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The article focuses on the application of disparate impact theory of discrimination in the Ricci versus Stefano court case. The court case has reportedly caused an argument between the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the definition of disparate impact as an act of discrimination. It explains that in the U.S. federal law, disparate treatment against minorities and Caucasians is banned.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano which involved a claim of race discrimination. It provides information about the race discrimination in employment is in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It presents that Title VII prohibits all race discrimination in employment and constitutionality of the disparate impact provision.

The article focuses on the concepts of cognitive illiberalism and irrelevant grants of summary judgment under Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act for employment discrimination cases by the U.S. courts. It discusses in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Ricci v. DeStefano that the Court granted plaintiff the improper summary judgment on the basis of cultural cognition and cognitive illiberalism. It also discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case of Scott v. Harris in this approach.

The article discusses the court case Ricci v. DeStefano wherein the U.S. Supreme Court raised the burden of proof of the defendant employer. The district court rejected the claims of the plaintiffs because the test exam results were rejected for all applicants, regardless of their race. According to the author, the practical result of the decision will be greater racial inequality of employment opportunity.

Many countries have fair employment laws to protect racial, gender, religious or ethnic minorities from discrimination and courts in the USA can order remedies such as one out of every three new hires should be a member of a protected group after finding an employer discriminated. What steps can an employer undertake to ensure its employment practices do not disadvantage minorities when it does not need to comply with a court order? This issue arose in Ricci v. DeStefano, a ‘reverse discrimination’ case under review by the U.S. Supreme Court. Seventeen Whites and 1 Hispanic who achieved sufficiently high scores qualifying them for promotion to lieutenant or captain of the New Haven Fire Department sued the city because it cancelled the examinations after seeing that no African American could be appointed to an existing vacancy. The City of New Haven justified its action on the basis that both examinations had a disparate impact on African Americans and Hispanics because the ratios of their pass rates to that of Whites were less than 80%, contrary to a ‘rule of thumb’ in the government's Uniform Guidelines. The city did not conduct statistical tests, which are referred to in the guidelines. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Is integration a form of discrimination? Remarkably, recent Supreme Court doctrine suggests that the answer to this question may well be yes. In Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court characterizes--for the very first time--government action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability and to integrate the workplace as "race-based," and then invalidates that action under a heightened level of judicial review. Consequently, Ricci suggests that the Court is open to the "equivalence doctrine," which posits that laws intended to racially integrate are morally and constitutionally equivalent to laws intended to racially separate. Under the equivalence doctrine, integration is simply another form of discrimination. The Court has not yet fully embraced this view. Ricci contains a significant limiting principle: To be actionable, the government's action must create racial harm, i.e., single out individuals on the basis of their race for some type of adverse treatment. Thus, the lesson of Ricci is not that governmental action with an integrative motive is always prohibited (at least for now); instead it is that racial harm really matters. The challenge for the government seeking to increase integration is to design facially race-neutral programs that open up access to opportunity and increase integration without imposing racial harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Ricci v. DeStefano case where the City of New Haven, Connecticut was found to have violated the disparate treatment law after it refused to use the test results for promoting Hispanic firefighters. It explains how the Court brought a radical way of treating disparate treatment liability by adopting a "color-blind" standard. It adds that this broadens the scope of application of disparate treatment law and made it easier for civil rights advocates to file for disparate treatment actions.

The Supreme Court's decision in Ricci v. DeStefano foregrounded the question of whether Title VII's disparate impact standard conflicts with equal protection. This Article shows that there are three ways to read Ricci, one of which is likely fatal to disparate impact doctrine but the other two of which are not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the prevention of workplace discrimination in the U.S. Topics discussed include link between diversity management and equal employment opportunity; the U.S. Supreme Court case Ricci v. DeStefano addressing diversity management practices; and anti-discrimination laws governing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

What has been the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Ricci v. Destefano on the selection and promotion practices of public employers?; Relying solely on circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court held that the Civil Service Board of New Haven, Connecticut, had engaged in Title VII disparate treatment discrimination by refusing to certify the results of a promotion examination that led, in turn, to a disparate impact on African American firefighters. To limit the discretion of public employers to disregard such selection and promotion exam results, the Ricci majority held that a public employer must “have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to the take the race-conscious discriminatory action.” This article argues that the decision effectively prohibits public employers from rejecting the results of selection and promotion instruments, even though there is evidence that screening instruments inequitably affect protected groups. It also forces public employers to become more careful in developing selection and promotion examinations or face the possibility of costly Title VII litigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the court case Ricci v. DeStefano, in which the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the content of the norm against race discrimination in employment. In the case, the Court instituted a color-blind standard to define discrimination under Title VII in some circumstances. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the federalism revolution is discussed. Also explored are the dangers to disparate impact the nonetheless remain.

One of the many questions arising from the Supreme Court's decision in Ricci v. DeStefano is the nature of the strong-basis-in-evidence standard used by the Court to rectify the perceived tension between Title VII's disparate treatment and disparate impact provisions. In this article, I demonstrate that the strong-basis-in-evidence standard comprises two related, but separate, legal paradigms. First, since its inception in the Equal Protection, affirmative action context, courts have treated the strong-basis-in-evidence standard as a burden of proof. However, the Supreme Court and the circuit courts have differed as to whether this burden of proof is a burden of production or a burden of persuasion. Based upon my legal analysis and economic models, I submit that the strong-basis-in-evidence standard lodges a burden of persuasion upon defendants. Second, I demonstrate that the Court's transfer of the strong-basis-in-evidence standard to the Title VII context in Ricci spurred the evolution of the standard from a burden of persuasion to a standard of proof. Principally, the transfer imported the strong-basis-in-evidence standard from the realm of legislative facts in the Fourteenth Amendment, Equal Protection context to the realm of adjudicative facts in the Title VII context. Relying upon the application of probability analysis to adjudicative facts, I show that in the Title VII context the strong-basis-in-evidence standard is a standard of proof falling below the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. I then demonstrate how this understanding of the strong-basis-in-evidence standard would apply to the propriety of discarding the results of a test showing a disparate impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In June 2009, the Supreme Court decided the employment discrimination case of Ricci v. DeStefano. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the City of New Haven, Connecticut, discriminated against White and Hispanic firefighters based on their race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964, when it refused to certify exam results that could have resulted in promotions for the firefighters. The case attempted to clarify what the Court saw as a conflict between two provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights act--disparate-treatment discrimination and disparate-impact discrimination. Unfortunately, the Court's decision and reasoning may cause even more confusion and questions in the area of employment discrimination leaving both public and private employers to ask themselves difficult questions regarding their employment practices and procedure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the need of U.S. Civil Rights Act's Title VII in mitigating the challenges of employment discrimination on several grounds including race, sex and religion. Topics include U.S. Supreme court case of Ricci v DeStefano regarding discrimination, a survey conducted by the Gallup Organization, on the same, and several issues related to job inequality including stereotype psychology in people, social biasing and negative attitude.

The article discusses U.S. government agencies in relation to the disparate impact strand of antidiscrimination law as of 2014, focusing on the ability to challenge allegedly harmful employment, education, and housing policies without having the burden of proving intentional discrimination. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and several U.S. Supreme Court cases are addressed, including Ricci v. DeStefano which deals with Title VII of the nation's Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The article discusses several U.S. Supreme Court cases regarding the issue of employment discrimination and plaintiffs' confusion in proving their cases including Ricci v. DeStefano, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. The cases address the violation of Title VII, which supports recruitment on the basis of job qualifications only under the U.S. Civil Rights Act. McDonnell Douglas standard, a framework includes shifting burdens to balance such issues.

The article discusses the research and development of employment test and testing practices that have less racial differences in comparison to the general intelligence employment tests. It depicts that a boost in the research and innovation in employment testing, following the enactment of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1991, made it easier for the employers to defend employment testing. It also informs about the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and Ricci v. DeStefano.

The article analyzes the implications of the Ricci v. DeStefano court case for Title VII affirmative action under the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964. The author believes that the Ricci case ruling suggests how the Supreme Court may handle a Title VII case in the future since it illustrated the justices' position on affirmative action. He further emphasizes that the Ricci case reflects the need for a city to have evidence of imminent disparate impact liability before discarding tests.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Ricci v. DeStefano, involving the disparate claims under Title VII section 703 of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1991. It was held that an employer cannot toss racially disparate test results unless that employer has a "strong basis in evidence." It provides information on a legislative amendment to Title VII which will circumvent the Civil Rights Act by forcing employers to accept results of racially discriminatory employment tests.

The article discusses the proposal of race audit which is an evaluative measure designed to figure out the sources of racial inequality. It focuses on matters related to corporate social audit and corporate social responsibility (CSR). It presents information on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Ricci v. DeStefano. The Court imposed barriers to local engagement relating to racial disparity and inequality.

The article discusses a court case in which 19 white and Hispanic city firefighters filed a suit against the city of New Haven, Connecticut, claiming that they were denied of promotions because of race. The complainants alleged that the city discriminated against them and argued that it violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The federal district courts ruled for the city allowing its motion for summary judgment. An overview of the U.S. Supreme Court's attempt to resolve the case is offered.

The article discusses Supreme Court jurisprudence on employment discrimination. It considers three cases that challenge the employment discrimination doctrine and these are Ricci v. DeStefano, Gross v. FBL Financial Services Inc. and AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen. In these cases, unlawful discrimination has been questioned by the court. The establishment of disparate treatment and intentional discrimination have also been reexamined in these cases.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Griggs v. Duke Power Co. regarding prohibition of racial discrimination in employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court held that Duke Power's employment practices related to high-school education or a passing score on standardized intelligence tests violates Title VII and affects African Americans. It addresses Ricci v. DeStefano regarding disparate-treatment discrimination against nonminority candidates.

The distinction between antisubordination and anticlassification has existed since the 1970s and has been frequently invoked by scholars to advocate for certain readings of antidiscrimination law. The anticlassification principle prohibits practices that classify people on the basis of a forbidden category. In contrast, the antisubordination principle allows classification (or consideration of, for example, race or sex) to the extent the classification is intended to challenge group subordination. While most scholars writing about antisubordination and anticlassification have done so in the context of equal protection, this Article systematically applies antisubordination and anticlassification values to assess recent developments in employment discrimination law and explore how they might tell us something about the trajectory of employment discrimination jurisprudence. In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Ricci v. DeStefano, a landmark Title VII case, and in 2008 Congress passed two new laws: the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA). These changes potentially undermine the very normative foundation of employment discrimination law. This Article argues that the major employment discrimination statutes have until recently had a substantial antisubordination orientation, in that they were designed to respond to a history of discrimination and incorporate many provisions that expressly take account of forbidden traits (through doctrines like disparate impact and reasonable accommodation). This Article then explores how recent changes to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title VII, and the enactment of GINA may imperil the underlying normative foundation of employment discrimination law by turning toward and emphasizing anticlassification values at the expense of employment discrimination's antisubordinationist foundation. The Article concludes by evaluating the turn, questioning whether the antisubordination/anticlassification distinction is the most apt framework for evaluating employment discrimination law, and suggesting a few changes that may help preserve the valuable antisubordination foundations of employment discrimination law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses several labor and employment cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2008-2009 term. These cases include the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Three closely decided labor and employment law cases are 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and Ricci v. DeStefano.

The author reviews U.S. Supreme Court cases that affect the nation's democratic backbone. The Court has invented doctrine, revised quotations, took words out of context in federal statutes, and manipulated rules of evidence on the issues of voting rights, abortion, and race discrimination as of 2024. The author observes that U.S. democracy is currently fragile, with aristocracy and kakistocracy lurking in the background.

In SFFA v. Harvard (SFFA), the Supreme Court further restricted a university's right to consider the racial identity of individual applicants during admissions. The ruling has spawned considerable confusion regarding a university's ongoing ability to pursue racial diversity, racial inclusion, and other equality-oriented goals--whether through "raceconscious" or "race-neutral" means. To assist institutions attempting to navigate the ruling, this article outlines a set of key legal rights and responsibilities that universities continue to possess following SFFA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the agendas of various Supreme Court eras and highlights the current agenda of the Roberts Court, U.S. It states that over time, the Court's agenda has evolved, ranging from safeguarding business interests and deferring to government power to ending Jim Crow laws and emphasizing federalism. It mentions that the current Roberts Court seems to be moving forward with a conservative social agenda, with a particular emphasis on issues like abortion, gun rights, and voting.

Given the narrow framing of the Supreme Court's decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, that employers cannot fire someone simply for being gay or transgender, numerous questions persist as to whether and to what extent LGBTQ Americans are protected against employment discrimination. Resolving these issues is likely to require years, if not decades, of litigation, leaving LGBTQ workers and their employers without meaningful guidance in the interim. This article contends that the most efficient means of clarifying these uncertainties is for Congress to enact a new employment statute known as the Title VII Amendments Act. As proposed, the Act would resolve each of Bostock's ambiguities in favor of affording greater protections to workers generally and LGBTQ persons specifically while avoiding the controversies that have derailed LGBTQ civil rights legislation in the past. Thus, the Title VII Amendments Act represents LGBTQ persons' best hope of attaining immediate, comprehensive employment protections and employers' best prospect of securing definitive, timely legal guidance post‐Bostock. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has the US Supreme Court become more conservative than the public? We introduce results of three surveys conducted over the course of a decade that ask respondents about their opinions on the policy issues before the court. Using these data, we show that the gap between the court and the public has grown since 2020, with the court moving from being quite close to the average American to a position that is more conservative than the majority of Americans. Second, in contrast to findings showing consistency in the public's approval of or deference to the court, we find that the public's expectations of the court vary significantly over time and in tandem with changes in the court's composition and recent rulings. Even so, many members of the public currently underestimate the court's conservative leaning. Third, we find that respondents' perceptions of the court's ideology relative to their own are associated with support for institutional changes but with important differences between Democrats and Republicans. The fact that so many people currently underestimate how conservative the court is implies that support for proposed changes to the court may be weaker than it would be if people knew with greater accuracy the court's conservative nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court-along with the rest of the country-has long divided over the question whether the United States has yet achieved a "post -racial" society in which race no longer matters in significant ways. How, if at all, this debate is resolved carries enormous implications for constitutional and statutory anti-discrimination law. Indeed, a post-racial discomfort with noticing and acting upon race supports a zero-sum approach to equality: if race no longer matters to the distribution of life opportunities, a decision maker's concern for the disparities experienced by members of one racial group may be seen as inextricable from its intent to discriminate against others. In recent decades, the Court's swing Justices expressly rejected claims of post-racial success even while moving towards an insistence that government remain color-blind in its actual treatment of individuals. Uncomfortable with the use of race-based classifications to further a governmental interest in addressing long-standing racial subordination, yet reluctant to dismiss the strength of that interest given its view of the continuing relevance of race to American life, a majority thus remained unwilling to treat as discriminatory government's attention to racial impact when choosing among various policy options. Recent developments, however, signal the possibility that the Court has now embraced a new understanding of equality that may be triggered by an assumption of post-racial success in certain contexts. For example, the Court in Ricci v. DeStefano for the first time characterized a decision maker's attention to its practices' racially disparate impact as evidence of its discriminatory, and thus unlawful, intent under Title VII. Ricci's redefinition of culpable mental state for anti-discrimination purposes thus destabilizes the longstanding premise that the Court does not view decision makers' attention to race to address patterns of racial hierarchy as itself suspicious. Decades after holding that the Equal Protection Clause does not require government to reconsider its actions that disproportionately exclude people of color and women so long as those actions are not motivated by an intent to harm, the Court has now concluded that statutory anti-discrimination law-and perhaps the Equal Protection Clause as well-prohibits government from reconsidering these actions under certain circumstances. If applied in the constitutional setting, as concurring Justice Scalia predicted, such a zero-sum understanding of equality would treat a government decision maker's attention to racial and gender hierarchies when choosing among various policy options as inherently suspicious-and thus unconstitutional unless the government's action survives heightened scrutiny. But such a turn is by no means inevitable. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's swing opinions in the Court's recent race discrimination decisions suggest the additional possibility that the Court has not yet determined in which direction, if any, it might turn in its understanding of equality. If so, opportunities remain for shaping that turn in ways that might avoid a collision between anti-discrimination commitments. These include revisiting the social meaning of measures that attend to the impact of various rules or standards on protected class members when choosing among available options that will then apply to all regardless of protected class status. Indeed, disparate impact provisions and similar efforts play an important role in ensuring that candidates-regardless of protected class status-are selected on actual merit, rather than on unexamined yet entrenched assumptions that replicate patterns of subordination at the expense of individual opportunity. Revisiting the social meaning of such efforts illustrates their win-win possibilities and challenges a zero-sum understanding of equality as ultimately impoverished. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court recently decided Ricci v. DeStefano, a case that had municipalities throughout the United States holding their breath. This case presents a scenario where either action by a municipal employer would result in potential liability under Title VII. Thus, the policy goal of Title VII-encouraging the voluntary compliance of employers by relaxing standards for liability when these attempts are made in good faith-is in danger of being undermined. This note examines both sides of this issue in light of the policy goals of Title VII. The note then delves into the background of the case, analyzes the legal claims made by both parties, and then analyzes the Supreme Court's ruling. possible outcomes of this case and the potential impact of these outcomes on similar future situations. Finally, the article asks whether the Court is able to find an appropriate middle-ground and how the Court's new standard will be affect future litigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court has had a dismal record on issues of race throughout American history. The Court enforced the institution of slavery, upheld "separate but equal," and consistently failed to deal with systemic racism and racial inequalities. The current Court is the most conservative since the mid-1930s and is unlikely to advance racial equality. Quite the contrary, it is likely to impose restrictions on what governments can do to advance racial equality. But there remains hope for positive change through other institutions, such as state constitutions, state courts, and the political process at all levels of government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As recent Senate confirmation practices suggest, the Supreme Court is best understood as the head of a political branch of government, whose Justices are chosen in a process that makes their ideological views dispositive. Throughout the nation's history, the Supreme Court has exercised its governing political ideology in ways that sacrifice the interests of nonwhites in order to advance the interests of Whites. In the present moment of heightened cultural sensitivity to structural discrimination and implicit bias, it would make sense to use affirmative action to help remedy the racially disparate distribution of societal resources that has been produced by a long history of covert discrimination. But the Supreme Court has held that such efforts to promote racial balance are patently unconstitutional, because the Constitution recognizes only intentional discrimination, and not racially disparate impact, as a form of inequality that can be addressed through affirmative action. However, there is a way in which efforts to both promote racial balance and remedy disparate impact would be permissible, even under the racial jurisprudence of the new six-to-three conservative Supreme Court. Affirmative action plans that used randomized lotteries to allocate resources, such as university admissions, among qualified applicants would constitute race neutral ways of approximating the allocation of resources that would exist in a truly nondiscriminatory culture. By using statistical randomness as a safeguard against structural discrimination and implicit bias, U.S. culture might be able to secure a level of racial justice that it has been unable to achieve through its antidiscrimination laws. The only significant cost of such lottery-based admissions would be the potential loss of some prestige by our elite educational institutions. But certainly, that is a price worth paying to secure a more meaningful level of racial equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information related to Antonin Scalia who has appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court for a long duration of time. Topics discussed include his career in which he achieved great prominence, and after his death on February, 2016 a law school was named in his honor and received award posthumously as the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2018.

Restrictive land use regulation has thwarted the upward mobility of many Americans, particularly Americans of color. Local restrictions imposed by affluent municipalities have limited access to safe neighborhoods, better housing, and good schools. Racism and economic self-interest have both played a role in exclusionary practices which have contributed to high housing costs that place a strain on the entire economy. Fair Housing Act litigation has been one weapon in the fight against these practices. Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., disparate impact litigation faces significant obstacles that limit its value as a tool to fight exclusionary zoning. First, because restrictive zoning ordinances have such widespread economic effect, it will generally be difficult to prove that their impact on members of protected classes is disparate. Second, municipalities are likely to have successful defenses against disparate impact claims arising from restrictive zoning--including the "business necessity" defense that zoning restrictions are necessary to minimize the tax burden on local residents. Third, litigation sets up an adversarial dynamic that leads municipalities to resist housing initiatives rather than embracing them. By contrast, incentives are better calculated to induce local cooperation in the development of fair housing. The Department of Housing and Urban Development made some use of incentives during the Obama Administration, but those efforts were not ideally designed to promote buy-in by recalcitrant municipalities and were abandoned during the Trump Administration. States, however, are well positioned to use the real property tax system to create substantial incentives for municipalities to abandon exclusionary practices. Using tax incentives rather than mandates would enlist municipal self-interest as a weapon against exclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At least one dissent per year is read aloud from the bench by a U.S. Supreme Court Justice. These occasions are often among the most dramatic events of the Court's calendar, as they feature a Justice speaking directly, and often passionately, to an audience which includes her fellow Justices. So, which cases tend to prompt these oral dissents, and what are the Justices' rhetorical strategies when they speak rather than just write their dissents? This Article will explore the answers to these questions by examining the oral dissents of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia from the year 2000 to the times of their respective deaths. These Justices were selected because they were two of the most prolific oral dissenters and because they embody starkly contrasting judicial philosophies. The Article canvasses the concept and purpose of oral dissent and details the kinds of cases in which each Justice was more likely to orally dissent. This Article argues that Scalia's rhetoric evinces a view of the law as "autonomous," operating independently of the facts of the case and ignoring the impact of the law on the litigants. He directed his dissents at the academy, perhaps in an effort to create a conservative counter canon. In contrast, Ginsburg's feminist jurisprudence espouses a view of the law as responsive to the facts and the need for social change. Her oral dissents often targeted cases involving discrimination, and she frequently spoke directly to those affected by unequal treatment, having experienced such treatment herself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the provision of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) of 1968 in the U.S. that allows plaintiffs to sue for housing discrimination under the disparate impact theory. Also cited are the 2015 Supreme Court ruling in the case Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), and the efforts by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the administration of President Donald Trump to roll back implementation of fair housing laws.