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Abstract: Problem solving in groups can be rich with tension for students. This tension may arise from conflicting approaches (conceptual and/or epistemological) and/or from conflict emerging in the social relations among group members. Drawing on video records of undergraduate students working collaboratively, we use three cases to illustrate the multifaceted ways in which conflict arises—combining conceptual, epistemological, and socioemotional dynamics—and a specific way of managing the tension that can emerge from the multifaceted conflict, “taking an escape hatch.” An escape hatch is a set of discourse moves through which participants close the conversational topic, thereby relieving tension, but before a conceptual resolution is achieved. We describe how epistemological twists and turns can be recruited as a means of managing the strong emotions experienced by the students, showing the coupling of emotion and epistemology in students’ conceptual sense making during group work. We help to provide the groundwork necessary for instructors to notice, understand, and respond to one way in which conceptual–epistemological–social–emotional aspects of interaction are coupled in the emergence of tension, rather than narrowly targeting instructional moves based on only conceptual or epistemological considerations. Instead, instructors should often respond to—and help students become aware of—the emotional component of peer interactions and its entanglement with the “cold cognitive” conceptual and epistemological components. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers have argued against deficit-based explanations of students’ difficulties with mathematical sense-making, pointing instead to factors such as epistemology. Students’ beliefs about knowledge and learning can hinder the activation and integration of productive knowledge they have. Such explanations, however, risk falling into a ‘deficit trap’—substituting a concepts/skills deficit with an epistemological one. Our interview-based case study of a freshman engineering major, ‘Jim,’ explains his difficulty solving a physics problem (on hydrostatic pressure) in terms of his epistemology, but avoids a deficit trap by modeling the dynamics of his epistemological stabilities and shifts in terms of fine-grained cognitive elements that include the seeds of epistemological expertise. Specifically, during a problem-solving episode in the interview, Jim reaches and sticks with an incorrect answer that violates common sense. We show that Jim has all the mathematical skills and physics knowledge he would need to resolve the contradiction. We argue that his difficulty doing so stems in part from his epistemological views that (i) physics equations are much more trustworthy than everyday reasoning, and (ii) physics equations do not express meaning that tractably connects to common sense. For these reasons, he does not view reconciling between common sense and formalism as either necessary or plausible to accomplish. But Jim’s in-the-moment shift to a more sophisticated epistemological stance highlights the seeds of epistemological expertise that were present all along: he does see common sense as connected to formalism (though not always tractably so), and in some circumstances, this connection is both salient and valued. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Some researchers, including B. K. Hofer and P. R. Pintrich (1997) and W. A. Sandoval (2005), argue for defining personal epistemology as views about the nature of knowledge and knowing but not views about the nature of learning. Others continue using a more expansive definition of personal epistemology that includes views about learning. I argue that the scope of personal epistemology should not be decided entirely a priori. If people's views about the nature of knowing and knowledge turn out to be separable from (despite being intertwined with) their views about the nature of learning, then it makes sense to define 2 separate areas of study corresponding to those 2 separable sets of psychological constructs. From some theoretical perspectives, however, empirical results may support the interpretation that views about knowledge are inseparably entangled with views about learning. In that case, excluding views about learning from personal epistemology obscures rather than elucidates the content and cognitive structure of students' views. To be clear, I do not think the community should decide, now, to etch “views about the nature of learning” into the definition of personal epistemology. I argue instead that it is more productive not to converge on a definition until further empirical and theoretical progress points us toward the best way to “cut up [nature] ... along its natural joints” (Plato, 1995, p. 64). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We discuss a case study of the influence of epistemology on learning for a student in an introductory college physics course. An analysis of videotaped class work, written work, and interviews indicates that many of the student's difficulties were epistemological in nature. Our primary goals are. to show instructors and curriculum developers that a student's personal epistemological stance-her ideas about knowledge and learning can have a direct, causal influence on her learning of physics, and to describe a mechanism for this interaction. This influence exists even when research-based curriculum materials provide implicit epistemological support. For this reason, curriculum materials and teaching techniques could become more effective by explicitly attending to students' epistemologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most research on personal epistemologies has conceived them as made up of relatively large, coherent, and stable cognitive structures, either developmental stages or beliefs (perhaps organized into theories). Recent work has challenged these views, arguing that personal epistemologies are better understood as made up finer grained cognitive resources whose activation depends sensitively on context. In this article, we compare these different frameworks, focusing on their instructional implications by using them to analyze a third-grade teacher's epistemologically motivated intervention and its effect on her students. We argue that the resources framework has more predictive and explanatory power than stage- and beliefs-based frameworks do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on personal epistemologies has begun to consider ontology: Do naive epistemologies take the form of stable, unitary beliefs or of fine-grained, context-sensitive resources? Debates such as this regarding subtleties of cognitive theory, however, may be difficult to connect to everyday instructional practice. Our purpose in this article is to make that connection. We first review reasons for supporting the latter account, of naive epistemologies as made up of fine-grained, context-sensitive resources; as part of this argument we note that familiar strategies and curricula tacitly ascribe epistemological resources to students. We then present several strategies designed more explicitly to help students tap those resources for learning introductory physics. Finally, we reflect on this work as an example of interplay between 2 modes of inquiry into student thinking, that of instruction and that of formal research on learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Questions the community consensus about epistemological sophistication. Distinction between the correctness and productivity of an epistemological belief; Conception of elementary school students on science; Generalizations on the nature of knowledge and learning.