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This article examines how the Soviet grand narrative of the Great Patriotic War (1941–45) was used in the school educational institution in one of the two Donbas "people's republics" between 2014 and 2021. Using as a case study a Luhansk school with one of the most pro-Russian and pro-occupation administrations, it explores which GPW sub-narratives were present in the school discourse of extracurricular activities, described in the school VKontakte online community. This article employs the elements of discourse analysis to assess visual and verbal texts, published by the school administration, which depict how schoolchildren engage in different Soviet-military contexts, celebrating, commemorating, or learning about GPW-related events. The article concludes that although the school administration incorporated the main Soviet narratives of the Great Patriotic War, present in contemporary Russian education, it also employed two regional GPW sub-narratives, which provide the Luhansk "republican" authorities with the local ideological foundation for militarizing the school youth. The article demonstrates that such militarization of the semiformal school setting is linked with the Russian educational policy and has implications on how pupils of different ages see the social reality and their role in it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the conflict studies literature, the article classifies the latest scholarly writings on the origins of the Donbas conflict into three general groupings: on the role of the history and identity of the region’s inhabitants, on the interference by “third” actors and on so-called contentious politics. The analysis suggests that the initial support of the uprising by Russia is usually greatly overestimated, and the level of social discontent and protest movements is underestimated. The study of contentious politics appears to be the most appropriate tool regarding the origins of the conflict. After 2015, the conflict took on, at least in part, the contours of an interstate clash, but the Donbas insurgency has continued to retain its authenticity. The failure of the 2015 settlement and the path to war after 2018 cannot be understood without considering the actions of Russia and those of Ukraine and leading Western states.

Copyright of Athenaeum: Polskie Studia Politologiczne is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Security Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Using the conf lict studies literature, the article classifies the latest scholarly writings on the origins of the Donbas conf lict into three general groupings: on the role of the history and identity of the region's inhabitants, on the interference by "third" actors and on so-called contentious politics. The analysis suggests that the initial support of the uprising by Russia is usually greatly overestimated, and the level of social discontent and protest movements is underestimated. The study of contentious politics appears to be the most appropriate tool regarding the origins of the conf lict. After 2015, the conf lict took on, at least in part, the contours of an interstate clash, but the Donbas insurgency has continued to retain its authenticity. The failure of the 2015 settlement and the path to war after 2018 cannot be understood without considering the actions of Russia and those of Ukraine and leading Western states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Museums in Ukraine’s Donbas region have endured a protracted war since 2014: many were occupied, looted, and re-established in Ukrainian governmentcontrolled territory, leaving behind collections. Against the backdrop of the events of 2014, this paper offers a brief analysis of how museums attempted to safeguard and evacuate their collections when Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Identifying key factors behind the widespread lack of successful evacuations, the paper touches on the social and financial cost of contingency planning, the distribution of responsibilities and resources, institutional bottlenecks, and altered perceptions of risk in war-affected areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Süleyman Demirel Law Review / Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of Suleyman Demirel Universitesi Hukuk Fakultesi Dergisi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study examines the ideology of the nation-building process in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. The key features of this process are uncovered through a discourse analysis of school textbooks published in the People's Republics and in Transnistria, and of the 'Russian Donbas' ideology. This is compared to the history and interpretations of the concept of 'Novorossiya'. This research demonstrates the difference between Donbas and other the post-Soviet contested states, and highlights the role of the Russian government and Russian radical right-wing intellectuals in the formation of the 'Russian Donbas' ideology. It concludes that, although Russia had a decisive influence on the development of the conflict in Donbas, Donbas also affected the ideological transformation of Putin's Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The occupation of Crimea and part of the Donbas will prevent roughly 12 percent of Ukrainian voters from participating in elections. These voters voted disproportionately for candidates and parties that supported closer ties with Russia. This article quantifies the changes to the electorate and projects the likely partisan impact. The changes decisively tip the Ukrainian electorate away from the east and south. Candidates and parties can no longer expect to build a national majority primarily in eastern and southern Ukraine, as Viktor Yanukovych did in 2010 and the Party of Regions did in 2012. Anticipating these effects, Ukraine’s government could seek to prolong these voters’ exclusion, while Russia could actually seek to end the occupation to get them re-included. The implication is that various actors could try to “gerrymander” the entire Ukrainian state, a phenomenon that previously has only been explored at the district level, within states. This raises the broader question of how electoral effects shape the many territorial disputes around the world.

The occupation of Crimea and part of the Donbas will prevent roughly 12 percent of Ukrainian voters from participating in elections. These voters voted disproportionately for candidates and parties that supported closer ties with Russia. This article quantifies the changes to the electorate and projects the likely partisan impact. The changes decisively tip the Ukrainian electorate away from the east and south. Candidates and parties can no longer expect to build a national majority primarily in eastern and southern Ukraine, as Viktor Yanukovych did in 2010 and the Party of Regions did in 2012. Anticipating these effects, Ukraine’s government could seek to prolong these voters’ exclusion, while Russia could actually seek to end the occupation to get them re-included. The implication is that various actors could try to “gerrymander” the entire Ukrainian state, a phenomenon that previously has only been explored at the district level, within states. This raises the broader question of how electoral effects shape the many territorial disputes around the world.

Bu çalışma, Rusya’nın Donbas Bölgesi’nde uyguladığı hibrit savaş yöntemini açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda hibrit savaş yöntemine ve Donbas Krizi’nin doğuşu ile gelişimine dikkat çekilmektedir. Hibrit savaş yöntemi yeni bir olgu olmasına rağmen son yıllarda devletler tarafından daha sık kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Bu yeni perspektif üzerinden çalışmada, Rusya’nın Donbas Krizi’ne dair yaklaşım ve politikaları üzerinde durulmaktadır. Çalışma krizin başlangıcından 2021 yılı sonuna kadar cereyan eden gelişmeleri ele almaktadır. Çalışmada görülmüştür ki, Rusya hibrit savaş yöntemini farklı araçlar aracılığıyla Ukrayna topraklarında önce Kırım’da, sonrasında Donbas’ta kullanmıştır. Aslında Kırım’ın ilhakı ile amacına ulaşan Rusya, Donbas konusunda ise henüz tam anlamıyla istediğini alamamıştır. Bu durum böyle devam ettiği takdirde Rusya ile Ukrayna arasında konvansiyonel bir savaş kaçınılmaz olarak karşımızda durmaktadır.

The war in Donbas led some observers to speculate that this event might threaten intergroup relations in Ukraine. While studies in the 1990s indicated relatively positive attitudes between the different ethnic and linguistic groups, it has not been analyzed systematically how these attitudes have developed over time. Such an analysis contributes to our general understanding as to how war and nation-building politics affect attitudes toward minorities. Analyzing survey data from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology from 1995 to 2018 using multivariate statistical methods, I show that the prejudice toward Russian-speaking Ukrainians – measured using the social distance scale – has increased since 2014, when both the war and Poroshenko's presidency began, although the rise is rather small. A likely explanation to this phenomenon is the perceived link between Russian speakers and Russia as the aggressor in the war. The fact that Yushchenko's presidency (2006–2009) did not result in a similar increase of negative sentiments, despite similarities between Yushchenko's and Poroshenko's identity politics, allows me to suggest that the higher level of prejudice under Poroshenko cannot be solely explained by the political rhetoric promoting an ethnic Ukrainian identity. However, the interplay of political rhetoric and war might have been relevant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2014, to oppose the state authorities of Ukraine, in some areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, illegal armed groups were formed, including young people under the age of 18. Some of the minors underwent appropriate training in paramilitary camps that sprung up spontaneously in the temporarily occupied territories of Donbas in 2014. In the future, the occupation administrations of the so-called republics started "systematic" work on the militarization of local youth: both through the sphere of education and in extracurricular time. Th e purpose of the study is to reveal the features of the militarization of youth in the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions through the activities of paramilitary camps. Th e research methodology consisted of historical-genetic and historical-systemic methods. Th e conducted research is based on a complex of sources: offi cial reports of the state authorities of Ukraine -- the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, the Ombudsman for Human Rights; data collected by human rights organizations; photo and video materials; messages in social networks; publications of mass media, including those controlled by self-proclaimed bodies in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; messages from "offi cial electronic resources" of self-proclaimed authorities in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Main results of the study. Based on the analysis of the activities of the paramilitary camps, it was possible to single out the main aspects of their work, the main subjects, the peculiarities of functioning, etc. The "system of military-patriotic education" in the quasi-formations in Donbas needs further study if it is considered a fully approved system of infl uence on children and youth by the Russian Federation for planting in other territories of Ukraine occupied by it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article attempts to analyse the situation in Ukraine in the face of ongoing Russian aggression and increasing pressure from the Kremlin towards Eastern European states. The armed confl ict taking place in Ukraine means that the geostrategic situation of Eastern Europe has changed. In this context, the Eastern Partnership, which was meant to be one of the key instruments shaping international relations with the states neighbouring the EU in the East, is quite often seen as an ineffective or even obsolete tool. There can be no doubt that the greatest problem for the Eastern Partnership is that the project is seen in geopolitical categories – thinking of the countries of the Eastern Partnership in the context of the necessity for them to choose between the European Union and Russia (listening to statements by the EU’s political decision-makers, it can often seem that those states have no other option). The key research question is whether we will be dealing with an assertive EU policy in tandem with current US policy, or whether there will be another reset in relations between the West and the Russian Federation.

The process by which peace has been deteriorating since the beginning of the 21st century until ending in the armed confrontation that takes place in Ukraine, after Russia's invasion of that country, violating international law, is studied. Putin's Russia is solely responsible for this the situation has been the responsibility of many other actors. No one is going to win the war and the urgent thing is to stop it to prevent the death and destruction it causes from continuing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has made iterative changes to its National Security Strategy (NSS) to bolster its position in the world. The initial intent of the NSS was to provide aspirational foreign policy goals and ambitions the Kremlin could work towards. In 2021, President Putin viewed Russia to be in a position to change the Kremlin's status in the world and decided to take action. In addition to publishing the 2021 NSS, President Putin also penned a personal history essay about Russia and Ukraine. President Putin's article provides the Kremlin with a narrative to garner popular domestic support and superficial justification for Russia's actions against Ukraine. The ultimate goal of the NSS is to reestablish the Cold War world order. President Putin is using Ukraine as a means to reassert Russia's position in the world while at the same time attempting to discredit the Euro-Atlantic rules-based order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article was submitted in late 2021, and became dated after Russia’s demonstrative preparation as well as start of an open, large-scale invasion of Ukraine early 2022. We nevertheless publish this commentary here in order to document the debate about the events leading to the escalation. No adaptations to the original 2021 article were made after the outbreak of high-intensity war on 24 February 2022. Avoiding a larger military escalation in the Russian–Ukrainian conflict is an important aim. Yet, historical experience suggests that concessions Ukraine or its Western partners toward Russian revanchist aspirations in Donbas may not help achieve it. On the contrary, Western softness, and Ukrainian weakness vis-à-vis the Kremlin will lead to further confrontation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the main ANSA involved in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. It focusses on an analysis of the specific phenomenon of the opolchentsy - Narodnoe opolchenie Donbassa. The aim of this paper is to introduce and describe these actors and to ground them in certain theoretical conceptions. The paper also tracks the changing motivations of the various ANSA brought under the umbrella of the quasi-state actor NOD throughout the conflict, and the changing array of formations that made up the opolchenie during a particular period of time. Evidently, the opolchenie do not fit into the usual classifications of ANSA.

This article examines representations of the enemy in the Ukrainian satirical songs pertaining to the Russo-Ukrainian war in the Donbas. I focus primarily on the output of Orest Liutyi (the stage persona of Antin Mukhars'kyi) and the semi-anonymous Mirko Sablich (Mirko Sablic) collective. Using the method of multimodal discourse analysis, I examine how the enemy opposing the Ukrainian Army is portrayed in the song lyrics and the accompanying music videos. Considering the complex nature of the conflict and the lack of uniformity in the backgrounds of the warring parties, I am particularly interested in who and why is identified as the enemy in the songs. The enemy appears in several guises: “moskal's”—Russian or pro-Russian aggressors from outside Ukraine; “separs”—Ukrainian collaborators who support, often through military efforts, the separation of the Donbas from Ukraine; and “vatniks”—passive anti-Ukrainian individuals who live in Ukraine and whose inaction is perceived to be harmful to Ukraine’s wartime efforts. Whereas these songs call upon Ukrainians to repel the external enemy (“moskal's”) in armed combat, no clear strategy is suggested for how the internal enemies (“separs” and “vatniks”) should be dealt with or, in some cases, even identified. As a result, Liutyi and Sablic, while positioning themselves as “counterpropaganda” projects, risk labelling as “the enemy,” and thus alienating, the audiences most susceptible to propaganda, who could otherwise benefit most from their myth-debunking efforts.

This study aims to examine the hybrid warfare method used by Russia in the Donbas region. In this context, attention is drawn to the concept of hybrid war and the emergence and development of the Donbas crisis. Despite the concept of hybrid war being a new phenomenon, it has been used more frequently by states in recent years. In this new perspective, the study is focused on Russia's approaches and policies regarding the Donbas Crisis. The study discusses the developments that took place from the beginning of the crisis to the end of 2021. It has been seen in the study that Russia used the hybrid warfare method through different instruments, first in the Crimea and then in the Donbas, the territory of Ukraine. In fact, Russia which achieved its goal with the annexation of Crimea has not yet fully achieved what it wants in the Donbas issue. If this situation continues, a conventional war between Russia and Ukraine will inevitably stand before us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines representations of the enemy in the Ukrainian satirical songs pertaining to the Russo-Ukrainian war in the Donbas. I focus primarily on the output of Orest Liutyi (the stage persona of Antin Mukhars'kyi) and the semianonymous Mirko Sablich (Mirko Sablic) collective. Using the method of multimodal discourse analysis, I examine how the enemy opposing the Ukrainian Army is portrayed in the song lyrics and the accompanying music videos. Considering the complex nature of the conflict and the lack of uniformity in the backgrounds of the warring parties, I am particularly interested in who and why is identified as the enemy in the songs. The enemy appears in several guises: "moskal's"--Russian or pro-Russian aggressors from outside Ukraine; "separs"--Ukrainian collaborators who support, often through military efforts, the separation of the Donbas from Ukraine; and "vatniks"--passive anti-Ukrainian individuals who live in Ukraine and whose inaction is perceived to be harmful to Ukraine's wartime efforts. Whereas these songs call upon Ukrainians to repel the external enemy ("moskal's") in armed combat, no clear strategy is suggested for how the internal enemies ("separs" and "vatniks") should be dealt with or, in some cases, even identified. As a result, Liutyi and Sablic, while positioning themselves as "counterpropaganda" projects, risk labelling as "the enemy," and thus alienating, the audiences most susceptible to propaganda, who could otherwise benefit most from their myth-debunking efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Political Science Studies / Studia Politologiczne is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article attempts to analyse the situation in Ukraine in the face of ongoing Russian aggression and increasing pressure from the Kremlin towards Eastern European states. The armed conflict taking place in Ukraine means that the geostrategic situation of Eastern Europe has changed. In this context, the Eastern Partnership, which was meant to be one of the key instruments shaping international relations with the states neighbouring the EU in the East, is quite often seen as an ineffective or even obsolete tool. There can be no doubt that the greatest problem for the Eastern Partnership is that the project is seen in geopolitical categories - thinking of the countries of the Eastern Partnership in the context of the necessity for them to choose between the European Union and Russia (listening to statements by the EU's political decision-makers, it can often seem that those states have no other option). The key research question is whether we will be dealing with an assertive EU policy in tandem with current US policy, or whether there will be another reset in relations between the West and the Russian Federation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the main ANSA involved in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. It focusses on an analysis of the specific phenomenon of the opolchentsy - Narodnoe opolchenie Donbassa. The aim of this paper is to introduce and describe these actors and to ground them in certain theoretical conceptions. The paper also tracks the changing motivations of the various ANSA brought under the umbrella of the quasi-state actor NOD throughout the conflict, and the changing array of formations that made up the opolchenie during a particular period of time. Evidently, the opolchenie do not fit into the usual classifications of ANSA.

The paper provides an analysis of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine within the multilateral attempt to manage or resolve the conflict in the Donets' Basin (Donbas). It aims to tentatively assess the SMM's influence on the de-escalation of the conflict during the Presidency of Petro Poroshenko, as a relatively closed political period. We explore the Mission's mandate, various evaluations of its operations and effectiveness, as well as the conflict participants' interaction with the Mission. The nature and dimension of the conflict have posed an, in its dimension, novel, yet, in its nature, not untypical challenge to the consensus-based OSCE. Despite the challenges of the Mission's specific scope and the limits placed on it by both Russian sabotage and a lack of resources, the SMM nevertheless managed, in 2014-2019, to contribute to de-escalation in the Donbas. Determinants of the net positive contribution of the SMM include its continued and large presence on the spot, the improvement of its reports on the situation in the conflict zone, as well as the development of more sophisticated monitoring methodologies and technologies over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central aim of the paper is to analyze the ceasefire line in eastern Ukraine, widely referred to as the "Contact Line," as an evolving border and a potential social and political boundary. We conceptualize the ceasefire line both as a special type of border that divides conflicting parties and a formerly integrated population and as a border regime managing different forms of mobility. Our mixed method approach combines ethnographic and survey data. The analysis of the formal border regime regulating the access to the divided territories is broadened by a perspective that foregrounds the local residents' practices and perceptions. The article highlights different mobilities and the informal variations in the border practices along and across the ceasefire line as well as the social and political identities accompanying these practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text, which is part of the new field of social sciences - Donbas Studies, presents partial results of the research carried out in the city of Severodonetsk, which is located in the Lugansk Oblast in Donbas. The author, using the ethnographic method of field research, was looking for an answer to the question of how the process of decommunization in Donbas proceeded, and in particular, how the sense of removing the symbols of communism was negotiated, what aspects of this process turned out to be socially conflicting, and what role young people played in this process? Using the interpretation of metaphors and etymologies, the author states that de-communization in Ukraine, apart from the official imperative of oblivion, brings an element of revenge with it. Thanks to participation in the discussion on the de-communization of young people, it is possible to notice that its field of meaning has been extended to include aspects relating not only to the assessment of the past, but also the current social situation in Ukraine. Thanks to this, de-communization does not only mean an order to forget, but also to remember. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a new theoretical framework based on conflict escalation theory and the concept of critical junctures to facilitate a more transparent analysis of the war in Ukraine's Donbas. It argues that researchers have proposed a variety of causes of the outbreak of violence in the region. However, in the absence of an overarching theoretical framework, it remains difficult to analyse the interplay of these causes and compare their explanatory power. In response, this article develops a theory-guided escalation sequence model. According to this model, the conflict's formative phase consisted of an escalation sequence that lasted from April until August 2014 and comprised six critical junctures. This article argues that attempts to explain the conflict should be evaluated and compared in terms of their ability to explain these critical junctures. It concludes that similar escalation sequence models could improve research on armed conflict beyond the case of the Donbas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a multidisciplinary analysis of the Russian Federation’s exploitation of legal systems, both international and domestic, to pervert arbitration efforts in Ukraine. This short study seeks to address challenges in moving forward with future mediation efforts and asserts that the Russian Federation exploits Minsk II to contain and subdue Ukraine. Simultaneously, Russia overtly disassociates itself with its manufactured conflict in Donbas while covertly maintaining a violent stalemate in the region. It deceptively supports these arbitration efforts to satisfy international stakeholders, but has weaponized the process to achieve impunity in pursuit of greater geopolitical objectives and violations of Ukrainian sovereignty. This article offers an overview of the emerging concept of Malign Legal Operations, a notion which is colloquially known as lawfare. It highlights the Russian Federation’s use of this strategy to achieve impunity within a revisionist approach to the rule of law. Furthermore, it summarizes peacebuilding efforts in the Russo-Ukrainian war from the perspective of malign legal operations and assess Minsk II to be a trap used to reduce violence in the region on the Kremlin’s terms by creating a “frozen conflict” in the likeness of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria. This article asserts that the Ukrainian law “On Special Self-Governance Procedure in Separate Regions of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts” is, de facto, the legal implementation of the Minsk Agreement without the accord being referenced by-name in the law. This fact, inter alia, serves Moscow by legally containing Ukraine and forcing a situation whereby the Kremlin’s objectives are pursued by Ukraine’s genuine and sincere desire to bring about peace in a conflict that was manufactured by the Russian Federation.

In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, the Law ‘On the specifics of state policy to ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Lugansk regions’, which is also called the ‘Law on De-occupation (or Reintegration) of Donbas’, became the key point. After four years of occupation of parts of southeastern Ukraine, the adoption of such a law was necessary, since this particular law formed and legally established the legal and organizational conditions for the resumption of territorial integrity of Ukraine. The importance of this law and the consequences of its adoption caused public involvement on behalf of civic organizations, political analysts, representatives of the academic and economic elite in the process of its discussion. However, due to the small amount of time from the stage of the legislative initiative to the publication of the law, it was not officially discussed by the public. Despite this, the enactment of the law led to an active public debate.

The authors’ fundamental objective is to bring to the attention of the international academic community the results of the military-historical investigation on the main events of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. The importance of this work is conditioned by the need of the Ukrainian society and the democratic international community for a comprehensive, objective analyse of the events associated with the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. For a better understanding of the military-historical processes, the authors suggest their own periodization of this armed conflict. The first period of the conflict is divided into three stages, each having its own features and characteristics.

The paper presents the results of ethnographic research on the mechanism of war framing combined with an analysis of the representation of children. Based on the analysis of materials from the Russian media (the case of crucifixion of a boy in Slavyansk) and ethnographic interviews with teachers in Kramatorsk, the author asks questions about the mechanisms of constructing the ontologies of child subjects by institutions of power in the conditions of war and the differentiation of grief after them. The conducted analysis, based mainly on the theses of Judith Butler, shows the differences in the construction of child subjects on both sides of the conflict. The author also points to the similarities in the treatment of children's bodies, understood universally as the projection surface of affects, especially those related to patriotism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyses the Eastern Ukraine and the Crimean crises that resulted with de facto boundaries of Ukraine in 2014-2015, from the perspective of Hybrid warfare that implemented by the Russian Federation (Russia). In order to understand the historical aspect of the cases, the causes and historical roots of the difference between Western and Eastern Ukraine has been emphasized by referring the identity of Ukraine. In order to prevent a possible confusion, all the other related concepts which share the method base with hybrid warfare concept, has also been explained. The causes and conditions that generated the hybrid warfare capability which assumed to be possessed by Russia, who is the executor of the Crimea and Donbas cases, have explored. With that aim, the security structure and the security concept which evolved to hybrid warfare capability of the Russia who inherited an obsolete and bulky armed forces from USSR, has discussed in the progress. This study aims to define the Russian interpretation of hybrid warfare in Crimean and Donbas Crises and explore the way of implementation in the Ukrainian battlefield within the context of historical and conceptual aspect as a case study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of the Ukrainian language in light of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas The problem of Ukrainian language in public discourse has been present since 1991, when Ukraine regained its independence. The problem is difficult, largely due to the historical past, mainly Soviet. For 26 years of independence Ukraine has not developed a unified and correct approach to solve this problem. In this article was an attempt to analyze how the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas influenced the language problem in Ukraine. The analysis covers four main aspects: everyday life (interpersonal communication), commercial (press market, books and electronic media, advertising), formal and official (functioning of the state, judiciary and education system) and symbolic (identity). Problem języka ukraińskiego na Ukrainie na tle aneksji Krymu i wojny w Donbasie Problem języka ukraińskiego w dyskursie publicznym obecny jest od czasu odzyskania niepodległości przez Ukrainę. Problem jest trudny i złożony, co w znacznym stopniu jest spowodowane przeszłością historyczną, głównie radziecką. Przez 26 lat niepodległości Ukraina nie wypracowała jednolitego i właściwego podejścia do rozwiązania tego problemu. Kwestia językowa jest poważnym wyzwaniem dla państwa ukraińskiego i jednym z ważniejszych problemów ukraińskiej polityki wewnętrznej. Ma ona cztery podstawowe aspekty: codzienny (komunikacja międzyludzka), komercyjny (rynek prasy, książek i mediów elektronicznych, a także reklam), formalno-urzędowy (funkcjonowanie państwa, zwłaszcza sądownictwa i systemu edukacji) oraz symboliczny/tożsamościowy. W artykule podjęto próbę analizy, w jaki sposób aneksja Krymu i wojna w Donbasie wpłynęły na kwestię językową na Ukrainie.

This is the first comparative article to investigate commonalities in Ukrainian and Irish history, identity, and politics. The article analyzes the broader Ukrainian and Irish experience with Russia/Soviet Union in the first and Britain in the second instance, as well as the regional similarities in conflicts in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine and the six of the nine counties of Ulster that are Northern Ireland. The similarity in the Ukrainian and Irish experiences of treatment under Russian/Soviet and British rule is starker when we take into account the large differences in the sizes of their territories, populations, and economies. The five factors that are used for this comparative study include post-colonialism and the "Other," religion, history and memory politics, language and identities, and attitudes toward Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The number of internally forcibly displaced persons is growing every year across the globe and exceeds the number of refugees. To date, Ukraine has the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Europe, with about 1.4 million people forced to flee from the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Employing Massey's concept of 'power geometry', the modalities of borders, and taking an intersectional approach, this article theorizes how IDPs are situated politically within a protracted conflict. Such an approach offers the chance to see how the reaction to the war brings authorities to see displaced people as a static category and reproduces a war-lexicon in policies, which fractures the space of everyday life. Drawing upon qualitative research on IDPs, the civil society, international organizations, and public officials in Ukraine, the article concludes that intersections of gender and older age with displacement, and the lack of state recognition of these differing groups of IDPs, together with the lack of the economic resources for social policy, produces multiple forms of social exclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on the concept of offensive coercive diplomacy, this article examines Russia's strategy in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and addresses the question of why Russia has failed to achieve its objectives. Through an analysis of notions such as "status quo" (in terms of who overturned it) and international law (in terms of who violated it), I attempt to show that Russia's actions in Eastern Ukraine qualify as offensive coercion. Backed up by force, Russia demanded that Ukraine implement a decentralization process and grant a part of Eastern Ukraine (Donbas) special status. Knowing that Russia's aim is to use Donbas as an instrument to control its political future, Ukraine refused to acquiesce to Russia's demand without restoring its sovereignty in Eastern Ukraine. With both sides refusing to budge, the crisis turned into a zero-sum game. This article seeks to contribute to research on coercive diplomacy by focusing on offensive coercion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bringing peace, security, and stability to the war-torn region of Donbas has proven to be a challenging – some would say near-impossible – task. The "Minsk II" agreement, signed in February 2015, was supposed to put an end to the armed hostilities, resolve the underlying political issues, and gradually restore Ukrainian government control of the country's eastern border. None of this has happened. Despite continuous Western support and pressure, progress in the implementation of the peace plan signed in Minsk has been slow, also after the much-anticipated Paris summit of the "Normandy Four" (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France) in December 2019. This article discusses the underlying causes of the current stalemate, emphasizing factors such as the inherently complex nature of the conflict, the process through which "Minsk II" came into being, the vague and ambiguous language of this and other agreements, practical challenges related to the timing and sequencing of agreed-upon measures, and Russia's persistent non-acknowledgement of its role in the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article is a study of anti-government mobilization in the cities of southern and eastern Ukraine in spring 2014. By closely examining the developments that preceded the outbreak of the armed insurrection in the Donbas, the study seeks to elucidate the various factors that precipitated the veritable collapse of the Ukrainian state in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and its stabilization elsewhere. The article argues that the armed conflict in the Donbas was hardly a predetermined outcome of the Russian government strategy—which was employed also outside the Donbas—but rather a product of a synergetic confluence of several structural and conjunctural factors that were absent or present to a much smaller degree elsewhere. These included the peculiar political and ethno-cultural profile of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; a higher degree of the legitimacy crisis of the interim government; the destabilizing effects of the status quo created by the victory of the Euromaidan—not only in terms of the change of Ukraine's geopolitical orientation and Russia's apparently compromised interests, but also in terms of the perceived change of status of different ethno-political communities; the proximity of the Russian border, trans-border ethnic politics, and the activities of nationalist groups from Russia; the residual influence of the once-powerful networks associated with clients of the former president Viktor Yanukovych; the relative weakness of organized pro-Ukrainian groups; and last but not least, the incremental collapse of the law enforcement apparatus, which drastically reduced the capacity of Ukrainian authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This collection of papers examines the impact of revolution and war on the development of the Ukrainian state and its sovereignty since 2014. Comparative literature on the state shows that aspects of statehood and sovereignty are shaped by war, and that domestic and international dimensions of statehood do not necessarily covary. The four papers in this collection examine these issues in detail. They show that Ukrainian statehood is strengthening internally and that the European Union is providing substantial external help in building the institutions of the Ukrainian state. However, the breakaway territories in Donetsk and Luhansk are also beginning to build some internal aspects of statehood, to go with the massive support they receive from Russia. These competing statehoods may make the impasse in eastern Ukraine even harder to solve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]