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This article reassesses and recontextualizes findings of an independent writing group commissioned in 2005 by what was then known as the Institute for Ethics of the American Medical Association (AMA). The authors were members of this group, which uncovered a paradigm case of structural racism that has perpetuated health inequity since the issue of admitting African Americans was first raised at the AMA's national meetings immediately after the Civil War ended, in 1868. Upon publication of the writing group's findings, the AMA publicly apologized for its social, cultural, and political roles in the racist history of organized medicine. Now, in 2021, the authors of this article seek to situate this aspect of the AMA's history as it prepares itself for antiracist leadership in the health care sector.

Meat is a multi-billion-dollar industry that relies on people performing risky physical work inside meat-processing facilities over long shifts in close proximity. These workers are socially disempowered, and many are members of groups beset by historic and ongoing structural discrimination. The combination of working conditions and worker characteristics facilitate the spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. Workers have been expected to put their health and lives at risk during the pandemic because of government and industry pressures to keep this "essential industry" producing. Numerous interventions can significantly reduce the risks to workers and their communities; however, the industry's implementation has been sporadic and inconsistent. With a focus on the U.S. context, this paper offers an ethical framework for infection prevention and control recommendations grounded in public health values of health and safety, interdependence and solidarity, and health equity and justice, with particular attention to considerations of reciprocity, equitable burden sharing, harm reduction, and health promotion. Meat-processing workers are owed an approach that protects their health relative to the risks of harms to them, their families, and their communities. Sacrifices from businesses benefitting financially from essential industry status are ethically warranted and should acknowledge the risks assumed by workers in the context of existing structural inequities.

The COVID-19 pandemic has raised a host of ethical challenges, but key among these has been the possibility that health care systems might need to ration scarce critical care resources. Rationing policies for pandemics differ by institution, health system, and applicable law. Most seem to agree that a patient's ability to benefit from treatment and to survive are first-order considerations. However, there is debate about what clinical measures should be used to make that determination and about other factors that might be ethically appropriate to consider. In this paper, we discuss resource allocation and several related ethical challenges to the healthcare system and society, including how to define benefit, how to handle informed consent, the special needs of pediatric patients, how to engage communities in these difficult decisions, and how to mitigate concerns of discrimination and the effects of structural inequities.

Background: The coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic has or threatens to overwhelm health care systems. Many institutions are developing ventilator triage policies. Objective: To characterize the development of ventilator triage policies and compare policy content. Design: Survey and mixed-methods content analysis. Setting: North American hospitals associated with members of the Association of Bioethics Program Directors. Participants: Program directors. Measurements: Characteristics of institutions and policies, including triage criteria and triage committee membership. Results: Sixty-seven program directors responded (response rate, 91.8%); 36 (53.7%) hospitals did not yet have a policy, and 7 (10.4%) hospitals' policies could not be shared. The 29 institutions providing policies were relatively evenly distributed among the 4 U.S. geographic regions (range, 5 to 9 policies per region). Among the 26 unique policies analyzed, 3 (11.3%) were produced by state health departments. The most frequently cited triage criteria were benefit (25 policies [96.2%]), need (14 [53.8%]), age (13 [50.0%]), conservation of resources (10 [38.5%]), and lottery (9 [34.6%]). Twenty-one (80.8%) policies use scoring systems, and 20 of these (95.2%) use a version of the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment score. Among the policies that specify the triage team's composition (23 [88.5%]), all require or recommend a physician member, 20 (87.0%) a nurse, 16 (69.6%) an ethicist, 8 (34.8%) a chaplain, and 8 (34.8%) a respiratory therapist. Thirteen (50.0% of all policies) require or recommend those making triage decisions not be involved in direct patient care, but only 2 (7.7%) require that their decisions be blinded to ethically irrelevant considerations. Limitation: The results may not be generalizable to institutions without academic bioethics programs. Conclusion: Over one half of respondents did not have ventilator triage policies. Policies have substantial heterogeneity, and many omit guidance on fair implementation., The coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic has overwhelmed health care systems or threatens to do so, and many institutions are developing ventilator triage policies. This study describes policies developed at hospitals associated with members of the Association of Bioethics Program Directors.

Blood pressure (BP) measurement is the most common procedure performed in clinical practice. Accurate BP measurement is critical if patient care is to be delivered with the highest quality, as stressed in published guidelines. Physician training in BP measurement is often limited to a brief demonstration during medical school without retraining in residency, fellowship, or clinical practice to maintain skills. One hundred fifty-nine students from medical schools in 37 states attending the American Medical Association's House of Delegates Meeting in June 2015 were assessed on an 11-element skillset on BP measurement. Only one student demonstrated proficiency on all 11 skills. The mean number of elements performed properly was 4.1. The findings suggest that changes in medical school curriculum emphasizing BP measurement are needed for medical students to become, and remain, proficient in BP measurement. Measuring BP correctly should be taught and reinforced throughout medical school, residency, and the entire career of clinicians.

Hypertension is the leading cause of cardiovascular disease in the United States and worldwide. It also provides a useful model for team‐based chronic disease management. This article describes the M.A.P. checklists: a framework to help practice teams summarize best practices for providing coordinated, evidence‐based care to patients with hypertension. Consisting of three domains—Measure Accurately; Act Rapidly; and Partner With Patients, Families, and Communities—the checklists were developed by a team of clinicians, hypertension experts, and quality improvement experts through a multistep process that combined literature review, iterative feedback from a panel of internationally recognized experts, and pilot testing among a convenience sample of primary care practices in two states. In contrast to many guidelines, the M.A.P. checklists specifically target practice teams, instead of individual clinicians, and are designed to be brief, cognitively easy to consume and recall, and accessible to healthcare workers from a range of professional backgrounds.

An editorial is presented which addresses a public health-based approach to preventing ideologically motivated violence (IMV) in America as of 2017, and it mentions the relationship between counterterrorism and public health, as well as a countering violent extremism (CVE) plan that was developed by then-U.S. President Barack Obama's administration in the early twenty-first century. The religious and political aspects of violence are assessed, along with Islamic and far-right extremists.

Evidence-based interventions differ for increasing hypertension awareness, treatment, and control and should be targeted for specific patient panels. This study developed a hypertension control cascade to identify patients with a usual source of care represented at each level of the cascade using the 2007-2012 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. Overall, 10.7 million adults in the United States were unaware of their condition, 3.8 million were aware but untreated, and 15.8 million were treated but uncontrolled. The results also suggest that failure to attain hypertension control because of lack of awareness or lack of treatment despite awareness occurs mainly among younger individuals and those with no annual healthcare visits, while the elderly and minorities are more likely to remain uncontrolled when aware and treated. Opportunities to leverage population health management functions in electronic health information systems to align the specific patient subgroups facing barriers to hypertension control at each level of the cascade with targeted hypertension management interventions are discussed.

Electronic personal health records could become important tools for patients to use in managing and monitoring their health information and communicating with clinicians. With the emergence of new products and federal incentives that might indirectly encourage greater use of personal health records, policy makers should understand the views of physicians on using these records. In a national survey of physicians in 2008-09, we found that although 64 percent have never used a patient's electronic personal health record, 42 percent would be willing to try. Strikingly, rural physicians expressed much more willingness to use such records compared to urban or suburban physicians. Female physicians were significantly less willing to use these tools than their male peers (34 percent versus 46 percent). Physicians broadly have concerns about the impact on patients' privacy, the accuracy of underlying data, their potential liability for tracking all of the information that might be entered into a personal health record, and the lack of payment to clinicians for using or reviewing these patient records.

The relationship between limited health literacy and poor health may be due, in part, to poor communication quality within health care delivery organizations. We explored the relationship between health literacy status and receiving patient-centered communication in clinics and hospitals serving communication-vulnerable patient populations. Thirteen health care organizations nationwide distributed a survey to 5929 patients. All patients completed seven items assessing patient-centered communication. One third also completed three items assessing health literacy. The majority of patients had self-reported health literacy challenges, reporting problems learning about their medical condition because of difficulty understanding written information (53%), a lack of confidence in completing medical forms by themselves (61%), and needing someone to help them read hospital/clinic materials (57%). Logistic regression models showed that, after adjustment for patient demographic characteristics and health care organization type, patients with limited health literacy were 28% to 79% less likely than those with adequate health literacy to report their health care organization "always" provides patient-centered communication across seven communication items. Using a scaled composite of these items, limited health literacy remained associated with lower reported communication quality. These results suggest that improving communication quality in health care organizations might help to address the challenges facing patients with limited health literacy. They also highlight that efforts to address the needs of patients with limited health literacy should be sensitive to the range of communication challenges confronting these patients and their caregivers.

Continuous quality improvement is a component of professionalism. Maintenance of Certification (MOC) is a mechanism in the USA for physicians to keep current with medical knowledge and contribute to practice improvement. Little is known about primary care physicians’ perceptions of the practice improvement (Part IV) components of MOC. We aimed to determine primary care physicians’ perceptions of their professional responsibility to participate in Part IV MOC. This was a cross-sectional study of primary care physicians using the American Medical Association Masterfile. We developed a nine-item survey, designed from expert consensus and literature to determine views on Part IV MOC as a professional responsibility. We surveyed 1500 randomly selected primary care physicians via mail from November 2014 to May 2015. The response rate was 42% (627 of 1,500): 47% (273 of 585) were family practitioners and 49% (289 of 585) were internists. Factor analysis revealed a two-factor survey, with five items pertaining to positive views of MOC Part IV and four items pertaining to negative views. Internists were more likely to view MOC Part IV as time consuming (82.0% vs. 70.3%, P = .001), expensive (50.9% vs. 38.8%, P = .004), and not relevant to practice (39.1% vs. 23.8%, P

Promoting racial/ethnic diversity within the physician workforce is a national priority. However, the extent of racial/ethnic discrimination reported by physicians from diverse backgrounds in today's health-care workplace is unknown.To determine the prevalence of physician experiences of perceived racial/ethnic discrimination at work and to explore physician views about race and discussions regarding race/ethnicity in the workplace.Cross-sectional, national survey conducted in 2006-2007.Practicing physicians (total n = 529) from diverse racial/ethnic backgrounds in the United States.We examined physicians' experience of racial/ethnic discrimination over their career course, their experience of discrimination in their current work setting, and their views about race/ethnicity and discrimination at work. The proportion of physicians who reported that they had experienced racial/ethnic discrimination "sometimes, often, or very often" during their medical career was substantial among non-majority physicians (71% of black physicians, 45% of Asian physicians, 63% of "other" race physicians, and 27% of Hispanic/Latino(a) physicians, compared with 7% of white physicians, all p0.05). Similarly, the proportion of non-majority physicians who reported that they experienced discrimination in their current work setting was substantial (59% of black, 39% of Asian, 35% of "other" race, 24% of Hispanic/Latino(a) physicians, and 21% of white physicians). Physician views about the role of race/ethnicity at work varied significantly by respondent race/ethnicity.Many non-majority physicians report experiencing racial/ethnic discrimination in the workplace. Opportunities exist for health-care organizations and diverse physicians to work together to improve the climate of perceived discrimination where they work.

The profession of medicine is based on a shared set of tacit and explicit agreements about what patients, doctors, and society at large should be able to expect from each other, a social contract that defines the profession. Historically, the development of this set of agreements depended upon the creation of social organizations that could speak for the entire profession. Over the last several decades, however, the perceived need for these organizations, and especially the umbrella organization for the profession, the American Medical Association, has waned. The reasons for this are complex, but the consequences are significant: an eroding social contract, fragmentation, lack of cohesion and integrity, and loss of the public's confidence. The present social contract is one-dimensional, overly simplistic, and failing to sustain the public's trust. To address these problems, a renewed social contract is necessary. Although this renewed contract should be based on foundations similar to the original, it must directly confront such contemporary challenges as resource allocation and conflicts of interest. Equally as important, to reinvigorate our social contract more physicians will need to come to grips with a basic truth: to sustain professionalism we need a strong, unified professional association.

Specialty board certification is a longstanding component of the US medical profession’s system of collective self-regulation. Although processes for board certification have changed over the years to match advancing medical practice and expanding public expectations of accountability, board certification has demonstrated to the public, the profession, colleagues, and the individual physician that certified specialists meet high specialtyspecific standards of education, expertise, and character.ThisViewpointdescribestheroleofboardcertification in collective professional self-regulation, current challenges and future directions.

There are three broad ethical issues related to handling public health emergencies. They are the three R's-rationing, restrictions and responsibilities. Recently, a severe shortage of annual influenza vaccine in the US, combined with the threat of pandemic flu, has provided an opportunity for policy makers to think about rationing in very concrete terms. Some lessons from annual flu vaccination likely will apply to pandemic vaccine distribution, but many preparatory decisions must be based on very rough estimates. What ethical principles should guide rationing decisions, what data should inform these decisions, how to revise decisions as new data emerge, and how to implement rationing decisions on the ground are all important considerations. In addition, ethicists might be able to help policy makers think through the importance of international cooperation in surmounting global rationing dilemmas and to accept the inevitable responsibilities of government in making and implementing rationing decisions.

The earliest forms of prescription drug benefit management generally entailed only processing claims between plan sponsors and network pharmacies. Not much emphasis was put on creating coverage policies, and little effort was put toward lowering costs. Basically, most prescriptions filled in

*The views expressed are the author's own. This article should not be construed as representing policies of the American Medical Association.

Patients and physicians often perceive the current health care system to be unfair, in part because of the ways in which coverage decisions appear to be made. To address this problem the Ethical Force Program, a collaborative effort to create quality improvement tools for ethics in health care, has developed five content areas specifying ethical criteria for fair health care benefits design and administration. Each content area includes concrete recommendations and measurable expectations for performance improvement, which can be used by those organizations involved in the design and administration of health benefits packages, such as purchasers, health plans, benefits consultants, and practitioner groups.

Preparedness for bioterrorism poses significant ethical challenges. Although public health ethics and preparedness have received attention recently, health care ethics must also be considered. In epidemics, the health care system assists public health in 3 tasks: detection, containment, and treatment. Detection might fail if all patients do not have access to care, or if physicians do not understand their obligation to report infectious diseases to public health authorities. Containment might fail if physicians view themselves only as advocates for individual patients, ignoring their social obligations as health professionals. Treatment might fail if physicians do not accept their professional duty to treat patients during epidemics. Each of these potential ethical barriers to preparedness must be addressed by physicians and society.

Little is known about contemporary physicians' sense of preparedness for bioterrorism, willingness to treat patients despite personal risk, or belief in the professional duty to treat during epidemics. In a recent national survey few physicians reported that they or their practice are "well prepared" for bioterrorism. Still, most respondents reported that they would continue to care for patients in the event of an outbreak of "an unknown but potentially deadly illness," although only a narrow majority reported believing in a professional duty to treat patients in epidemics. Preparing physicians for bioterrorism should entail providing practical knowledge, preventive steps to minimize risk, and reinforcement of the profession's ethical duty to treat.

Ethically, physicians should discuss all medically appropriate services with patients, but coverage restrictions can make these discussions difficult. In a national survey of physicians, we asked how often physicians elected not to offer their patients useful services because of health plan coverage rules. During the course of a year, 31 percent reported having sometimes not offered their patients useful services because of perceived coverage restrictions. Among these, 35 percent reported doing so more often in the most recent year than they did five years ago. It can be frustrating for doctors to discuss uncovered services with their patients, but open communication is necessary for shared decision making and to improve coverage decisions.

This study examined the test-retest reliability of physicians’ self-reported manipulation of reimbursement rules for patients. The test-retest reliability of self-report of three specific tactics were examined: (1) exaggerating the severity of patients’ conditions, (2) changing a patient’s official (billing) diagnosis, and (3) reporting signs or symptoms that patients did not have. The reliability of a scaled summary measure of physicians’manipulation of reimbursement rules was also assessed. Overall, the authors found high levels of test-retest agreement across all three items and the summary measure. These findings suggest that self-report can be used to produce reliable data on this controversial issue. Specifically, the three items reported here can be used to produce a reliable summary measure of physicians’manipulation of reimbursement rules to help patients obtain care that physicians perceive as necessary.

BACKGROUND: Individual physicians who are paid prospectively, as in capitated health plans, might tend to encourage patients to avoid or to join these plans according to the patient’s health status. Though insurance risk selection has been well documented among organizations paid on a prospective basis, such physician-level risk selection has not been studied. OBJECTIVE: To assess physician reports of risk selection in capitated health plans and explore potentially related factors. DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS: National mailed survey of primary care physicians in 1997–1998, oversampling physicians in areas with more capitated health plans. RESULTS: The response rate was 63% (787 of 1,252 eligible recipients). Overall, 44% of physicians reported encouraging patients either to join or to avoid capitated health plans according to the patients’ health status: 40% encouraged more complex and ill patients to avoid capitated plans and 23% encouraged healthier patients to join capitated plans. In multivariable models, physicians with negative perceptions of capitated plan quality, with more negative experiences in capitated plans, and those who knew at each patient encounter how they were being compensated had higher odds of encouraging sicker patients to avoid capitated plans (odds ratios, 2.0, 2.2, and 2.0; all confidence intervals >1). CONCLUSIONS: Many primary care physicians report encouraging patients to join or avoid capitated plans according to the patient’s health status. Although these physicians’ recommendations might be associated primarily with concerns about quality, they can have the effect of insulating certain health plans from covering sicker and more expensive patients.

Mail surveys of physicians have been characterized by lower response rates than general population surveys, raising concerns about nonresponse bias. Although monetary incentives have routinely been used to improve survey response among physicians, questions remain regarding how much of an incentive is most cost-effective. The present study seeks to further examine the effects of incentive size on response rates to a national mail survey of physicians.This study used a random sample of 873 physicians practicing in the United States; the response rate was 65% (n = 563). Respondents were randomly assigned to receive a $5, $10, or $20 cash incentive in the initial mailing. Except for the magnitude of the incentive, the procedures for each condition were identical, with each respondent receiving up to 3 follow-up mailings and 2 telephone calls.Overall response rates ranged from 60.3% for the $5 incentive category to 68.0% for the $10 incentive category. Differences in overall response rates across the incentive categories, however, were not significant. Higher levels of incentives also did not significantly reduce the number of mail and/or telephone interventions required to reach the target response rate of 60.0%. As expected, aggregate costs (excluding labor) were lowest for the $5 incentive group.Our findings suggest that changes in the magnitude of incentive do not automatically result in increases in survey response among physicians. Possible reasons for this lack of effect as well as alternatives to monetary incentives are addressed.

Importance Physicians’ views about health care costs are germane to pending policy reforms. Objective To assess physicians’ attitudes toward and perceived role in addressing health care costs. Design, Setting, and Participants A cross-sectional survey mailed in 2012 to 3897 US physicians randomly selected from the AMA Masterfile. Main Outcomes and Measures Enthusiasm for 17 cost-containment strategies and agreement with an 11-measure cost-consciousness scale. Results A total of 2556 physicians responded (response rate = 65%). Most believed that trial lawyers (60%), health insurance companies (59%), hospitals and health systems (56%), pharmaceutical and device manufacturers (56%), and patients (52%) have a “major responsibility” for reducing health care costs, whereas only 36% reported that practicing physicians have “major responsibility.” Most were “very enthusiastic” for “promoting continuity of care” (75%), “expanding access to quality and safety data” (51%), and “limiting access to expensive treatments with little net benefit” (51%) as a means of reducing health care costs. Few expressed enthusiasm for “eliminating fee-for-service payment models” (7%). Most physicians reported being “aware of the costs of the tests/treatments [they] recommend” (76%), agreed they should adhere to clinical guidelines that discourage the use of marginally beneficial care (79%), and agreed that they “should be solely devoted to individual patients’ best interests, even if that is expensive” (78%) and that “doctors need to take a more prominent role in limiting use of unnecessary tests” (89%). Most (85%) disagreed that they “should sometimes deny beneficial but costly services to certain patients because resources should go to other patients that need them more.” In multivariable logistic regression models testing associations with enthusiasm for key cost-containment strategies, having a salary plus bonus or salary-only compensation type was independently associated with enthusiasm for “eliminating fee for service” (salary plus bonus: odds ratio [OR], 3.3, 99% CI, 1.8-6.1; salary only: OR, 4.3, 99% CI, 2.2-8.5). In multivariable linear regression models, group or government practice setting (β = 0.87, 95% CI, 0.29 to 1.45, P = .004; and β = 0.99, 95% CI, 0.20 to 1.79, P = .01, respectively) and having a salary plus bonus compensation type (β = 0.82; 95% CI, 0.32 to 1.33; P = .002) were positively associated with cost-consciousness. Finding the “uncertainty involved in patient care disconcerting” was negatively associated with cost-consciousness (β = −1.95; 95% CI, −2.71 to −1.18; P Conclusion and Relevance In this survey about health care cost containment, US physicians reported having some responsibility to address health care costs in their practice and expressed general agreement about several quality initiatives to reduce cost but reported less enthusiasm for cost containment involving changes in payment models.

THE 1999 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT TO ERR IS Human: Building a Safer Health System launched the modern patient safety movement by estimating a large number of yearly error-related deaths among hospitalized patients in the United States. But 12 years later, there are no reliable data on how many patients in the United States are injured or die each year because of errors in ambulatory settings. The number may be substantial; 52% of paid medical malpractice claims in 2009 were for events in the outpatient setting, and two-thirds of these claims involved major injury or death. More than 10 years ago, a group of experts convened by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) reported that “medical error and injury are substantial in ambulatory care, [but] there has been little systematic research specifically aimed at patient safety questions in ambulatory care.” To jump-start a new research agenda, the conferees made 11 specific recommendations. Virtually none have been implemented.

The term “Electronic Health Records” (EHR) means something different to each of the stakeholders in health care, but it always seems to carry a degree of emotional baggage. Increasingly, EHRs are advertized as a nearly unmitigated good that will transform medical care, improve safety and efficiency, allow better patient engagement, and open the door to an era of cheap, effective, timely, and patient-centered care. Indeed, for some EHR proponents the benefits of adopting them are so obvious that adoption has become an end in itself. But for others — and especially for a number of skeptical practitioners and patients — EHR is a code word that portends the corporate transformation of health care delivery, the loss of patient privacy, the demand that patients bear more responsibility in health care, and the unreflective takeover of the health care system by people who do not understand medical care or how health care relationships unfold.

The authors argue that physician practices should routinely collect data on the race and ethnic group of their patients. They caution against the use of these data to infer information about health-related values or beliefs, and they discuss the benefit of using these data at the population level to detect disparities in care and to improve the quality of care.

To examine the association between physician race/ ethnicity, workplace discrimination, and physician job turnover.Cross-sectional, national survey conducted in 2006-2007 of practicing physicians (n = 529) randomly identified via the American Medical Association Masterfile and the National Medical Association membership roster. We assessed the relationships between career racial/ethnic discrimination at work and several career-related dependent variables, including 2 measures of physician turnover, career satisfaction, and contemplation of career change. We used standard frequency analyses, odds ratios and chi2 statistics, and multivariate logistic regression modeling to evaluate these associations.Physicians who self-identified as nonmajority were significantly more likely to have left at least 1 job because of workplace discrimination (black, 29%; Asian, 24%; other race, 21%; Hispanic/Latino, 20%; white, 9%). In multivariate models, having experienced racial/ethnic discrimination at work was associated with high job turnover (adjusted odds ratio, 2.7; 95% CI, 1.4-4.9). Among physicians who experienced workplace discrimination, only 45% of physicians were satisfied with their careers (vs 88% among those who had not experienced workplace discrimination, p value.01), and 40% were contemplating a career change (vs 10% among those who had not experienced workplace discrimination, p value.001).Workplace discrimination is associated with physician job turnover, career dissatisfaction, and contemplation of career change. These findings underscore the importance of monitoring for workplace discrimination and responding when opportunities for intervention and retention still exist.

Regulating clinical trials for testing new drugs is fraught with risk. Misregulation can slow development of innovative and useful new drugs, but in other ways misregulation can foster trials that are inefficient and unethical, driven by commercial rather than scientific ends, and that can harm patients. In this paper, we argue not for more but for better regulation, based on the goal of rapidly producing innovative and safe products that represent significant advances in medical care. Data on industry-funded, late-stage clinical trials demonstrate an urgent need for dramatic changes in how these trials are designed, conducted, and analyzed. On the one hand, current patent rules can dissuade development of innovative new products with smaller markets and press trial designers to create positive results too rapidly. But at the same time, numerous studies show that when the pharmaceutical industry sponsors clinical trials, the results are systematically biased in favor of the sponsor's product, often to the detriment of patients and the public. The reasons for this bias are both complex and unavoidable, and the ways in which clinical trial design, conduct, and reporting can be inappropriately influenced are so varied and nuanced, that efforts to manage this conflict of interest and prevent harms are inevitably unsuccessful. Instead, we conclude such conflict should be avoided and a strong firewall should exist between drug developers and the final stages of clinical testing in humans. All financial support for phase III clinical trials should pass through a public-private partnership organization — perhaps tied to a broader clinical effectiveness research enterprise — which would be charged with designing, funding, and monitoring late-stage human clinical trials of new pharmaceutical products.

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates prescription drug marketing, not prescribing. However, off-label use is common, often lacks supporting evidence, and may expose patients to unwarranted risk. We sought to determine physicians' knowledge of the FDA-approved indications of commonly prescribed drugs, and to assess whether physicians' belief that an indication is FDA-approved increases with level of evidence supporting such use.We conducted a national random sample mail survey of 599 primary care physicians and 600 psychiatrists from November 2007 to August 2008. Physicians were presented with 14 drug-indication pairs (e.g., gabapentin [Neurontin] for diabetic neuropathy) that varied in their FDA-approval status and levels of supporting evidence.The adjusted response rate was 47%, respondents were similar to non-respondents, and physicians commonly prescribed the drugs examined. The average respondent accurately identified the FDA-approval status of just over half of the drug-indication pairs queried (mean 55%; median 57%). Accuracy increased modestly (mean 60%, median 63%) when limited to drugs the respondent reported having prescribed during the previous 12 months. There was a strong association between physicians' belief that an indication was FDA-approved and greater evidence supporting efficacy for that use (Spearman's rho 0.74, p0.001). However, 41% of physicians believed at least one drug-indication pair with uncertain or no supporting evidence (e.g., quetiapine [Seroquel] for dementia with agitation) was FDA approved.These findings highlight a pressing need for more effective methods to inform physicians about the evidence base, or lack thereof, for drugs they prescribe off label.

An independent panel of experts, convened by the American Medical Association (AMA) Institute for Ethics, analyzed the roots of the racial divide within American medical organizations. In this, the first of a 2-part report, we describe 2 watershed moments that helped institutionalize the racial divide. The first occurred in the 1870s, when 2 medical societies from Washington, DC, sent rival delegations to the AMA's national meetings: an all-white delegation from a medical society that the US courts and Congress had formally censured for discriminating against black physicians; and an integrated delegation from a medical society led by physicians from Howard University. Through parliamentary maneuvers and variable enforcement of credentialing standards, the integrated delegation was twice excluded from the AMA's meetings, while the all-white society's delegations were admitted. AMA leaders then voted to devolve the power to select delegates to state societies, thereby accepting segregation in constituent societies and forcing African American physicians to create their own, separate organizations. A second watershed involved AMA-promoted educational reforms, including the 1910 Flexner report. Straightforwardly applied, the report's population-based criterion for determining the need for phySicians would have recommended increased training of African American physicians to serve the approximately 9 million African Americans in the segregated south. Instead, the report recommended closing all but 2 African American medical schools, helping to cement in place an African American educational system that was separate, unequal, and destined to be insufficient to the needs of African Americans nationwide.

Between 1910 and 1968, the National Medical Association (NMA) repeatedly clashed with the American Medical Association (AMA) over the latter organization's racial bars to membership and other health policy issues. The NMA, founded in 1895 as a nonexclusionary medical society to provide a voice for disenfranchised black physicians and patients, struggled in its early years, during which AMA leadership took scant notice of it. But skirmishes ensued over such actions as stigmatizing racial labels in the AMA's American Medical Directory, which, beginning in 1906, listed all U.S. physicians but designated African Americans with the notation col. The NMA also repeatedly asked the AMA to take action against overt racial bars on blacks' membership in its constituent state and county societies. During the civil rights era, African American physicians received no AMA support in seeking legal remedies to hospital segregation. And the NMA and AMA found themselves opposed on other policy issues, including Medicaid and Medicare. These differences eventually catalyzed a series of direct confrontations. The 1965 AMA meeting in New York City, for example, was protested by about 200 NMA-led picketers. The NMA's quest for racial equality in medicine was supported by some other medical organizations, such as the Medical Committee for Human Rights. In 1966, the AMA House voted to amend the AMA Constitution and Bylaws, giving its Judicial Council (now the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs) the authority to investigate allegations of discrimination. This paved the way for a subsequent era of increasing cooperation and understanding.

According to the former chief of training at the Navy's Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school, waterboarding is a "controlled drowning" that "occurs under the watch of a doctor, a psychologist, an interrogator and a trained strap-in/strap-out team." When waterboarding is used as part of mock interrogations during SERE training, "A team doctor watches the quantity of water that is ingested and for the physiological signs which show when the drowning effect goes from painful psychological experience to horrific, suffocating punishment, to the final death spiral." (1) Since waterboarding entails introducing liquid into the airway and risks letting water get sucked into the lungs, if it is to be demonstrated at all it makes sense for it to be done under close medical supervision. After all, a mock interrogatee could potentially die during waterboarding, even if only by accident. So why risk it? Well, a lot of military training is risky. Waterboarding, like other coercive interrogation techniques, is used during SERE training to prepare soldiers for what they might face at the hands of our enemies. The rationale is that some of our enemies might be unreservedly evil. They might believe our soldiers to be less than human. They might, like the Nazis, believe they are fighting "a decisive battle between two ideologies" and "an entirely new kind of war" in which "different standards" must be used. (2) Certainly, Al Qaeda has not adhered to the laws of war and has brutally tortured and murdered captives. In sum, when fighting evil totalitarians we need to train our soldiers based on the reality that they might be subjected to torture during interrogation. One question this raises is whether one can be trained to withstand torture. The training environment is artificial, of course. Soldiers are there voluntarily. A medical team is standing by, and the soldiers know their torturers won't actually kill them (at least not intentionally). But even so, experience shows that soldiers often withstand torture without releasing valuable information. During the Vietnam War, despite torture, only about 5 percent of the four hundred airmen captured signed anti-American propaganda statements, let alone divulged sensitive information. (3) Others have behaved similarly: In an examination of 625 instances of torture in France between 1500 and 1750, between 67 percent and 95 percent of victims never confessed, even "on the rack, under repeated drowning, crushing of joints, and the like." (4) When the victims of torture do "talk," they often--and perhaps intentionally--provide unreliable as well as true information. In fact, there is very little evidence that torture is effective as an interrogation technique, and some evidence that it can backfire dramatically. (5) But I digress. The real question at hand is how to hold to account the medical personnel needed to support waterboarding detainees. The method is so dangerous, according to the SERE trainer, that it can be carried out with any degree of safety only if a medical team is at hand. (6) This means, as Newsweek put it, that "presumably" medical teams have monitored the waterboarding of detainees by the CIA. (7) This would be consistent with written assertions from the administration that prisoners are "medically and operationally evaluated as suitable [for coercive interrogation] (considering all techniques to be used in combination)." (8) It would also fit with the leaked assessment of the International Committee of the Red Cross, referring to conditions at Guantanamo, that U.S. physician involvement in coercive interrogations there constituted "a flagrant violation of medical ethics." (9) Beyond ethics, participation in water-boarding could also put these physicians in significant legal jeopardy as parties to a war crime. But this is where the story gets strange. Torture has long been illegal under U.S. law. Since 1984, the legal definition of torture in the United States has been "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession. …

Recent arguments over whether certain public health interventions should be mandatory raise questions about what counts as a "mandate." A mandate is not the same as a mere recommendation or the standard of practice. At minimum, a mandate should require an active opt-out and there should be some penalty for refusing to abide by it. Over-loose use of the term "mandate" and the easing of opt-out provisions could eventually pose a risk to the gains that truly mandatory public health interventions, such as childhood vaccines, have provided over the last 50 years. Already, confusion about what counts as a mandate, and about what criteria should be used to determine when a public health intervention should be implemented as a mandate, has led to some inappropriate public policy decisions. For instance, by any reasonable criteria, the yearly influenza vaccine should be mandatory for health care workers. To enforce this mandate, those who refuse vaccination should be required to sign a waiver, and patients - especially those at high risk from flu - should be informed when they receive care from unvaccinated practitioners.

As the American system of health care delivery strains under the weight of erratic coverage, inefficiency, and uncertain quality, proposals for how it should be reformed have proliferated. (1) Some proposals focus primarily on improving quality, others on restraining costs; all, directly or indirectly, address access to health care. (2) We present a consensus framework for evaluating how well a proposal addresses the issue. While access is affected by a number of factors (geography, distribution of providers, and so on), for this essay we focus primarily on ethical issues in access to health care coverage. The framework emerges from the work of the multi-stakeholder Ethical Force Program, which uses a standardized process derived from well-accepted methods for generating consensus on clinical practice guidelines and measuring quality in health care. (3) The program is a collaborative initiative led by the Institute for Ethics at the American Medical Association. It was established in 1997 "to improve health care by advancing ethical behavior among all participants." (4) It is motivated by the beliefs that ethical standards are fundamental to health care systems that are effective and trusted, that all stakeholders in health care should be accountable for their ethics, and that stakeholders must work together to ensure that shared ethical standards are widely promoted, understood, and followed. (5) The program functions as a national quality improvement organization for health care ethics. As such, it produces an array of reports and tools that all stakeholders can use to assess and improve the ethical environment of health care. The method by which it produces consensus statements has been described in detail elsewhere. (6) In brief, it runs as follows. An oversight body provides guidance on all programmatic activities. (For a list of the members, see the accompanying box.) The oversight body comprises a diverse group of leaders from all aspects of health care delivery, including clinicians, patients, provider organizations, purchasers, and others. The AMA holds two seats on the oversight body; the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality, the American Hospital Association, The Joint Commission, and the National Committee for Quality Assurance also hold permanent seats. The remaining seats are filled to three-year terms by vote of the oversight body, which seeks to ensure diverse perspectives and involvement. To determine consensus on recommendations, the oversight body votes on whether members support each recommendation using a one to ten scale. A statement is rejected if it fails to achieve an average score of greater than seven or if any member gives it a vote of less than three. We used this consensus process to come to agreement on four core ethical obligations for health system reforms that aim to improve access to care. We present these obligations with a number of more specific consensus recommendations that follow from taking the four ethical obligations seriously. Access to Health Care as an Ethical Issue As the number of Americans without health care coverage continues to increase, access to care is a major political, economic, and policy problem. Unequal access to health care is also an ethical issue. Most Americans understand this: 72 percent think our society should ensure universal access to health care, and 60 percent consider it to be a moral rather than a strictly political or economic issue. (7) We hold that three core American values are at stake: equality of opportunity, justice, and compassion. Equality of opportunity is essential for each of us to fulfill the American promise of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and personal health is an essential ingredient to ensure opportunity. (8) Equality of opportunity is compromised whenever identifiable subpopulations of American society are disproportionately affected by limited access to care. For instance, it belies the American ideal that all are created equal when disparities in access to care lead to consistently poorer health outcomes for specific racial and ethnic groups. …

Confidentiality is a core value in medicine and public health yet, like other core values, it is not absolute. Medical ethics has typically allowed for breaches of confidentiality when there is a credible threat of significant harm to an identifiable third party. Medical ethics has been less explicit in spelling out criteria for allowing breaches of confidentiality to protect populations, instead tending to defer these decisions to the law. But recently, issues in military detention settings have raised the profile of decisions to breach medical confidentiality in efforts to protect the broader population. National and international ethics documents say little about the confidentiality of detainee medical records. But initial decisions to use detainee medical records to help craft coercive interrogations led to widespread condemnation, and might have contributed to detainee health problems, such as a large number of suicide attempts several of which have been successful. More recent military guidance seems to reflect lessons learned from these problems and does more to protect detainee records. For the public health system, this experience is a reminder of the importance of confidentiality in creating trustworthy, and effective, means to protect the public's health.

Responses to public health emergencies can entail difficult decisions about restricting individual liberties to prevent the spread of disease. The quintessential example is quarantine. While isolating sick patients tends not to provoke much concern, quarantine of healthy people who only might be infected often is controversial. In fact, as the experience with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) shows, the vast majority of those placed under quarantine typically don't become ill. Efforts to enforce involuntary quarantine through military or police powers also can backfire, stoking both panic and disease spread. Yet quarantine is part of a limited arsenal of options when effective treatment or prophylaxis is not available, and some evidence suggests it can be effective, especially when it is voluntary, home-based and accompanied by extensive outreach, communication and education efforts. Even assuming that quarantine is medically effective, however, it still must be ethically justified because it creates harms for many of those affected. Moreover, ethical principles of reciprocity, transparency, non-discrimination and accountability should guide any implementation of quarantine.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recently recommended that HIV screening should become routine for all adults in the United States. Implicit in the CDC proposal is the notion that pre-test counseling would be more limited than at present, and that written informed consent to screening would no longer be required. If widely implemented, routine testing would mark a tremendous shift in the US HIV screening strategy. There are a number of considerations used to determine what screening tests should be routine, and HIV fits the bill in almost every regard. Yet the stigma associated with HIV infection remains, making the CDC's recommendation highly controversial. Will minimizing requirements for pre-test counseling and special written informed consent lead to unexpected or unwanted HIV testing, or do these stringent counseling and consent requirements needlessly scare people away? Will widespread and routine testing be associated with declining stigmatization, or will it drive some patients away from seeking desperately needed health care? These are high stakes questions, and we're about to find out the answers.

Objectives Potential bioterrorism challenges policy makers to balance competing public health priorities. Earlier surveys showed low physician bioterrorism preparedness but did not assess physicians' general public health preparedness, compare the preparedness of emergency and primary care physicians, or assess temporal trends. Methods This was a national, cross-sectional, random-sample survey conducted in 2003. Results Overall, 744 of 1,200 eligible physicians responded (response rate, 62%). Of these, 58% of emergency physician respondents and 48% of primary care physician respondents reported having learned a lot about responding to bioterror since September 11, 2001 (p < 0.01). However, only 43% of emergency physicians and 21% of primary care physicians agreed they are generally “well prepared to play a role in responding to a bioterror attack” (p < 0.001). Beliefs about balancing public health priorities were similar among emergency and primary care respondents. Seventy-eight percent of respondents believed that local health care systems need to be prepared for bioterrorism, and 92% believed that local health care systems need to be prepared for natural epidemics. By contrast, only 23% and 46% of respondents reported that their local health care systems are well prepared for bioterrorism and natural epidemics, respectively. Meanwhile, 77% agreed that “influenza is a greater threat to public health than bioterrorism,” and 21% reported that bioterrorism preparedness efforts are diverting resources from more important public health problems. Conclusions In 2003, most emergency and primary care physicians reported that they and their local health care systems were not yet well prepared to respond to a bioterror attack, and many believed that more resources should go toward preparing for natural epidemics. These findings highlight the importance of expanding bioterrorism preparedness efforts to improve the public health system more broadly.

*The views expressed are the author's own. This article should not be construed as representing policies of the American Medical Association.

With this issue, we begin a regular feature on bioethics and public health. We welcome Matthew K. Wynia, M.D., M.P.H., Director of the Institute for Ethics of the American Medical Association as our new Contributing Editor. If you have comments or suggestions regarding this feature, please email us at manuscript@ bioethics.net.

This study examines physicians' attitudes toward key Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule requirements and assesses the effects of their implementation. We found that despite physicians' generally negative views toward the Privacy Rule, they rated organizations implementing more rule requirements better at protecting the privacy of patient records than organizations that have not implemented the requirements. The policy implications of the findings are discussed.