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The sinking of the Lusitania sharpened debate in Washington over whether the United States should make the defense of neutral rights a casus belli. The hard line that President Woodrow Wilson adopted regarding German violations of neutral rights caused his secretary of state to resign in protest, with the redlines established in 1915 generating a precarious neutrality that lasted less than two years. This article examines the links between Wilson's wartime policies, the revisionist literature of the interwar period, and the Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s. It argues that "history's lessons" may mislead rather than inform if context is ignored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For several years both national governments as well as international organisations are increasingly discussing political management tools which rely on findings of the behavioural sciences. Unlike rules, economic incentives and awareness-raising measures, so-called nudges especially promise gentle, effective and cost-efficient management by exploiting the systematic distortion of human decision-making behaviour. While the current nudging euphoria can mostly be traced back to the rise of behavioural economics since the 1980s, the current article argues that simultaneously discussions of ecological regulation exhibited a similar development. During the 1980s, disappointment that greater environmental awareness did not result in more adequate behaviour towards the environment and the recognition of the limits of economic management instruments led to the rise of "environmental conduct" as an independent category which social and behavioural scientists sought to describe and influence. This simultaneous change of the discourse in both the field of political regulation as well as theoretical reflection is traced back to four factors: the academic success story of the behavioural sciences, the disenchantment with idealised presumptions of rationality and the project of science-driven policy, the change of planning culture as well as the processes of deregulation and marketisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Bulletin of Medical History is the property of University of Toronto Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article presents a report from a June 10-11, 2016 conference on the role of German chancellor Willy Brandt in the Socialist International organization and his relationship with North and Latin America. Topics of presentations delivered include the history of German-U.S. relations, a comparison of Brandt with chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and Brandt's role in Cold War missile negotiations in the 1980s.

Was the U.S. spying on German know-how? During the 1950s, the West German chemical industry became deeply concerned about the attempts of American companies and the U.S. military to hire German scientists and establish R & D facilities in Germany. In their estimation, such activities amounted to nothing less than a form of industrial espionage. Leading industry representatives claimed that the loss of knowledge posed a serious threat to West Germany’s economy at the very moment of the country’s return to world markets after World War II. Also a surprisingly large part of their rhetoric was dominated by fears that American knowledge acquisitions endangered German national security. This article takes a closer look at the brain drain and the discourse surrounding industrial espionage during the 1950s within the context of a profound reassessment of the political significance of knowledge production and dissemination during the early Cold War on both sides of the Atlantic. It shows how and why the chemical industry’s vigorous countermeasures to fend off perceived threats of espionage failed to mobilize the support of the West German government. Moreover, it makes visible the many fault lines and points of tension that resulted from competing national economic and security interests within the Western Cold War alliance in its formative phase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article explores German public relations campaigns in the U.S. and the use of propaganda films to influence public opinion during World War I. The author reflects on the preparation and distribution of films by publicity agent Matthew Claussen and business manager Felix Malitz. Emphasis is given to topics such as the emotional responses of U.S. film audiences, the lack of funding from the German Foreign Office, and maintaining U.S. neutrality.

Through an examination of American policy toward Germany during late 1918 to 1919, this article challenges widely held ideas about the attitudes of American President Woodrow Wilson toward democracy promotion. Scholars typically have seen in Wilson’s foreign policy the antecedents of several subsequent U.S. presidents’ policies of democracy promotion and democratic interventionism. This study contends that at least during the second half of Wilson’s presidency, however, Wilson did not regard it as appropriate for the United States to intervene in the internal political affairs of other nations to promote democracy. While he hoped that postwar Germany would come to embrace democracy, he believed that the Germans would have to find democracy on their own. Despite the fact that those American diplomatic officials who were most familiar with the situation in Germany continually urged a more active U.S. policy to promote democracy there, Wilson remained deeply skeptical of the new German government and adhered firmly to the view that the United States should refrain from attempting to influence Germany’s internal political affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article reports on a panel on trust as an element of soft power in politics and economics in West Germany from the 1970s onwards, at the Deutscher Historikertag (Conference of German Historians), held from September 25-28, 2012, in Mainz, Germany. Topics of discussion included West German foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s, the attitudes of French President François Mitterrand toward Germany, and exchange-of-persons programs as a factor in German-American relations in the 1980s.

This article contextualizes the recent debates about German and European anti-Americanism by highlighting the paradoxical nature of such sentiments. Using examples from the Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany, and the postwar period, this article shows that anti-Americanism arose less from divergent cultural trends and perceived "value gaps," as many recent authors have argued. Rather, anti-Americanism should be seen as a measure of America's continued influence and success. After all, anti-Americanism more often than not went hand in glove with "Americanization." Frequently, anti-Americans, namely those who are voicing anti-Americanism, were products of cultural transfer-processes emanating in the U.S. They also saw themselves allied with American anti-establishment forces. Thus, to a degree, anti-Americanism can be seen as by-product of westernization. Although the focus of this article is on Germany, the argument about the complex web of repudiation and embrace can be observed in other European (or even African, Arab, Asian, or South American) contexts as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A letter to the editor is presented in response to the "Interchange: World War I" online discussion which appears in the September 2015 issue of the journal and addresses various aspects of the American experience in that war, as well as democratic principles and German threats to U.S. security.