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This paper reports on the research done under a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Research Announcement task, “Assessment of System Safety Risks for NextGen Concepts and Technologies.” We describe the methods and tools used in the task and results from first-order analyses of two NextGen ground-based automation concepts. The first-order results demonstrate the ability of the assessment method developed in previous NASA research to address NextGen concepts and to link research results rigorously to systemwide risk. The method explicitly addresses response times and failures, and the results, while first-order, specifically identify the time criticality of tactical conflict detection and resolution. I. Introduction n this research, we extended and applied to automated NextGen concepts the separation assurance safety risk assessment method we developed for the NASA Research Announcement task, “Conduct Safety Analysis of the Separation Assurance Function in Today’s National Airspace System (NAS)” (Ref. 1). As in our previous work, we addressed the task objective in two ways. First, we established functional and quantitative frameworks to allow integration of the results of all forms of safety and risk research into a single risk assessment. Second, we identified sources of data and developed and tested modeling tools to demonstrate the feasibility of our analysis approach. We conducted first-order risk assessments of two NextGen concepts: a Ground-Automation Controlled (GAC) concept based on the Advanced Airspace Concept (AAC) proposed by Erzberger in Ref. 2, and a near-term GroundAutomation Assisted (GAA) concept based on the concept proposed by McNally et al. in Ref. 3. Both concepts are based on managing traffic with ground-based automation using data link communications to control aircraft on timebased four-dimensional trajectories (4DTs). This paper describes analysis of the fully operational concepts plus two abnormal conditions. The first abnormal condition is a loss of intent data condition, which could be caused by a weather or emergency disruption leading to open 4DTs or by a hardware failure leading to loss of transmitted intent data; the second is a single aircraft inoperative transponder condition, which could be caused by hardware failure or by being turned off. Both concepts include a ground-based strategic element, a ground-based tactical element, an airborne Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) element, and an airborne see-and-avoid element. The AAC concept includes a monitoring human controller element, while the human-based GAA concept includes an active human controller in the strategic and tactical elements. The paper is organized as follows: 1) Section II presents our aviation safety risk analysis method and introduces the two NextGen concepts assessed. 2) Section III discusses the conflict modeling tool and the conflict probability data used for the risk assessments.

The concepts, operating paradigms, and required technologies of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) are still evolving. These continuing changes highlight a need for a modeling platform that can effectively address the complexity of diverse future scenarios and help assess their impact on safety. We discuss this need in detail with respect to the requirements and benefits of such a flexible modeling platform. We describe the LMI ACAS (Airspace Conflict Analysis Simulation) tool, a simulation modeling framework with 3-dimensional visualization, and we show how such an application can meet these analytical requirements and discuss the benefits of implementing a multi-dimensional visualization.