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A biologically motivated individual-based framework for evolution in network-structured populations is developed that can accommodate eco-evolutionary dynamics. This framework is used to construct a network birth and death model. The evolutionary graph theory model, which considers evolutionary dynamics only, is derived as a special case, highlighting additional assumptions that diverge from real biological processes. This is achieved by introducing a negative ecological feedback loop that suppresses ecological dynamics by forcing births and deaths to be coupled. We also investigate how fitness, a measure of reproductive success used in evolutionary graph theory, is related to the life-history of individuals in terms of their birth and death rates. In simple networks, these ecologically motivated dynamics are used to provide new insight into the spread of adaptive mutations, both with and without clonal interference. For example, the star network, which is known to be an amplifier of selection in evolutionary graph theory, can inhibit the spread of adaptive mutations when individuals can die naturally.

The classical models of evolution have been developed to incorporate structured populations using evolutionary graph theory and, more recently, a new framework has been developed to allow for more flexible population structures which potentially change through time and can accommodate multiplayer games with variable group sizes. In this paper we extend this work in three key ways. Firstly by developing a complete set of evolutionary dynamics so that the range of dynamic processes used in classical evolutionary graph theory can be applied. Secondly, by building upon previous models to allow for a general subpopulation structure, where all subpopulation members have a common movement distribution. Subpopulations can have varying levels of stability, represented by the proportion of interactions occurring between subpopulation members; in our representation of the population all subpopulation members are represented by a single vertex. In conjunction with this we extend the important concept of temperature (the temperature of a vertex is the sum of all the weights coming into that vertex; generally, the higher the temperature, the higher the rate of turnover of individuals at a vertex). Finally, we have used these new developments to consider the evolution of cooperation in a class of populations which possess this subpopulation structure using a multiplayer public goods game. We show that cooperation can evolve providing that subpopulations are sufficiently stable, with the smaller the subpopulations the easier it is for cooperation to evolve. We introduce a new concept of temperature, namely “subgroup temperature”, which can be used to explain our results.

Evolution in finite populations is often modelled using the classical Moran process. Over the last 10 years, this methodology has been extended to structured populations using evolutionary graph theory. An important question in any such population is whether a rare mutant has a higher or lower chance of fixating (the fixation probability) than the Moran probability, i.e. that from the original Moran model, which represents an unstructured population. As evolutionary graph theory has developed, different ways of considering the interactions between individuals through a graph and an associated matrix of weights have been considered, as have a number of important dynamics. In this paper, we revisit the original paper on evolutionary graph theory in light of these extensions to consider these developments in an integrated way. In particular, we find general criteria for when an evolutionary graph with general weights satisfies the Moran probability for the set of six common evolutionary dynamics.

The modelling of evolution in structured populations has been significantly advanced by evolutionary graph theory, which incorporates pairwise relationships between individuals on a network. More recently, a new framework has been developed to allow for multi-player interactions of variable size in more flexible and potentially changing population structures. While the theory within this framework has been developed, and simple structures considered, there has been no systematic consideration of a large range of different population structures, which is the subject of this paper. We consider a large range of underlying graphical structures for the territorial raider model, the most commonly used model in the new structure, and consider a variety of important properties of our structures with the aim of finding factors that determine the fixation probability of mutants. We find that the graphical temperature and the average group size, as previously defined, are strong predictors of fixation probability, whilst all other properties considered are poor predictors, although the clustering coefficient is a useful secondary predictor when combined with either of temperature or group size. The relationship between temperature/average group size and fixation probability is sometimes, however, non-monotonic, with a directional reverse occurring around the temperature associated with what we term “completely mixed” populations in the case of the Hawk-Dove game, but not the Public Goods game.

We model a mobile population interacting over an underlying spatial structure using a Markov movement model. Interactions take the form of public goods games, and can feature an arbitrary group size. Individuals choose strategically to remain at their current location or to move to a neighbouring location, depending upon their exploration strategy and the current composition of their group. This builds upon previous work where the underlying structure was a complete graph (i.e. there was effectively no structure). Here, we consider alternative network structures and a wider variety of, mainly larger, populations. Previously, we had found when cooperation could evolve, depending upon the values of a range of population parameters. In our current work, we see that the complete graph considered before promotes stability, with populations of cooperators or defectors being relatively hard to replace. By contrast, the star graph promotes instability, and often neither type of population can resist replacement. We discuss potential reasons for this in terms of network topology.