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As founder of modern political economics and prominent theorist of the commercial society, Adam Smith's importance is universally recognized. Little, however, has been done so far to develop Adam Smith's virtue ethics in the context of modern business, characterized by digitalization. This article aims to rediscover Adam Smith's virtue of prudence and its relevance for the "e-commercial society": It presents a framework that considers the central place of prudence in the relationship between a prosperous e-commercial system and societal flourishing. In Smith's view of the commercial society, prudence enables people to develop habits of character related to industriousness, genuineness, spirit of sacrifice, and self-command, which help in the conduct of a prosperous business activity. This article translates Smith's virtue of prudence into a language typical of consumers in the current e-commerce scenario, considering their development as persons and the contribution of their activities to the good of society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Cultura Económica is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) challenges much of our traditional understanding of military ethics. What virtues and what sort of ethics education are needed as we move into an ever more AI-driven military reality? In this article we suggest and discuss key virtues that are needed, including the virtue of prudence and the accompanying virtue of good and proper storytelling. We also reflect on the ideal of “explainable AI,” and philosophize about the role of fear in helping us understand what is actually at stake in a military infused with AI-enabled and AI-driven weapons.

The introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) challenges much of our traditional understanding of military ethics. What virtues and what sort of ethics education are needed as we move into an ever more AI-driven military reality? In this article we suggest and discuss key virtues that are needed, including the virtue of prudence and the accompanying virtue of good and proper storytelling. We also reflect on the ideal of "explainable AI," and philosophize about the role of fear in helping us understand what is actually at stake in a military infused with AI-enabled and AI-driven weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Scripta Mediaevalia is the property of Universidad Nacional de Cuyo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Argumenta Philosophica is the property of Herder Editorial S.L. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Philostrato is the property of Epiarte, S.L. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

According to the spontaneity view of the role of the passions in moral deliberation, Aquinas holds that virtuous passions play an active role in moral deliberation, prior to the formation of moral judgement and choice. This article offers a qualified defense of this view. Qualified, because critics of this view are right to point out that Aquinas is generally suspicious of the passions, and he is careful to delimit the role that they can plan in processes of moral deliberation and choice. A defense, nonetheless, because Aquinas does give a positive role to virtuous passions in the early stages of moral discernment and deliberation, prior to judgement. Furthermore, Aquinas has strong reasons to defend something like the spontaneity view, given his overall view of the virtues as perfections of the powers they inform. That in itself does not necessarily mean that he does defend the spontaneity view, but it does suggest that we can develop such a defense out of what he does say, in such a way as to extend and clarify central elements of his moral theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on a Christian philosophy grounded in the experience of truth. To better understand this, it will explore: (1) the kind of philosophical approach that provides a space for people to preoccupy themselves with truth and draws them to further probe into the fundamental questions; (2) a return to the basics: philosophy as love of wisdom and for love of wisdom is personal, an experiential journey; (3) finally, a vision of Christian philosophy that is not purely theoretical but teaches one how to incarnate every truth and virtue. Christian philosophy provides us with an experience in, with, and of the truth in terms of understanding and developing certain traits and virtues such as prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. The shaping and molding of these good habits within each person are important in maintaining a Christian worldview to keep one grounded while being immersed in the world and its realities, allowing the Christian to become a reality within oneself and for others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cauriensia: Revista Anual de Ciencias Eclesiásticas is the property of Instituto Teologico San Pedro de Alcantara de Caceres and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Studia Poliana is the property of Studia Poliana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Logos: A Journal, of Religion, Philosophy Comparative Cultural Studies & Art (08687692) is the property of Logos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of International Journal of Political Philosophy / Las Torres de Lucca is the property of Revista Las Torres de Lucca. Facultad de Filosofia, Ciudad Universitaria and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Adab Al-Kufa is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article presents the prerequisites and primary characteristics of Duns Scotus’ understanding of natural moral virtues. It presents the main arguments of Scotus that led to the modification of the Aristotelian approach to moral virtues in the following areas: honing the notion of virtue as the habit of choice, reducing the causal role of virtues, the secondary significance of virtue in the definition of moral good, reducing virtues to modes of willpower, questioning the connection between prudence and moral virtues, the easing of the mutual connection of virtues and, finally, the partialisation of prudence. The context of modification forms the difference between nature and will and the theory of natural law, which establishes the moral good. The article points out the historical and systematic context of Scotus’ ethics and the evaluation of its contribution to the consideration of virtues.

The present work aims to analyse the idea of legal prudence in the thought of Javier Hervada, according to the premises of the classic realism. The article begins with the study about the moral action and prudence in Aristotle and st. Thomas’ s philosophy, continuing with the explication of the anexed virtues to the prudence and the particular position of Hervada. Also, it will be tested the prudential reasoning as paradigm of the legal reasoning. Finally, it will be summarized certains critical conslussions about the thinking of the spanish philosopher. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Character encompasses six basic virtues. These virtues can be listed as wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. Each virtue comprises various character strengths that are creativity, curiosity, open-mindedness, love of learning, perspective, honesty, bravery, perseverance, zest, kindness, love, social intelligence, fairness, leadership, citizenship, forgiveness, modesty, prudence, self-regulation, appreciation of beauty and perfection, gratitude, hope, humor, and spirituality. It was aimed to examine the learning outcomes in the Life Science Course Curriculum (LSCC) in terms of character strengths in the present study. This research was carried out with the analytical research model. In the research framework, deductive content analysis was used. According to the results, prudence, self-regulation, citizenship, kindness, and social intelligence were the top five character strengths in LSCC. The strengths of bravery, persistence, leadership, forgiveness, modesty, hope, and humor were not found in LSCC. The most prominent virtue in LSCC was temperance. It is noteworthy that courage was the least emphasized virtue in LSCC. As the grade increased, the virtue of wisdom was more emphasized within LSCC learning outcomes. Considering the units, self-regulation, social intelligence, citizenship, kindness, prudence, and open-mindedness were the most emphasized character strengths in the unit of Life in Our School. Self-regulation, prudence, social intelligence, open-mindedness, love, and appreciation were the most common ones in the unit of Life in Our Home. Prudence and selfregulation came to the fore in the units of Healthy Life and the Safe Life. Citizenship in the unit of Life in Our Country and curiosity, love of learning, and love in the unit of Life in Nature became distinctive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work seeks to stimulate the exercise of a virtue without which man will not fully possess any other good habit: the virtue of sagacity. As a first and indispensable step, the true meaning of this virtue is explained. Since it holds a close relation with the virtue of prudence, the study commences by treating of the characteristics of the prudent man, thus deepening an understanding of the virtue of sagacity. Prudence is a virtue that brings us to decide and act correctly. Sagacity, in turn, holds the same qualities as prudence, but is practiced when facing an occasion in which agility in decision and action is required. The outcome of this investigation seeks to highlight the perfection of this virtue, while at the same time examining the opposite vices, especially the vice of deviousness. The work is based on the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, in particular those contained in the Summa Theologiae. In consonance with the Thomist line of thought, other authors with knowledge of the topic were included in the study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text focuses on a comparison of the concept of prudence from the points of view of Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham, detailing four various insights into the core of prudence. The first concerns the position of the virtue of prudence within the framework of ethics; the second deals with the role of will and the intellect in regard to virtue; the third describes the principles of prudence; and the fourth is dedicated to relations between an exterior and interior act of virtue. On the basis of the comparison, we discover that the understanding of prudence has changed radically along with the transformation of the relations among reason, will and natural inclinations. While prudence, according to Aquinas, illuminates us the ways to properly pursue the good of our natural inclinations, Ockham does not associate prudence and virtue with the idea of inclination at all. This change also had an impact on the perception of an exterior act of virtue. An interior act is crucial for both authors, but while Aquinas sees an exterior act as the apex of prudence, Ockham is not convinced about the importance of reaching it. In the case of Ockham’s ethical theory, there is a distinct shift from the ethics of virtue towards the incoming modern formalism and individualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to reconstruct Dante Alighieri's understanding of the virtue of prudence by analyzing both his explicit formulations and symbolic representations depicting its role in attaining happiness by means of practical action, as well its political aspects. Dante's approach is confronted with that of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, and the text argues in favor of understanding Dante's character of Virgil in the Divine Comedy as a symbolic representation of Aristotelian prudence in a Christian framework of frequent interaction between the natural and supernatural realm of human experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Studia Poliana is the property of Studia Poliana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Many scholars have argued that the Protestant Reformation generally departed from virtue ethics, and this claim is often accepted by Protestant ethicists. This essay argues against such discontinuity by demonstrating John Calvin's reception of ethical concepts from Augustine and Aristotle. Calvin drew on Augustine's concept of eudaimonia and many aspects of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, including concepts of choice, habit, virtue as a mean, and the specific virtues of justice and prudence. Calvin also evaluated the problem of pagan virtue in light of traditional Augustinian texts discussed in the medieval period. He interpreted the Decalogue as teaching virtue, including the cardinal virtues of justice and temperance. Calvin was not the harbinger of an entirely new ethical paradigm, but rather a participant in the mainstream of Christian thinkers who maintained a dual interest in Aristotelian and Augustinian eudaimonist virtue ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking the cue from the recent Italian edition of La prudence chez Aristote (1963) written by P. Aubenque, in this article, La phronesis umana. A margine di La prudenza in Aristotele di Pierre Aubenque, we want to retrace the genesis of the concept of phronesis in Aristotle: on the one hand, this allows us to investigate the relationship between theory and praxis, which is far from clear and which has considerable implications; on the other hand, with this analysis we have the opportunity to problematize the political horizon and this enables us to speak of the virtue, which otherwise would not be explained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Azarbe is the property of Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Murcia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Thomas Aquinas holds not only that prudence, the virtue of right practical reasoning, is necessary for living well, but emphatically asserts that it “is the virtue most necessary to human life.” This essay argues that the force of Thomas’ assertion should not be understood as simply contradicting the objection—that “it seems that prudence is not a virtue necessary to living a good life”—with vigor, but rather, as we intend to show, that although all the moral virtues are necessary for the good life, there is a superior importance to the need for prudence, as that whereby the parts of virtuous living are not merely stacked up like building blocks of moral righteousness, but coalesced into a complete whole. To make clear the reasons for this preeminent necessity, we shall first consider the parts and constitution of prudence itself, its relationship to the other virtues, and conclude with its principal act, praeceptum.

The concept of virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre has been treated by his critics in a unsystematic and shallow way. In particular, the virtue of prudence (the 'phronesis') has received little attention. Prudence is a very important virtue in MacIntyre's thought, although the author has not analyzed it in a unitary and systematic way. His main proposals about human being and moral enquiry can not be understood without the virtue of prudence. The aim of this paper is to offer an exposition and an analysis of this virtue in MacIntyre's thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article begins by recalling the most important understandings associated with the term prudence in the history of philosophy.Then it introduces the Aristotelian concept of prudence linked to practical truth—prudence seen in contrast to wisdom and knowledge of manufacturing. The article discusses various forms of rational knowledge associated with the right will, and proves the need of linking prudence to all the other ethical virtues based on moral principles. It emphasizes the problem of how to relate general principles to specific actions which involve particular goods. For resolving this problem, the article refers to Aristotle who sees the solution in political ethics which has a significant impact on individual behavior; consequently, good law and proper education are considered to be necessary conditions which allow to form the moral judgment skills for providing a morally good life. The article concludes with the claim that the proper field to capture the specificity of prudence includes the theory of human action and that of human morality.

The article focuses on the role of the virtue of prudence in developing people's abilities and thus in achieving perfection. It concetrates on three areas. The formation of this virtue in antiquity is the starting point. While Plato linked it to leadership, Aristotle underlined its practical side. Although being a dianoethical virtue, it should direct ethical virtues that are like “blind" without it. Then it focuses on Thomas Aquinas, who builds on the philosophy of being and enriches Aristotle's attitude with Christian elements. The above-mentioned authors agree that the virtue of prudence plays a key role in achieving internal integrity. In the last part, the article deals with the revival and return to the virtue of prudence. Nowadays, huge scientific knowledge and eff ective technical means are available, but these are outside the fi eld of ethics. However, the daily life of an individual requires axiological criteria. There is also a need for prudence to make a person in a particular situation able to decide correctly and with responsibility for the future. It is the task of prudence, as well: pro-video, anticipate. This makes this virtue extremely relevant and necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to the rather commonly held opinion that the understanding of prudence (as a certain virtue) has not changed essentially since the ancient times, it is argued in the paper that there are two not only distinct but also incompatible concepts of prudence: the modern -- amoral or nonmoral, and the classical (Aristotelian- Thomist) -- strictly moral. The claim that these concepts are distinct and incompatible implies that 'modern prudence' is not part of 'classical prudence' but is essentially diff erent from it: one cannot be prudent in both senses (for instance, part of modern prudence is continence/self-control, whereas classical prudence excludes continence/ self-control). Apart from the comparison of both concepts of prudence, the paper also provides an analysis of their relations with the so-called 'prudential values' as well as of the causes of the evolution (or rather: revolution) in the understanding of prudence which took place in modern philosophy; It is also argued that within ethics which assumes the classical understanding of prudence there is no place for what Sidgwick called the 'dualism of practical reason'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ars Longa is the property of Ars Longa and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article is an attempt to formulate a Thomistic spiritual philosophy of recovery. The author faces two issues. One, what do recovering alcoholics mean when they say: “I am spiritual, but not religious?” He comes to the conclusion that it means recovering alcoholics are experiencing spiritual healing in their willingness to trust a loving God who has performed a miracle of recovery from alcoholism in their life. As a result of this experience, they are prepared to live a life of virtuous habit. Two, recovering alcoholics have discovered a spiritual second nature of moral character. The author explains why there are many in A.A. who discover that as God comes into their life and they turn to the path of virtue they rediscover religious worship and devotion is essential to the one day at a time journey.

In this article I utilize recent psychological and sociological studies on education along with Catholic philosopher Josef Pieper's work on the relationship between sight, prudence and the perception of reality to show the importance of vision and experience for moral education. Drawing on the above, I then will look specifically at the importance of liberal arts education in universities and how this would relate specifically to disciplines like the sciences. What this article argues is that education needs to be more holistic. It needs to take seriously the tight integration of both the development of technical learning along with other important kinds of knowledge and experience. One becomes the scientific self not just through gaining technical proficiencies but by becoming a well-rounded and holistic person. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term kairos has been used to mean, alternatively, right timing or proportion in Ancient Greek rhetoric, by Jesus to refer to the Christian eschaton and by Paul Tillich and modern liberation theologians to refer to the breakthrough of the divine into human history. Kairos, unlike chronos, is an intrinsically qualitative time and implies a consciousness of the present as well as the need for responsive action. This emphasis on action provides the link between kairos and virtue, the particular virtue in question being that of prudence (phronesis in Greek). The aim of this article is twofold: to highlight and make explicit the connections between the notion of kairos and the Russian literary-theorist and philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin's rhetorical and ethical world, with particular emphasis on his notion of carnival; secondly, to further support a Christian reading of Bakthin's work by making explicit the connections between his carnivalesque vision and a Christian reading of the ethical importance of kairos and its links with incarnation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author utilizes a fragment of the Żywot człowieka poczciwego (Cnota - wielka królowa) by Mikołaj Rej, to prove that the Polish author reinterpreted Seneca's ideas and adapted them to be in harmony with Christian teaching. The author invokes, above all, the authority of Lucius Lipsius. By comparing particular fragments of Rej's work to Myśli and Moral letters to Lucilius by Seneca he shows numerous similarities between the philosophical systems of these two authors. For example, finds correspondence in their attitudes to virtue, material goods, prudence, fame and truth. However, there are also differences, including Rej's and Seneca's opinion on suicide. Finally, the author analyzes the stylistic devices that enabled Rej to create a guide that promotes neo-stoic values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]