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The impact of the regional universal telecommunication service policy on telephone access as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy in providing telephone service for low-income households at the state level were investigated. The study covers the period 1984-1996 and was designed to determine whether the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has been successful in eliminating barriers to competition. Empirical results showed that there was a significant increase in the number of households with telephone at the state level even as inefficiencies in service were still evident.

The experience of the telecommunications industry at the state level following the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act provides some important lessons for policy makers worldwide. An analysis of the US model of telecommunications policy in California, Texas and Michigan showed an ongoing quest to render the state and federal levels of regulation mutually consistent. Furthermore, the telecommunications policy is influenced by the existing economic, political and social structures of territories where it is implemented.

The imminent technological convergence between the telecommunication and media sectors has raised the issue regarding the construction of a regulatory framework that promotes growth in both sectors, assures market competition and provides consumers and the public with sufficient protection from market failure. Increased competition in the information market is expected to shape this regulatory framework to be an appropriate one.

After overall entry deregulation, regulation of market power can only be justified in local telecommunication networks as long as they constitute monopolistic bottlenecks. Technical progress leads to a gradual disappearance of monopolistic bottlenecks, pointing out the large potential for economically efficient phasing out of sector-specific regulation. In contrast, all forms of asymmetric regulation containing an intrinsic bias towards some firms or technologies have a strong tendency towards overregulation. The new telecommunications laws in Germany and Switzerland are shown to be prominent examples of asymmetric regulatory frameworks. Since the new telecommunications law in Switzerland is less restrictive and more transparent than its German counterpart, it seems to be more suitable to tackle the potential for phasing out sector specific regulation in telecommunications.

Very highly priced telecommunications capacity and insufficient competitiveness in pricing structures are proving a barrier to the expansion of Internet services, especially in many parts of Europe. Users must accepted limited choices in the pricing options available, and service providers are prevented from expanding and configuring networks. However, the Internet has the potential to undermine traditional telecommunications pricing structures, and it is vital to adopt forward-looking policies on telecommunications regulation. Competition in local access is also important.

The proposed breakup of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp (NTT) into three separate companies will significantly change Japan's telecommunications standards strategy. It will eliminate virtual monopsony in the telecommunications equipment market and stem Japanese standards research activities which are mostly spearheaded by NTT laboratories. The breakup will also enhance the role of Japan's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications in the standards-setting process.

Short and long-range issues should be considered in the development of an agenda for Japanese telecommunications. The issue of whether Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp should be broken-up and divested should be de-emphasized in favor of more important concerns. Focus should also be given to the promotion of competition among local access and other telecommunications markets.

Japan has maintained an ineffective telecommunications reform policy for over 10 years. The policy remains focused on enhancing the benefits of telecommunications customers instead of the development of the industry. The reform policy has also failed to promote competition in Japan's telecommunications markets. The failure is attributed to the increased protection the policy provides new market entrants.

By the end of this century, the telecommunications market in the European Union will have been transformed o a collection of national monopolies providing little apart from basic voice telephony and Value-Added Network Services (VANS) into a unified, competitive market for multimedia services - or at least that is the intention behind a series of directives issued by the European Commission. This should open up enormous opportunities for service providers, whatever their origin, and the process of forming the necessary alliances for world-wide coverage has begun in earnest. A first step, in many cases, is the privatization of the national monopoly provider. New forms of competition such as cable and mobile telephony are springing up with unprecedented speed - so fast, indeed, that the consumer is being left in the wake of the technology., The European telecommunications market is comprised of national monopolies that provide little more than voice telephony and value-added network services such as fax and e-mail. The EU has issued a series of directives aimed at breaking up these monopolies through privatization to establish a competitive multimedia services market. The UK is leading in telecommunications reform while Germany, France, Belgium and Italy are still resisting such efforts. Alliances are already being formed to enter the market for mobile telephony and multimedia services.

Information on the public domain can possibly be used as basis for predicting the alterate service market in Pittsburg, PA. With an excess of $78M every year, the market includes revenues for termination of switched access and local leased services as well as special access services which hold nearly 1/3 of the total. The use of these data go against the 1934 Communications act although policy makers should study the uses of these data before actions limiting the reporting requirements of availability of these reports are made.