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Land value capture is considered as a promising strategy to finance transit-oriented development (TOD). This paper aims to provide a better understanding of the potential to apply negotiable developer obligations (NDOs) for TOD projects in China through two game experiments simulating negotiation processes. Based on the conceptual framework of three fundamental dilemmas, our findings indicate that (1) value capture-based contributions to TOD often 'compete' with other public goals; (2) despite lacking clear regulation, some cities have successfully introduced informal practices to acquire developer contributions; and (3) NDOs seem less feasible under the current conditions of the anti-corruption campaign in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to deal with severe traffic and environmental issues, transit-oriented development (TOD) has been encouraged in China. Land-based value capture strategies have been applied, with varying degrees of success, as a way of co-financing TOD investments. Often, these strategies are based on innovative, but informal planning and land management practices which help to bypass institutional barriersto the effective use of land-based value capture mechanism. This paper aims to identify the interaction between the institutional context and land-based value capture mechanisms for TOD in China and discusses potential ways to deal with those informal practices based on both empirical evidence from successful cases in some Chinese cities and international practices. The findings from literature review, expert interviews, a focus group meeting and three case studies highlight several insights: 1) the effectiveness of land-based value capture for TOD in China is constrained by unsupportive planning, rigid financial regulation, and inefficient governance; 2) informal planning strategies, including the "rail plus property strategy", the "two-step bidding strategy" and the "land reserve strategy" have been experimentally applied to bypass these barriers; and 3) evidence from international TOD policies on the one hand and the institutionalization of experimental planning strategies on the other hand suggests some options how China could move forward in this matter. • Three types of institutional barriers to value capture prevent effective TOD strategies in China. • Informal strategies have been taken by several Chinese cities as a way to bypass current regulation. • Supportive policies, planning experiments, and land value taxation are suggested as three institutional innovations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]