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On January 10, 1984, the United States and the Holy See announced the establishment of diplomatic relations. The decision was made in a context of revived tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union after the détente of the 1970s. At first sight there seems to have been a perfect ideological convergence between President Ronald Reagan and Pope John Paul II, as both were famous for their vocal anticommunism. The rapprochement witnessed in the 1980s has led some to posit the existence of an alliance between Rome and Washington, the aim of which was to hasten the collapse of Marxist regimes. Yet, a closer analysis of Vatican-American relations during that period contradicts such an interpretation, as the Vatican did not by any means endorse all of Reagan’s Cold War-related policies. This led to efforts on the part of Washington to convince the Holy See of the legitimacy of its foreign policy options. Arms reduction, Strategic Def! ense Initiative, Central America, and Poland were some of the topics brought up by Washington in order to secure Vatican approval, or at the very least to prevent a condemnation, even an implicit one, of US policies. Sometimes, the Holy See did act in a manner construed as favorable to US interests. However, this was always in keeping with its own interests, which were not solely Cold War-related, and which the Vatican always pursued, whether they tallied with those of the United States or not.; Le 10 janvier 1984, les Etats-Unis et le Saint-Siège annoncent l’établissement de relations diplomatiques. Cette décision s’inscrit dans un contexte de tensions accrues entre les Etats-Unis et l’Union soviétique après la détente qui avait caractérisé les années 1970. L’accord idéologique semble parfait entre Ronald Reagan et Jean-Paul II, tous les deux connus pour leur anticommunisme farouche. Le rapprochement constaté dans les années 1980 a conduit certains à évoquer l’existence d’une alliance entre Rome et Washington ayant visé à précipiter la chute des régimes marxistes. Pourtant, une analyse plus poussée de leurs relations pendant cette période tend à infirmer cette lecture. Le Vatican ne va pas toujours approuver les politiques de déstabilisation des régimes marxistes menées par l’Administration Reagan, contrairement aux attentes de cette dernière. Washington, pris au dépourvu, va consentir des efforts importants pour convaincre Rome du bien fondé de sa politique étrangère. Négociations de désarmement, Initiative de défense stratégique, Amérique centrale et Pologne seront autant de sujets abordés pour essayer d’emporter l’adhésion du Saint-Siège, ou tout du moins pour éviter une condamnation, ne serait-ce qu’implicite, de sa politique. Parfois, le Saint-Siège va agir dans un sens favorable aux intérêts américains, mais quelle que soit l’effet de ses prises de position sur Washington, ces dernières s’expliquent par le fait que le Saint-Siège a agi selon des intérêts qui ne sont pas tous liés à la lutte contre le communisme.

On January 10, 1984, the United States and the Holy See announced the establishment of diplomatic relations. The decision was made in a context of revived tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union after the détente of the 1970s. At first sight there seems to have been a perfect ideological convergence between President Ronald Reagan and Pope John Paul II, as both were famous for their vocal anticommunism. The rapprochement witnessed in the 1980s has led some to posit the existence of an alliance between Rome and Washington, the aim of which was to hasten the collapse of Marxist regimes. Yet, a closer analysis of Vatican-American relations during that period contradicts such an interpretation, as the Vatican did not by any means endorse all of Reagan’s Cold War-related policies. This led to efforts on the part of Washington to convince the Holy See of the legitimacy of its foreign policy options. Arms reduction, Strategic Def! ense Initiative, Central America, and Poland were some of the topics brought up by Washington in order to secure Vatican approval, or at the very least to prevent a condemnation, even an implicit one, of US policies. Sometimes, the Holy See did act in a manner construed as favorable to US interests. However, this was always in keeping with its own interests, which were not solely Cold War-related, and which the Vatican always pursued, whether they tallied with those of the United States or not.; Le 10 janvier 1984, les Etats-Unis et le Saint-Siège annoncent l’établissement de relations diplomatiques. Cette décision s’inscrit dans un contexte de tensions accrues entre les Etats-Unis et l’Union soviétique après la détente qui avait caractérisé les années 1970. L’accord idéologique semble parfait entre Ronald Reagan et Jean-Paul II, tous les deux connus pour leur anticommunisme farouche. Le rapprochement constaté dans les années 1980 a conduit certains à évoquer l’existence d’une alliance entre Rome et Washington ayant visé à précipiter la chute des régimes marxistes. Pourtant, une analyse plus poussée de leurs relations pendant cette période tend à infirmer cette lecture. Le Vatican ne va pas toujours approuver les politiques de déstabilisation des régimes marxistes menées par l’Administration Reagan, contrairement aux attentes de cette dernière. Washington, pris au dépourvu, va consentir des efforts importants pour convaincre Rome du bien fondé de sa politique étrangère. Négociations de désarmement, Initiative de défense stratégique, Amérique centrale et Pologne seront autant de sujets abordés pour essayer d’emporter l’adhésion du Saint-Siège, ou tout du moins pour éviter une condamnation, ne serait-ce qu’implicite, de sa politique. Parfois, le Saint-Siège va agir dans un sens favorable aux intérêts américains, mais quelle que soit l’effet de ses prises de position sur Washington, ces dernières s’expliquent par le fait que le Saint-Siège a agi selon des intérêts qui ne sont pas tous liés à la lutte contre le communisme.

International audience

International audience; The rise of populist actors is increasingly associated with economic issues such as welfare, redistribution and international trade. However, the link between populism and the economy remains unclear. This chapter argues the importance of a specific concept of economic populism whereby economic issues may be partially embedded into a populist frame. This frame may be expressed differently across contexts and it may also cross-cut traditional economic cleavages. Moreover, economic populism may be found among ordinary citizens in the form of a specific set of attitudes. Based on a recent comparative cross-sectional survey of citizens in France, Switzerland and the United States, we show that economic populism forms a common attitudinal dimension across these three countries, which is however differently distributed across the left-right axis and which manifests differently in relation to other important economic correlates of populism such as economic redistribution, welfare chauvinism and attitudes towards globalization, according to context.