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The break-up of the Soviet Union resulted in many formerly centrally planned and highly controlled economies to experience radical reforms that fully changed the business landscape. With these political and economic changes, many businesses and organizations in transition economies not only experienced major restructuring, but also acquired increased access to modern information technology (IT). Though much of the development in transition economies is supported by IT, there is not much published research dealing with the role of IT specifically in transition economies. The objective of this special issue is to stimulate research in this important area. In the introduction to this special issue, distinctive business and social conditions in transition economies, and the potential impacts of such conditions on IT use, as well as factors which may inhibit research of IT in transition economies are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a history and criticism of the Marxist school of sociology and examines the opinions of sociologist Karl Marx regarding technological innovation. Details are provided about the way innovations and capitalism were treated by Marx and by his successors, such as N. D. Kondratieff and Leon Trotsky. A cyclical model for innovation is presented and innovation is linked to capitalism. The Soviet Union is also provided as an example of the conflict between socialism and industrialization and innovation.

The article discuses the concepts of left wing opposition spokesman Evgeni Preobrazhenski regarding industrialization of Soviet Union. Referring to the famous "goods famine" of 1925, Preobrazhenski says that it was an accentuated expression of deep-seated maladjustments in the structure of the Soviet economy. In his view, the shortages of the present were, to a large extent, the results of the enforced prodigality of the past. to reveal themselves. While the possibility of securing output increases by more intensive utilization of available equipment was diminishing as capacity limits were approached, the deterioration of equipment was progressing. The situation as Preobrazhenski saw it, however, called for something much more far-reaching. This was due in part to the fact that such a complete renewal of equipment provided the best opportunity for a wide-scale application of the technological improvements which had accumulated in previous years and which he viewed as uniformly capital-using.

Early industrial development in Soviet Union means its development during the period of the first two Five Year Plans-is commonly acknowledged to have been extremely rapid by international standards. As such, it inevitably exerts a strong attraction on the governments of underdeveloped nations. There is a natural interest in seeing what lessons can be learned from it. This paper concentrates on one such lesson. In trying to explain this rapid rate of development, three different lines of explanation have been pushed by various Western scholars. The main explanation given is the high proportion of national income set aside for investment, and the fact that such investment was directed primarily into the expansion of directly-productive rather than social capital. This investment was accompanied by a large influx of labor into industry and construction, since this labor force was more pushed out of agriculture than pulled into industry, such relocation of human resources did not interfere with a program of restricting consumption to the advantage of investment.