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We analyze collaborations in which two firms facing external competition reorganize to form an input joint venture as an alternative to horizontal merger. Under standard regularity conditions, the collaboration can lead to higher profits than a horizontal merger, though the effect on prices, quantities, and welfare depends on the form of downstream competition. In light of our results regarding profits, we provide reasons why firms might still wish to merge: imperfect information, cost synergies, and organizational asymmetries. We further consider how our comparisons change with the managerial structure of the joint venture (i.e., by delegation of input pricing). (JEL L13, L23, L42), I. INTRODUCTION Collaboration via joint production can present an attractive alternative for rival firms contemplating a horizontal merger, particularly for large firms concerned with an antitrust challenge. U.S. antitrust guidelines [...]

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is responsible for regulation in the communications marketplace and for management of the nation's non-federal radio spectrum. During the past year, FCC economists continued to work on auctions so as to repurpose mid-band spectrum for advanced wireless services – including 5G – as well as initiatives to close the connectivity gap and make broadband more affordable. FCC economists also evaluated the likely competitive effects of Verizon's proposed acquisition of prepaid competitor TracFone Wireless. Finally, FCC economists helped in setting up the novel Broadband Data Collection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are concerns across government, industry, and academia over the inadequacies of data on broadband Internet connections. These inadequacies are important to consider because government policies and regulations, industry strategies, and scholarly research can be impacted by inaccurate or distorted data. Given that there are ongoing discussions about policy initiatives to improve these data, this article sets out to critically review publicly available data, identify important limitations of these data, and profile studies that have used these data successfully. In this review, the dynamic nature of broadband data will be discussed and the tradeoffs of pursuing further investments to create better databases evaluated. This evaluation suggests a more fruitful research path would be to recognize and work around existing data drawbacks, using the studies profiled in this article as examples, to explore a multitude of issues related to broadband availability, adoption, and use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract We examine the extent to which the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) 2015 "Open Internet" and 2018 "Restoring Internet Freedom" orders constrain anti-competitive and discriminatory pricing. We show that without regulation of interconnection agreements, and by allowing Internet Service Providers to cap bandwidth while also engaging in "zero rating," the prescriptive regulations promulgated by the FCC in its 2015 order left the door open for both anti-competitive and discriminatory pricing. Conversely, by undoing the Title II underpinning for its 2015 adopted rules, the FCC may bind itself from being able to remedy anti-competitive or discriminatory pricing in the future. Highlights • The FCC, 2015 Open Internet order did not ban paid interconnection or zero rating. • Similar ISPs could have priced interconnection to produce cartel-like behavior. • Zero rating could leave ISPs and consumers worse off than termination fees. • Thus, the 2015 order left room for anti-competitive and discriminatory pricing. • By reversing the 2015 order, the FCC has little recourse against such pricing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a sample of recent FCC matters of economic interest. These include nonstructural remedies in a number of wireless telecommunications transactions, econometric attempts to identify which schools are likely to have access to fiber broadband, and the implementation of 'rural broadband experiments' to improve the effectiveness of subsidy programs to promote universal service. We close with some observations regarding the prominence of vertical concerns in FCC policy assessments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]