Search

This paper proposes and probes the plausibility of a framework to explain how business associations position themselves politically as trade-related sustainability obligations get stronger. An analysis of the submissions of EU business associations during a consultation on trade and sustainability indicates that firm-level and organisational characteristics explain well trade associations' political cleavages. The paper can provide new insights to help understand a major development in the EU and beyond. The EU is passing through an unprecedented shift in its approach to trade and sustainability as it is likely to rely on legal sanctions to enforce sustainability commitments in trade agreements. Understanding the position of EU business interests in that process is relevant to project the consequences of such shift. Besides, as sustainability provisions in trade agreements get stronger, associations may play an ever-important role in promoting their members collectively or in shielding them from reputational costs. Understanding their political positioning is thus key to understanding the very politics of trade and sustainable development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some protrade business interests that are against hard enforcement of labor and environmental provisions in trade deals may end up eventually supporting it, while others stick to their initial opposition. Why? When will their positions change? The existing literature would expect protrade interests to be more or less in favor of non-trade issues in trade policies according to how dependent on the international economy they are. However, longitudinal variation in export- and import-dependence does not suffice to explain change of the sort I am interested in. I argue that the position of protrade business interests change as they accumulate experiences on the negotiation/ratification of trade deals. To probe that argument, I present two paired comparisons analyzing the position of protrade business interests as pertains to the use of sanctions to enforce labor and environmental provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed by Canada and Australia, and by the United States (US) and European Union (EU) between 1993 and 2019. My analysis points to the overall plausibility of my hypothesis and to avenues for future research. The paper helps understand the political activity of business interests on trade and sustainable development and can shed new light on the politics behind the design of social and environmental provisions in PTAs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]