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Scotus claims that Christ's human nature depends on the second person of the Trinity (he describes a relationship of dependence that a nature, as communicable, has on its suppositum) in a way analogous to that in which an accident depends on a substance. He also claims that Christ's human accidents depend on Christ's human nature. This article addresses whether or not these dependence relations are transitive, and concludes that Scotus denied the transitivity of such dependence relations in order to bring him closer to Zwingli's view -not Luther's-, regarding the Christological question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to the claims of recent commentators, I argue that Boethius holds a modified version of the Ammonian three-fold universal (transcendent, immanent, and conceptual). He probably identifies transcendent universals as divine ideas, and accepts too forms immanent in corporeal particulars, most likely construing these along the Aphrodisian lines that he hints at in a well-known passage from his second commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge. Boethius never states the theory of the three-fold form outright, but I attempt to show that this theory nevertheless underlies and gives structure to what Boethius has to say on the topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author presents his views regarding the issues not understood by theologian Augustine on the doctrine of fourth-century Greek trinitarian traditions. The author clarifies the teachings of Augustine in some parts of book 5 and 7 of "De Trinitate" regarding divine simplicity and its relation to the use of the term "person" in God. He concludes that Augustine's hesitancy on the use of the genus word "person" is simply his reluctance to use a genus word without an available species word.

The view that the divine substance is some item common to the three persons is frequently rejected in modern trinitarian thought in favour of the view that the divine substance is properly identical with the Father in a way that it is not identical with the Son or Spirit. I argue that these views cannot safeguard the monarchy of the Father, and that in order to safeguard this latter doctrine, it is necessary to hold that the divine substance is some item common to the three persons. I show how this view does not require that there is any sense in which the divine substance is prior to the divine persons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]