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Although uniquely positioned to provide insight into the nature and dynamics of terrorism, overall the field of criminology has seen few empirically focused analyses of this form of political violence. This article seeks to add to the understanding of terror through an exploration of how general levels of violence within a given society influence the probability of political dissidents within that society resorting to terror as a form of political action. Drawing on the legitimation-habituation thesis, the authors explore whether general levels of legitimate and illegitimate violence within a society predict terrorist violence (both internal and external in direction) within that society. To do so, the authors use zero-inflated negative binomial regression models to perform time series cross-sectional analysis on predictors of terrorist events from the Global Terrorism Database. The authors find support for their core hypothesis and provide a discussion of the implications for the findings within their data and for future criminological research on terrorism. (Contains 12 notes, 5 tables, and 1 figure.)

We present two simulations designed to convey the strategic nature of terrorism and counterterrorism. The first is a simulated hostage crisis, designed primarily to illustrate the concepts of credible commitment and costly signaling. The second explores high-level decision making of both a terrorist group and the state, and is designed to highlight scarce-resource allocation and organizational dynamics. The simulations should be useful both in a traditional classroom setting as well as to the larger public. We provide a primer on the subject matter, and all the material necessary to run the simulations.

Democratic countries have long dealt with the challenge of terrorism. I discuss the challenges associated with how democracies can manage terrorist violence. I outline what terrorism is and is not and why this matters in understanding how to manage and mitigate terrorism's impacts on democratic countries. Next, I discuss terrorism in democracies like the United States and France and show the reasons why citizens should be concerned and practical in the ways our countries respond to terrorism. Importantly, I discuss the perceived existential threat of terrorism for democracy and argue why this largely overblown. Briefly, I outline the major reasons why scholars think terrorism occurs and how this should link to our policy responses. In the conclusion, I argue that counterterrorism strategies should directly follow from the reasons why we think terrorism happens and why I think this should be a central concern for analysts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding why and how individuals participate in militant organizations has been the focus of an increasing amount of scholarship. Traditionally, these studies focus at either the individual or organizational level of explanation. This article advances the discussion on individual participation in militant organizations by combining primary and secondary sources at both levels to explain how the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attracted individuals into its organization as either suicide bombers or frontline fighters. First, at the individual level, we analyze a primary source dataset of over 4,000 personnel files from foreign fighters who went to Syria to join ISIS between 2013 and 2014. Second, at the organizational level, we examine trends in Islamic State propaganda and messaging to see how the recruitment of individuals into the organization placed them on certain operational paths. Two specific takeaways emerge. First, foreign fighters in 2013–2014 volunteered to become suicide bombers with relatively less frequency than in past iterations of the conflict in Iraq and Syria. Second, fighters from Western countries and fighters from countries undergoing a civil war were especially less likely to volunteer for a suicide role. More broadly, this analytical essay makes a case for the value of looking inside an organization as well as at individuals to get a more complete picture about group-level behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are some locations more attractive targets for transnational terrorism than others? Remarkably little is known about the local-level conditions and attributes that determine precisely where transnational terror attacks occur within targeted countries. To date, quantitative terrorism research identifies country- or region-level correlates of terrorism, neglecting possible local factors. In this study, we posit five local-level factors that increase the likelihood of a terror attack: security of a target, accessibility, symbolism, material harm, and exclusion. Using a variety of estimation strategies, including multilevel, negative binomial, and propensity score matching models, we regress new sub-national geographically coded transnational terrorism data on various sub-national measures that might theoretically increase the likelihood of a terror attack. The results demonstrate that although country- and region-level factors matter, numerous local-level conditions, including where civil violence occurs, sub-national economic activity, and proximity to capitals and urban areas, are equally, if not more, important. The results help to substantiate the analytical benefits of adopting the sub-national level of analysis in the study of transnational terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do conciliatory and coercive counterinsurgency tactics affect militant group violence against civilians? Scholars of civil war increasingly seek to understand intentional civilian targeting, often referred to as terrorism. Extant research emphasizes group weakness, or general state attributes such as regime type. We focus on terrorism as violent communication and as a response to government actions. State tactics toward groups, carrots and sticks, should be important for explaining insurgent terror. We test the argument using new data on terrorism by insurgent groups, with many time-varying variables, covering 1998 through 2012. Results suggest government coercion against a group is associated with subsequent terrorism by that group. However, this is only the case for larger insurgent groups, which raises questions about the notion of terrorism as a weapon of the weak. Carrots are often negatively related to group terrorism. Other factors associated with insurgent terrorism include holding territory, ethnic motivation, and social service provision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the conceptual literature on terrorism, there is no shortage of answers to the question: "What is terrorism?" Indeed, the terrorism literature has been heavily criticized for a deluge of definitions. And yet the booming quantitative terrorism literature generally examines a narrow set of "what is terrorism?": how country-level factors explain variation in the number of terrorist attacks. This article demonstrates the variety of ways in which scholars currently operationalize terrorism and compares them to the ways it could be operationalized. I replicate studies using alternative operationalizations of terrorism to examine the consequences of the terrorism literature's collective bet to focus on attack counts at the country level. Finally, I discuss the implications of the narrow set of operational choices with an eye towards how a greater variety of approaches would produce a more robust research agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 9/11, entertainment media has focused on depictions of terrorism and counterterrorism. How do dramatic depictions of counterterrorism practices—specifically torture—affect public opinion and policy? Using a mixed within-subjects and between-subjects experimental design, we examine how framing affects support for torture. Participants (n = 150) were randomly assigned to a condition for dramatic depictions showing torture as (a) effective, (b) ineffective, or (c) not present (control). Participants who saw torture as effective increased their stated support for it. Participants who saw torture—regardless of whether or not it was effective—were more likely to sign a petition on torture. We discuss the policy implications of our findings on how framing affects opinion and action regarding torture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is committed for strategic reasons as a form of costly signaling to an audience. However, since over half of terrorist attacks are not credibly claimed, conventional wisdom does not explain many acts of terrorism. This article suggests that there are four lies about terrorism that can be incorporated in a rationalist framework: false claiming, false flag, the hot-potato problem, and the lie of omission. Each of these lies about terrorism can be strategically employed to help a group achieve its desired goal(s) without necessitating that an attack be truthfully claimed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine and test the logic that outbidding among insurgent groups results in more suicide terrorism specifically and more terrorism of any type, which has become a popular argument in recent years. A global analysis of terrorism from 1970–2004 provides scant support for the notion that outbidding increases suicide terrorism. An extension of the argument to all types of terrorist attacks provides even less support. The logic of outbidding has received considerable attention in academic and policy circles in recent years. Similar to the argument that democratic occupation increases suicide terror, our lack of empirical support suggests that considerable cross-national work is still needed to understand suicide terror adequately. We suggest some reasons why this may be the case, drawing particular attention to the problem of overgeneralizing from a limited set of cases. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Asal, Victor et al. (2012) Killing Civilians or Holding Territory? How to Think about Terrorism. International Studies Review, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2012.01127.x [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although uniquely positioned to provide insight into the nature and dynamics of terrorism, overall the field of criminology has seen few empirically focused analyses of this form of political violence. This article seeks to add to the understanding of terror through an exploration of how general levels of violence within a given society influence the probability of political dissidents within that society resorting to terror as a form of political action. Drawing on the legitimation–habituation thesis, the authors explore whether general levels of legitimate and illegitimate violence within a society predict terrorist violence (both internal and external in direction) within that society. To do so, the authors use zero-inflated negative binomial regression models to perform time series cross-sectional analysis on predictors of terrorist events from the Global Terrorism Database. The authors find support for their core hypothesis and provide a discussion of the implications for the findings within their data and for future criminological research on terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]