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Connecting the dots between Vilém Flusser and Heinz von Foerster, this essay explores the links and somewhat belated co-emergence of media theory and cybernetics as a vanishing mediator in modern literary history and the posthuman turn: first, media theory's cybernetic investments and re-deployments of certain concepts and, second, a much humbler claim for cybernetics, namely, its status as a media theory in all but name. Preeminently, the idea that there's no outside to the Whole, second-order observation, the key piece from von Foerster, is central to Flusserian thinking. There's always an observer observing, and that's in any type of epistemology that's a hard problem of complexity, like a problem that can't be easily resolved. The subject isn't a human per se but a knot and also a not of relations, as Flusser puts it, a juncture for various channels of information that also presents impedances. Von Foerster's transit is from physicist - interested in engineering and a systemic constructivism - to meta-physicist reaching into the impossibilities of the social sphere and cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We set forth what one may call a "constitutional reading" in opposition to the traditional widespread "constructivist reading" of the object of cognition. In the light of the so-called one-object view reading of Transcendental idealism, the object of cognition is nothing but the object that exists in itself insofar as it appears to our cognitive apparatus. The object exists mind-independently, while our cognition of the same object must be mind-independent. The constructivist reading mistakes the epistemological problem of how we come to cognize mind-dependently that what we represent ("the constitutional view") are mind-independent objects with the Berkelian ontological problem of how we construct objects out of an undifferentiated, unstructured manifold (the constructivist view) My diagnosis is as follows. The first reason is the traditional "two-worlds view" reading of Kant's idealism: if we take what exists in itself and the object of cognition as distinct things, then we must conclude that the object of cognition is a mind-dependent construction. Constructivist readers mistake the mind-dependent nature of our human cognition of objects for the putative mind-dependent nature of the known object. The second reason is overintellectualization. Constructivist readers mistake the objectifying syntheses of the imagination, below the threshold of self-consciousness, for cognitive conceptual operations by means of which we cognize (erkennen) the objects of cognition, or so I shall argue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Warmińskie is the property of University of Warmia & Mazury in Olsztyn and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Research communication in interdisciplinary research projects requires a way of demarcation of theory and knowledge that is easy to communicate, is inconsequential for the framework of concepts, results, and procedures within existing scientific disciplines, and abstains from trying to resolve the dispute between (neo)positivists and constructivists. A simple way of demarcation starts from the notion of language‐independent and language‐dependent reality. Currently, what passes for knowledge ("news") and myth ("fake news") depends, besides on sheer volume and frequency of the messages, increasingly on the internal consistency of (computer) language‐dependent reality and decreasingly on language‐independent reality. All language is instruction, and knowledge is to know which instructions (that is, theory) are predictive of a result, state, or situation in language‐independent reality. Any theory that doesn't reduce outcome space, or contains one or more empirically/physically impossible instructions, or produces wrong predictions, or falls short of demonstration is not knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Philosophia is the property of Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The current interest in the tacit aspects of knowledge has diverted attention from the economic significance of its converse, explicit or articulated knowledge, and, by implication, the importance of articulation—the process through which tacit skills and knowledge are made explicit—and codification—the process of rendering articulated knowledge in fixed, standardized and easily replicable form. In partial alignment with the literature on "distributed cognition" the article outlines a general model of articulation as a process involving the interplay of three elements: "theory," "codes," and "tools" in communities ranging in size from small groups to entire industries. The costs and benefits of articulation are discussed, drawing attention to how these may be affected by institutional and organizational design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We agree with Kwan and Tsang (2001) that critical realism represents an important point of epistemological departure from mainstream realism, and that it has the potential to inform strategy research. To that end, Kwan and Tsang's argument for a critical realist perspective is valid. There however exist substantial nontrivial differences between constructivism and critical realism. While critical realism contests some of the default assumptions of empiricism and realism which treat social systems as closed systems, it is still predicated upon an inherent order of things that is graspable by research. Constructivism instead focuses on the manner in which researchers constitute theories in the act of describing them. This important distinction makes constructivism far more of a departure from empiricism than critical realism, and therefore it has a different set of implications for strategy research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mir and Watson (2000) advocate that constructivism has the potential to inform strategy research. In their discussions, they compare constructivism with realism, and highlight certain alleged strengths of the former over the latter. Although their paper provides some insights, their version of constructivism is problematic and their understanding of realism is inaccurate. In this note we clarify some key issues concerning constructivism and realism. Moreover, we argue that Mir and Watson's insights can be accommodated within a critical realist framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the iterative conception, each set is formed out of sets that are, in some sense, prior to it. Because priority plays an essential role in explanations of why contradiction-inducing sets, such as the universal set, do not exist, the success of these explanations depends on our ability to make sense of the relevant priority relation. I argue that attempts to do this have fallen short: understanding priority in a straightforwardly constructivist sense threatens the coherence of the empty set and raises serious epistemological concerns; but the leading realist interpretations–ontological and modal interpretations of priority—are deeply problematic as well. I conclude that the purported explanatory virtues of the iterative conception are, at present, unfounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Inciso is the property of Universidad La Gran Colombia, Seccional Armenia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper studies Fichte's views of the cognitive problem, especially his account of the three fundamental principles. I argue three points: first, Kant's position includes two incompatible approaches to knowledge I will be calling representationalism and constructivism; second, in his early writings Fichte defends a version of the so-called Copernican Revolution or Copernican turn, more specifically a revised conception of "representation"; and, third, though Fichte's version of the Copernican turn improves on Kant's, it is not a satisfactory solution to the cognitive problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the constructivist epistemology which has evolved with the systematic theory or social system. Topics discussed include importance of constructivism, systems theory and sociological theory, modernization of interpretation by the philologists and empiricists from the field of natural science, psychology and sociology are the founders of these conceptions.

Copyright of Studia Warmińskie is the property of University of Warmia & Mazury in Olsztyn and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A constructivist model of ethical meaning making is developed. The effort begins by distinguishing three versions of constructivist theory—personal construct psychology, radical constructivism, and social constructionism. Then, the following four premises of an integrated constructivist perspective are presented: (a) People are informationally closed systems, (b) people are active meaning makers, (c) people are social beings, and (d) people construe epistemologically and ontologically. These premises are used to examine and counter criticisms that portray constructivism as endorsing an “anything goes” relativism. This clears a space for the development of a constructivist model of ethical meaning making, outlined in the final section of the article. This model is rooted in personal construct psychology, but is also influenced by radical constructivism and social constructionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) states that a realistic reading of scientific theories (especially of modern physics) requires to take structures as ontologically fundamental. Regardless of how this commitment is articulated, OSR proponents agree that the appropriate framework for developing such a position is the semantic approach to theories. I argue that, at least in aspects relevant to the formulation of OSR, the semantic approach is not superior to the syntactic one. I also show that the Received View has the necessary conceptual resources to adequately express the metaphysical commitments of OSR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper situates the problem of defeaters in a larger debate about the source of normative authority. It argues in favour of a constructivist account of defeasibility, which appeals to the justificatory role of normative principles. The argument builds upon the critique of two recent attempts to deal with defeasibility: first, a particularist account, which disposes of moral principles on the ground that reasons are holistic; and second, a proceduralist view, which addresses the problem of defeaters by distinguishing between provisional and strictly universal principles. The particularist view fails to establish that moral principles have no epistemological import, but it raises important questions about their role in practical reasoning. The proceduralist view fails to distinguish between reasoning by default and reasoning by principles, but it shows that normative principles have a structural justificatory role. The constructivist view recognizes that the moral valence of normative claims vary across contexts, but denies that this is because of holism about reasons. Rather, it defends defeasibility within a constructivist account of reasoning where universality serves as the matrix of judgment. The constructivist view vindicates the justificatory role of universal normative principles, and makes room for some ordinary sources of defeasibility, which are left unaccounted by competing views, and which depend on the agent’s own progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this brief note, we outline Mario Ornaghi's contributions to the field of computational logic to celebrate his 70th birthday. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: Constructivist epistemology is not a doctrinal set of clear and consistent theses and assumptions but a movement full of tensions, with minimally integrated lines of discussions. Problem: This situation explains why it is so difficult to come up with a general definition of constructivist epistemology that could serve as a starting point to study its several research programs systematically and comparatively. Method: We compare the constructivist epistemologies of Jean Piaget, Ernst von Glasersfeld, Humberto Maturana, and Niklas Luhmann regarding tensions between knowledge/reality and individual/society. Results: Our comparison leads to a general definition of constructivist epistemology as a heterogeneous movement problematizing certain dualities - such as subject/object, knowledge/reality, or individual/society - that have been shown to be central for epistemological inquiry. We argue that such dualisms can be used as dimensions for critical analysis, comparison, and discussion among the different research programs, and that, at the same time, they would allow us to analyze the general strategies characterizing such programs. The comparative and critical analysis of the programs by way of the aforementioned tensions results in an organized presentation highlighting their convergences, divergences, and singularities. Implications: The framework presented for evaluation (and further elaboration) can be useful to elucidate the standpoints of constructivist epistemology's research programs, and thence consolidate lines of dialogue among them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy is the property of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Context · In the past three decades, the work of Varela has had an enormous impact on current developments in contemporary science. Problem · Varela's thought was extremely complex and multifaceted, and while some aspects - notably his contributions to the autopoietic theory of living and enactivist approach to cognition - have gained widespread acclaim, others have been ignored or watered down. Method · We identify three dimensions of Varela's thought: (a) anti-realism of the "middle way"; (b) anti-foundationalism of the circular onto-epistemology; and (c) ethical/social implications of the circularity. The discussion of these dimensions is followed by a concise overview of the individual target articles in this issue and the topics they cover. Finally, we discuss in what ways the articles extend and relate to Varela's work. We do this by means of a concrete example: the relation between "enaction" and "enactivism." Results · We show that the ignoring-cum-watering-down process of Varela's contributions to science is at least partly linked to these three dimensions of Varela's thought. On the basis of our examination, we also find that the more narrow research topics are always interrelated with broader philosophical reflection. Researching into ignored and watered-down aspects of Varela's work enables us to not only gain fresh insights into Varela's overall philosophy and rekindle interest in the topics and themes that have been brushed aside, but also cast a fresh light on those that are currently flourishing. Implications · Reviving interest in Varela's work in toto could lead to fruitful research and discussion in numerous scientific fields. To illustrate this idea, we delineate, tentatively, three domains - theoretical, empirical, and existential - where Varela's contribution to philosophy and science could instigate a productive exchange of views. Constructivist content · All three dimensions of Varela's philosophy have strong affinities with the radical constructivist critique of realism and some of its epistemological and ethical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on two questions: (1) Is understanding intimately bound up with accurately representing the world? (2) Is understanding intimately bound up with downstream abilities? We will argue that the answer to both these questions is 'yes', and for the same reason-both accuracy and ability are important elements of orthogonal evaluative criteria along which understanding can be assessed. More precisely, we will argue that representational-accuracy (of which we assume truth is one kind) and intelligibility (which we will define so as to entail abilities) are good-making features of a state of understanding. Interestingly, both evaluative claims have been defended by philosophers in the literature on understanding as the criterion of evaluation. We argue that proponents of both approaches have important insights and that, drawing on both their own observations and a few novel arguments, we can construct a more complete picture of understanding evaluation. We thus posit the theory of there being Multiple Understanding Dimensions. The main thing to note about our dualism regarding the evaluative criteria of understanding is that it accounts for the intuitions about cases underlying both previously held positions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Selcuk University Social Sciences Institute Journal is the property of Selcuk University Social Sciences Institute Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Jean Piaget’s research program—which involved the study of child development as a central feature (viz. “stages”), but which can be understood more broadly as advancing a constructive theory of knowledge (i.e., “genetic epistemology”)—is thought by many contemporary developmentalists to have been guided by a coherent, complete, and unchanging meta-theoretical framework: “equilibration.” While this is correct philosophically, it is incorrect historically. Briefly put: the formal meaning of equilibration changed over time, and thus so too did the entirety of the theory that relied upon it. To focus in on one specific change of particular importance, this article examines how Piaget appealed to the changing ideas of Kurt Gödel and their interpretations by French-speaking logicians. This historical analysis (a Foucauldian archaeology) thereby excavates a “neo-Gödelian turn” in Piaget’s research program. The resulting framework is then sketched in outline: the updated formal meta-theory that made possible “Piaget’s new theory.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims at a confrontation of two approaches to epistemology in order to answer the question posed in its title whether the theory of knowledge should focus on static or dynamic aspects of human cognition. In the first part, the author presents a metascientific understanding of epistemology defined in his own works as an ordered set of investigative perspectives, which practicing researchers have at their disposal when they are interested to attain a specific state of knowledge, or to support their beliefs about the nature of investigative domains with regard to the existence forms and accessibility of investigated objects. And, in the second, the subject matter of a more detailed presentation constitutes a psychophysiological approach to epistemology pertaining to the human organism preoccupied with sensorial and mental activities as a cognizing subject who aims at achieving a certain kind of information about reality. Common for both approaches to epistemology is the attainment of experiential knowledge. However, when the metascientific epistemology refers to a dispositional-perspectivistic state of knowledge acquired in cognition, the attention of the psychophysiological epistemology is paid to cognitive-constructivists activities of human organisms as subject acquiring their knowledge through personal experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constitutivists explicitly emphasize the importance of self-reflection for rational agency. Interestingly enough, there is no clear account of how and why self-reflection plays such an important role for these views. My aim in this paper is to address this underappreciated problem for constitutivist views and to determine whether constitutivist self-reflection is normatively oriented. Understanding its normative features will allow us to evaluate a potential way that constitutivism may meet its purported metaethical promise. I begin by showing why constitutivism, as exemplified by Korsgaard's and Velleman's respective views, takes self-reflection to be a constitutive feature of rational agency. Closer examination of this claim suggests three underappreciated problems for the constitutivist's apparent reliance on self-reflection. First, we have no picture of the specific role that self-reflection plays. Second, it is unclear in what sense it is a requirement for full-fledged agency and, thereby, for self-constitution. Third, it is not clear whether it has any necessary normative features, even given the often cited moral normativity associated with constitutivism. In §1, I will address the first and second questions. §2 will be dedicated to considering the third question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some progress in the debate by defending a robust conception of construction, which names a distinctive view of practical reasoning as transformative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Main objectives and subjective aspects are traceable in the concepts of information, document, knowledge, knowledge organization and levels of reality. Objective and subjective aspects are both present in each of these entities, as it is sometimes implicitly recognized even by some of the authors that usually underline exclusively the objective or the subjective elements of these entities. "Moderate constructivism" is the synthesis of objectivism and subjectivism that consists in recognizing that reality is neither completely given nor completely built and it constitutes (beyond too marked pseudo-oppositions) the paradigm today de facto dominant both in epistemology studies and in knowledge organization studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I analyze the main arguments and counterarguments proposed by realists and anti-realists stances for and against the scientific ability to produce objective and true scientific knowledge about the social and natural world. I argue that the theoretical and observational language which social and natural scientists use to refer to several scientific observable and unobservable entities, phenomena, properties and processes are determined, in practice, by their theoretical research traditions. This shows that scientific methodology depends so heavily on scientific theories that is, at most, a constructive procedure and not a discovery procedure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several letters to the editor are presented in response to the article "Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology," by Urban Kordes in a 2016 issue.

Context ? Epistemologically, constructivism has reached its goals, particularly by emphasizing the idea of participatory observation, circularity, and the fact that construction is based on experience. However, rather than research, the main occupation of constructivists and second-order cyberneticians seems to lie in making the case for their epistemological idea, which has been exhausted in many aspects. > Purpose ? To counteract this exhaustion and an increasingly apparent lack of energy, it is argued that constructivism requires a dedicated field of research, a field where it would be possible to test constructivist concepts empirically and thus go beyond mere theoretical discourse. > Method ? Based on a review of basic constructivist premises and a critical examination of the field of empirical phenomenological research, the article connects their respective findings. > Results ? The article proposes that empirical research on lived experience (i.e., empirical phenomenology) requires a constructivist epistemological foundation and might therefore be a logical continuation of constructivist endeavours. In such a way, both fields might benefit considerably. Not only would constructivism acquire an empirical tool for testing its ideas, such a partnership might also provide empirical phenomenology with a more suitable epistemological platform than the realism-based research framework of cognitive science (of which it has become an integral part). The possibilities and problems of introducing empirical research into constructivism are also discussed. > Implications ? The article presents an opportunity to re-think the role and future of constructivism. It suggests educating a new generation of constructivist researchers whose principal goal would be the attempt to study lived human experience. That could also open a path to the experimental grounding of many constructivist insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The processes of globalization and regionalization worldwide require new forms of regulation, which must overcome, coordinate and organize the current institutional normative structures characteristic of modernity. The present work is an epistemological essay, based on Jean Piaget, that proposes the need to extend the current normative structures, namely moving from an institutional modern stage to a postmodern systemic stage. This proposal is based, first, on the existence of sociocognitive stages that determine the essential characteristics of any social structure of regulation. Second, the proposal is based on the global construction of a new stage of sociocognitive regulatory structures: the constructivist-systemic stage. Third, the approach predicts the emergence of a new state structure with a systemic character: the International-State. This new structure of systemic governance would only be able to arise on the basis of the institutional normation structures of the current nation-state. The neopiagetian methodological analysis - with dialectical character - that this article exposes aims to demonstrate the mentioned sociocognitive thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article starts with the observation that a sociological analysis of interactions concerning drugs cannot rely on accounts of drugs that were generated in the field because these accounts (such as the distinction between drugs and non-drugs or between intended effects and side effects) are shaped by strong interests. The article suggests two approaches to obtaining actor-independent accounts, both of which are based on comparisons. The first approach is a symmetrization of perspectives, which can be achieved by including the perspectives of as many different actors as possible as well as the abstract actors of science and law. The second approach starts from the definition of a problem that is contingent but grounded in practices of the field. In the case of drugs, this problem can be constructed as how laypersons can rate the identity and quality of specific things as unproblematic. In both cases, an ontological idea of the 'drug as such' is replaced by a social-constructivist view of the drug, which at the same time takes the drug's materiality into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constructivism and constructionism are two distinct epistemologies. Yet, within religious education many have tended to use these terms interchangeably or as being complementary to one another. This article provides conceptual clarity in relation to both epistemologies by comparing each in terms of their origins and epistemological premises, their ontologies, and their respective purposes. It concludes by articulating some implications concerning the use of each to contribute to research in the field of religious education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A literary criticism of the book "Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy" by Bernard Williams is presented. It argues that Kantian constructivism provides the resources to adequately address moral objectivity. It mentions that moral objectivism is the meta-ethical position that some system of ethics or morality is universally valid, without any further semantic or metaphysical claim. It examines the relation of objective features of moral claims with the subjective experience of moral agents.

Featuring a provincial spinster named Adela, who eventually becomes a man named Juan, Jaime de Armiñán's My Dearest Señorita (Mi querida señorita, produced by José Luis Borau, 1971) became the first Spanish film to deal with the topic of transsexuality. Resorting to allegorical readings, previous scholarship has associated the film's hermaphrodite with the Francoist cultural and ideological anomaly. While acknowledging the film's progressive political critique of the Francoist regime, others have seen the protagonist's eventual integration into heterosexuality as a symptom of the film's conservative gender and sexual politics. This article moves from a focus on identity politics to an emphasis on queer subjectivity and from an allegorical reading to an emphasis on the film's revolutionary stylistic choices. I read the film from a queer subject position that points towards a political form of a 'becoming subjectivity' that escapes, if only partially, a representational form of politics and the logic of identity. By focussing on seemingly inconsequential fragments and transitory details, this article explores how the film self-referentially mobilizes a queer body and subjectivity at key moments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Context This conceptual paper tries to tackle the advantages and the limitations that might arise from including second-order science into global climate change sciences, a research area that traditionally focuses on first-order approaches and that is currently attracting a lot of media and public attention. Problem The high profile of climate change research seems to provoke a certain dilemma for scientists: despite the slowly increasing realization within the sciences that our knowledge is temporary, tentative, uncertain, and far from stable, the public expectations towards science and scientific knowledge are still the opposite: that scientific results should prove to be objective, reliable, and authoritative. As a way to handle the uncertainty, scientists tend to produce "varieties of scenarios" instead of clear statements, as well as reports that articulate different scientific opinions about the causes and dynamics of change (e.g., the IPCC). This might leave the impression of vague and indecisive results. As a result, esteem for the sciences seems to be decreasing within public perception. Method This paper applies second-order observation to climate change research in particular and the sciences in general. Results Within most sciences, it is still quite unusual to disclose and discuss the epistemological foundations of the respective research questions, methods and ways to interpret data, as research proceeds mainly from some version of realistic epistemological positions. A shift towards self-reflexive second-order science might offer possibilities for a return to a "less polarized" scientific and public debate on climate change because it points to knowledge that is in principle tentative, uncertain and fragmented as well as to the theory- and observation-dependence of scientific work. Implications The paper addresses the differences between first-order and second-order science as well as some challenges of science in general, which second-order science might address and disclose. Constructivist content Second-order science used as observation praxis (second-order observation) for this specific field of research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the authors' response to commentaries on their article on a second-order science of interdisciplinary research. They discuss some questions that reflect important common themes in the commentaries including the reason for starting in wicked problems and the nature of second-order research processes. They also justify the advantage of polyocular research as a framework for interdisciplinary work.

Context The problems that are most in need of interdisciplinary collaboration are "wicked problems," such as food crises, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development, with many relevant aspects, disagreement on what the problem is, and contradicting solutions. Such complex problems both require and challenge interdisciplinarity. Problem The conventional methods of interdisciplinary research fall short in the case of wicked problems because they remain first-order science. Our aim is to present workable methods and research designs for doing second-order science in domains where there are many different scientific knowledges on any complex problem. Method We synthesize and elaborate a framework for second-order science in interdisciplinary research based on a number of earlier publications, experiences from large interdisciplinary research projects, and a perspectivist theory of science. Results The second-order polyocular framework for interdisciplinary research is characterized by five principles. Second-order science of interdisciplinary research must: 1. draw on the observations of first-order perspectives, 2. address a shared dynamical object, 3. establish a shared problem, 4. rely on first-order perspectives to see themselves as perspectives, and 5. be based on other rules than first-order research. Implications The perspectivist insights of second-order science provide a new way of understanding interdisciplinary research that leads to new polyocular methods and research designs. It also points to more reflexive ways of dealing with scientific expertise in democratic processes. The main challenge is that this is a paradigmatic shift, which demands that the involved disciplines, at least to some degree, subscribe to a perspectivist view. Constructivist content Our perspectivist approach to science is based on the second-order cybernetics and systems theories of von Foerster, Maruyama, Maturana & Varela, and Luhmann, coupled with embodied theories of cognition and semiotics as a general theory of meaning from von Uexküll and Peirce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's response to commentaries on his article on the need for a new scientific method or a second-order science. He explains his position on the existence of several epistemologies and that constructivism is more versatile compared with the other epistemologies. He also discusses the four models used in science and supports the suggestion that second-order science will preserve the practical powers of current science.

The author argues that there is no need for a new scientific method or a second-order science and that the application of scientific theories may affect the systems they describe. He comments on the position of U.S. cybernetician Stuart Umpleby on rethinking and expanding the philosophy of science. He also suggests that knowledge about the world should not be considered as scientific knowledge.