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Tort remedies for domestic violence, while not new, are not widely used. Many states do not explicitly provide for them, and those that do may find their goals stymied by procedural obstacles that legislatures did not consider. This paper highlights a recent case that the California legislature, leading the country with its specific Domestic Violence tort, likely intended its statutes to cover, thereby providing compensation to the plaintiff. But the case nearly foundered on an objection to personal jurisdiction and required an appellate opinion to reverse the trial court and get the case out of the starting gate. This delay--and the risk to the plaintiff's recovery-- was unnecessary and easily avoidable. Legislators and judges following California's lead in actualizing domestic violence tort remedies should clarify their statutes' jurisdictional reach and the choice-of-law effects in the text of their bills. States have always had a great amount of leeway and vary greatly in their treatment of Domestic Violence torts. In 2024, as some states seek to provide specifically for this remedy for domestic violence survivors, they can preempt procedural challenges--that are especially foreseeable given everything known about tactics employed in Domestic Violence litigation--to truly make DV torts less illusory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Art 4:202, in: European Group on Tort Law (ed), Principles of European Tort Law [2005] no 21). In 2005, the European Group on Tort Law (EGTL) published the text and commentary of its Principles of European Tort Law (PETL). 7 See I BA Koch i , Strict Liablity, in: European Group on Tort Law (ed), Principles of European Tort Law (2005) no 4. 8 See I Koch i (fn 7) no 4. [Extracted from the article]

Within their different mandates, the ICJ and the ICC have decided on compensation for mass atrocities, including the same factual scenarios and related dual state/individual responsibility. However, no publication has examined these developments jointly and comparatively. Thus, this article seeks to determine how both courts are and should be developing compensation jurisprudence on mass atrocity cases. This article suggests that these two courts should construe a coherent, principle-based, and human rights-oriented international law of compensation for mass atrocities. Despite the differences in the compensation law and practice of the ICJ and the ICC, there are common elements such as the violation of an international obligation (wrongful act/international crime), damages, and the causal link between them. There are also some similarities concerning compensation goals, proof matters, and damage valuation. Both courts can and should conduct an adapted use of each other's jurisprudence, considering their different mandates rather than doing so mechanically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tort law contains multiple doctrines governing the assignment of liability and the calculation of damages. But in what sequence should courts apply these doctrines? Does it matter, for example, whether a court applies comparative fault before or after mitigation of damages? The answer, rather surprisingly, is that sequencing does matter, and it can substantially affect the compensation that a tort victim ultimately receives. Yet the existing case law on sequencing is ad hoc, inconsistent, and undertheorized, and the issue has been entirely overlooked by the academic literature. In this Article, we introduce and examine the question of sequencing. We offer three contexts in which the question arises in torts: failures to mitigate, damage caps, and collateral sources of funding. All of these contexts play a major role in determining liability and compensation, yet each demonstrates a different way in which attention to sequencing can improve legal analysis. Building on these examples, we develop a general theory of damages sequencing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the tort compensation system is to make an injured party whole; no less, but no more. With that concept in mind, Connecticut first codified its "collateral source" reduction rules in 1985, which were designed to prevent an injured party from obtaining a "double recovery" of economic damages already paid to the injured party, or paid on the injured party's behalf through an outside source, such as insurance.1 In Marciano v. Jimenez, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted section 52-225a to declare that when "any" right of reimbursement or subrogation exists to any portion of the claimed economic damages, there should be no collateral source reduction.2 As a result of this precedent, trial courts now routinely deny collateral source reductions in an overbroad manner. As of today, in any case involving the presence of a lien placed on the lawsuit for medical expenses paid, such as in cases with plaintiffs covered by Medicare or Medicaid, the Marciano decision has been interpreted to require the denial of any collateral source reduction. This includes the portions of the bill that were contractually written off by the provider and were never incurred by plaintiff. Judicial interpretation of section 52-225a in this manner, however, is inapposite with the legislative intent behind the statute's enaction. A plaintiff's recovery of financial damages for medical expenses that were never incurred or owed is the type of windfall benefit section 52-225a was designed to avoid. In light of such harsh results, the Marciano decision needs to be rectified upon reconsideration of the decision by the Connecticut Supreme Court or through legislative action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article focuses on Canada's tort of negligent investigation argues that exonerees in the U.S. would benefit from access to such tort liability, and explains where the tort could and could not fit into American law. It mentions Supreme Court of Canada's Hill v. Hamilton- Wentworth Regional Police Services Board decision on international jurisdictions' rejection. It also mentions need of improving compensation for wrongfully convicted.

This article examines a recent decision of the Nigerian Court of Appeal that essentially pronounces that, in respect of oil spill litigation in Nigeria, statutes of limitation are inapplicable to the federal law that creates the basis for oil spill compensation claims. This decision has dire consequences for the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The article finds this decision not only bad for public policy but actually based on very faulty reasoning and contradictory of an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal that was not considered. The article concludes that, despite this decision being the most recent, lower courts in Nigeria are not bound to follow it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Everyone understands that the invention of the automobile has had a profound effect on daily life in America. It has transformed our workplaces, altered our neighborhoods, and radically changed our environment. But cars have never been perfectly safe, and, as the years have passed, injuries and fatalities have mounted. This Article contends that, just as motor vehicles have remade our culture, these injuries and deaths--some 3.5 million fatalities and counting--have catalyzed fundamental changes in the contours, purposes, and limits of our law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On September 25, 1976, the Israeli Road Accident Victims Compensation Act came into force. Prior to its enactment, road accident injuries were subject to the common law of torts, as codified in the Civil Wrongs Ordinance. The statutory reform was intended to achieve a social goal- namely, securing prompt and satisfactory compensation to all road accident victims, including many who would not have been entitled to compensation otherwise. To this end, the legislature abolished fault-both as a basis for and as a defense against liability-expanded mandatory insurance, and established the Road Accident Victims Compensation Fund as a residual compensation mechanism. Two secondary goals of this socially motivated reform were extensive loss-spreading and reduction in court congestion and administrative costs. This Article provides a critical evaluation of the common perception of this legislation. It challenges the Act's claims to fame, demonstrating that the changes it was intended to bring about did not occur, occurred to a much lesser extent than commonly believed, or could have occurred anyway. This casts doubts on the validity of the rhetoric surrounding the legislative project and provides valuable lessons for other jurisdictions considering similar reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Waves of technological change explain the most important transformations of American tort law. In this Article, I begin by examining historical instances of this linkage. Following the Industrial Revolution, for example, machines, no longer humans and animals, powered production. With greater force, locomotives and other machines inflicted far more severe injuries. These dramatic technological changes prompted the replacement of the preexisting strict liability tort standard with the negligence regime. Similarly, later technological changes caused the enactment of workers’ compensation statutes, the implementation of automobile no-fault systems in some states and routinized automobile settlement practices in others that resemble a no-fault system, and the adoption of “strict” products liability. From this history, I derive a model explaining how technological innovation alters (1) the frequency of personal injuries, (2) the severity of such injuries, (3) the difficulty of proving claims, and (4) the new technology’s social utility. These four factors together determine the choice among three liability standards: strict liability, negligence, and no-fault liability with limited damages. I then apply this model to the looming technological revolution in which autonomous vehicles, robots, and other Artificial Intelligence machines will replace human decision-making as well as human force. I conclude that the liability system governing autonomous vehicles is likely to be one similar to the workers’ compensation system in which the victim is relieved of the requirement of proving which party acted tortiously and caused the accident. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is one of the greatest enigmas of American legal history. Enacted in 1789, it was little used until the late 1970s, when foreigners notably began seeking compensation under its terms for human rights abuses committed around the world. Recently, the us Supreme Court seemed to put an end to this practice - but the ATS is still of interest to historians. After the American War of Independence, Great Britain and the United States maintained a robust trade and close economic relationship. Many Americans saw the perpetuation of these ties as essential to the new republic's prosperity. The ATS helped frame the United States' mercantile associations in terms of customary maritime and trade law; in particular, evidence suggests it aimed to provide a mechanism in us courts for the remedy of commercial disputes, especially with Americans' former imperial overlord, in accordance with the contemporary law of nations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the effect that the passage of time has on the right to invoke international responsibility of states. Specifically, the article considers whether passage of a prolonged period of time results in a loss of that right. Customary international law as it is reflected in the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts sets out two circumstances when an injured state loses its right to invoke responsibility. The first, if the injured state validly waives the claim. The second, if the injured state validly acquiesces in the lapse of the claim. This Article reviews both of these grounds and enquires whether any one of them is applicable to Latvia’s compensation claim against Russia for Soviet occupation and damages suffered during the years of Soviet rule. It is suggested that Latvia has not waived its claim nor acquiesced in the lapse of the claim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we analyse the controversy that took place between Blum and Kalven, and Calabresi around rationality or, more broadly, how individuals behave. We analyse how their respective conception regarding this specific aspect was included in their analyses about what economics could say about fault, liability and compensation of victims in the case of accident and their respective views on the law. First, we show that the debate was a sequel of the discussions that took place in tort law from the 1930s to the 1950s. Second, we claim that their treatment of rationality strongly relates to their views about what the law should be and about what are the objectives and goals of the law. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]