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This article analyses the European Union's response to the threat of the 'returning foreign fighter' (referred to with increasing frequency as the 'foreign terrorist fighter'), arguing that it has been characterized by a move to (re)frame migration and border control as essential aspects of EU counter-terrorism policy. The article offers three important observations on the significance of this move. First, it critiques the way in which the EU's response to this problem is based upon and reinforces a narrow understanding of returning foreign fighters. Second, it argues that the EU has invoked the threat from returning foreign fighters not with the sole intention of preventing terrorism but rather as part of the ongoing securitization of migration and the EU border. Third, it suggests that the threat from returning foreign fighters has been invoked as a way of further legitimizing the EU's emerging role as a security actor and its embrace of preemptive security practice. The article argues throughout that the move to construct the returning foreign fighter issue in this way has important political and social implications for all categories of migrant, with migrant populations now deemed a potential source of terrorist threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This overview examines critically the post-9/11 empirical literature on terrorism. Major contributions by both economists and political scientists are included. We focus on five main themes: the changing nature of terrorism, the organization of terrorist groups, the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies, modern drivers or causes of terrorism, and the economic consequences of terrorism. In so doing, we investigate a host of questions that include: How do terrorist groups attract and retain members? What determines the survival of terrorist groups? Is poverty a root cause of terrorism? What counterterrorism measures work best? In the latter regard, we find that many counterterrorism policies have unintended negative consequences owing to attack transference and terrorist backlash. This suggests the need for novel policies such as service provision to counter some terrorist groups' efforts to provide such services. Despite terrorists' concerted efforts to damage targeted countries' economies, the empirical literature shows that terrorism has had little or no effect on economic growth or GDP except in small terrorism-plagued countries. At the sectoral level, terrorism can adversely affect tourism and foreign direct investment, but these effects are rather transient and create transference of activities to other sectors, thus cushioning the consequences. (JEL F21, F52, H56, K42, Z31) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminologists and terrorism specialists alike have conducted research on the deterrent effect of policies; however, to date, only criminologists have thoroughly examined the associated displacement of crime and diffusion of benefits. Using data from the Eco-Incidents Database, this study first examines the deterrent effect of government efforts targeting animal rights and environmental terrorism over several years. Next, it extends this application by examining nonterrorist actions by both terrorist groups and nonterrorist groups to see if deterrent actions have any unintended consequences. Results show no evidence of displacement, but rather that several government actions evidenced a diffusion of benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the need for the U.S. to differentiate the dangers in various countries in its fight against terrorism. Factors covered include the flaws of the U.S. approach of fighting terrorism everywhere and the War on Terrorism, priorities that the U.S. should consider regarding jihadists, and ways in which the U.S. level of counterterrorism should correspond to the real danger. Also mentioned are changes in assessing the risk of terrorism, the number of Americans killed by jihadists in the U.S. since September 11, 2001 through the end of 2016, and dangers posed in the Middle East and to the stability of U.S. allies by terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.

The collapse of Greece's premier terrorist organization, the 17 November (17N) group, back in the summer of 2002 was a truly dramatic event, considering 17N's 27-year career, but it was not such a watershed event in the country's history as it was presented at the time by the mainstream political and media establishments. 17N's dismantling and imprisonment, far from demoralizing and emasculating the armed struggle movement, led to the emergence of new urban guerrilla groups and the increase and intensification of revolutionary violence. This article reassesses Greece's persistent terrorism problem by focusing on the nature, threat, and operational evolution of a new generation of political militancy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the possibility of bringing terrorists to face trials in the U.S. courts focusing on the Palestine Liberation Organization and its attacks on Americans. Topics discussed include personal jurisdiction, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992, and the treatment of Supreme Court's decision in the Daimler AG v. Bauman case by the U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia and Southern District of New York.

The article focuses on the link between deterrence and counterterrorism policy in the U.S. Topics discussed include the role of former President George W. Bush for handling terrorist networks, strategies provided by military officials for deterrence and counterterrorism operations, and the importance of military investment.

So far there has been little substantive research about how individuals engaged in counterterrorism initiatives, whether as community members or police officers or other professionals, negotiate this challenging terrain. This article suggests that community-based approaches to counterterrorism rely on the careful construction of certain forms of community engagement, rather than an all-encompassing claim that “communities defeat terrorism.” This article explores this issue further through analyzing and exploring the role that connectors, rather than communities per se, may play in counterterrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the human rights of terrorist detainees in cases of indefinite detention in the U.S. Topics include the U.S. PATRIOT Act, the treatment of suspected terrorists by the U.S., and the balancing of national security with the humane treatment of prisoners. Information is provided on constitutional law in the U.S.

Today's world faces challenges and threats of unprecedented scope, scale and complexity. In recent decades, the world has seen many changes, not only because of the complexity of world matters, but also because of the entrance of non-state actors in world politics. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons are a threat to the health and well-being of the international community. Given the real threat of a large-scale CBRN attack, defense against these weapons is both an international security and public health issue. In recent years, the goals and actions of non-state terrorists have changed in a way that makes the use of CBRN weapons more within the realm of possibility, while technological advances have made the possibility of a CBRN attack more feasible than in decades and centuries past. Advances in science and technology have made the threat of a CBRN attack a distinct possibility. This paper seeks to provide an overview of terrorism as a whole, as well as a current and future assessment of nonstate actors and the use of CBRN weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at terrorism perpetrated under the auspices of Islamic fundamentalist organizations, as of 2013. It says that violent Islamic extremism represents a significant threat not only in the Middle East, but globally, citing actual or aborted crimes and terror attacks by Islamists in countries including Thailand, France, Canada, and Tanzania. It discusses the war in Syria, focusing on the Nusra Front, allied with the terrorist group al-Qaeda. It discusses U.S. counterterrorism and military policies under the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama. A sidebar offers data on Islamist crimes and terrorist attacks in Great Britain and the U.S.

Terrorists trained on European soil, but originating from the Middle East, attacked the world's only superpower on September 11, 2001. Countering this terrorist threat has become an increasingly significant part of European Foreign Policy. At the same time, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has become an increasingly important dimension of European Foreign Policy. This article examines the extent to which counterterrorism has occupied a prominent place in the ENP, with a particular focus on the Southern Mediterranean ENP partners. The findings of this article suggest that, despite the commonly held view in the literature that security issues, in particular terrorism, have dominated the ENP agenda, counterterrorism cooperation between the European Union (EU) and its Southern Mediterranean ENP partners has not advanced as much as might have been expected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act empowers the executive branch to designate organizations and individuals "Specially Designated Global Terrorists." Though IEEPA designation is used against both domestic and foreign entities, its consequences are most severe within the United States. The designee's assets are frozen and transacting with the designee becomes a federal felony. For an American organization, IEEPA designation is a death sentence. For an American individual, it amounts to house arrest. This Article analyzes IEEPA using the Mendoza-Martinez test for determining whether a purportedly civil statute imposes criminal punishment and concludes that IEEPA designation of U.S. persons violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by imposing criminal punishment without providing the required procedural protections. This Article offers a new framework for evaluating preventive counterterrorism policies and provides clarity to a notoriously unclear area of constitutional law--the jurisprudence of the civil-criminal divide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses terrorist plotting and extremism in Indonesia in 2010. Topics include counter-terrorism efforts of the Indonesian government, the discovery of a training camp for Islamic extremists in Aceh, police raids and arrests of leaders of the organizations, and the strength of jihadi groups such as the Jemaah lslamiyah in Indonesia.

The article discusses the increasing capabilities of transnational Islamist extremist terrorist networks, particularly the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), to organize and perform high-level and sophisticated intelligence operations globally against the U.S. and other Western countries in 2011. It highlights the need for the country's intelligence community to work collaboratively to prevent the lethal activities of these groups. It also explores the changes made by the country's government to its intelligence services to address terrorist threats and trace their leaders.

The article discusses anti-American terrorists who are also American citizens. The problems which such cases present for national security are cited, as they would enjoy free passage in and out of the U.S., and the legal rights which U.S. law grants to all criminal suspects. An overview of the history of American citizenship is presented, focusing on political conflicts, ethnic conflicts, and changes in citizenship law. Issues related to dual citizenship and immigration are addressed, and the legal principles involved in denationalizing a traitor are discussed.

The article introduces articles within the issue, including an article by Joseba Zulaika on past and current counterterrorism policies, an article by Bob de Graaf and Beatrice de Graaf on the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies and an article by Leena Makki on terrorism.

The U.S. strategy for combating international Islamist terrorists must be based on an understanding of the terrorists' behavior and the process of radicalization to violence. This process includes four dimensions: a sense of moral outrage, interpreted in a specific way, which resonates with one's personal experiences, and is channeled through group dynamics, both face-to-face and online. The threat has evolved over the past decade. The process of radicalization continues in a hostile physical environment, but it is enabled by the Internet, resulting in a disconnected, decentralized social structure. The threat of this "leaderless jihad" is self-limiting because of its confining structure and the lack of appeal of its utopian ideal. It will probably fade away for internal reasons, if not sustained by overly aggressive tactics construed as a "war on Islam." The appropriate strategy against this threat is to contain and neutralize the radicalization process along its four dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the "Global War on Terror" has succeeded in constricting al Qaeda's ability to operate, it has not eliminated the threat. Al Qaeda is stronger and more resilient than at any time since 2001 due to its ability to adapt, innovate, and reconfigure its resources in response to a hostile counterterrorism environment. This article presents a new framework for considering the war against al Qaeda. Policy makers must recognize that the current conflict is not a single conflict, but rather three conflicts: a war of action, a war of networks, and a war of ideas. Viewing al Qaeda in this manner will facilitate the integration of counterterrorism policy and strategy from the tactical to the strategic level. Furthermore, the failure to understand why al Qaeda has survived and prospered precludes the development and deployment of a cogent counterterrorism strategy. Finally, the authors present a set of policy recommendations structured around this framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like all other terrorist movements, al-Qaeda will end. While it has traits that exploit and reflect the current international context, it is not utterly without precedent: some aspects of al-Qaeda are unusual, but many are not. Terrorist groups end according to recognisable patterns that have persisted for centuries, and they reflect, among other factors, the counter-terrorist policies taken against them. It makes sense to formulate those policies with a specific image of an end in mind. Understanding how terrorism ends is the best way to avoid being manipulated by the tactic. There is vast historical experience with the decline and ending of terrorist campaigns, yet few policymakers are familiar with it. This paper first explains five typical strategies of terrorism and why Western thinkers fail to grasp them. It then describes historical patterns in ending terrorism to suggest how insights from that history can lay a foundation for more effective counter-strategies. Finally, it extracts policy prescriptions specifically relevant to ending the campaign of al-Qaeda and its associates, moving towards a post al-Qaeda world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like all other terrorist movements, al-Qaeda will end. While it has traits that exploit and reflect the current international context, it is not utterly without precedent: some aspects of al-Qaeda are unusual, but many are not. Terrorist groups end according to recognisable patterns that have persisted for centuries, and they reflect, among other factors, the counter-terrorist policies taken against them. It makes sense to formulate those policies with a specific image of an end in mind. Understanding how terrorism ends is the best way to avoid being manipulated by the tactic. There is vast historical experience with the decline and ending of terrorist campaigns, yet few policymakers are familiar with it. This paper first explains five typical strategies of terrorism and why Western thinkers fail to grasp them. It then describes historical patterns in ending terrorism to suggest how insights from that history can lay a foundation for more effective counter-strategies. Finally, it extracts policy prescriptions specifically relevant to ending the campaign of al-Qaeda and its associates, moving towards a post al-Qaeda world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like all other terrorist movements, al-Qaeda will end. While it has traits that exploit and reflect the current international context, it is not utterly without precedent: some aspects of al-Qaeda are unusual, but many are not. Terrorist groups end according to recognisable patterns that have persisted for centuries, and they reflect, among other factors, the counter-terrorist policies taken against them. It makes sense to formulate those policies with a specific image of an end in mind. Understanding how terrorism ends is the best way to avoid being manipulated by the tactic. There is vast historical experience with the decline and ending of terrorist campaigns, yet few policymakers are familiar with it. This paper first explains five typical strategies of terrorism and why Western thinkers fail to grasp them. It then describes historical patterns in ending terrorism to suggest how insights from that history can lay a foundation for more effective counter-strategies. Finally, it extracts policy prescriptions specifically relevant to ending the campaign of al-Qaeda and its associates, moving towards a post al-Qaeda world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like all other terrorist movements, al-Qaeda will end. While it has traits that exploit and reflect the current international context, it is not utterly without precedent: some aspects of al-Qaeda are unusual, but many are not. Terrorist groups end according to recognisable patterns that have persisted for centuries, and they reflect, among other factors, the counter-terrorist policies taken against them. It makes sense to formulate those policies with a specific image of an end in mind. Understanding how terrorism ends is the best way to avoid being manipulated by the tactic. There is vast historical experience with the decline and ending of terrorist campaigns, yet few policymakers are familiar with it. This paper first explains five typical strategies of terrorism and why Western thinkers fail to grasp them. It then describes historical patterns in ending terrorism to suggest how insights from that history can lay a foundation for more effective counter-strategies. Finally, it extracts policy prescriptions specifically relevant to ending the campaign of al-Qaeda and its associates, moving towards a post al-Qaeda world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000, the Israeli government has extensively employed a policy of assassinating members of Palestinian terrorist organizations. Theoretically, the net effect of an assassination on future terrorism is indeterminate because it embodies two conflicting effects: the assassination of a terrorist hurts his organization's capabilities, but may increase the motivation for future attacks. Our indirect, empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of assassinations for Isreali counterterrorism is based on Israeli stock market reactions to news of such operations. We rely on the fact that terrorism has had significant adverse effects on the Israeli economy and claim that the stock market should react positively to news about effective counterterrorism measures but negatively to news about counterproductive ones. We find that the market does not react to assassinations of low-ranked members of Palestinian terrorist organizations. The market does react strongly, however, to the assassinations of senior leaders of terrorist organizations: it declines following assassinations targeting senior political leaders but rises following assassinations of senior military leaders. To the extent that these reactions reflect expectations regarding future levels of terrorism they imply that the market perceives the first type of assassinations as counterproductive, but the second as an effective measure in combating terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a 1-year campaign launched by China in May 2014 to crack down on terrorism and uncover terrorist networks and extremist groups. Topics discussed include crackdown in Urumqi where armed personnel carriers and groups of uniformed soldiers with machine guns carry out patrols, the impact of China's crackdown on terrorists on different sectors of society and on Uighurs and the internationalization of Uighur militancy that led China to reassess its counter-terrorism strategy.

Like all other terrorist movements, al-Qaeda will end. While it has traits that exploit and reflect the current international context, it is not utterly without precedent: some aspects of al-Qaeda are unusual, but many are not. Terrorist groups end according to recognisable patterns that have persisted for centuries, and they reflect, among other factors, the counter-terrorist policies taken against them. It makes sense to formulate those policies with a specific image of an end in mind. Understanding how terrorism ends is the best way to avoid being manipulated by the tactic. There is vast historical experience with the decline and ending of terrorist campaigns, yet few policymakers are familiar with it. This paper first explains five typical strategies of terrorism and why Western thinkers fail to grasp them. It then describes historical patterns in ending terrorism to suggest how insights from that history can lay a foundation for more effective counter-strategies. Finally, it extracts policy prescriptions specifically relevant to ending the campaign of al-Qaeda and its associates, moving towards a post al-Qaeda world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]