a decision, and only then gave their confidence, subjects were mostly Bayes optimal. In contrast, in a less-commonly used design in which subjects indicated their confidence and decision simultaneously, they were roughly equally likely to use the Bayes optimal strategy or to use a heuristic but suboptimal strategy. Our results suggest that, while people's confidence reports can reflect Bayes optimal computations, even a small unusual twist or additional element of complexity can prevent optimality.

The neural mechanisms underlying conscious visual perception have been extensively investigated using bistable perception paradigms. Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies suggest that the right anterior superior parietal (r-aSPL) and the right posterior superior parietal lobule (r-pSPL) have opposite roles in triggering perceptual reversals. It has been proposed that these two areas are part of a hierarchical network whose dynamics determine perceptual switches. However, how these two parietal regions interact with each other and with the rest of the brain during bistable perception is not known. Here, we investigated such a model by recording brain activity using fMRI while participants viewed a bistable structure-from-motion stimulus. Using dynamic causal modeling (DCM), we found that resolving such perceptual ambiguity was specifically associated with reciprocal interactions between these parietal regions and V5/MT. Strikingly, the strength of bottom-up coupling between V5/MT to r-pSPL and from r-pSPL to r-aSPL predicted individual mean dominance duration. Our findings are consistent with a hierarchical predictive coding model of parietal involvement in bistable perception and suggest that visual information processing underlying spontaneous perceptual switches can be described as changes in connectivity strength between parietal and visual cortical regions., (Copyright © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

During binocular rivalry, visual perception alternates spontaneously between two different monocular images. Such perceptual reversals are slowed or halted if stimuli are presented intermittently with inter-stimulus intervals larger than ~400 ms--a phenomenon called stabilization. Often, the neural correlates of reversal and stabilization are studied separately, and both phenomena in turn are studied separately from the neural correlates of conscious perception. To distinguish the neural correlates of perceptual content, stabilization and reversal, we recorded MEG signals associated with each in the same group of healthy humans observing repeated trials of intermittent presentation of a dichoptic stimulus. Perceptual content correlated mainly with modulation of stimulus-specific activity in occipital/temporal areas 150-270 ms after stimulus onset, possibly reflecting inhibition of the neural populations representing the suppressed image. Stability of perception reflected a gradual build-up of this modulation across at least 10 trials and was also, to some extent, associated with parietal activity 40-90 ms and 220-270 ms after stimulus onset. Perceptual reversals, in contrast, were associated with parietal (150-270 ms) and temporal (150-210 ms) activity on the trial before the reversal and a gradual change in perception-specific activity in occipital (150-270 ms) and temporal (220-420 ms) areas across at least 10 trials leading up to a reversal. Mechanistically, these findings suggest that stability of perception during rivalry is maintained by modulation of activity related to the two monocular images, and gradual adaptation of neuronal populations leads to instability that is eventually resolved by signals from parietal and late sensory cortices., (Copyright © 2014. Published by Elsevier Inc.)

That objective reference is necessary for formation of reliable beliefs about the external world is almost axiomatic. However, Condorcet (1785) suggested that purely subjective information--if shared and combined via social interaction--is enough for accurate understanding of the external world. We asked if social interaction and objective reference contribute differently to the formation and build-up of collective perceptual beliefs. In three experiments, dyads made individual and collective perceptual decisions in a two-interval, forced-choice, visual search task. In Experiment 1, participants negotiated their collective decisions with each other verbally and received feedback about accuracy at the end of each trial. In Experiment 2, feedback was not given. In Experiment 3, communication was not allowed but feedback was provided. Social interaction (Experiments 1 and 2 vs. 3) resulted in a significant collective benefit in perceptual decisions. When feedback was not available a collective benefit was not initially obtained but emerged through practice to the extent that in the second half of the experiments, collective benefits obtained with (Experiment 1) and without (Experiment 2) feedback were robust and statistically indistinguishable. Taken together, this work demonstrates that social interaction was necessary for build-up of reliable collaborative benefit, whereas objective reference only accelerated the process but--given enough opportunity for practice--was not necessary for building up successful cooperation.

Several recent behavioral studies have shown that the enumeration of a small number of items (a process termed subitizing) depends on the availability of attentional resources and is not a preattentive process as previously thought. Here we studied the neural correlates of visual enumeration under different attentional loads in a dual-task paradigm using fMRI. Relatively intact subitizing under low attentional load compared to impaired subitizing under high attentional load was associated with an increase in BOLD signal in the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ). Crucially, attentionally modulated response in the rTPJ was specific to small set sizes (up to 3 items) and did not occur at larger set sizes (5-7 items). This result has two implications: (1) Subitizing involves part of the fronto-parietal network for stimulus-driven attention providing neural evidence against preattentive subitizing. (2) Activity in rTPJ is set-size modulated. Together with similar evidence from studies probing visual short-term memory, this result suggests that rTPJ modulation might reflect the brain's ability to attentively handle small set sizes. Thus, the rTPJ may play an important role for the emergence of a capacity limit in both enumeration and visual short-term memory.

When visual input has conflicting interpretations, conscious perception can alternate spontaneously between competing interpretations [1]. There is a large amount of unexplained variability between individuals in the rate of such spontaneous alternations in perception [2-5]. We hypothesized that variability in perceptual rivalry might be reflected in individual differences in brain structure, because brain structure can exhibit systematic relationships with an individual's cognitive experiences and skills [6-9]. To test this notion, we examined in a large group of individuals how cortical thickness, local gray-matter density, and local white-matter integrity correlate with individuals' alternation rate for a bistable, rotating structure-from-motion stimulus [10]. All of these macroscopic measures of brain structure consistently revealed that the structure of bilateral superior parietal lobes (SPL) could account for interindividual variability in perceptual alternation rate. Furthermore, we examined whether the bilateral SPL regions play a causal role in the rate of perceptual alternations by using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and found that transient disruption of these areas indeed decreases the rate of perceptual alternations. These findings demonstrate a direct relationship between structure of SPL and individuals' perceptual switch rate., (Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

In everyday life, many people believe that two heads are better than one. Our ability to solve problems together appears to be fundamental to the current dominance and future survival of the human species. But are two heads really better than one? We addressed this question in the context of a collective low-level perceptual decision-making task. For two observers of nearly equal visual sensitivity, two heads were definitely better than one, provided they were given the opportunity to communicate freely, even in the absence of any feedback about decision outcomes. But for observers with very different visual sensitivities, two heads were actually worse than the better one. These seemingly discrepant patterns of group behavior can be explained by a model in which two heads are Bayes optimal under the assumption that individuals accurately communicate their level of confidence on every trial.

Recent theories propose that semantic representation and sensorimotor processing have a common substrate via simulation. We tested the prediction that comprehension interacts with perception, using a standard psychophysics methodology. While passively listening to verbs that referred to upward or downward motion, and to control verbs that did not refer to motion, 20 subjects performed a motion-detection task, indicating whether or not they saw motion in visual stimuli containing threshold levels of coherent vertical motion. A signal detection analysis revealed that when verbs were directionally incongruent with the motion signal, perceptual sensitivity was impaired. Word comprehension also affected decision criteria and reaction times, but in different ways. The results are discussed with reference to existing explanations of embodied processing and the potential of psychophysical methods for assessing interactions between language and perception.