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Copyright of Bulletin of Ablai Khan KazUIRandWL: Series 'International Relations & Regional Studies' is the property of Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations & World Languages and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article discusses how state-organized, memory-cultural production drawing on religious signifiers contributes to a sacralization of Turkish public memory institutions and public space. This reinforces an Islamic-nationalist imagination of contemporary Turkey. The article explores state-led, disciplinary interventions in museal space (the Sacred Trusts exhibition of relics at Topkapı Palace Museum) and commemorative ritual in public space, display and education (the rise, fall and recalibration of Holy Birth Week (Kutlu Doğum Haftası). Drawing on theories of symbolic politics, nationalism, memory and space, the article elucidates the sacralization of Turkish memory production as a contesting yet malleable negotiation of nationalism. Innovative Islamic memory practice and ritualization requires careful discursive and disciplinary boundary drawing, catering to theological sensitivities and Sunni-orthodox mores. Then again, the spatial boundaries between various memory-cultural domains are becoming less distinct. Today, Islamic-nationalist imaginaries surface in the interstices of public memory institutions, public education and everyday public space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article interrogates the role of print culture and visual communication design in the permeation of Turkish national consciousness into everyday practices. It seeks to understand the phenomenon of "banal nationalism," argued by Michael Billig, in a broader context of cultural production advocated by Tim Edensor. It does this by looking into Turkey's first liberalization period in the 1950s where a boosting print industry, a standard print language, and high literacy contributed to the daily reproduction of a collective historical past through representations. This period is analyzed through publications like Sunday comic strips, advertorial giveaways, and illustrated history journals that emulate popular American formats in the commodification of history. These are treated as material tools to present and disseminate an imaginary reconciliation of secular modernism with imperial history in a new print culture. This analysis reveals how representations in the foreground of everyday cultural artifacts are used to produce and reproduce difference that designates a distinct national consciousness detached from the realm of state. It also sheds light on the prevalence of identity negotiation and the commoditization of culture in the professionalization of visual communication disciplines in non-Western design paradigms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Abant Social Sciences / Abant Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi is the property of Journal of Abant Social Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Turkish Studies - Economics, Finance, Politics is the property of Electronic Turkish Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies / Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi (CTAD) is the property of Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish History and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Based on primary sources such as field notes, reports, and project memorandums, this article addresses architectural restoration work in Turkey from the 1920s to the 1960s. Despite the country's limited budget and workforce, especially in the early years of the republic, the government crafted an intense preservation program of historic monuments, whereby preservation professionals implemented the scientific protection of architectural heritage mainly through maintenance and repairs. This article argues that the historiography of Turkish art became an agent in restoration, while the concept of the essence of national architecture served as the ideological basis for physical interventions. Seeking to restore the pure forms of Turkish architecture, preservationists searched for the pedigree of built works, and Sinan's style was treated as the zenith of Turkish architecture. Works by him, along with other examples associated with the "Classical Period of Architecture" were subjected to heavy-handed interventions aimed at achieving stylistic purity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A monument constructed in the dynastic beginnings of the Ottoman Empire, the 14th-century Yeşil Camii (Green Mosque) was one of the first buildings sponsored after the conquest of the Byzantine city Nicaea (İznik). Commissioned by C, andarlı Kara Halil Hayreddin Pasha (1364-1387), the mosque became a landmark of a burgeoning Ottoman government that soon reigned over three continents. With the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the centuries-old Ottoman Empire, with all its institutions, was abolished. The Türk Tarih Tezi (Turkish History Thesis) became the propaganda of the nation-state, denoting a national spirit among Turks in all periods of history. In this historicist reading, the Green Mosque became a beacon signifying the zeitgeist of pure national building forms for the Turks. In the late 1930s, the secular appraisal of this thesis began to wane in favor of a religiousethnic reading. Imperial monuments with an Islamic past came to befit the locus of Turkish identity. Nevertheless, the ideological transformation of the Green Mosque transcended any objectifying vision. The nationalist lens shifted, emphasizing Muslim-Turks over the Turkish race and iterating a formal revelation of the Green Mosque that has perpetuated the long-standing understanding of the building. This essay presents the Green Mosque in view of the texts written by prominent architects and historians, against the backdrop of crossing boundaries between architectural historiography and nationhood of space, from early beginnings to the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A monument constructed in the dynastic beginnings of the Ottoman Empire, the 14th-Century Yeşil Camii (Green Mosque), was one of the first buildings sponsored after the conquest of the Byzantine city Nicaea (İznik). Commissioned by Çandarlı Kara Halil Hayreddin Pasha (1364-1387), the mosque became a landmark of a burgeoning Ottoman government that soon reigned over three continents. With the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the centuries-old Ottoman Empire, with all its institutions, was abolished. The Türk Tarih Tezi (Turkish History Thesis) became the propaganda of the nation-state, denoting a national spirit among Turks in all periods of history. In this historicist reading, the Green Mosque became a beacon signifying the zeitgeist of pure national building forms for the Turks. In the late 1930s, the secular appraisal of this thesis began to wane in favor of a religious-ethnic reading. Imperial monuments with an Islamic past came to befit the locus of Turkish identity. Nevertheless, the ideological transformation of the Green Mosque transcended any objectifying vision. The nationalist lens shifted, emphasizing Muslim-Turks over the Turkish race and iterating a formal revelation of the Green Mosque that has perpetuated the long-standing understanding of the building. This essay presents the Green Mosque in view of the texts written by prominent architects and historians, against the backdrop of crossing boundaries between architectural historiography and nationhood of space, from early beginnings to late 1980s.

Turkish foreign policy, largely characterized as political selfishness, reflects the set of ideological concepts known as the new Turkish nationalism, which makes the country a rather difficult partner to deal with. This article examines the problem of the new Turkish nationalism. It focuses particularly on the Turkish-centric integration under the “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy as a new form of Turkish nationalism, which is especially evident on the space of the so-called “Turkic world”. The authors analyze the main features of Turkish nationalism in the econom ic, political, cultural, and educational spheres. They note that in the humanitarian sphere Turkey continues to focus on the “common Turkic” institutions as well as the ideas of the pan-Turkism ideologists of the past amidst the urge for unification. Moreover, the article considers the concept of Turkey’s self-perception as a “hub”, which generally occurs in all the above-mentioned areas. At the same time, all cases under study are affected by the populist expressions of the Turkish political elite about the unity of the Turks of the world.

Boycotts, one of the important forms of political consumerism, are democratic actions in which consumers show their sensitivity to social issues via consumer protests. These actions are seen as more peaceful forms of opposition, separated from other politically motivated forms of opposition, and seen as citizen practices that reinforce democracy. However, in some cases, boycotts can threaten political and social equality, support undemocratic ideologies, and turn into hostile actions when these peaceful collective movements are shaped by consumer ethnocentrism fed by nationalism and religiosity. This study examines the factors affecting the participation of individuals in boycotts within the framework of political consumerism, and in particular, the relationship between important concepts for ethnocentrism such as nationalism and religiosity, and participation in boycotts within the context of Turkey. In this study, which was conducted using survey data collected from a representative sample in Turkey in 2020, a statistically significant relationship is found between "nationalism", "religiosity", "education level", "full-time employment" and the frequency of boycotts. Our quantitative analysis in the context of ethnocentrism, which is the main focus of the research, shows that the level of religiosity in Turkey is more effective in participating in boycotts than the level of nationalism. While this study contributes to the understanding of consumer behavior in the context of political participation, an important field of study in communication studies, it is also important for the development of new policies and communication strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Monuments, schools, hospitals and named streets, parks or squares that are mutually constructed in big cities as examples of historical and cultural values are places of common memory in Turkey and Pakistan. Accurate understanding of the collective past and historical consciousness affects not only the present, but also the shaping of the future. Therefore, cultural phenomena such as tradition, language, and religion, national and religious holidays in the collective past of a society contribute to the formation of historical consciousness and national identity. The memory places, which play an important role in the construction of the common future through the cultural values of the Pakistani and Turkish societies, also reflect the socio-political and cultural memory objects of both societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines state building in Dersim with reference to local demands and the state capacity. It first analyzes how the Turkish nationalists aimed to transform the Dersim region. The focus then shifts to the local responses towards the state policies following the military operations of 1937 and 1938. I posit that the Kurds' relation with the state relied on pragmatism and negotiation rather than outright hostility. Moreover, I demonstrate that the locals' expectations from the state overlapped with the Turkish state's pre-operation agenda for the most part. Despite the local endorsement, the limited state capacity constituted a major obstacle in implementing land redistribution policy and expanding road networks with limited progress. The opening of schools, however, produced somewhat mixed results in the sense that the enrollment rates did not correspond to the increase in the number of schools. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains how the Turkish nation's composition has changed under Justice and Development Party rule. Turkish nationalism and Turkish national identity have dramatically changed since 2010, when the Kurdish Opening process was started by former prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The Syrian refugee crisis and the influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey created another change in Turkish national identity. Increasing religiosity in Turkey and the use of Islam by the Justice and Development Party created a flexible nation, where all Sunni Muslims can be considered members even though they are not ethnically Turkish. The author uses primary sources, such as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's speeches since 2010, to show how his discourse became more embracing of non-Turkish Muslim groups and created a dynastic understanding of nationalism based on religion rather than the idea of an ethnically homogenous, secular Turkish nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I examine how journalists working for the Turkish national mainstream televisual media represent Kurds – a significant national 'Other' of Turkish society – in the process of news production. My research is based on ethnographic fieldwork and interviews conducted between 2011 and 2014 in the newsrooms of two Turkish television channels with different political outlooks and experiences. The study reveals an unprecedented interest of mainstream television media in the inclusionary representation of Kurds during the research period due to a temporary change to the traditional Turkish state policy toward Kurds. In this new political context, I argue that the journalistic practice and discourse on Kurds is likely to be determined by political differences among Turkish journalists. The Turkish journalists working for these two different channels, for example, seek to justify and advance conflicting political agendas since they have contradicting political worldviews and political experiences. Based on these findings, this article demonstrates how the three factors of political worldview, political experience, and political context combine to shape journalistic values – the values which orient various stages of news production, at which journalists imagine, categorize, and articulate the Kurds and decide how to represent them in news outputs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional historiographical paradigm depicts the consolidation of nation‐state and nationalism in Turkey as a top‐down political project characterised by the domination of the 'center' over the 'periphery'. In this narrative, the masses are portrayed as either passive recipients or silenced opponents of the nation‐state project. Based on a historical and contemporary analysis of the state‐sponsored tea production in Rize, this article contends that this perspective neglects the agency of the provincial population in the reproduction of the nation‐state and nationalism in Turkey and in influencing the decisions made by the state elite. The economic interventionist measures of the ruling authority to extend its nationalist hegemony across Anatolia also opened a field of action for rural/provincial populations to negotiate their interests with the state and thereby influence its policies. The main contours of this relationship have remained salient during the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) period, and it needs to be taken into account to explain this party's large ideological appeal in the Black Sea region. This argument builds on a fieldwork conducted in Rize that included in‐depth interviews with local tea workers and farmers as well as extensive archival research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the identity dynamics of the Arabic-speaking Greek Orthodox community of the Hatay province of Turkey. Citizens of Turkey, members of the Greek Orthodox church and Arabic speakers, members of this small but historic community stood at the crossroads of three nationalisms: Greek, Syrian and Turkish. Following the urbanization waves that swept through the Turkish countryside since the 1950s, thousands of Hatay Greek Orthodox moved to Istanbul and were given the chance to integrate with the Greek minority there. The case of the Hatay Greek Orthodox community points to the resilience of millet -based identities, more than a century after the demise of the Ottoman Empire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the emergence of Nobel Prize-winning Turkish scientist Aziz Sancar as a scientific persona model. After receiving the Nobel Prize in 2015, Sancar's nationalistic tendencies and close relationship with incumbent Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) leaders opened up a wide range of discussions on how a scientist's relationship with politics should be intellectually interpreted. Focusing on the case of Aziz Sancar, this article examines the specific contextual conditions in which a scientist expresses his identity and how it is interpreted by the public. To this end, the aim of this work is to present an in-depth analysis of the discussions that took place in Ekşi Sözlük, a popular social media platform acting as an online forum in Turkey, and news from the national media and to scrutinize how a scientific persona is conceived in Turkey and how Aziz Sancar has been 'de-scienticized' in the heavy polarized Turkish political atmosphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Xinjiang Autonomous Region has been a complex puzzle for Chinese rulers throughout history and its people have been diverse in cultural, religious, and ethnic areas. In addition, geographical features and the existence of a border region challenge China's control on this area. Since 1949, the Uyghur separatists and the independence of East Turkestan as an internal problem. Since early 1990s, China has recognized the international aspects of this dilemma and has been forced to confront its consequences. The new policy affected China's relations with Turkey, which in addition to its historical, linguistic, religious and cultural ties with the Muslim Uighurs, was ideologically inspired by Uighur nationalism as well as a suitable place for Uyghur refugees. So the authors intend to investigate how the Xinjiang situation has affected China-Turkey relations. It seems that the quality and quantity of China-Turkey relations before the 1990s have been affected by the Xinjiang developments, and have been undermined, and the Xinjiang developments after the 1990s have been managed at the expense of the Uighurs by the economic, military and political relations between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relying on a theoretical frame developed in reference to an interdisciplinary research field, this article provides a critical analysis of Turkey's citizenship education (CE) curriculum with a view to revealing discourses that inhibit the promotion of cosmopolitan values of human rights, democratic citizenship and diversity. The analysis demonstrates that a complementary set of ethno-religious, statist and neoliberal discourses undermines the cosmopolitan values. The inharmonious patchwork of these two sets of conflicting discourses raises the question of whether CE in Turkey really empowers students to support democracy. This question reveals the significance of developing a CE curriculum underpinned by a consistent set of socio-political values in Turkey and elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of TESAM Academy Journal is the property of Tesam Academy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Turkey has become a powerful example of rising ethno-religious nationalism since the ruling Justice and Development Party allied with the Nationalist Movement Party in 2016. Conceptualising the political ideology in power as Islamic nationalism, I expose ways in which this ideology is articulated in the education reform discourse of 'new Turkey' through a critical analysis of a foundational education reform report (the Report). The analysis shows various aspects of ethno-religious construction of education reform discourse through a focus on citizenship education (CE) partly because the prominent configuration of power relations manifests itself in considerations of CE. The analysis finds that the Report vilifies CE and proposes an alternative for it: social entrepreneurship. Furthermore, it presents Turkey's diverse population as a monolithic homogenous mass and makes no mention of democracy and human rights values. These findings call out the research community to investigate the negative implications of rising ultra-nationalism for CE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the role and impact of religious civil society in situations of armed conflict through a case study of Kurdish Islamist civil society organisations and activists in Turkey. The focus is on the period following the collapse of the peace process and resurgence of violence in mid-2015 between Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkêrên Kurdistanê). Based on 40 in-depth interviews conducted in the city of Diyarbakir, I identify three main challenges to the effectiveness of religious civil society in peacebuilding processes: (1) relations with the state, (2) legacy and relationship with institutional violence, and (3) advocacy and representation of community needs. This article shows how ethnicity and Islam are shifting, contingent interactions in the construction of Kurdish identity, especially in response to violence. Although the public expression of pro-Kurdish rights claims altered under a securitisation rubric during this period, the demand for a peaceful settlement to the conflict transcends ideological and social differences across many Kurds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following domestic political dynamics, disunity and redirected priorities of the EU and decreasing in its NATO geostrategic role, Turkey turned to new policy norm where narrowed national interests gained absolute dominance in foreign relations. The ensuing quest for flexible alliances with Western rivals has generated more transactional and compartmentalized relationships with Western powers as Turkey considers its traditional ties with them as unequal and at times unfavorable to its interests. From historic low points in relations with US and EU, more often benefits Russia as a more powerful partner in ‘marriage of convenience’ with Turkey. Turkey in regions as Middle East, Balkan, Caucasus, Central Asia and some part of Africa, aims for a larger role and persistently builds its capacity to influence events. The ambitious leadership and the transformation of the cooperative and economically based Turkish policy to one more exclusive and security-oriented, confronted Turkey with a myriad of actors of various scales including global heavyweights.

This article is an overview of the state stance and attitude towards minorities throughout history of the republic of Turkey. It represents the official approach of the republic towards ethnic and religious groups. Though due to actions of the Ottoman Empire, the number of non-Turks in the republic of Turkey already was incomparably small, however their existence could not be ignored. Still Turkey recognizes only three minorities (Greeks, Armenians, and Jews) and for decades adopted the strategy of regarding all minority persons other than Greeks, Armenians, and Jews as Turks. Ethnic variety was considered a threat to territorial integrity of Turkey. Every action was directed to create a unitary nation-state suppressing ethnic identities of non-Turks. In this article state policy towards ethnic groups in the republic of Turkey is examined from the perspective of the Lausanne Treaty provisions and legislative regulations regarding the status and rights of minorities showing to what extent authorities have followed them and rising the controversial points minority representatives face in exercising their rights.

The Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/AKP) activities in bridging Islam and nationalism marks a historic milestone in Turkey’s democracy. Throughout its two decades-long leadership, AKP, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership, demonstrated that nationalism and Islam do not clash with Turkey’s stance on secularism. Such understanding provides AKP with a strategic leverage, both at the domestic and international level, especially within the Muslim world. Reflecting upon Rustow’s democratic transition model and Ibn Khaldun’s classic conceptualisation on ashabiyyah, this article attempts to comprehend how Turkish nationalism is formulated within its relations with Islam as AKP’s political roots. Aside from consolidating its political power at the domestic level, this article suggests that the Islam and democracy synthesis provides an opportunity for Turkey to strengthen its political image and position in the region. In a much broader context, this article attempts to contribute to academic discussions on the relationship between religion and states which undergo the process of democratisation.

This article analyses the limits of the main political discourses used by local and international actors, branding the Cyprus issue as an “intercommunal” or “bicommunal” conflict. It relies on a study of political developments in Northern Cyprus, a fieldwork done in Cyprus in 2018 and two interviews conducted with members of the European commission in the Cyprus Settlement Support Unit in 2020. Three main ideas come out of this analysis. The first is that this branding affects the geopolitics of the island of Cyprus. On the one hand, it has been used to set the international legal framework that binds the peace efforts that have failed to find a lasting solution for the past 45 years. On the other, it validates Turkey’s stance on the Cyprus issue. Secondly, the term “bicommunal” cannot explain the major changes in the politics of Northern Cyprus since 2003. Focusing on the “intercommunal” definition of the conflict doesn’t account for the political and demographic cleavages within the Turkish Cypriot community. Finally, since the Republic of Cyprus accessed the European union in 2004, a new level of complexity has been added to the Cyprus issue. The EU’s strategy on the island through its attachment to a strict reading of international law, found itself locked into the framework that has prevented any major breakthroughs.

This essay considers Ziya Gökalp, the received "spiritual father of Turkish nationalism", as an early mastermind of fascism in Greater Europe. During the 1910s, Gökalp acted as a prophet of expansive war and as a mentor of demographic engineering in the Ottoman capital, Istanbul, which was a laboratory for new political styles in a crisis-ridden empire. Gökalp's thinking longed for a supreme leader in an army-like, disciplined and hierarchised society, while it rejected a social contract-based nation and state. An influential inspiration for and beyond the new élites in the capital, Gökalp combined the call for radical modernisation according to "European civilisation" with an assertive essentialism based on völkisch (cultural-racial-ethnic Turkish) and religious (political Islamic) references. He was the chief ideologist of the Young Turk party-state (1913–18) – side by side with Talaat Pasha, its main executive leader – and "the father of my thoughts" for Kemal Atatürk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cultural imperialism thesis that emerged in late 20th century focused on inequalities in the West driven global flow of culture and communication, and how that adversely affected the cultural conditions of nations in the so called Third World. However, the core–periphery dynamic at the root of cultural imperialism has not merely been confined to the transnational level, from the West to the Rest. It has existed at the national level as well. Conducting a historical examination of state policy vis-à-vis Kurdish culture in Turkey, and drawing on the theories of cultural imperialism, internal colonialism and nationalism, I develop the concept of internal cultural imperialism to capture the state of severe center peripheral cultural imbalance that has been a product of Turkish nationalist ideology and its policies of cultural homogenization. In hegemonic condition, the state's ultimate goal has been to subjugate and/or possibly eradicate the cultures of non-core groups within its territory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two books explore the ideological and political landscape of Turkey under the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). Nostalgia for Empire: The Politics of Neo-Ottomanism argues that Turkish politics is underpinned by various forms of nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire. While it makes some contributions to the understanding of Turkey's Islamist thinkers during the Cold War, its theoretical framework and approach to recent history are problematic. Erdoğan's Empire: Turkey and the Politics of the Middle East is an accessible yet relatively nuanced account of the country's politics in recent years. Its policy prescriptions are at times too reductive, but the book is a solid entry point for the nonspecialist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To consolidate a predominant party system, an incumbent party will attempt to anchor voting behavior to social cleavages, a strategy called cleavage enclosure. However, does this strategy actually work? In Turkey, the incumbent AKP government has focused its campaigning on conservatives and nationalists. The analysis of the 2018 post-election survey reveals that the cleavage enclosure worked for conservatives but not for nationalists. Of the incumbent supporters in the previous election, conservatives replicated their support, whereas nationalists were less likely to support the incumbent than other identity holders. Nationalists tend to punish but not reward the incumbent party for its economic performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The early monumental statues of Atatürk in Turkey have so far been studied from the perspective of the state and its ambition to disseminate a national consciousness. While this state‐centric approach has been helpful to understand the role of symbolism in nation‐building, it ends up reducing people to a passive recipient of symbolic indoctrination. We, in contrast, approach public perception as an active component in the discursive construction of these monuments over time. We first analyse the period until the death of Atatürk in 1938 during which the democratic possibility of conflicting with the official narrative remained quite minimal. We then look at the aftermath of Atatürk's death, which coincides with the introduction of the multiparty democracy in Turkey where there were more critical engagements with these monuments, particularly by the right‐wing constituents and politicians. We conclude that such resistance was still discursively bound by the nationalist context within which it operated. Our analysis of the politics of symbolism in Turkey taps into the theoretical works of Hanna Pitkin and Warren Breckman. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The second decade of the 21st century is often described as the time of a new rise of right nationalist and right populist parties all over the world. The rising presence of big right factions in European parliaments makes experts talk about a “right turn” phenomenon. At the same time Turkey, a country that unites in itself both European and Middle Eastern political and civilizational specifics, is witnessing an apparently similar process to occur. The authors of the article analyze the reasons of right parties’ success in Europe and conditions that provide popularity for the right wing. Primarily, this success has been associated with an inner structural crisis of the European Union, which was acknowledged by the general public following the 2015 migration crisis. The authors mostly focus on the 2018 parliament elections in Turkey, which gave the majority of seats to right and center-right parties. They also survey the history and the place of nationalism in the country’s political system, and investigate the reasons making the Turkish political elites to turn to the nationalistic ideology at present. The authors conclude that in spite of a formal similarity in the observed political processes and the literal congruence of some of the reasons that have determined the right rise in Europe and Turkey, we shouldn’t consider the right wing’s successes in the Republic of Turkey and in the European Union to be the parts of the same global process, as their endogenous causes differ.

This article describes global shifts in migration and population demography and the simultaneous increase in nationalism and xenophobia. The literature lays out a need for more research examining how young people from immigrant or refugee backgrounds are being affected by contemporary trends in nationalism and xenophobia across diverse national contexts. This article concludes with an overview of five papers addressing the topic in the special section. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the 'nationalist movement' of Ahıska, a forcibly displaced people who have been arriving in Turkey from various parts of the former Soviet Union since the early 1990s. I focus on how members of this community attempt to define the Turkish nation, how they invoke migration to Turkey as a patriotic and nationalist act, how they criticize the state's responses to this migration as insufficiently nationalist, and how they respond to the movement of non‐Turkish others into the territorial and documentary space that they seek to inhabit. This nationalist movement, albeit small in number, demands our attention because it is born of a phenomenon that is intimately familiar to displaced people and not commonly associated with nationalism – the longing for rest. This longing animates Ahıska efforts to organize themselves and engage with the Turkish state. What possibilities and limitations does this genre of nationalist movement hold for displaced people across the world? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thinking theoretically about three important and recent events affecting the Kurds can help us to understand better their political experiences.1 These events include (1) The breakdown of the Turkish Government-Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) cease-fire in July 2015; (2) the failure of the advisory referendum on independence that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq held on September 25, 2017; and (3) the Turkish military incursion into northeastern Syria (Rojava or Syrian Kurdistan) in October 2019. I first examine five different theories of international relations as well as the concept of levels of analysis and theories of nationalism. In doing so, I refer intermittently to these three important recent events concerning the Kurds and then describe them more fully to illustrate how thinking theoretically can help explain what happened and why. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on municipal elections promising to challenge the party's hold over Istanbul. Topics include hopeful partisans simply pointing to the many neighboring mosques filled before the Hagia Sophia's reconversion; and International Association of Byzantine Studies (AIEB) revoking the decision holding the next International Congress of Byzantine Studies in Istanbul in 2021.

Copyright of Journal of Emerging Economies & Policy is the property of JOEEP: Journal of Emerging Economies & Policy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Iranian Studies / İran Çalışmaları Dergisi is the property of Journal of Iranian Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Religious populism features prominently in the global political landscape. This contribution focuses on this particular type of populism, and the political strategies employed by religious populist actors, with a focus on the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey. Although there is an established literature on religious populism, there are still dynamics that need to be studied further. How religious populists outflank their rivals, especially those with relatively conservative ideologies and understandings of nationalism, remains unanswered, for example. In this study, I investigate how the AKP, as a religious populist party, has competed with and distinguished itself from other mainstream and conservative Turkish political actors and movements, and their respective nationalist ideologies: (a) the secular political establishment, including the Kemalist Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party), (b) the tradition(s) the party was originally part of but is no longer viable, the Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement, (c) other popular religious movements that have a claim to power (such as the Gülen, or Hizmet, movement), and finally (d) ultranationalist segments and parties such as the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party), each of which has their own interpretations of citizenship and nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey's relations with the EU have gradually soured roughly since 2013. Today, Turkey and the EU have an erratic modus vivendi episodically bordering political crises. This study attempts to provide a critical constructivist account of Turkey's foreign policy change towards the EU between 2002 and 2017. This change in state behaviour analysed in relation to the paradigmatic shift in Turkish national identity discourses regarding civilisational self-understanding led by the AKP elites. The article asserts that this transformation in Turkish national self-perception made fluctuations in Turkey's policies towards the EU and gradual deterioration of relations 'thinkable' via the medium of national identity discourses. The impact of Turkey's new hegemonic civilisational self-understanding is pursued within the epistemological framework of conceivability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]