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Philosophers of science are increasingly arguing for and addressing the need to do work that is socially and scientifically engaged. However, we currently lack well-developed frameworks for thinking about how we should engage other expert communities and what the epistemic benefits are of doing so. In this paper, I draw on Collins and Evans' concept of 'interactional expertise' – the ability to speak the language of a discipline in the absence of an ability to practice – to consider the epistemic benefits that can arise when philosophers engage scientific communities. As Collins and Evans argue, becoming an interactional expert requires that one 'hang out' with members of the relevant expert community in order to learn crucial tacit knowledge needed to speak the language. Building on this work, I argue that acquiring interactional expertise not only leads to linguistic fluency, but it also confers several 'socio-epistemic' benefits such as the opportunity to cultivate trust with scientific communities. These benefits can improve philosophical work and facilitate the broader uptake of philosophers' ideas, enabling philosophers to meet a variety of epistemic goals. As a result, having at least some philosophers of science acquire interactional expertise via engagement will likely enhance the diversity of epistemic capacities for philosophy of science as a whole. For some philosophers of science, moreover, the socio-epistemic benefits identified here may be more important than the ability to speak the language of a discipline, suggesting the need for a broader analysis of interactional expertise, which this paper also advances. • Many philosophers of science have interactional expertise in scientific fields. • Acquiring interactional expertise can improve philosophical work. • Engaging scientists enables philosophers to build trust with scientific communities. • Immersion in a scientific community can facilitate uptake of philosophical work. • Interactional expertise provides more than just linguistic fluency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of the sociology of scientific knowledge distinguishes between contributory and interactional experts. Contributory experts have practical expertise—they can "walk the walk." Interactional experts have internalized the tacit components of expertise—they can "talk the talk" but are not able to reliably "walk the walk." Interactional expertise permits effective communication between contributory experts and others (e.g., laypeople), which in turn facilitates working jointly toward shared goals. Interactional expertise is attained through long-term immersion into the expert community in question. To assess interactional expertise, researchers developed the imitation game—a variant of the Turing test—to test whether a person, or a particular group, possesses interactional expertise of another. The imitation game, which has been used mainly in sociology to study the social nature of knowledge, may also be a useful tool for researchers who focus on cognitive aspects of expertise. In this paper, we introduce a modified version of the imitation game and apply it to examine interactional expertise in the context of blindness. Specifically, we examined blind and sighted individuals' ability to imitate each other in a street-crossing scenario. In Phase I, blind and sighted individuals provided verbal reports of their thought processes associated with crossing a street—once while imitating the other group (i.e., as a pretender) and once responding genuinely (i.e., as a non-pretender). In Phase II, transcriptions of the reports were judged as either genuine or imitated responses by a different set of blind and sighted participants, who also provided the reasoning for their decisions. The judges comprised blind individuals, sighted orientation-and-mobility specialists, and sighted individuals with infrequent socialization with blind individuals. Decision data were analyzed using probit mixed models for signal-detection-theory indices. Reasoning data were analyzed using natural-language-processing (NLP) techniques. The results revealed evidence that interactional expertise (i.e., relevant tacit knowledge) can be acquired by immersion in the group that possesses and produces the expert knowledge. The modified imitation game can be a useful research tool for measuring interactional expertise within a community of practice and evaluating practitioners' understanding of true experts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hazards and disasters arise from interactions between environmental and social processes, so interdisciplinary research is crucial in understanding and effectively managing them. Despite support and encouragement from funding agencies, universities, and journals and growing interest from researchers, interdisciplinary disaster research teams face significant obstacles, such as the difficulty of establishing effective communication and understanding across disciplines. Better understanding of interdisciplinary teamwork can also have important practical benefits for operational disaster planning and response. Social studies of science distinguish different kinds of expertise and different modes of communication. Understanding these differences can help interdisciplinary research teams communicate more clearly and work together more effectively. The primary role of a researcher is in contributory expertise (the ability to make original contributions to a discipline); but interactional expertise in other disciplines (the ability to understand their literature and communicate with their practitioners) can play an important role in interdisciplinary collaborations. Developing interactional expertise requires time and effort, which can be challenging for a busy researcher, and also requires a foundation of trust and communication among team members. Three distinct aspects of communication play important roles in effective interdisciplinary communication: dialects, metaphors, and articulation. There are different ways to develop interactional expertise and effective communication, so researchers can pursue approaches that suit their circumstances. It will be important for future research on interdisciplinary disaster research to identify best practices for building trust, facilitating communication, and developing interactional expertise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The field of autism studies is a highly disputed territory within which competing contradictory discourses abound. In this field, it is the voices and claims of autistic people regarding their own expertise in knowledge production concerning autism that is most recent in the debate, and traditionally the least attended to. In this article, I utilise the theories of Harry Collins and colleagues in order to reflect upon and conceptualise the various claims to knowledge production and expertise within the field of autism studies, from the perspective of an author who has been diagnosed as being on the autism spectrum. The notion that autistic people lack sociality is problematised, with the suggestion that autistic people are not well described by notions such as the ‘social brain’, or as possessing ‘zero degrees of cognitive empathy’. I then argue, however, that there is a qualitative difference in autistic sociality, and question to what extent such differences are of a biological or cultural nature, and to what extent interactional expertise can be gained by both parties in interactions between autistic and non-autistic people. In conclusion, I argue that autistic people have often become distrustful of researchers and their aims, and are frequently frozen out of the processes of knowledge production. Such a context results in a negative feedback spiral with further damage to the growth of interactional expertise between researchers and autistic people, and a breakdown in trust and communication leading to an increase in tension between stakeholder groups. The involvement of autistic scholars in research and improvements in participatory methods can thus be seen as a requirement, if social research in the field of autism is to claim ethical and epistemological integrity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Patient non-adherence is a common and important concern in clinical medicine. Some cases of patient non-adherence are cases in which the patient disagrees with the physician's recommended treatment based on particular reasons. Drawing upon science and technology studies literature, specifically the discussion by Collins and Evans and Wynne of how best to understand scientific controversies, I relate their ideas to the analogous conflict that may occur within a clinical interaction. I draw upon their recognition of the importance of contributory expertise and interactional expertise in providing legitimate knowledge. I also draw upon Wynne's idea of the 'negotiation of meanings' as an important element of the clinical interaction. To resolve potential conflicts between patient and physician before they develop into 'non-adherence', I propose the implementation of a new epistemological framework that recognizes legitimate knowledge offered by the patient as well as the physician. By situating this patient expertise framework within the paradigm of patient-centred medicine, and by assuming the goal of medical treatment to be treatment of suffering, patient expertise becomes centralized as a means of determining the nature of patient suffering. Two aspects of the patient's tacit knowledge - the body aspect and the meaning aspect - both of which are context-dependent and directly accessible only to the patient, are thus recognized as knowledge essential to the success of the interaction. The physician's role becomes that of both medical expert and possessor of 'interactional expertise', by which the physician recognizes and includes patient expertise in the treatment decision. By recognizing and incorporating the negotiation of meanings into the development of a treatment plan, this epistemological model of patient expertise should prevent cases of non-adherence based on disagreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What do producers know about their audiences, how do they know it, and how does this knowledge inform their output? Recent research has tackled these questions as they relate to journalists and social media users, but few studies have put their knowledge to the test, never mind with the audience's help. This study does so by conceptualizing the producers' orientation to, and tacit knowledge of their audiences, and by introducing the Imitation Game methodology to media and communication studies. It reports on a study that tested whether Radio-Canada producers could pass as members of their audience to actual members acting as judges. In 12 imitation games comprising dialogue around 63 questions, producers convincingly mimicked audience members on knowledge, preference, and biographical questions, and nearly so on opinion questions. Their critical reflections and plausible accounts of reception practice generally confounded judges across question types, thus demonstrating the method's promise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychologists and philosophers tend to treat expertise as a property of special individuals. These are individuals who have devoted much more time than the general population to the acquisition of their specific expertises. They are often said to pass through stages as they move toward becoming experts, for example, passing from an early stage, in which they follow self-conscious rules, to an expert stage in which skills are executed unconsciously. This approach is 'one-dimensional'. Here, two extra dimensions are added. They are drawn from the programme known as Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE) and its 'Periodic Table of Expertises'. SEE, which is sociological, and/or Wittgensteinian, in inspiration, takes expertise to be the property of groups; there are 'domains' of expertise. Under SEE, level of expertise grows with embedding in the society of domain experts; the key is the transmission of domain-specific tacit knowledge. Thus, one extra dimension is degree of exposure to tacit knowledge. Under SEE, domains can be big or small so there can be 'ubiquitous tacit knowledge', such as natural-language-speaking or other elements of general social behaviour, which belong to every member of a society. The second extra dimension is, therefore, 'esotericity'. The resulting three-dimensional 'expertise-space' can be explored in a number of ways which reveal the narrowness of the analysis and the mistakes that have been made under the one-dimensional model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I reply to my critics in respect of my work on expertise. I define the 'core' of the multidisciplinary 'expertise studies'. I argue that those who have taken the work seriously could resolve their problems by paying more attention to the core. Each could have made good use of an aspect of the core. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper, drawing on the example of simulation codes used in nuclear physics and high-energy physics, seeks to highlight the ethical implications of discontinuing support for simulation codes and the loss of knowledge embodied in them. Predicated on the concept of trading zones and actor network models, the paper addresses the problem of extinction of simulation codes and attempts to understand their evolution and development within those frameworks. We show that simulation codes of closed type develop to the level of creoles, becoming local languages and standards of scientific centers and disappearing as their few main developers leave, whereas codes of open types become universal languages, imposing problem-solving patterns on the entire community and crowding out other codes. The paper suggests that because of simulations' reliance on tacit knowledge, practices entrenched in codes cannot be exhaustively explicated or transmitted through writing alone; on the contrary, the life cycle of a simulation code is determined by the life cycle of its trading zone. We examine the extent to which both of these phenomena pose a risk to the preservation of knowledge. Bearing upon intergenerational ethics, we draw analogies between the pure intergenerational problem (PIP) and the problem of preserving the knowledge implemented in simulation codes and transmitting it to future generations. We argue that for the complete transfer of knowledge, it is necessary to develop and maintain inhabitability and sustainability of simulation trading zones in a controllable way, at least until the demand for these codes is warranted to cease in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a detailed reading Gascoigne and Thornton’s book Tacit Knowledge (2013), which aims to account for the tacitness of tacit knowledge (TK) while preserving its status as knowledge proper. I take issue with their characterization and rejection of the existential-phenomenological Background—which they presuppose even as they dismiss—and their claim that TK can be articulated “from within”—which betrays a residual Cartesianism, the result of their elision of conceptuality and propositionality. Knowledgeable acts instantiate capacities which we might know we have and of which we can be aware, but which are not propositionally structured at their “core”. Nevertheless, propositionality is necessary to what Robert Brandom calls, in Making It Explicit (1994) and Articulating Reasons (2000), “explicitation”, which notion also presupposes a tacit dimension, which is, simply, the embodied person (the knower), without which no conception of knowledge can get any purchase. On my view, there is no knowledgeable act that can be understood as such separately from the notion of skilled corporeal performance. The account I offer cannot make sense of so-called “knowledge-based” education, as opposed to systems and styles which supposedly privilege “contentless” skills over and above “knowledge”, because on the phenomenological and inferentialist lines I endorse, neither the concepts “knowledge” nor “skill” has any purchase or meaning without the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The word busongo names a kind of technological ‘know-how’ across a large number of languages in south central Africa, a distribution that is a testament to the word’s age. This essay reconstructs the history of the invention and changing meanings of busongo from its first millennium origins and tracks its use to the present using the methods of comparative historical linguistics. The resulting history illustrates the interplay of affective and sensory dimensions of technology in the creation of new understandings of technological practices in medieval central Africa. As a form of conceptual history, the story of busongo also raises new questions about the relationship between tacit knowledge, explicit knowledge and speech: is speech a form of tacit knowledge? If so, what are the implications for the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a study that analyzed the concept of expertise as to moral philosophers. Topics covered include the moral expertise debate on conflation of expertise with the concept of authority, the sociological theory of expertise according to Harry Collins and Robert Evans and the different kinds of competencies and moral expertises. Conclusions indicated that moral philosophers can be included in the group of moral decision-makers as specialist members.

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‘Tacit’ and ‘explicit’ knowledge, and their relation to expertise, have a long-standing importance within social studies of science and technology. At the centre of the development of thinking about these topics has been the work of Harry Collins and Robert Evans. In this article, we bring to bear observations of the work of people involved in grading eye disease, and their seeming display of expertise, tacit and explicit knowledge, on three thrusts identified in the work of Collins, and Collins and Evans. These thrusts are the following: (1) a concern with the appearance of tacit knowledge in the activities of experts, (2) a commitment to studying expertise as ‘real’ and substantive rather than attributed, and (3) a commitment to promoting the recognition and fostering the management of expertise by providing analytical distinctions regarding expertise and its reliance on tacit knowledge. By considering what is involved in the work of grading eyes, we relocate the interest in tacit and explicit knowledge, and their bearing on expertise, in how expert knowledge is displayed and made recognizable in and through courses of action and interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We propose that strategic human resource management (SHRM) practices nurture a context of knowledge sharing where tacit knowledge can be turned into explicit knowledge and that this type of knowledge sharing promotes innovative behaviours. We draw on the fields of knowledge management and international human resource management to show why organisations need to turn tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge to gain most from their workforce skills and creativity. Findings from a couple of cross-national case studies show how SHRM promotes employees to interact and share knowledge so that there is a conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge that informs innovative behaviour. In Case Study 1, the focus is on a UK local authority that implemented a bundle of SHRM practices through a people management programme, which resulted in a flattened management structure. In Case Study 2, the focus is on a geriatric hospital in Malta that introduced a management presence to an interdisciplinary team working to improve patient care. The analysis also highlights the methodological contribution of qualitative research for enabling inductive enquiry that yields emergent themes – an approach not typically seen in SHRM innovation studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To become an expert in a technical domain means acquiring the tacit knowledge pertaining to the relevant domain of expertise, at least, according to the programme known as 'Studies of Expertise and Experience' (SEE). We know only one way to acquire tacit knowledge and that is through some form of sustained social contact with the group that has it. Those who do not have such contact cannot acquire the expertise needed to make technical judgments. They can, however, use social expertise to judge between experts or expert claims. Where social expertise is used to make technical judgments we refer to it as 'transmuted expertise'. The various kinds of transmuted expertise are described and analysed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Different approaches to expertise and argumentation are discussed. After introducing the problem of expertise and its present day significance in a historical context, various connections with the study of arguments are highlighted. The need for and potential of argumentation analysis to contribute to existing research in social epistemology, science studies, and cognitive science, is discussed, touching on the problems of reasoning and argumentation, embodiment, tacit knowledge, expert context versus public context, expert disagreement, persuasion versus justification, and argument analysis as meta-expertise. As the arguments used by experts constitute a boundary object, we presume that a dialogue format is suitable to address central problems of the special issue 'Rethinking Arguments from Experts'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Harry Collins' Tacit and Explicit Knowledge is engaged to clarify and expand the notions of tacit and explicit. A broader continuum for tacit knowledge and its indirectly or only partially explicable components is provided by complementing Collins' exposition of tacit knowledge with a discussion of formal systems and Polanyi's exposition of tacit knowing. Support is provided for Collins' distinction between strings and language, mechanical modeling as a form of explication, and the notion that machines lack tacit knowledge and language. While Collins emphasizes the inexplicability of cultural fluency as tacit knowledge, Polanyi emphasizes the functional dimension of skillful performances. The conceptual strengths and weaknesses of Collins' and Polanyi's approaches are examined. Collins' emphasis on string transformation and his division of tacit knowing into Relational (RTK), Somatic (STK), and Collective (CTK) are helpful tools, but should not flatten Polanyi's multiple levels of knowing and being into a dualism that may encourage reductionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information about the 13th biennial Science, Technology Policy and Management in Latin Ibero-American Context Conference that was held on October 28-30, 2013 in Porto, Portugal is presented. The conference included a workshop on philosopher Michael Polanyi, a discussion over transmission of tacit knowledge by urbanization and a talk entitled "Michael Polanyi's Post-Critical Vision: Science, Technology and Society" by philosopher Phil Mullins.