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In their work on the black-market economy in the 21st century, Gilman, Goldhammer, and Weber explore the topic of “deviant globalization,” which analyzes the dark side of global trade. Their description includes the illicit flows, black markets, and trafficking in drugs and human bodies that are as much a part of the new world disorder as multinational corporations and instant financial transfers. This article will look at one specific element of deviant globalization: the diaspora flows resulting from the collapse of a transnational insurgent organization. This article seeks to answer three important questions: First, what is the terrorist diaspora? Second, what are the implications of this diaspora, or more precisely, what is the threat posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters? And finally, what can the United States do to mitigate the threat posed by foreign fighters fleeing the battlefields in Iraq and Syria? The term “terrorist diaspora,” as currently used, more accurately describes foreign fighters who traveled from more than eighty different countries to fight with militant groups in Iraq and Syria, but have moved on, or soon will move on, to other countries. While some of these fighters might go on to provide support to Salafi-jihadist insurgencies, the part of the terrorist diaspora we are most concerned with are the foreign fighters who will move on from Syria and Iraq to participate in other civil wars or organize terrorist cells that plot to attack the West.

To date, much of the literature on the financing of terrorism and insurgency has focused at the macro-level on groups involved in financing their organizations through involvement in the drug trade. This paper discusses some of those implications, but argues that to better understand the threat faced by the new generation of jihadists in the West, security forces and intelligence services must also look at the micro-level of how lower level trafficking, drug dealing and petty criminal activity, combined with prison radicalization and ties to the black market and illicit underworld, combine to present a new spin on a longstanding threat. To be sure, the micro-level is even more difficult to counter, given already poor community-police cooperation and relations in the marginalized communities throughout the West. Further, the threat from drug trafficking at the micro-level can be equally as nefarious, as smaller cells are given greater autonomy to finance plots, recruit new members and ultimately conduct attacks in developed democracies. The paper concludes with some policy recommendations geared toward helping host-nations build capacity in critical areas, including law enforcement and intelligence, from the local to the state to the federal level. Disclaimer The analysis and opinions contained in this article are those of the author solely and do not represent the analysis and opinions of The RAND Corporation or any of the other institutions or organizations he is affiliated with. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss3/2

Testimony presented before the House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Illicit Finance on September 7, 2018.

Testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States on July 13, 2017.

These video conference proceedings present panel discussions from a daylong conference on the evolving terrorist threat, which took place on June 27, 2017, in the Washington office of the RAND Corporation. RAND researchers Seth Jones, Colin Clarke, Lynn Davis, Ben Connable, Andrew Hoehn, Jack Riley, and Linda Robinson, along with experts from the larger national security community discuss the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), al-Qa'ida, and other terrorist groups.

Document submitted August 11, 2017, as an addendum to testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States on July 13, 2017.

Narcotics have long been one of the most valuable illicit markets, and government efforts to stem both their supply and demand face on-going challenges. This chapter describes the global distribution of major illegal narcotics from source to destination with a focus on heroin and cocaine routes. It explains how traffickers seek out states with weak administrative structures, law enforcement and customs as it is less costly to move illegal wares through states that suffer from weak institutions and a significant informal economy. The links to such areas has grown with the spread of globalisation, and collaboration between criminal enterprises to terrorist organisation has become more prominent. The author concludes that State building and enhancement of good governance practices are key complements to punitive approaches and sanctions.