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We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral obligation together only if they each have (i) a contextspecific capacity to view their situation from the group's perspective, and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective, in that it does not imply that the individuals have any obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight various distinctive features of our account. One such feature is that moral obligations are always relative to an agential perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyses behaviour in non‐zero‐sum finite multi‐stage games, particularly the Centipede Game. The classical Nash Equilibrium fails to explain empirical behaviour and intuitive logic and has therefore been challenged. This paper introduces the 'Pure Collective Equilibrium', or PCE, which describes the equilibrium reached when agents assess their utility not by their own payoffs but by the mean collective payoff of the team, as outlined by some team‐reasoning hypotheses. Classical behaviour and purely collective team reasoning then both represent special cases—the first in which agents and their counterparts are on the Nash Equilibrium path, and the second in which agents and their counterparts are purely collective team reasoners. It is argued that agents intentionally and consistently deviate from classical rationality in the Centipede Game, even in the absence of philanthropic altruists or error‐plagued populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article in this journal, Duijf claims to have proved that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation. His formalization mimics team reasoning but ignores its essential agency switch. The possibility of such a payoff transformation was never in doubt, does not imply that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation, and makes no sense in a game in which payoffs represent players' utilities. A theorem is proved here that a simpler and more intuitive payoff transformation can mimic any theory that predicts what strategies players will choose in a well-defined game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theory of collective mind involves the individual's representation of a shared mental perspective, wherein the self and other converge in their experience. It is a mental representation of collective awareness of a common world and/or a common mind. Information that is encoded in relation to a collective mind is psychologically amplified and prioritized in individual cognition. Representing oneself as part of a collective mind strengthens relational bonds and increases cooperation, especially when it functions as both the origin and target of a representation. Theory of mind research has traditionally focused on the ascription of mental states to a single individual. Here, we introduce a theory of collective mind: the ascription of a unified mental state to a group of agents with convergent experiences. Rather than differentiation between one's personal perspective and that of another agent, a theory of collective mind requires perspectival unification across agents. We review recent scholarship across the cognitive sciences concerning the conceptual foundations of collective mind representations and their empirical induction through the synchronous arrival of shared information. Research suggests that representations of a collective mind cause psychological amplification of co-attended stimuli, create relational bonds, and increase cooperation, among co-attendees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on a kind of reasoning in which the members of a group with a goal of its own may engage, herein referred to as "real team reasoning." Starting with four challenging observations on what is, and is not, involved in acting together towards a group or collective goal, an account of a collective goal that accords with these observations is offered. This account appeals to a joint commitment of the parties, understood as is explained. Several virtues of the account are noted, and it is defended against a methodological objection privileging theoretical parsimony by reference in part to the need to invoke joint commitment in other contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of the evolutionary stability of team reasoning has been answered in multiple, even opposing ways. We provide a general, conceptual categorization of these existing answers along four dimensions: (1) the unit of selection, (2) the notion of fitness for team reasoners, (3) the stage of decision-making, and (4) the ludic ecology. Beyond affording a better assessment of the different modeling choices underlying the existing results, the categorization highlights important conceptual questions for the evolutionary foundations of team reasoning. We illustrate this by looking in more detail into what should count as fitness for team reasoners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the conditions under which cooperative team reasoning arises and stabilizes in complex social structures. Team reasoning is a theory that explains cooperative behavior in social settings of strategic choice, even in situations where classical game theory fails. By simulating the emergence of cooperation via team reasoning, this paper analyzes the performance of team reasoners compared to classically rational agents and individual reasoners. Simulation results are provided regarding the efficacy of team reasoning in mixed-game settings. It is shown that cooperative team reasoning is viable and stabilizing under favorable conditions such as the share of coordination games played, but sensitive to the amount and abilities of their interacting counterparts. Finally, the paper provides first ideas on how the current framework might be extended toward collective actors that gain further stability through processes of self-formalization and inner-organizational redistribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the implications of a Civil Economy approach to consumer ethics, by addressing the idea that Antonio Genovesi's (1713–1769) notion of mutual assistance can be understood in terms of collective intentionality or team reasoning. I try to give reasons for this idea by a careful examination of Genovesi's conception of social life and human agency and by reading it through the lens of team reasoning. I argue that this understanding of mutual assistance may imply broad constraints over agents' choices whenever they conflict with the good of society. Then I explore the implications of a mutual assistance approach to market ethics in a global society, where conflicting views of good and different group affiliations are possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Games of pure mutual interest require players to coordinate their choices without being able to communicate. One way to achieve this is through team-reasoning, asking ‘what should we choose’, rather than just assessing one’s own options from an individual perspective. It has been suggested that team-reasoning is more likely when individuals are encouraged to think of those they are attempting to coordinate with as members of an in-group. In two studies, we examined the effects of group identity, measured by the ‘Inclusion of Other in Self’ (IOS) scale, on performance in nondescript coordination games, where there are several equilibria but no descriptions that a player can use to distinguish any one strategy from the others apart from the payoff from coordinating on it. In an online experiment, our manipulation of group identity did not have the expected effect, but we found a correlation of .18 between IOS and team-reasoning-consistent choosing. Similarly, in self-reported strategies, those who reported trying to pick an option that stood out (making it easier to coordinate on) also reported higher IOS scores than did those who said they tended to choose the option with the largest potential payoff. In a follow-up study in the lab, participants played either with friends or with strangers. Experiment 2 replicated the relationship between IOS and team-reasoning in strangers but not in friends. Instead, friends’ behavior was related to their expectations of what their partners would do. A hierarchical cluster analysis showed that 46.4% of strangers played a team reasoning strategy, compared to 20.6% of friends. We suggest that the strangers who group identify may have been team reasoning but friends may have tried to use their superior knowledge of their partners to try to predict their strategy.

Sometimes we make a decision about an action we will undertake later and form an intention, but our judgment of what it is best to do undergoes a temporary shift when the time for action comes round. What makes it rational not to give in to temptation? Many contemporary solutions privilege diachronic rationality; in some "rational non‐reconsideration" (RNR) accounts once the agent forms an intention, it is rational not to reconsider. This leads to other puzzles: how can someone be motivated to follow a plan that is contrary to their current judgment? How can it be rational to form a plan to resist if we can predict that our judgment will shift? I show how these puzzles can be solved in a framework where there are multiple units of agency, distinguishing between the judgments of the timeslice and those of the person over time, and allowing that the timeslice can "self identify", taking the person over time as the relevant unit of agency and doing intrapersonal team reasoning (with a different causal role for intentions than RNR accounts). On my account, resisting temptation is compatible with synchronic rationality, so synchronic and diachronic rationality are aligned. However, either resisting or succumbing to temptation can be instrumentally rational, depending on the unit of agency that is identified with. In order to show why we ought to resist temptation, we need to draw on a non‐instrumental rationale. I sketch possible routes for doing this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Meta-representation does not always facilitate social interaction. We illustrate this claim focusing on the case of coordination, and conjecture that people coordinate using a mode of reasoning that does not require the representation of others' beliefs. We compare this sort of belief-less reasoning with theories that appeal to limited meta-representation, and present evidence indicating that people employ both – with meta-representation being used less frequently in coordinative than in competitive tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Team reasoning is the idea that we can think as a ‘we’ and this can solve some coordination dilemmas, such as Hi-Lo. However, team reasoning can only solve the dilemmas it is intended to solve if the conditions for team reasoning warrant the belief that others will also perform team reasoning and these conditions cannot render team reasoning otiose. In this paper, I will supplement the theory of team reasoning by explaining how agency transformation also involves a change in the normative attitude. To do this, I will use the theory of affordances, which is the idea that the environment provides ways to interact with it. I will argue that when a person perceives as a group member, she associates herself and the other members with the group’s mosaic of affordances. This triggers a feeling of joint ownership of the agency. It is the feeling that it is up to us to deal with the situation, so we feel entitled to demand each other to cooperate. It warrants the belief that others are team-reasoners without rendering team reasoning otiose. This means that the agency transformation (from I to we) involves a change in the normative attitude.

Games of pure mutual interest require players to coordinate their choices without being able to communicate. One way to achieve this is through team-reasoning, asking 'what should we choose', rather than just assessing one's own options from an individual perspective. It has been suggested that team-reasoning is more likely when individuals are encouraged to think of those they are attempting to coordinate with as members of an in-group. In two studies, we examined the effects of group identity, measured by the 'Inclusion of Other in Self' (IOS) scale, on performance in nondescript coordination games, where there are several equilibria but no descriptions that a player can use to distinguish any one strategy fromthe others apart fromthe payoff from coordinating on it. In an online experiment, our manipulation of group identity did not have the expected effect, but we found a correlation of .18 between IOS and team-reasoning-consistent choosing. Similarly, in self-reported strategies, those who reported trying to pick an option that stood out (making it easier to coordinate on) also reported higher IOS scores than did those who said they tended to choose the option with the largest potential payoff. In a follow-up study in the lab, participants played either with friends or with strangers. Experiment 2 replicated the relationship between IOS and team-reasoning in strangers but not in friends. Instead, friends' behavior was related to their expectations of what their partners would do. A hierarchical cluster analysis showed that 46.4% of strangers played a team reasoning strategy, compared to 20.6% of friends. We suggest that the strangers who group identify may have been team reasoning but friends may have tried to use their superior knowledge of their partners to try to predict their strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In ordinary discourse, a single duty is often attributed to a plurality of agents. In Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals, Stephanie Collins claims that such attributions involve a “category error”. I critically discuss Collins’ argument for this claim and argue that there is a substantive sense in which non-agential groups can have moral duties. A plurality of agents can have a single duty to bring about an outcome by virtue of a capacity of each to practically reason about what they ought to do together. I also argue that Collins’ attempt to give a reductive account of such “we-reasoning” fails.

People often use norms to coordinate behavior andaccomplish shared goals. But how do people learn andrepresent norms? Here, we formalize the process by whichcollaborating individuals (1) reason about group plans duringinteraction, and (2) use task features to abstractly representnorms. In Experiment 1, we test the assumptions of our modelin a gridworld that requires coordination and contrast it with a“best response” model. In Experiment 2, we use our model totest whether group members’ joint planning relies more onstate features independent of other agents (landmark-basedfeatures) or state features determined by the configuration ofagents (agent-relative features).

Against the orthodox view of the Nash equilibrium as "the embodiment of the idea that economic agents are rational" (Aumann, 1985, p 43), some theorists have proposed 'non-classical' concepts of rationality in games, arguing that rational agents should be capable of improving upon inefficient equilibrium outcomes. This paper considers some implications of these proposals for economic theory, by focusing on institutional design. I argue that revisionist concepts of rationality conflict with the constraint that institutions should be designed to be incentive-compatible, that is, that they should implement social goals in equilibrium. To resolve this conflict, proponents of revisionist concepts face a choice between three options: (1) reject incentive compatibility as a general constraint, (2) deny that individuals interacting through the designed institutions are rational, or (3) accept that their concepts do not cover institutional design. I critically discuss these options and I argue that a more inclusive concept of rationality, e.g. the one provided by Robert Sugden's version of team reasoning, holds the most promise for the non-classical project, yielding a novel argument for incentive compatibility as a general constraint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines two strands of literature regarding economic models of cooperation. First, payoff transformation theories assume that people may not be exclusively motivated by self-interest, but also care about equality and fairness. Second, team reasoning theorists assume that people might reason from the perspective of the team, rather than an individualistic perspective. Can these two theories be unified? In contrast to the consensus among team reasoning theorists, I argue that team reasoning can be viewed as a particular type of payoff transformation. However, I also demonstrate that many payoff transformations yield actions that team reasoning rules out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In ordinary discourse, a single duty is often attributed to a plurality of agents. In Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals, Stephanie Collins claims that such attributions involve a “category error”. I critically discuss Collins’ argument for this claim and argue that there is a substantive sense in which non-agential groups can have moral duties. A plurality of agents can have a single duty to bring about an outcome by virtue of a capacity of each to practically reason about what they ought to do together. I also argue that Collins’ attempt to give a reductive account of such “we-reasoning” fails.

Intuitively, even very young children can act jointly. For instance, a child and her parent can build a simple tower together. According to developmental psychologists, young children develop theory of mind by, among other things, participating in joint actions like this. Yet many leading philosophical accounts of joint action presuppose that participants have a robust theory of mind. In this article, I examine two philosophical accounts of joint action designed to circumvent this presupposition, and then I proffer my own novel account of what makes (at least some) interactions between very young children and others joint. I argue that children can take up without deliberation intentions with a joint content that have been transmitted to them by others. In doing so, children can come to share intentions with others, and by acting on these shared intentions they can come to act jointly, all without employing a robust theory of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of himself or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action of which they would be parts. This latter version of the move manages to capture the cooperative character of joint intentional cooperative action, and does this without requiring of participants that they act on higher‐order interlocking intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a critical reconstruction of Sugden's intellectual itinerary with respect to his theory of team reasoning, starting from the beginning of his reflection in the early 1980s to his latest contributions in 2015. My reconstruction follows both a historical and an interpretative approach to show the continuity of different lines of thought, developed in different moments, notwithstanding the changes in the aims and scope of the theory from one period to another. I divide the evolution of Sugden's team reasoning into four main stages. The first includes some works prior to 1993, and the second is from 1993 to 2000. The third and fourth stages are from 2001 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2015, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such mutualistic cooperation is rational. They propose that teams can be agents and that individuals in teams can adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning that enables them to do their part in achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes. We show that it can be rational to play payoff-dominant outcomes, given that an agent group identifies. We compare team reasoning to other theories that have been proposed to explain how people can achieve payoff-dominant outcomes, especially with respect to rationality. Some authors have hoped that it would be possible to develop an argument that it is rational to group identify. We identify some large—probably insuperable—problems with this project and sketch some more promising approaches, whereby the normativity of group identification rests on morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing approaches to data envelopment analysis focus mainly on the derivation of the efficiency of the individual decision‐making unit (DMU) or on the calculation of the weights of multiple inputs or outputs, but pay little attention to the team interest of all the DMUs. Motivated by the idea of team reasoning, in which the benefit of the team is of higher importance than that of each individual, this paper considers all the DMUs as a team and introduces the team indexes including the overall efficiencies, variance, boundaries of all the DMUs, and relationships between DMUs. Several models are first developed to estimate values of the team indexes based on which decision makers can provide their preferences regarding them. Then, models are established to obtain the interval efficiencies of individual DMUs under the condition that the team indexes are satisfied. Several examples are given to illustrate the proposed approaches and verify their applicability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two alternative modes of reasoning in coordination games are prominently discussed in the literature: level- k thinking and team reasoning. In order to differentiate between the two modes of reasoning, we experimentally investigate payoff-asymmetric coordination games using an intra-group communication design that incentivizes subjects to explain the reasoning behind their decisions. We find that the reasoning process is significantly different between games. In payoff-symmetric games, team reasoning plays an important role for coordination. In payoff-asymmetric games, level- k reasoning results in frequent miscoordination. Our study clearly illustrates how small differences between strategic situations have a strong influence on reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his book, Understanding Institutions, Francesco Guala discusses two solutions to the problem of mindreading for coordination, the solution thinking approach proposed by Adam Morton and the team reasoning approach developed by Michael Bacharach, Robert Sugden, and Natalie Gold. I argue that the family resemblance between the two approaches is even stronger than Guala thinks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a concept of intentional cooperation for mutual benefit. This concept uses a form of team reasoning in which team members aim to achieve common interests, rather than maximising a common utility function, and in which team reasoners can coordinate their behaviour by following pre-existing practices. I argue that a market transaction can express intentions for mutually beneficial cooperation even if, extensionally, participation in the transaction promotes each party’s self-interest.

In many everyday activities, individuals have a common interest in coordinating their actions. Orthodox game theory cannot explain such intuitively obvious forms of coordination as the selection of an outcome that is best for all in a common-interest game. Theories of team reasoning provide a convincing solution by proposing that people are sometimes motivated to maximize the collective payoff of a group and that they adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning from preferences to decisions. This also offers a compelling explanation of cooperation in social dilemmas. A review of team reasoning and related theories suggests how team reasoning could be incorporated into psychological theories of group identification and social value orientation theory to provide a deeper understanding of these phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do responsibility voids exist? That is, are there situations in which the group is collectively morally responsible for some outcome although no member can be held individually morally responsible for it? To answer these questions, I draw a distinction between competitive and cooperative decision contexts based on the team-reasoning account of cooperation. Accordingly, I provide a reasoning-based analysis of cooperation, competition, moral responsibility, and, last, potential responsibility voids. I then argue that competitive decision contexts are free of responsibility voids. The conditions for the existence of responsibility voids in cooperative decision contexts depend on the type of uncertainty the group faces, either external or coordination uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Team reasoning is thought to be descriptively and normatively superior to the classical individualistic theory of rational choice primarily because it can recommend coordination on Hi in the Hi-Lo game and cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma-type situations. However, left unanswered is whether it is rational for individuals to become team members, leaving a gap between reasons for individuals and reasons for team members. In what follows, I take up Susan Hurley's attempt to show that it is rational for an individual to become a team member. I argue that her account fails to show that becoming a team member is necessary to gain the advantages of coordination in Hi-Lo games or cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma-type situations, and that individuals will often fare better reasoning as individual agents than as members of a team. I argue further that there is a more general problem for team reasoning, specifically that the conditions needed to make it rational for a team member to employ team reasoning make becoming a team member unnecessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revue d'Economie Politique is the property of Editions Dalloz Sirrey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revue d'Economie Politique is the property of Editions Dalloz Sirrey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revue d'Economie Politique is the property of Editions Dalloz Sirrey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revue d'Economie Politique is the property of Editions Dalloz Sirrey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revue d'Economie Politique is the property of Editions Dalloz Sirrey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revue d'Economie Politique is the property of Editions Dalloz Sirrey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application produces multiple solutions of games, some of which seem less compelling than others. The recent development of the theory of team reasoning addresses this by suggesting that interacting players in games may sometimes reason as members of a team -- a group of individuals who act together in the attainment of some common goal. A number of properties have been suggested for team-reasoning decision-makers' goals to satisfy, but a few formal representations have been discussed. In this paper we suggest a possible representation of these goals based on the notion of mutual advantage. We propose a method for measuring extents of individual and mutual advantage to the interacting decision-makers, and define team interests as the attainment of outcomes associated with maximum mutual advantage in the games they play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperative behavior is often observed in ordinary market transactions. To account for this observation, Robert Sugden proposes a team reasoning theory in which the common interest of team reasoners is defined by the notion of mutually beneficial practice. We study the relationships between mutually beneficial practices and Berge equilibria (a Berge equilibrium is a strategy profile such that a unilateral change of strategy by any one player cannot increase another player's payoff). We propose two sufficient conditions under which a (strict) Berge equilibrium is a mutually beneficial practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper studies the connections between philosophical action theory and planning methods in artificial intelligence. It proposes a method of cooperative planning in which agents select actions using a combination of planning and team reasoning. Whereas several standard approaches to multi-agent planning start from individuals' plans and try to combine them into a group plan, the proposed method starts from constructing a group plan from which the individuals derive their sub-plans. The former method is labelled I-mode planning and the latter we-mode planning. The basic idea of the proposed we-mode planning method is that the agents conceive themselves as a group agent that selects the best plan specifying the actions of all individual agents who then carry out their parts in the group plan. We-mode planning is suited for human-robot cooperation in situations in which the participants have a shared goal and a shared plan evaluation function, and can observe each others' actions. The method is expected to lead in some cases to more human-like robot behaviour and more efficient execution of joint actions in human-robot teams. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider how conceptions of the self and identity from the philosophical literature can help us to understand identity disturbance in borderline personality disorder (BPD). We present 3 philosophical approaches: connectedness, narrative, and agency. We show how these map on to 3 different ways in which the self can be temporally extended. The connectedness approach is dominant in philosophy, and the narrative approach has been used by psychiatry, but we argue that the lesser-known agency approach provides a promising way to theorize some aspects of identity disturbance in BPD. It relates the 2 diagnostic criteria of identity disturbance and disinhibition and is consistent with evidence of memory deficits and altered self-processing in BPD patients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate experimentally the conditions under which bounded best-response and collective-optimality reasoning are used in coordination games. Using level- k and team reasoning theories as exemplars, we study games with three pure-strategy equilibria, two of which are mutually isomorphic. The third is always team-optimal, but whether it is predicted by level- k theory differs across games. We find that collective-optimality reasoning is facilitated if the collectively optimal equilibrium gives more equal payoffs than the others, and is inhibited if that equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the others, considered separately. We suggest that coordination cannot be explained by a single theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If group members aim to fulfil a collective obligation, they must act in such a way that the composition of their individual actions amounts to a group action that fulfils the collective obligation. We study a strong sense of joint action in which the members of a group design and then publicly adopt a group plan that coordinates the individual actions of the group members. We characterize the conditions under which a group plan successfully coordinates the group members’ individual actions, and study how the public adoption of a plan changes the context in which individual agents make a decision about what to do. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]