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Copyright of Studies in Law & Economics / Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne is the property of Lodz Scientific Society / Lodzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Purpose – The purpose of the paper was to examine the challenges inherent in harnessing the UN and other AML counter-measures, paying particular attention to the United Nations Resolutions on countering financing of terrorism and why the UN Security Resolutions have not been easy to invoke. As regards other AML counter-measures, the paper examined the legal status of soft law instruments, articulating the possible reasons why they are easy to implement. Design/methodology/approach – The paper was written by the analysis of UN and other AML counter-measures – which were evaluated in the gaze of how they have been implemented across states. While states are under an obligation to implement UN AML counter-measures such as international treaties and soft law instruments, private banks as non-state actors have exploited some loopholes in the law to flaunt them. This has undermined the efficacy of global AML counter-measures. Many banks have been fined for violating UN sanctions on countries like Iran and Sudan. These examples were utilized in appraising the current UN and other AML counter-measures across states. Findings – The findings of the paper were compelling in demonstrating that global anti-money laundering laws are often emasculated by the fact that they are implemented in the realm of international law. International law manifests itself within independent member states' vested strategic self-interests. In the event of conflicts, national self-interests will prevail. But again, money laundering is an opportunistic crime because it generates both synergies and externalities and the response of individual states often depends on how it is affected by it. It is wrong to assume as doing things in the realm of international law is not as easy as it is presumed to be. Research limitations/implications – It would have been better to carry out interviews so as to corroborate secondary data sources used in writing this paper. But due to some constraints, this option was not possible. It would also have been better to undertake the analysis of data based on a large sample of countries rather than cherry picking. While implementing AML counter-measures in the realm of international law is necessary to foster international co-operation, there are still some loopholes that need to be paid more attention. Originality/value – The paper was written, analysed and evaluated based on the most recent literature on implementation of UN and other AML counter-measures across countries. It also utilized the recent cases involving violations of UN AML counter-measures by banks on sanctioned countries such as Iran and Sudan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explain the incompatibility of anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) measures as a hasty over-reaction after 9/11, focusing on the compliance burdens that this imposes on the regulated sector, most notably financial institutions. Design/methodology/approach – This paper explains the fundamental differences between money laundering and terrorist financing. It follows the evolution of the marriage between AML and CTF measures in the USA and the UK, comparing the pre and post-9/11 phases. Consequently, the specific legal burdens placed on financial institutions as a result of this marriage are discussed. Findings – The paper, while recognising the importance of targeting terrorist money, contends that inherent differences exist between money laundering and terrorist financing, and fusing them together is a hasty reaction to the 9/11 attacks. It argues that the need of the hour is to focus on terrorist profiling, rather than attempting to target terrorist financing through the AML regime. It also concludes that financial institutions are unfairly burdened with the task of "suspecting" terrorist funds, while receiving little or no guidance in this respect. Originality/value – This paper is of value to governments, regulators, and financial institutions considering the effective implementation of the AML-CTF regime in the UK and the USA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to measure the size of the money laundering and terrorism financing problem, identify threats and trends, the techniques employed and the amount of funds involved to determine whether the information obtained about money laundering and terrorism financing in real-world environments can be transferred to virtual environments such as Second Life and World of Warcraft. Design/methodology/approach – Analysis of 184 Typologies obtained from a number of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) bodies to: determine whether trends and/or patterns can be identified in the different phases of money laundering or terrorism financing, namely, the placement, layering and integration phases; and to establish whether trends and/or behaviours are ubiquitous to a particular money laundering or terrorism financing Type. Findings – Money launderers and terrorism financers appeared to have slightly different preferences for the placement, layering and integration techniques. The more techniques that are used, the more cash can be successfully laundered or concealed. Although terrorism financers use similar channels to money launderers, they do not utilise as many of the placement, layering and integration techniques. Rather, they prefer to use a few techniques which maintain high levels of anonymity and appear innocuous. The sums of monies involved in money laundering and terrorism financing vary significantly. For example, the average maximum sum involved in money laundering cases was AUD 68.5M, as compared to AUD 4.8 for terrorism financing cases. Originality/value – This paper provides some insight into the relationship between predicate offence, the predominant techniques utilised in carrying out that offence and the sums of money involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents research on international cooperation on counterterrorism initiated by the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). Arrest information and information on use of Interpol counterterrorism resources by member countries of the organization are examined to determine counter factual benefit measurements used to compute cost-benefit ratios of Interpol counterterrorism spending. It is found that Interpol generates a return of approximately $200 for each dollar spent on counterterrorism. The return from Interpol's Stolen & Lost Travel Document database is considered.

Efforts to prevent and preempt further terrorist attacks in the United States and other developed countries have intruded into many spheres of public and private life. This article provides a short assessment of the redeployment of anti-money laundering regimes to combat the financing of terrorism. This expansion of financial surveillance is directed by international organizations and domestic legislation in the belief that terrorists and their financiers may be found, identified and detained. After providing background to the anti-money laundering regime, the article looks at the domestic and extraterritorial application of the USA PATRIOT Act. One conclusion of this analysis finds that a financial panopticon has coalesced out of the wide range of financial and non-financial businesses now required to report “suspicious financial activity.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2004, the Government Accountability Office reported that in the context of homeland security and disaster management, regional organization is an effective way to improve intergovernmental cooperation and preparedness at the local level. In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security began including risk (vulnerability) calculations in its funding formulas and adopted a regional approach to the distribution of funds to major metropolitan areas. Despite regionalism's theoretical appeal and its popularity as an organizational structure, what makes regionalism work in the context of emergency management/homeland security has not been methodically examined at the first responder level. Our study of local governments in Florida empirically tests the relationship between perceived vulnerabilities (risks) and the effectiveness of regional emergency management organizational structures. We find that certain types of local vulnerabilities, such as population attributes and infrastructure, are more powerful promoters of proregionalism sentiments than others, most notably financial condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This comparative study of ten nations in Southeast Asia demonstrates how terrorist groups in the region finance their activities and how governments combat terrorism financing. It demonstrates that area countries converge on norm acceptance measured as the spread of the international norms and practices and their transformation into national law. Norm acceptance, however, does not cause adherence and application of norms. Differences in scope, pace, and success of implementation and effectiveness of new rules between countries are related to the preferences and calculations of policymakers; the institutional capacity of political systems to produce policy changes; administrative and law enforcement capacities, and characteristics of the financial systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]