Search

Background: As one of the most common psychological problems, social anxiety disorder (SAD) has lots of negative effects on the physical and mental development of individuals, such as decreasing the quality of interpersonal relationships, and even causing depression, suicidal ideation, etc., as well as leads individuals to generate mental illness stigma. The mental illness stigma that individuals perceive affects not only how they perceive themselves (first-person perspective) but also how they perceive others' appraisals of them (third-person perspective), which further exacerbates their anxiety symptoms. Objective: The study aims to explore the self-processing characteristics of individuals with social anxiety disorder from the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective. Methods: This study adopted the self-referential paradigm to conduct the recognition memory test on individuals with social anxiety disorder (30 participants in experiment 1) and individuals without social anxiety disorder (31 participants in experiment 2) in the two experiments. Results: In experiment 1, the recognition rate of individuals with social anxiety disorder under the self-appraisals condition was significantly higher than that under the condition of appraisals on mothers; in the three conditions of self-appraisals, appraisals on mothers and mothers' reflected appraisals, the recognition rate of negative trait adjectives was significantly higher than that of positive trait adjectives. In experiment 2, there was no significant difference in recognition rate of individuals without social anxiety disorder under the three conditions, and the recognition rate of positive trait adjectives was significantly higher than that of negative trait adjectives under the three conditions. Conclusion: Individuals with social anxiety disorder have a negative bias in selfprocessing and are more likely to focus on self-information, which is different from the self-positive bias of individuals without social anxiety disorder. This study can be beneficial to know the self-cognitive characteristics of individuals with social anxiety disorder, help them get rid of negative cognitive patterns, and remove the mental illness stigma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: As a unique part of human thinking, people can project themselves into the past or the future for mental time travel. This study attempts to expand the temporal self into the domain of the collective self. Methods: We used an adapted temporal collective self-reference paradigm to probe into the positivity bias of temporal collective self in this study. In Experiment 1, the first-person perspective was adopted for the participants to conduct the temporal collective self-reference processing, and the third-person perspective was adopted for the temporal collective self-reference processing in Experiment 2. Results: The findings indicated that no matter from the first-person perspective or the third-person perspective, people show positivity bias in the trait adjectives judgment, response times and recognition rates during the temporal collective self-processing. Discussion: This study explores mental time travel on the level of collective self, and contributes to deepening the understanding of temporal collective self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We usually observe ourselves from two perspectives. One is the first‐person perspective, which we perceive directly with our own eyes, and the other is the third‐person perspective, which we observe ourselves in a mirror or a picture. However, whether the self‐recognition associated with these two perspectives has a common or separate neural basis remains unclear. To address this, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine brain activity while participants viewed pretaped video clips of themselves and others engaged in meal preparation taken from first‐person and third‐person perspectives. We found that the first‐person behavioral videos of the participants and others induced greater activation in the premotor‐intraparietal region. In contrast, the third‐person behavioral videos induced greater activation in the default mode network compared with the first‐person videos. Regardless of the perspective, the videos of the participants induced greater activation in the salience network than the videos of others. On the other hand, the videos of others induced greater activation in the precuneus and lingual gyrus than the videos of the participants. These results suggest that the salience network is commonly involved in self‐recognition from both perspectives, even though the brain regions involved in action observation for the two perspectives are distinct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mental time travel is one of the most remarkable achievements of mankind. On the one hand, people perceive past self, present self, and future self as a continuous unity; on the other hand, people have the ability to distinguish among the three types of temporal selves because there are different representations of them. In this study, we used an adapted temporal self-reference paradigm to explore the processing mechanism of different temporal selves. Temporal self-reference was performed from the first-person perspective in Experiment 1 and from the third-person perspective in Experiment 2. The results indicated that people showed a more positive bias toward future self compared with past self and present self no matter in the first-person perspective or third-person perspective. There was no difference in recognition rate among past self, present self, and future self. Compared with the first-person perspective, present self-processing in the third-person perspective was more abstract and generalized, which may reflect that the third-person perspective has the same distancing function as time. This study can deepen understandings on temporal self-appraisals from different perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mental time travel is one of the most remarkable achievements of mankind. On the one hand, people perceive past self, present self, and future self as a continuous unity; on the other hand, people have the ability to distinguish among the three types of temporal selves because there are different representations of them. In this study, we used an adapted temporal self-reference paradigm to explore the processing mechanism of different temporal selves. Temporal self-reference was performed from the first-person perspective in Experiment 1 and from the third-person perspective in Experiment 2. The results indicated that people showed a more positive bias toward future self compared with past self and present self no matter in the first-person perspective or third-person perspective. There was no difference in recognition rate among past self, present self, and future self. Compared with the first-person perspective, present self-processing in the third-person perspective was more abstract and generalized, which may reflect that the third-person perspective has the same distancing function as time. This study can deepen understandings on temporal self-appraisals from different perspectives.

In the perception of self-motion, visual cues originating from an embodied humanoid avatar seen from a first-person perspective (1st-PP) are processed in the same way as those originating from a person's own body. Here, we sought to determine whether the user's and avatar's bodies in virtual reality have to be colocalized for this visual integration. In Experiment 1, participants saw a whole-body avatar in a virtual mirror facing them. The mirror perspective could be supplemented with a fully visible 1st-PP avatar or a suggested one (with the arms hidden by a virtual board). In Experiment 2, the avatar was viewed from the mirror perspective or a third-person perspective (3rd-PP) rotated 90° left or right. During an initial embodiment phase in both experiments, the avatar's forearms faithfully reproduced the participant's real movements. Next, kinaesthetic illusions were induced on the static right arm from the vision of passive displacements of the avatar's arms enhanced by passive displacement of the participant's left arm. Results showed that this manipulation elicited kinaesthetic illusions regardless of the avatar's perspective in Experiments 1 and 2. However, illusions were more likely to occur when the mirror perspective was supplemented with the view of the 1st-PP avatar's body than with the mirror perspective only (Experiment 1), just as they are more likely to occur in the latter condition than with the 3rd-PP (Experiment 2). Our results show that colocalization of the user's and avatar's bodies is an important, but not essential, factor in visual integration for self-motion perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advances our understanding of consumer behavior by examining the influence of autobiographical memory perspective on consumer's self‐congruence. While extant research has primarily restricted itself to the consequences of self‐congruence, this work focuses on an antecedent, by examining the psychological processes associated with the consumer's autobiographical memory perspective and the resulting impact on self‐congruence. Through three experiments, we demonstrate that visualizing autobiographical memories from a first‐person versus a third‐person perspective impacts consumers' self‐brand congruence differently under varied circumstances. Specifically, differing degrees of self‐brand congruence are experienced when consumers focus on differences (vs. similarities) between their present and recalled selves, combined with distinct autobiographical memory perspectives. The autobiographical memory perspective is identified as a key determinant of consumers' perceived change in self‐image, which, in turn, has a cascading effect on their self‐brand congruence. Thus, consumers' perceived change in self‐image is identified as the mechanism underlying the main effect. Furthermore, as an important component of self‐image, this research determines and examines a moderating influence of self‐esteem in the relationship between autobiographical memory perspective and self‐congruence. Collectively, these results facilitate our understanding of the autobiographical memory perspective as an antecedent of consumer's self‐congruence, with implications for nostalgia advertising and retro branding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hintergrund: Verstehen und Erklären bilden traditionellerweise eine Methodendichotomie mit einer legitimierenden Intention für Geistes- und Naturwissenschaften. Es wird der Frage nachgegangen, welche Dimensionen dem Gebrauch von „Verstehen“ im Fachgebiet Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie innewohnen und welche Bedeutung sie für die Praxis haben.Methode: Kritische Diskussion der historischen Wurzeln der Verstehen-Erklären-Dichotomie und deren Einführung in die Psychiatrie durch Jaspers. Der Begriff „Verstehen“ wird einer linguistischen und logischen Analyse unterzogen. Von dem postulierten latenten, dreidimensionalen Gebrauch von „Verstehen“ in Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie werden in diesem Aufsatz die Lesart als logische Operation der Zuordnung und die Lesart als Sinnerfassung, vornehmlich bei Jaspers, analysiert.Ergebnisse: Die philosophischen Quellen lassen sich jeweils hermeneutischen, einfühlend-psychologischen, idealtypisch-sinnkategorisierenden und subsumptionstheoretischen Ansätzen zuordnen. Die Begriffsanalyse zeigt, dass „Verstehen“ als Prädikat graduell und polysemantisch ist und dass dessen Definition den unterschiedlichen Bedeutungen konjunktiv Rechnung tragen muss. Diese Bedeutungen können zu drei Dimensionen verdichtet werden: die rational-diagnostische oder Kohärenz verleihende Zuordnung, das psychologisch-hineinversetzende Nachempfinden oder typologische Sinnerhellung und die dialogische Verständigung. Die verstehende Psychologie gründet bei Jaspers nicht auf Einfühlung, sondern auf Zuordnung zu und Abgleich mit idealtypischen Zusammenhängen.Diskussion: „Verstehen“ als logische Operation der Zuordnung und als Sinnerfassung geht von einem Prädikat in der transitiven Ersten-Person-Perspektive („wer“ verstanden werden soll, als objektivierbar) in Verbindung mit einer Dritten-Person-Perspektive („was“ verstanden werden soll) aus. Diese Analyse soll um eine weitere Erste-Person-Perspektive („wer“ verstanden werden soll, als Subjekt) in Verbindung mit einer dialogischen Zweiten-Person-Perspektive („wie“ verstanden werden soll, als Verständigung) ergänzt werden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How is the approach of Indian philosophers to the study of consciousness different from that of their Western counterparts? To answer this question, it is necessary to understand how the Indian philosophical tradition distinguishes between consciousness and non-consciousness. How does it present and solve the mind-body problem? The article explores the difference in understanding of mind and consciousness in some schools of Indian philosophy. First, the article considers some major Indian philosophical principles underlying the relationship between mind and consciousness which make the Indian tradition unique in comparison to the West. The last part of the article analyzes one by one the most representative Indian philosophical theories of mind and consciousness (with their corresponding terminology). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current design of virtual reality (VR) applications relies essentially on the transposition of users’ viewpoint in first-person perspective (1PP). Within this context, our research aims to compare the impact and the potentialities enabled via the integration of the third-person perspective (3PP) in immersive virtual environments (IVE). Our empirical study is conducted in order to assess the sense of presence, the sense of embodiment, and performance of users confronted with a series of tasks presenting a case of potential use for the video game industry. Our results do not reveal significant differences concerning the sense of spatial presence with either point of view. Nonetheless, they provide evidence confirming the relevance of using the first-person perspective to induce a sense of embodiment toward a virtual body, especially in terms of self-location and ownership. However, no significant differences were observed concerning the sense of agency. Concerning users’ performance, our results demonstrate that the first-person perspective enables more accurate interactions, while the third-person perspective provides better space awareness.

The Nietzschean conception of selfhood has been the subject of considerable debate in the Anglophone commentary. This debate has been focused on what Sebastian Gardner coined as 'the lack of fit' between Nietzsche's theoretical and practical remarks on the self. There have been various attempts at a solution to the lack of fit and in this article we address one such solution, which we call the 'transcendental reading'. We argue that the reading is right to highlight that Nietzschean selfhood risks elimination of first-person practical agency. We contend, however, that the reading limits our understanding of his critique of a strictly first-person conception of selfhood. This critique aims to reject a conception of the self as distinct from the drives. We finally suggest an alternative solution to the lack of fit that takes into account the concerns of the transcendental reading, but seeks to overcome its limitations. Das nietzschesche Konzept der Selbstheit ist in der englischsprachigen Forschungsliteratur Gegenstand einer lebhaften Debatte. Sie hat sich auf das von Sebastian Gardner namhaft gemachte 'lack of fit', die Passungslücke zwischen Nietzsches theoretischen und praktischen Ausführungen zum Begriff des Selbstseins konzentriert. Derzeit gibt es verstärkt Bestrebungen, diese Lücke zu füllen. In diesem Artikel befassen wir uns mit einer möglichen Losung, die wir als 'transzendentale Lesart' bezeichnen. Wir stimmen Lesarten zwar zu, die hervorheben, dass die nietzschesche Selbstheit riskiert, eine ichbezogene praktische Handlungssteuerung zu eliminieren, behaupten jedoch, dass sie Nietzsches Kritik eines grundsätzlich ichbezogenen Konzepts von Selbstheit einschränken. Diese Kritik beabsichtigt, einen Begriff des Selbsts als unterschieden von den Trieben zu verwerfen. Wir schlagen darum zuletzt eine alternative Losung für den 'lack of fit' vor, die einerseits die Belange der transzendentalen Lesart berücksichtigt und andererseits ihre Beschränkungen überwindet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theoretical and empirical accounts suggest that impairments in self-other discrimination processes are likely to promote the expression of hallucinations. However, our understanding of such processes during adolescence is still at an early stage. The present study thus aims 1) to delineate the neural correlates sustaining mental simulation of actions involving self-performed actions (first-person perspective; 1PP) and other-performed actions (third-person perspective; 3PP) during adolescence 2) to identify atypical activation patterns during 1PP/3PP mental simulation of actions in hallucination-prone adolescents 3) to examine whether differential risk for schizophrenia (clinical vs genetic) is also associated with differential impairments in the 1PP/3PP mental simulation of actions during adolescence. Twenty-two typically developing controls (Control group; 6 females), twelve hallucination-prone adolescents (AH group; 7 females) and thirteen adolescents with 22q11.2 Deletion Syndrome (22q11.2DS group; 4 females) were included in the study. During the fMRI task, subjects were presented with a cue (self-other priming cues) indicating to perform the task using either a first person perspective (you-1PP) or a third person perspective (friend-3PP) and then they were asked to mentally simulate actions based on the type of cue. Our results indicated that atypical patterns of cerebral activation, particularly in the key areas of self-other distinction, were found in both groups at risk for auditory hallucinations (AH and 22q11.2DS). More precisely, adolescents in the AH and 22q11.2DS groups presented decreased activations in the parieto-occipital region BA19 during 3PP. This study characterizes the neural correlates of mental imagery for actions during adolescence, and suggests that a differential risk for hallucination-proneness (clinical vs. genetic) is associated to similar patterns of atypical activations in key areas sustaining self-other discrimination processes.

It has been shown that it is possible to induce a strong illusion that a virtual body (VB) is one's own body. However, the relative influence of a first-person-perspective (1PP) view of the VB and spatial coincidence of the real body and VB remains unclear. We demonstrate a method that permits separation of these two factors. It provides a 1PP view of a VB, supporting visuomotor synchrony between real body and VB movements, but where the entire scene including the body is rotated 15° upwards through the axis connecting the eyes, so that the VB and real body are coincident only through this axis. In a within-subjects study that compared this 15° rotation with a 0° rotation condition, participants reported only slightly diminished levels of perceived ownership of the VB in the rotated condition and did not detect the rotation of the scene. These results indicate that strong spatial coincidence of the virtual and real bodies is not necessary for a full-body ownership illusion. The rotation method used, similar to the effects of vertical prisms, did not produce significant negative side-effects, thus providing a useful methodology for further investigations of body ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated the neural correlates of motor resonance during the observation of natural transitive actions and determined how the observer's perspective modulates the neural activation. Seventeen right-handed participants observed right and left hand tool grasping actions from a first-person or third-person perspective while undergoing fMRI. A two-factorial analysis of variance over the parietal region revealed no main effects of hand identity or perspective, but unveiled a hand by perspective interaction effect. The first-person perspective elicited parietal activation in the hemisphere contralateral to the performing hand as if the modelled action was mimicked with the same anatomical hand. In the third-person perspective, parietal activation ipsilateral to the modelled hand was found, indicating a specular strategy, rather than an anatomical imitation. Motor resonance was maximal in three foci in the superior parietal lobule and intraparietal sulcus that have been associated with prehensile actions. Our results suggest that therapeutic strategies aimed to elicit motor resonance, such as motor imagery and observational modelling, can adjust their spatial frame of reference according to the hemisphere they intend to stimulate. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Theory-of-mind (ToM) involves modeling an individual's mental states to plan one's action and to anticipate others' actions through recursive reasoning that may be myopic (with limited recursion) or predictive (with full recursion). ToM recursion was examined using a series of two-player, sequential-move matrix games with a maximum of three steps. Participants were assigned the role of Player I, controlling the initial and the last step, or of Player II, controlling the second step. Appropriate for the assigned role, participants either anticipated or planned Player II's strategy at the second step, and then determined Player I's optimal strategy at the first step. Participants more readily used predictive reasoning as Player II (i.e., planning one's own move) than as Player I (i.e., anticipating an opponent's move), although they did not differ when translating reasoning outcome about the second step to optimal action in the first step. Perspective-taking influenced likelihood of predictive reasoning, but it did not affect the rate at which participants acquired it during the experimental block. We conclude that the depth of ToM recursion (related to perspective-taking mechanisms) and rational application of belief-desire to action (instrumental rationality) constitute separate cognitive processes in ToM reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To adopt a first-person perspective on consciousness is typically understood as a matter of inwardly engaging one's awareness in such a way as to make one's conscious states and their properties into objects of awareness. When awareness is thus inwardly engaged, experience functions as both act and object of awareness. As objects of awareness, an experience-token and its various properties are items of which a subject is aware. As an act of awareness, an experience-token is that in virtue of which items - in this case, other experience-tokens and their properties - can appear, to a subject, as objects of awareness. The precise nature of the relation between experience functioning as act and as object is a matter of dispute. However, two broad possibilities can be distinguished: (1) as acts of awareness, experiences reveal other experiences to subjects by way of a form of direct, unmediated, acquaintance, (2) as acts of awareness experiences reveal other experiences to subjects by way of modes of presentation of those experiences. I shall argue against (1). Possibility (2), I shall argue, entails a form of representationalism about experiences: experiences are defined by their representational role. However, (2) also yields a crucial but largely neglected consequence of representationalism: necessarily, in any given experience, there is an aspect of this experience that must be understood in terms of its representational role but cannot be understood in terms of its representational content. I shall call this the ineliminable intentional core of the experience. The ineliminable intentional core of the experience is, necessarily, not an object of inwardly engaged awareness. This entails a significant revision in the way we think about the concept of the first-person perspective, and of what it is to study consciousness from the inside. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]