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Do we have a unified pre-theoretical concept of morality? This paper makes a start on the larger argument that we do not, by countering criticisms of virtue ethics on the ground that it does not adequately capture such a pre-theoretical concept. One criticism is discussed and met, namely that the reasons on which virtuous people act fail to have the special force of moral reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary reflection on the concept of value oscillates between positions that advocate absolutist realism and positions that propose total relativism. The present paper aims to distance itself from these two ways of reading the topic, rejecting any monolithic conception, and proposing a stratified theory of value. Beginning with an analysis of values that differentiates them from both "goods" and "valuations," the author outlines an understanding of value that must be investigated in its multiple, interconnected layers. The stratification starts from the role of the emotional sphere and comes down to a formal and absolute conception of the concept. The goal of the paper is to outline the different levels of validity of each proposed layer, which must be recognized and differentiated, with the aim of also capturing the difficulties and ambiguities that characterize the transition from one level to another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many of the recent methodological debates within political theory have focused on the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction. While ideal theorists recognise the need to develop an account of the transition between the two levels of theorising, no general proposal has been advanced thus far. In this article, I aim to bridge this conceptual gap. Towards this end, I first reconstruct the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction within a simplified two-dimensional framework, which captures the primary meanings usually attributed to it. Subsequently, I use this framework to provide an algorithm for the bidirectional transition between ideal and non-ideal theory, based on the incremental derivation of normative models. The approach outlined illuminates the various ways in which principles derived under highly idealised assumptions might be distorted by the circumstances of our current world and illustrates the various paths which we can pursue in moving from our current state of the world to an ideal one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I maintain that intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of axiology. Many contemporary philosophers disagree; they say the proper object of value theory is final value. I examine three accounts of the nature of final value: the first claims that final value is non‐instrumental value; the second claims that final value is the value a thing has as an end; the third claims that final value is ultimate or non‐derivative value. In each case, I argue that the concept of final value described is either identical with the classical notion of intrinsic value or is not a plausible candidate for the primary concept of axiology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental ethics has been dominated by an idealist logic that limits its positive impact on the natural world about which environmental philosophers care deeply. Environmental ethicists need to alter the ways we think and talk about what we value and the relations among ideas, values, and actions. Drawing on the sociology of religion and Marxian philosophy among other sources, a new approach may increase our understanding of how ideas are lived out and how we might increase the impact of our ideas about the value of nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are children's value priorities different from their parents' generation? We present data from the youngest children's sample that has been included in a comprehensive family study of values so far: Our study is based on self‐reported values of 127 six‐ to eleven‐year‐old German children (M = 7.89, SD = 1.35) and their mothers and fathers. We further took into account two potentially interacting developmental variables that have been suggested in the literature: (a) family members' gender and (b) cultural milieu (we looked specifically at families with Turkish immigration background and families without immigration background). While values of self‐transcendence, self‐enhancement and openness to change did not differ significantly between the two generations, children found conservation significantly more important than their parents. This contrasts with findings from previous studies with older participants. We discuss to what extent this effect may be unique to this developmental stage of middle childhood that had not been covered by previous research. Females valued conservation more than males, and conservation was more important in families with as compared to families without Turkish immigration background. There was neither a gender × generation nor a cultural milieu × generation interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on value congruence rests on the assumption that values denote desirable behaviors and ideals that employees and organizations strive to approach. In the present study, we develop and test the argument that a more complete understanding of value congruence can be achieved by considering a second type of congruence based on employees’ and organizations’ counter-ideal values (i.e., what both seek to avoid). We examined this proposition in a time-lagged study of 672 employees from various occupational and organizational backgrounds. We used difference scores as well as polynomial regression and response surface analyses to test our hypotheses. Consistent with our hypotheses, results reveal that counter-ideal value congruence has unique relations to employees’ trust in the organization that go beyond the effects of ideal value congruence. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of this expanded perspective on value congruence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Choices that are underdetermined by reason, such as choices arising from incommensurability among values, involve an element of arbitrariness, and arbitrary choices are commonly thought to be inimical to the rule of law. In this article, I suggest that we should distinguish between two different ideals of the rule of law, and that the arbitrariness of some judicial choices has different implications for these different ideals. One ideal of the rule of law can be understood as 'the rule of authority'; the other can be understood as 'the rule of reason'. The latter ideal is opposed to decisions that lack reason, but not to arbitrary choices between undefeated reasons. The arbitrariness involved in choosing between undefeated reasons may be a deficit in one ideal of the rule of law (the rule of authority), but not a deficit in the other (the rule of reason). Moreover, it is important to recognise that these are distinct ideals that can conflict, and not rival interpretations of a single ideal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines questions of the family and its role and place in the system of life values in northern regions, where familial traditions have been preserved. Results of six demographic-sociological studies conducted in 1993–2011 in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) are presented. A broad spectrum of opinions about the value and significance of family is revealed. Three main groupings of life values established their relevance for the preservation of familial traditions. Differing views are explained concerning competition among familial, societal-labor and personal orientations as functions of the age and marital and social status of study participants. Family retains its significance in the life of northerners, given their clear child-centric priorities. The relevance for survey participants of material well-being and acceptable modern housing is understood by the authors as a base condition for the life-sustenance of families, and in such a context is not a competitor to family as a fundamental life value for northerners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should we pursue aesthetic value, or incorporate it into our lives, if we want to? Is there an ideal of aesthetic life? Philosophers have proposed numerous answers to the analogous question in moral philosophy, but the aesthetic question has received relatively little attention. There is, in essence, a single view, which is that one should develop a sensibility that would give one sweeping access to aesthetic value. I challenge this view on two grounds. First, it threatens to undermine the meaningful attachments we form with aesthetic items, e.g., poems, paintings, songs, or items of design and dress. Second, it fails to accommodate the motivational character of our encounter with beauty, which can diminish our desire to pursue the wider world of aesthetic value. I conclude that whatever the aesthetic ideal is, it must reconcile our desire to broaden our access to aesthetic value with our desire to maintain and cultivate our meaningful aesthetic attachments. I motivate the alternative thought that having style is the aesthetic ideal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author expresses his opinion on some legal and philosophical considerations in intrinsic and instrumental values of diversity and the selection of competing visions of the world. Topics discussed by the author include instrumental and intrinsic values as two basic values, values in practical decision making, the affirmative action cases in education in the U.S., and the consideration for democratic intervention.

Copyright of International Review of Education / Internationale Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article, the author offers his opinion on moral dilemmas and analyzes its implications for the structure of normative moral systems. He examines two criteria of consistency that can be used to evaluate a given moral system. The first criterion assumes that a satisfactory moral system will not allow irresolvable moral conflicts to occur and the second criterion allows irresolvable moral conflicts to occur, but also holds that there are possible worlds in which no such conflicts occur. He believes that the second criterion is more plausible, however the respective roles that the criterions assign to moral dilemmas appear similar. He also discusses several concepts related to the issue.

This article argues that Nietzsche's transvaluation project refers not to a mere inversion or negation of a set of nihilism-prone, Judeo-Christian values but, instead, to a different conception of what a value is and how it functions. Traditional values function within a standard logical framework and claim legitimacy and "bindingness" based on exogenous authority with absolute extension. Nietzsche regards this framework as unnecessarily reductive in its attempted exclusion of contradiction and real opposition among competing values. I propose a nonstandard, dialetheic model of valuation that requires a value to be both true and false as well as neither true nor false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the papers "An Abulensean Pragmatist?," "Pragmatism and Santayana's Realms," and "Santayana's Limited Pragmatism" by professor Angus Kerr-Lawson for his interpretation of philosopher George Santayana's philosophy of values and on Santayana's connection with American pragmatism. The term "abulensean" as it applies to the Santayana's philosophy is to emphasize the role of the Mediterranean tradition and the "Spanishness," according to the article. Kerr-Lawson's understanding that Santayana didn't differ from the pragmatists on the problem of values is discussed.

Values refer to one's ideals and ultimate standards that are considered important in life. These are the principles for action encompassing abstract goals. This article evaluates the core life values of Turkish women. The results show that women give more importance to life values such as health, happiness and love. On the other hand, the life values of wealth and richness and a comfortable house are not considered important by women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Values Education is the property of Journal of Values Education and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores the ways that consumption practices and the expectations around consumption are changing in Havana, Cuba. Drawing on studies of citizenship, I argue that consumption is a right of citizenship and, as such, has transformative power— not necessarily positive— for society and its citizens. This is especially the case when there are economic and political distinctions made about who can and cannot consume what products. Ethnography provides insights into the varying forms of consumption that Cubans encounter, and the ways that these are fragmenting socialist ideals and values, perceptions of national unity, and, ultimately, definitions of belonging and citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper concerns the relation between goodness, or value, and practical reasons, and in particular the so-called 'buck-passing' account (BPA) of that relation recently offered by T. M. Scanlon, according to which goodness is not reason-providing but merely the higher-order property of possessing lower-order properties that provide reasons to respond in certain ways. The paper begins by briefly describing BPA and the motivation for it, noting that Scanlon now accepts that the lower-order properties in question may be evaluative. He also insists that the BPA is not biconditional (wisely, since otherwise goodness becomes a 'Cambridge property'), which leaves him with the task of explaining why goodness arises only in a sub-set of cases in which lower-order properties ground reasons. Having rejected two attempts to do this, based on elucidation of the responses and of the reasons, I suggest that Scanlon may claim that goodness arises in, and only in, cases where the lower-order properties are evaluative and that goodness itself provides us with a way of distinguishing the evaluative from the non-evaluative. In other words, he should retain the negative component of BPA, according to which being good is not itself reason-providing, while surrendering the positive, according to which the property of goodness is merely the higher-order property of having lower-order properties that provide reasons to respond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a social-psychological analysis on the racist value judgments. The authors argue that racist value judgments convey beliefs which are objectively false. They also note that these judgments has a content which is imprecise in principle and rational assessment. They added that their position reacts to a view that the judgments could be offensive to the mind and cuts across several metaethical debates. They further revealed that the notion of objective which they opppose in the claim that racist value judgments are false beliefs imply the idea of the falseness of racist beliefs.

This paper challenges the argument for assuming that one single principle could provide acceptable solutions for all the issues discussed in bioethics, either self-determination or quality instead of sanctity of life. The example of eugenics bears out that what is really at stake is the capacity to cope with very complex decisions and intertwined values, that involve political no less than moral responsibility. Maybe it's not impossible to be 'pro-choice' and 'pro-life' at the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the issues of sacredness in negotiations. According to the authors, negotiators won't negotiate if they believe that sacred values such as their safety and health and that of their children would be at stake. They add that sacred values cannot be dealt in a negotiation or be endangered, because they believed that sacred values has no monetary equivalent. Furthermore, they said that sacred values are regarded by some researchers to be a hindrance in getting an outcome in negotiations based in ideology. Other information related to sacredness are also mentioned.

Copyright of Societes is the property of De Boeck Universite and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The essay underlines the variety of identifying profiles, syncretic constructions of modern and post-modern values, in multiple, variable ways that reflect the complexity of society. Traditional values meet with values of expression and liberty, through self-directed constructions which tend to confront the uneasiness of post-modern times. The more identity is of an individualistic nature, the more menacing the figure of the foreigner seems, and the more any kind relational strategy is precluded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines representations of democratic practices in a handful of contemporary utopian novels and sketches. The analysis serves several purposes. It provides a relatively unique way of reviewing and interrogating democratic ideals and virtues, identifying their ambiguities, presuppositions, and interconnections. The analysis serves also to reveal tensions within and between these ideals and virtues, and to explain why many of these tensions are unavoidable and how they might be negotiated. Finally, the analysis facilitates assessment of the potential benefits and risks associated with alternative arrangements and strategies aimed at securing democratic ideals and virtues, and at negotiating the tensions between democratic ideals and between those ideals and other goods and values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deviance et Societe is the property of Medecine et Hygiene and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Examines the relationship between the European intellectual Piero Sraffa and Italian intellectual Antonio Gramsci. Sraffa's contribution to the magazine "Ordine Nuovo" or "New Order" by correspondence from London, England; Gramsci's introduction of Sraffa to other intellectuals; Claim that Sraffa never renounced in the course of his life, the ideals and political values that had united him to Gramsci;Sraffa and Gramsci's communication through Tatiana Schucht; Principles, values and ideals discussed by Sraffa and Gramsci.

This article explores the notion of bringing a family business's family values and traditions regarding religion and forgiveness into their everyday lives to create healing when family business differences have broken or severed family relationships. The philosophy of the ritual is to pair it with other family rituals and use it as a tool to begin to focus on the future. The ritual helps the family understand that hurts are inevitable in the context of family businesses, but that the ritual is a way to get beyond them and start over again. The forgiveness ritual that is created draws on the family's history and use of religious traditions to create forgiveness and a new beginning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explains that the mass media is a powerful teacher, and its lessons should not be ignored if United States schools want to live up to the presumed ideals of American education. Ideals of democracy; Increased opportunity for each American; Honoring the diversity of the population; Responsible world leadership; Media goals and purposes do not necessarily support American values.

The Slogan holds that one situation cannot be worse (or better) than another unless there is someone for whom it is worse (or better). This principle appears to provide the basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Larry Temkin, however, argues that the Slogan is not a plausible moral ideal, since it stands against not just teleological egalitarianism, but also values such as freedom, rights, autonomy, virtue and desert. I argue that the Slogan is a plausible moral principle, one that provides a suitable moral basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Contrary to Temkin, freedom, autonomy, virtue, and rights can all be understood in person-affecting terms, while equality of outcome cannot. Moreover, the Slogan is open to a variety of different ideas about how we should weight or rank people's gains and losses. This flexibility allows the Slogan to accommodate ideals such as prioritarianism and desert. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is concerned with newly qualified teachers' endeavour to reconcile their personal values and beliefs with the reality of teaching. The article arguesthat they do not only need to become experts in the technical aspects of teaching, but need also to develop the professional capability to manage conflicts arising out of the interaction of their personal and professional lives. The 10 newly qualified secondary teachers participating in this qualitative study were amongst the first cohort to undergo the statutory induction programme introduced in England in September 1999. By adopting a case-study approach, data collection took place by means of semi-structured questionnaires and interviews. Particular attention is paid to the way in which the newly qualified teachers attempted to develop into reflective-reflexive practitioners by negotiating a balance of professional autonomy and institutional conformity and by reconciling their personal beliefs and values with those expected by and of the profession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the fundamental concept of fact and value perspectives of philosopher Peter Winch. According to the author, the study on the linguistic analysis and philosophical belief of Winch provides an opportunity to interpret the resemblance of his works as well as evaluate the relevance of his ideals on realism and metaphysical issues. Moreover, the author states that Winch believed on the importance of philosophy for social scientific understandings to overcome the difference between fundamental distinction of subject and object approach. It also offers information on arguments of Winch, fact-value dichotomy and formal analogies which infer the unfamiliar form of life and community.

El artículo habla sobre el mal espíritu dentro de nuestras vidas y las maneras en que se trata de enredarnos y engañarnos. También va a hablar de las maneras en que, según Ignacio de Loyola, el buen espíritu ayuda para aclarar y mostrar el camino para una vida mejor. Este tema ha vuelto a ser de moda quizá por la falta de distinción entre lo bueno y lo malo en estas décadas. Lo importante es analizar lo que vale más y preguntar cuales valores son más importantes para un ser humano.

The article presents the author's view concerning the issue between art and environment. He discusses the factors associated with the concept of disproportionate values between the context of aesthetic and environment. He outlines certain values to which the two concepts differ. He asserts that the current environment is a state of consequences of man's actions as well as the latter's related inactions. Indeed, he claims that the values relevant to art consciousness are more charismic and ideational.

The article relates how a bout with the flu forced a working mother to reexamine how she became stressed out. The demands of her responsibilities at work and at home gave her little time for relaxation. As a management educator, she has learned that creating a simpler life requires more than focus and a reevaluation of values and beliefs about life, work and success. The Trends Research Institute in Rhinebeck, New York has listed the requirements for creating a simple lifestyle, a life which values time, health, contribution and peace of mind.

The article presents the author's comment concerning the issue raised by Dr. Warren H. Anderson on the differences between art consciousness and routine and operational qualities. She disagrees with Anderson's idea that a contemporary artist performs in isolation from his society's values. However, she asserts that the artist obtains the character of uniqueness in the selection of their subject. She denotes that the claim of Anderson that the artists neglect to participate in the destruction of the disproportionate aesthetic values depicts the latter's incapability of affecting change within the society.

The article explores the attributes of a modern school in the United States. It is argued that the most essential component of such a school is an ideal. This is composed of a physical ideal, an intellectual ideal and a moral ideal. Other important components of a modern school from the point of view of a philosopher are the methods and the devices.