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The U.S. military requires medical readiness to support forward-deployed combat operations. Because time and distance to neurosurgical capabilities vary within the deployed trauma system, nonneurosurgeons are required to perform emergent cranial procedures in select cases. It is unclear whether these surgeons have sufficient training in these procedures.This quality-improvement study involved a voluntary, anonymized specialty-specific survey of active-duty surgeons about their experience and attitudes toward U.S. military emergency neurosurgical training.Survey responses were received from 104 general surgeons and 26 neurosurgeons. Among general surgeons, 81% have deployed and 53% received training in emergency neurosurgical procedures before deployment. Only 16% of general surgeons reported participating in craniotomy/craniectomy procedures in the last year. Nine general surgeons reported performing an emergency neurosurgical procedure while on deployment/humanitarian mission, and 87% of respondents expressed interest in further predeployment emergency neurosurgery training. Among neurosurgeons, 81% had participated in training nonneurosurgeons and 73% believe that more comprehensive training for nonneurosurgeons before deployment is needed. General surgeons proposed lower procedure minimums for competency for external ventricular drain placement and craniotomy/craniectomy than did neurosurgeons. Only 37% of general surgeons had used mixed/augmented reality in any capacity previously; for combat procedures, most (90%) would prefer using synchronous supervision via high-fidelity video teleconferencing over mixed reality.These survey results show a gap in readiness for neurosurgical procedures for forward-deployed general surgeons. Capitalizing on capabilities such as mixed/augmented reality would be a force multiplier and a potential means of improving neurosurgical capabilities in the forward-deployed environments.

To characterize humanitarian trauma care delivered by US military treatment facilities (MTFs) in Afghanistan and Iraq during combat operations.International Humanitarian Law, which includes the Geneva Conventions, defines protections and standards of treatment to victims of armed conflicts. In 1949, these standards expanded to include injured civilians. In 2001, the Global War on Terror began in Afghanistan and expanded to Iraq in 2003. US MTFs provided care to all military forces, civilians, and enemy prisoners. A thorough understanding of the scope, epidemiology, resource requirements, and outcomes of civilian trauma in combat zones has not been previously characterized.Retrospective cohort analysis of the Department of Defense Trauma Registry from 2005 to 2019. Inclusion criteria were civilians and Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Coalition Personnel (NNCP) with traumatic injuries treated at MTFs in Afghanistan and Iraq. Patient demographics, mechanism of injury, resource requirements, procedures, and outcomes were categorized.A total of 29,963 casualties were eligible from the Registry. There were 16,749 (55.9%) civilians and 13,214 (44.1%) NNCP. The majority of patients were age above 13 years [26,853 (89.6%)] and male [28,000 (93.4%)]. Most injuries were battle-related: 12,740 (76.1%) civilians and 11,099 (84.0%) NNCP. Penetrating trauma was the most common cause of both battle and nonbattle injuries: 12,293 (73.4%) civilian and 10,029 (75.9%) NNCP. Median Injury Severity Score (ISS) was 9 in each cohort with ISS≥25 in 2236 (13.4%) civilians and 1398 (10.6%) NNCP. Blood products were transfused to 35% of each cohort: 5850 civilians received a transfusion with 2118 (12.6%) of them receiving ≥10 units; 4590 NNCPs received a transfusion with 1669 (12.6%) receiving ≥10 units. MTF mortality rates were civilians 1263 (7.5%) and NNCP 776 (5.9%). Interventions, both operative and nonoperative, were similar between both groups.In accordance with International Humanitarian Law, as well as the US military's medical rules of eligibility, civilians injured in combat zones were provided the same level of care as NNCP. Injured civilians and NNCP had similar mechanisms of injury, injury patterns, transfusion needs, and ISS. This analysis demonstrates resource equipoise in trauma care delivered to civilians and NNCP. Hospitals in combat zones must be prepared to manage large numbers of civilian casualties with significant human and material resources allocated to optimize survival. The provision of humanitarian trauma care is resource-intensive, and these data can be used to inform planning factors for current or future humanitarian care in combat zones.

Over the last 20 years of war, there has been an operational need for far forward surgical teams near the point of injury. Over time, the medical footprint of these teams has decreased and the utilization of mobile single surgeon teams (SSTs) by the Services has increased. The increased use of SSTs is because of a tactical mobility requirement and not because of proven noninferiority of clinical outcomes. Through an iterative process, the Committee on Surgical Combat Casualty Care (CoSCCC) reviewed the utilization of SSTs and developed an expert-opinion consensus statement addressing the risks of SST utilization and proposed mitigation strategies.A small triservice working group of surgeons with deployment experience, to include SST deployments, developed a statement regarding the risks and benefits of SST utilization. The draft statement was reviewed by a working group at the CoSCCC meeting November 2021 and further refined. This was followed by an extensive iterative review process, which was conducted to ensure that the intended messaging was clear to senior medical leaders and operational commanders. The final draft was voted on by the entire CoSCCC membership. To inform the civilian trauma community, commentaries were solicited from civilian trauma leaders to help put this practice into context and to further the discussion in both military and civilian trauma communities.After multiple revisions, the SST statement was finalized in January 2022 and distributed to the CoSCCC membership for a vote. Of 42 voting members, there were three nonconcur votes. The SST statement underwent further revisions to address CoSCCC voting membership comments. Statement commentaries from the President of the American Association for the Surgery for Trauma, the chair of the Committee on Trauma, the Medical Director of the Military Health System Strategic Partnership with the American College of Surgeons and a recently retired military surgeon we included to put this military relevant statement into a civilian context and further delineate the risks and benefits of including the trauma care paradigm in the Department of Defense (DoD) deployed trauma system.The use of SSTs has a role in the operational environment; however, operational commanders must understand the tradeoff between tactical mobility and clinical capabilities. As SST tactical mobility increases, the ability of teams to care for multiple casualty incidents or provide sustained clinical operations decreases. The SST position statement is a communication tool to inform operational commanders and military medical leaders on the use of these teams on current and future battlefields.

During the last 20 years of conflict in the Middle East, improvements in body armor and the use of improvised explosive devices have resulted in an increased incidence of complex craniofacial trauma (CFT). Currently, CFT comprises up to 40% of all casualties. We present new data from the recent conflict in Iraq and Syria during Operation Inherent Resolve.Data were collected for patients treated at role 1, role 2, and role 3 facilities in Iraq and Syria over a 1-year period. During this time, a specialized headneck surgical augmentation team was deployed and colocated with the central role 3 facility. Data included for this cross-sectional study are as follows: injury type and mechanism, triage category, initial managing facility and subsequent levels of care, and procedures performed.Ninety-six patients sustained CFT over the study period. The most common injuries were soft tissue (57%), followed by cranial (44%) and orbital/facial (31%). Associated truncal and/or extremity injuries were seen in 46 patients (48%). There were marked differences in incidence and pattern of injuries between mechanisms (all p0.05). While improvised explosive devices had the highest rate of cranial and truncal injuries, gunshot wounds and blunt mechanisms had higher incidences of orbital/facial and neck injuries. Overall, 45% required operative interventions including complex facial reconstruction, craniotomy, and open globe repair. Mortality was 6% with 83% due to associated severe brain injury. Most patients were local nationals (70%) who required discharge or transfer to the local health care system.Complex craniofacial trauma is increasingly seen by deployed surgeons, regardless of subspecialty training or location. Deployment of a centrally located head and neck team greatly enhances the capabilities for forward deployed management of CFT, with excellent outcomes for both US and local national patients.Therapeutic/care management; Level V.

The Blue Book , published in conjunction with the Military Health System Strategic Partnership with the American College of Surgeons, serves as a reference manual for institutions wishing to establish a military-civilian partnership (MCP). To evaluate the applicability of the criteria contained in the Blue Book , we created a survey to be distributed to MCP military surgeons and their civilian host champions.E-mail surveys were sent to MCP military surgeons and civilian host champions. Military surgeons were queried about basic demographic information and aspects of the MCP including type, duration of assignment, onboarding, malpractice coverage, and billing for services. We gathered information on the role of military surgeons at the MCP, workload information, and trauma cases. The civilian host champions survey focused on institutional activities including trauma surgical volume, clinical and educational opportunities for the military surgeons, and exposure to research. Military-civilian partnership military surgeons and civilian host champions were questioned on program attributes: administrative support, budget, and profile of the program within the institution.Ten MCP military surgeons and 7 host champions completed surveys. The majority of military surgeons were assigned to the MCP for a 3-year instructor role (90%), and most were trauma surgeons (80%). Clinical activities for the military surgeon were where 60% spent ≥13 weeks annually on trauma. Military surgeons identified host program support in academic growth, deployment preparation, and sense of value at the MCP as positive attributes. Civilian host champions unanimously reported that exposure to research, opportunities to lead trauma teams, dedicated intensive care unit time, and patient volume were positive program attributes.This preliminary survey demonstrates that the criteria put forth in the Blue Book align with experiences of MCP military surgeons and host champions. Continued development of this survey and others like it may be useful in the MCP program selection and evaluation process.Therapeutic/care management; Level V.

Military involvement in Afghanistan ended in 2021, and while low-intensity troop engagements continue globally, casualty numbers are dwindling. To understand the clinical and operational connections between blood utilization and clinical paradigm shifts in resuscitation strategies, a review of blood product utilization and the changes in the last decade was conducted within the US Central Command area of responsibility. The intent of this review was to assess patterns of blood use during the last decade of the United States' involvement in the most recent major conflicts to potentially inform future blood requirements.Blood product and types transfused between January 1, 2011, and December 31, 2020, were acquired from the Medical Situational Awareness in Theater blood reports. All reported blood usage data in the US Central Command area of responsibility were queried.Packed red blood cells and fresh frozen plasma (FFP) usage showed no statistically significant change over time ( τb = 0.24, p = 0.3252; τb = -0.47, p = 0.0603). Fresh and stored whole blood (SWB) use increased overtime ( τb = 0.69, p = 0.0056; τb = 0.83, p = 0.0015). A strong inverse relationship was found between SWB and FFP usage ( r = -0.68, p = 0.0309) and liquid plasma and FFP usage ( r = -0.65, p = 0.0407) over time.Whole blood usage increased significantly over time with a preference for SWB. Component therapy is anticipated to remain a critical element of resuscitation in the event of large-scale combat operations secondary to supply chain and longer storage times.Therapeutic/care management; Level III.

BACKGROUND As the United States withdraws from overseas conflicts, general surgeons remain deployed in support of global operations. Surgeons and surgical teams are foundational to combat casualty care; however, currently, there are few casualty producing events. Low surgical volume and acuity can have detrimental effects on surgical readiness for those frequently deployed. The surgical team cycle of deployment involves predeployment training, drawdown of clinical practice, deployment, postdeployment reintegration, and rebuilding of a patient panel. This study aims to assess these effects on typical general surgeon practices. Quantifying the overall impact of deployment may help refine and implement measures to mitigate the effects on skill retention and patient care. METHODS Surgeon case logs of eligible surgeons deploying between January 1, 2017, and January 1, 2020, were included from participating military treatment facilities. Eligible surgeons were surgeons whose case logs were primarily at a single military treatment facility 26 weeks before and after deployment and whose deployment duration, location, and number of deployed cases were obtainable. RESULTS Starting 26 weeks prior to deployment, analyzing in 1-week intervals toward deployment time, case count decreased by 4.8% (p < 0.0001). With each 1-week interval, postdeployment up to the 26-week mark, case count increased by 6% (p < 0.0001). Cases volumes most prominently drop 3 weeks prior to deployment and do not reach normal levels until approximately 7 weeks postdeployment. Case volumes were similar across service branches. CONCLUSION There is a significant decrease in the number of cases performed before deployment and increase after return regardless of military branch. The perideployment surgical volume decline should be understood and mitigated appropriately; predeployment training, surgical skill retention, and measures to safely reintegrate surgeons back into their practice should be further developed and implemented. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE Economic/Decision, Level III.

OBJECTIVE Describe etiologies and trends in non-battle deaths (NBD) among deployed U.S. service members to identify areas for prevention. BACKGROUND Injuries in combat are categorized as battle (result of hostile action) or nonbattle related. Previous work found that one-third of injured US military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan had nonbattle injuries and emphasized prevention. NBD have not yet been characterized. METHODS U.S. military casualty data for Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 were obtained from the Defense Casualty Analysis System (DCAS) and the Department of Defense Trauma Registry (DoDTR). Two databases were used because DoDTR does not capture prehospital deaths, while DCAS does not contain clinical details. Nonbattle injuries and NBD were identified, etiologies classified, and NBD trends were assessed using a weighted moving average and time-series analysis with autoregressive integrated moving average. Future NBD rates were forecast. RESULTS DCAS recorded 59,799 casualties; 21.0% (n = 1431) of all deaths (n = 6745) were NBD. DoDTR recorded 29,958 casualties; 11.5% (n = 206) of all deaths (n = 1788) were NBD. After early fluctuations, NBD rates for both Iraq and Afghanistan stabilized at approximately 21%. Leading causes of NBD were gunshot wounds and vehicle accidents, accounting for 66%. Approximately 25% was self-inflicted. A 24% NBD rate was forecasted from 2015 through 2025. CONCLUSIONS Approximately 1 in 5 deaths were NBD. The majority were potentially preventable, including a significant proportion of self-inflicted injuries. A single comprehensive data repository would facilitate future mortality monitoring and performance improvement. These data may assist military leaders with implementing targeted safety strategies.

BACKGROUND Military operations vary by scope, purpose, and intensity, each having unique forces and actions to execute a mission. Evaluation of military operation fatalities guides current and future casualty care. METHODS A retrospective study was conducted of all US military fatalities from Operation New Dawn in Iraq, 2010 to 2011. Data were obtained from autopsies and other records. Population characteristics, manner of death, cause of death, and location of death were analyzed. All fatalities were evaluated for concomitant evidence of underlying atherosclerosis. Nonsuicide trauma fatalities were also reviewed for injury severity, mechanism of death, injury survivability, death preventability, and opportunities for improvement. RESULTS Of 74 US military Operation New Dawn fatalities (median age, 26 years; male, 98.6%; conventional forces, 100%; prehospital, 82.4%) the leading cause of death was injury (86.5%). The manner of death was primarily homicide (55.4%), followed by suicide (17.6%), natural (13.5%), and accident (9.5%). Fatalities were divided near evenly between combatants (52.7%) and support personnel (47.3%), and between battle injury (51.4%) and disease and nonbattle injury (48.6%). Natural and suicide death was higher (p < 0.01, 0.02) among support personnel who were older (p = 0.05) with more reserve/national guard personnel (p = 0.01). Total population prevalence of underlying atherosclerosis was 18.9%, with more among support personnel (64.3%). Of 46 nonsuicide trauma fatalities, most died of blast injury (67.4%) followed by gunshot wound (26.1%) and multiple/blunt force injury (6.5%). The leading mechanism of death was catastrophic tissue destruction (82.6%). Most had nonsurvivable injuries (82.6%) and nonpreventable deaths (93.5%). CONCLUSION Operation New Dawn fatalities were exclusively conventional forces divided between combatants and support personnel, the former succumbing more to battle injury and the latter to disease and nonbattle injury including self-inflicted injury. For nonsuicide trauma fatalities, none died from a survivable injury, and 17.4% died from potentially survivable injuries. Opportunities for improvement included providing earlier blood products and surgery. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE Therapeutic, level V and epidemiological, level IV.

Background Quantification of medical interventions administered during prolonged field care (PFC) is necessary to inform training and planning. Materials and methods Retrospective cohort study of Department of Defense Trauma Registry casualties with maximum Abbreviated Injury Scale (MAIS) score of 2 or greater and prehospital records during combat operations 2007 to 2015; US military nonsurvivors were linked to Armed Forces Medical Examiner System data. Medical interventions administered to survivors of 4 hours to 72 hours of PFC and nonsurvivors who died prehospital were compared by frequency-matching on mechanism (explosive, firearm, other), injury type (penetrating, blunt) and injured body regions with MAIS score of 3 or greater. Covariates for adjustment included age, sex, military Service, shock, Glasgow Coma Scale, transport team, MAIS and Injury Severity Score (ISS). Sensitivity analysis focused on US military subgroup with AIS/ISS assigned to nonsurvivors after autopsy. Results The total inception cohort included 16,202 casualties (5,269 US military, 10,809 non-US military), 64% Afghanistan, 36% Iraq. Of US military, 734 deaths occurred within 30 days, nearly 90% occurred within 4 hours of injury. There were 3,222 casualties (1,111 US military, 2,111 non-US military) documented for prehospital care and died prehospital (691) or survived 4 hours to 72 hours of PFC (2,531). Twenty-five percent (815/3,222) received advanced airway, 18% (583) ventilatory support, 9% (281) tourniquet. Twenty-three percent (725) received blood transfusions within 24 hours. Of the matched cohort (1,233 survivors, 490 nonsurvivors), differences were observed in care (survivors received more warming, intravenous fluids, sedation, mechanical ventilation, narcotics, antibiotics; nonsurvivors received more intubations, tourniquets, intraosseous fluids, cardiopulmonary resuscitation). Sensitivity analysis focused on US military (732 survivors, 379 nonsurvivors) showed no significant differences in prehospital interventions. Without autopsy information, the ISS of nonsurvivors significantly underestimated injury severity. Conclusion Tourniquets, blood transfusion, airway, and ventilatory support are frequently required interventions for the seriously injured. Prolonged field care should direct resources, technology, and training to field technology for sustained resuscitation, airway, and breathing support in the austere environment. Level of evidence Prognostic, Level III.

In the future, United States Navy Role 1 and Role 2 shipboard medical departments will be caring for patients during Distributed Maritime Operations in both contested and noncontested austere environments; likely for prolonged periods of time. This literature review examines 25 modern naval mass casualty incidents over a 40-year period representative of naval warfare, routine naval operations, and ship-based health service support of air and land operations. Challenges, lessons learned, and injury patterns are identified to prepare afloat medical departments for the future fight. Level of evidence Literature Review, level V.

BACKGROUND Combat casualty care has been shaped by the prolonged conflicts in Southwest Asia, namely Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. The utilization of surgeons in austere locations outside of Southwest Asia and its implication on skill retention and value have not been examined. This study hypothesizes that surgeon utilization is low in the African theater. This lack of activity is potentially damaging to surgical skill retention and patient care. METHODS Military case logs of surgeons deployed to Africa under command of Special Operations Command Africa between January 1, 2016, and January 1, 2020, were examined. Cases were organized based on population served, general type of procedure, current procedural terminology codes, and location. RESULTS Twenty deployment caseloads representing 74% of the deployments during the period were analyzed. In 3,294 days, 101 operations were performed, which included 45 on combat/terrorism related injuries and 19 on US personnel. East and West African deployments, combat, and noncombat zones, respectively, were compared. East Africa averaged 4.1 ± 3.8 operations per deployment, and West Africa, 7.3 ± 8.0 (p = 0.2434). In East Africa, 56.1% of total operations were related to combat/terrorism, compared with 29.6% of total operations in West Africa (p = 0.0077). West Africa had a significantly higher proportion of elective (p = 0.0002) and humanitarian cases (p =

The Military Health System is currently in the midst of a sea change as Military Treatment Facilities transition to Defense Health Agency governance. During this time of transition, the measurement and sustainment of forward deployed caregiver readiness is undergoing appropriate and much needed scrutiny. Recently, the American Association for the Surgery of Trauma assembled an expert panel to examine forward deployed caregiver readiness, identify gaps, and propose potential solutions. A qualitative theme array analysis of the session was performed, and three readiness themes were identified including: 1) defining readiness, 2) measuring readiness, and 3) maintaining and replenishing readiness. This article focuses on the various readiness gaps, solutions and areas of controversy identified. Level of evidence Expert opinion, level V.

BACKGROUND The management of battlefield trauma requires a specific skill set, which is optimized by regular trauma experience. As military casualties from the prolonged conflicts in the Middle East decrease, challenges exist to maintain battlefield trauma readiness. Military surgeons must therefore depend on the Military Health System. The purpose of the study was to evaluate the frequency of surgical cases relevant to deployed combat casualty care performed at military treatment facilities (MTFs). METHODS Combat casualty care relevant cases (CCC-RCs) were defined as emergent, open surgical cases in which the patient required a blood transfusion. Case logs from four military treatment centers with surgical residency training programs were used. Twenty-four months of case records between January 1, 2017, and January 1, 2019, were included to determine total numbers of CCC-RCs at each institution. The results were compared with San Antonio Military Medical Center's, the Department of Defense's only American College of Surgeons-verified level 1 trauma center. RESULTS Fifty-one trauma/general surgeons and six vascular surgeons case logs were examined. Thirty (0.3%) of 10,529 cases performed by trauma/general and vascular surgeons over the 2-year study period were considered CCC-RCs. These results were in contrast to San Antonio Military Medical Center, which had a significantly higher proportion of CCC-RCs (113 of 320 cases, 35.3%, p < 0.0001). CONCLUSION A cross-section of MTF surgical case complexity demonstrates a lack of cases considered to be CCC-RCs. At the MTFs evaluated, surgical case surrogates for combat trauma and combat casualty care is close to zero. These data are potentially representative of other military treatment centers, which focus on beneficiary care. For readiness purposes, MTFs that care primarily for Tricare beneficiaries without a significant trauma population should not be considered meaningful sources of CCC-RCs for trauma/general and vascular surgeons. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE Therapeutic/care management study, level V.

Introduction In the far forward combat environment, the use of whole blood is recommended for the treatment of hemorrhagic shock after injury. In 2016, US military special operations teams began receiving low titer group O whole blood (LTOWB) for use at the point of injury (POI). This is a case series of the initial 15 patients who received LTOWB on the battlefield. Methods Patients were identified in the Department of Defense Trauma Registry, and charts were abstracted for age, sex, nationality, mechanism of injury, injuries and physiologic criteria that triggered the transfusion, treatments at the POI, blood products received at the POI and the damage-control procedures done by the first surgical team, next level of care, initial interventions by the second surgical team, Injury Severity Score, and 30-day survival. Descriptive statistics were used to characterize the clinical data when appropriate. Results Of the 15 casualties, the mean age was 28, 50% were US military, and 63% were gunshot wounds. Thirteen patients survived to discharge, one died of wounds after arrival at the initial resuscitative surgical care, and two died prehospital. The mean Injury Severity Score was 21.31 (SD, 18.93). Eleven (68%) of the causalities received additional blood products during evacuation/role 2 and/or role 3. Vital signs were available for 10 patients from the prehospital setting and 9 patients upon arrival at the first surgical capable facility. The mean systolic blood pressure was 80.5 prehospital and 117 mm Hg (p = 0.0002) at the first surgical facility. The mean heart rate was 105 beats per minute prehospital and 87.4 beats per minute (p = 0.075) at the first surgical facility. The mean hospital stay was 24 days. Conclusion The use of cold-stored LTOWB at POI is feasible during combat operations. Further data are needed to validate and inform best practice for POI transfusion. Level of evidence Therapeutic study, level V.

Background Comprehensive analyses of battle-injured fatalities, incorporating a multidisciplinary process with a standardized lexicon, is necessary to elucidate opportunities for improvement (OFIs) to increase survivability. Methods A mortality review was conducted on United States Special Operations Command battle-injured fatalities who died from September 11, 2001, to September 10, 2018. Fatalities were analyzed by demographics, operational posture, mechanism of injury, cause of death, mechanism of death (MOD), classification of death, and injury severity. Injury survivability was determined by a subject matter expert panel and compared with injury patterns among Department of Defense Trauma Registry survivors. Death preventability and OFI were determined for fatalities with potentially survivable or survivable (PS-S) injuries using tactical data and documented medical interventions. Results Of 369 United States Special Operations Command battle-injured fatalities (median age, 29 years; male, 98.6%), most were killed in action (89.4%) and more than half died from injuries sustained during mounted operations (52.3%). The cause of death was blast injury (45.0%), gunshot wound (39.8%), and multiple/blunt force injury (15.2%). The leading MOD was catastrophic tissue destruction (73.7%). Most fatalities sustained nonsurvivable injuries (74.3%). For fatalities with PS-S injuries, most had hemorrhage as a component of MOD (88.4%); however, the MOD was multifactorial in the majority of these fatalities (58.9%). Only 5.4% of all fatalities and 21.1% of fatalities with PS-S injuries had comparable injury patterns among survivors. Accounting for tactical situation, a minority of deaths were potentially preventable (5.7%) and a few preventable (1.1%). Time to surgery (93.7%) and prehospital blood transfusion (89.5%) were the leading OFI for PS-S fatalities. Most fatalities with PS-S injuries requiring blood (83.5%) also had an additional prehospital OFI. Conclusion Comprehensive mortality reviews of battlefield fatalities can identify OFI in combat casualty care and prevention. Standardized lexicon is essential for translation to civilian trauma systems. Level of evidence Epidemiological, level IV.

Under direction from the Defense Health Agency, subject matter experts (SMEs) from the Joint Trauma System, Armed Forces Medical Examiner System, and civilian sector established the Military Trauma Mortality Review process. To establish the most empirically robust process, these SMEs used both qualitative and quantitative methods published in a series of peer-reviewed articles over the last 3 years. Most recently, the Military Mortality Review process was implemented for the first time on all battle-injured service members attached to the United States Special Operations Command from 2001 to 2018. The current Military Mortality Review process builds on the strengths and limitations of important previous work from both the military and civilian sector. To prospectively improve the trauma care system and drive preventable death to the lowest level possible, we present the main misconceptions and lessons learned from our 3-year effort to establish a reliable and sustainable Military Trauma Mortality Review process. These lessons include the following: (1) requirement to use standardized and appropriate lexicon, definitions, and criteria; (2) requirement to use a combination of objective injury scoring systems, forensic information, and thorough SME case review to make injury survivability and death preventability determinations; (3) requirement to use nonmedical information to make reliable death preventability determinations and a comprehensive list of opportunities for improvement to reduce preventable deaths within the trauma care system; and (4) acknowledgment that the military health system still has gaps in current infrastructure that must be addressed to globally and continuously implement the process outlined in the Military Trauma Mortality Review process in the future. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level III.

Animal-assisted interventions have been implemented in both inpatient and outpatient settings and have demonstrated positive outcomes on patients and hospital staff. Animal-assisted interventions have not been previously reported in any burn center. A therapy dog program was established at our burn center with the intent of improving duration and quality of rehabilitation sessions and physical therapy. Satisfaction surveys were distributed to patients and staff. After one year, 14 patient surveys and 23 staff surveys were collected. Implementation of this program was feasible and patients worked with the therapy dogs in all environments of the burn center: outpatient, ward, and ICU. Most patients reported improved pain and anxiety after working with the therapy dogs. All patients reported that they would like more sessions with the therapy dogs. All staff members were satisfied or very satisfied with their therapy dog visit and all enjoyed having the therapy dogs present. Most reported an improved mood after seeing the therapy dogs and wanted that additional therapy dog visits. One year after the implementation of the therapy dog program, we have demonstrated feasibility, acceptability, and desirability of this type of program at our burn center. Given the paramount importance of rehabilitation in the recovery of burn patients, further investigation into therapy should be performed and longer term outcomes assessed.

Between conflicts, many of the combat casualty care lessons learned are lost as the nation shifts priorities and providers leave the military. Solutions are needed to bridge the knowledge gap created by interwar periods. One of the foremost solutions is partnerships between civilian trauma centers and the military health system. Over the past two decades, a myriad of military-civilian partnerships (MCPs), which vary in their composition, duration, and focus, was created. The objective of this report is to describe the initial attempt of the Department of Defense to catalog existing MCPs to inform both civilian and military stakeholders. This initial catalog is intended as a reference to aid in future MCP development and facilitate the synchronization of efforts to improve trauma care delivery and readiness.Using methodology from the Institute of Defense Analysis, the total number of eligible trauma centers in the United States was determined. The Institute of Defense Analysis determined eligibility-based American College of Surgeons Trauma Center verification or state trauma center designation. Each military service provided their list of MCPs, which were categorized. Military-civilian partnerships were cataloged by various characteristics and program components. Key variables include number and type of personnel trained, duration of training, and focus, for example, team versus individual focused and training versus maintaining proficiency focused.A total of 1,139 hospitals in the United States are potentially eligible for MCPs. There are at least 87 unique partnerships; the majority are part-time sustainment MCPs. The Air Force has the largest number of providers in MCPs. There are many challenges to maintain accurate and up to date data on MCPs.With the collated information, the Defense Health Agency, military services, special operations community, and civilian partners will be better empowered to optimize the readiness value of their programs and better prepare our military medical providers for the nation's and military's future needs.

Across disciplines, mentorship has been recognized as a key to success. Acute care surgeons, focused on the care of trauma surgery, emergency general surgery and surgical critical care, practice in a wide variety of settings and have unique mentorship needs across all phases of their career. Recognizing the need for robust mentorship and professional development, the American Association for the Surgery of Trauma (AAST) convened an expert panel entitled ‘The Power of Mentorship’ at the 81st annual meeting in September 2022 (Chicago, Illinois). This was a collaboration between the AAST Associate Member Council (consisting of surgical resident, fellow and junior faculty members), the AAST Military Liaison Committee, and the AAST Healthcare Economics Committee. Led by two moderators, the panel consisted of five real-life mentor-mentee pairs. They addressed the following realms of mentorship: clinical, research, executive leadership and career development, mentorship through professional societies, and mentorship for military-trained surgeons. Recommendations, as well as pearls and pitfalls, are summarized below.

This review focuses on the use of the case fatality rate (CFR), the killed in action percentage (%KIA) and died of wounds (%DOW) as battlefield medical outcome measures and reports the current statistical data for recent conflicts. Further, the review defines each statistic, and identifies their usefulness and limitations in medical research. The CFR, %KIA, and %DOW have been used by many authors since the beginning of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001. However, these statistics are primarily derived from administrative databases maintained by the Defense Casualty Analysis System, and their primary purpose is not to evaluate the effectiveness of medical treatment. We believe both the magnitude of the improvements in CFR and %KIA and impact of medical treatment on these statistics have been in some cases overstated. Battlefield lethality is significantly impacted by non-medical factors. Some medical researchers, likely unknowingly, continue to use these statistics, especially the CFR, without taking all battlefield confounders into account. The Department of Defense Trauma Registry provides opportunity for improved data collection, performance improvement, and standardization of the combat casualty care statistics thereby allowing for meaningful comparisons and a better understanding of battlefield trauma care.

Motor vehicle-related (MVR) incidents are important causes of morbidity among deployed US service members (SMs). Nonbattle MVR injuries are usually similar to civilian MVR injuries, while battle MVR injuries are often unique due to the blast effects from precipitating explosive mechanisms. Our primary objective was to describe the characteristics and trends of nonfatal MVR injuries sustained by deployed US SMs. A second objective was to assess the association between mechanism of injury (i.e., explosive vs. nonexplosive) and limb amputation.We conducted a retrospective cross-sectional analysis using data from the Department of Defense Trauma Registry collected from October 2001 to December 2018. Descriptive statistics were reported stratified by mechanism of injury (explosive vs. nonexplosive). The association between mechanism of injury and limb amputation was assessed using logistic regression models.There were 3,119 US casualties who sustained nonfatal MVR injuries, 2,380 (76.3%) SMs sustained nonexplosive MVR injuries while 739 (23.7%) sustained explosive MVR injuries. Of all MVR casualties, 2,085 (66.9%) were in Iraq or Syria and 1034 (33.1%) in Afghanistan. The annual prevalence of nonfatal MVR battle casualties was highest in Iraq and Syria from 2003 to 2009 and Afghanistan from 2009 to 2014, ranging overall 15 to 50 MVR casualties per 1,000 wounded in action. There were 92 limb amputations associated with MVR incidents. Compared with nonexplosive MVR mechanisms, explosive MVR mechanisms had higher association with limb amputation (adjusted odds ratio, 2.6; confidence interval, 1.7-3.9), even after adjusting for injury year and Injury Severity Score (AOR, 2.1; confidence interval: 1.4-3.4).Motor vehicle-related incidents are an important cause of injury in US military operations. Compared with nonexplosive MVR incidents, explosive MVR incidents result in more severe injuries, and have a higher associated risk of limb amputation. Continued efforts to improve injury prevention through protective equipment and medical training specific to MVR injuries are needed.Prognostic and epidemiological study, Level III.

Background Death from uncontrolled hemorrhage occurs rapidly, particularly among combat casualties. The US military has used warm fresh whole blood during combat operations owing to clinical and operational exigencies, but published outcomes data are limited. We compared early mortality between casualties who received warm fresh whole blood versus no warm fresh whole blood. Methods Casualties injured in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2014 who received ≥2 red blood cell containing units were reviewed using records from the Joint Trauma System Role 2 Database. The primary outcome was 6-hour mortality. Patients who received red blood cells solely from component therapy were categorized as the non–warm fresh whole blood group. Non– warm fresh whole blood patients were frequency-matched to warm fresh whole blood patients on identical strata by injury type, patient affiliation, tourniquet use, prehospital transfusion, and average hourly unit red blood cell transfusion rates, creating clinically unique strata. Multilevel mixed effects logistic regression adjusted for the matching, immortal time bias, and other covariates. Results The 1,105 study patients (221 warm fresh whole blood, 884 non–warm fresh whole blood) were classified into 29 unique clinical strata. The adjusted odds ratio of 6-hour mortality was 0.27 (95% confidence interval 0.13–0.58) for the warm fresh whole blood versus non–warm fresh whole blood group. The reduction in mortality increased in magnitude (odds ratio = 0.15, P = .024) among the subgroup of 422 patients with complete data allowing adjustment for seven additional covariates. There was a dose-dependent effect of warm fresh whole blood, with patients receiving higher warm fresh whole blood dose (>33% of red blood cell–containing units) having significantly lower mortality versus the non–warm fresh whole blood group. Conclusion Warm fresh whole blood resuscitation was associated with a significant reduction in 6-hour mortality versus non–warm fresh whole blood in combat casualties, with a dose-dependent effect. These findings support warm fresh whole blood use for hemorrhage control as well as expanded study in military and civilian trauma settings.

BACKGROUND: Whole blood is optimal for resuscitation of traumatic hemorrhage. Walking Blood Banks provide fresh whole blood (FWB) where conventional blood components or stored, tested whole blood are not readily available. There is an increasing interest in this as an emergency resilience measure for isolated communities and during crises including the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. We conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis of the available evidence to inform practice. METHODS: Standard systematic review methodology was used to obtain studies that reported the delivery of FWB (PROSPERO registry CRD42019153849). Studies that only reported whole blood from conventional blood banking were excluded. For outcomes, odds ratios (ORs) and 95% confidence interval (CI) were calculated using random-effects modeling because of high risk of heterogeneity. Quality of evidence was assessed using the Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development, and Evaluation system. RESULTS: Twenty-seven studies published from 2006 to 2020 reported >10,000 U of FWB for >3,000 patients (precise values not available for all studies). Evidence for studies was "low" or "very low" except for one study, which was "moderate" in quality. Fresh whole blood patients were more severely injured than non-FWB patients. Overall, survival was equivalent between FWB and non-FWB groups for eight studies that compared these (OR, 1.00 [95% CI, 0.65-1.55]; p = 0.61). However, the highest quality study (matched groups for physiological and injury characteristics) reported an adjusted OR of 0.27 (95% CI, 0.13-0.58) for mortality for the FWB group (p < 0.01). CONCLUSION: Thousands of units of FWB from Walking Blood Banks have been transfused in patients following life-threatening hemorrhage. Survival is equivalent for FWB resuscitation when compared with non-FWB, even when patients were more severely injured. Evidence is scarce and of relative low quality and may underestimate potential adverse events. Whereas Walking Blood Banks may be an attractive resilience measure, caution is still advised. Walking Blood Banks should be subject to prospective evaluation to optimize care and inform policy. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Systematic/therapeutic, level 3.

Calciphylaxis is a rare, necrotizing skin disorder usually associated with kidney disease, but also caused by many other systemic illnesses. This disease is associated with mortality rates as high as 80% at 1year. We present the demographic and clinical data of nine patients with calciphylaxis treated at our burn center over a 10year period. We review the literature on the clinical presentation, pathophysiology, diagnosis and treatment of this rare disease. We propose that these patients be treated similar to patients with thermal burn injury; meaning intensive wound care, surgical management, critical care and physical therapy. Burn centers are uniquely capable of caring for these incredibly complex patients due to their experience in managing patients with extensive skin and soft tissue defects, wounds and diseases.

BACKGROUND Thoracic surgery constitutes 2.5% of surgical procedures performed in theater, but the skills required are increasingly foreign to military surgeons. This study examines thoracic surgical workload in Iraq and Afghanistan to help define surgical training gaps. METHODS Retrospective analysis of Department of Defense Trauma Registry for all role 2 (R2) (forward surgical) and role 3 (R3) (theater) military facilities, from January 2002 to May 2016. The 95 thoracic surgical International Classification of Diseases-9th Rev.-Clinical Modification procedure codes were grouped into 10 categories based on anatomy or endoscopy. Select groups were further stratified by type of definitive procedure. Procedure groupings were determined and adjudicated by surgeon subject matter experts. Data analysis used Stata Version 15 (College Station, TX). RESULTS Of the total procedures, 5,301 were classified as thoracic surgical procedures and were included in the present study. The majority of thoracic surgical procedures (4,645 [87.6%]) were recorded as being performed at R3 medical treatment facilities (MTFs). The thoracic surgical procedures groups with the largest proportions were: bronchoscopy (39.1%), thoracotomy (16.9%), diaphragm (15.6%), and lung (11.4%). The most common lung procedure subgroup, aside from not otherwise specified, was segmentectomy (28.8%). The R3 MTFs recorded nearly five times the number of lung procedures compared with R2 MTFs; with R3 MTFs recording more than eight times the number of lobectomies compared with R2 MTFs. Thoracic workload was variable over the 15-year study period. CONCLUSION Thoracic surgical skills are necessary in the deployed environment to manage combat-related injuries. Given the current trends in training and specialization, development and sustainment of thoracic surgical skills is challenging in the deployed US trauma system and likely for other nations, and humanitarian surgical care as well. Current training and practice paradigms pose both training and sustainment challenges for surgeons who deploy to a combat zone. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE Therapeutic/Care Management IV.

The US Military has achieved the highest casualty survival rates in its history. However, there remain multiple areas in combat trauma that present challenges to the delivery of high-quality and effective trauma care. Previous work has identified research priorities for pre-hospital care, but there has been no similar analysis for forward surgical care.A list of critical "focus areas" was developed by the Committee on Surgical Combat Casualty Care (CoSCCC). Individual topics were solicited and mapped to appropriate focus areas by group consensus and review of Eastern Association for the Surgery of Trauma (EAST) and Joint Trauma System guidelines. A web-based survey was distributed to the CoSCCC and the military committees of EAST and the American Association for the Surgery of Trauma. Topics were rated on a Likert scale from 1 (low) to 10 (high priority). Descriptives, univariate statistics, and inter-rater correlation analysis was performed.13 research focus areas were identified (eight clinical and five adjunctive categories). Ninety individual topics were solicited. The survey received 64 responses. The majority of respondents were military (90%) versus civilians (10%). There was moderate to high agreement (inter-rater correlation coefficient = 0.93, p0.01) for 10 focus areas. The top five focus areas were Personnel/Staffing (mean, 8.03), Resuscitation and Hemorrhage Management (7.49), Pain/Sedation/Anxiety Management (6.96), Operative Interventions (6.9), and Initial Evaluation (6.9). The "Top 10" research priorities included four in Personnel/Staffing, four in Resuscitation/Hemorrhage Management, and three in Operative Interventions. A complete list of the topics/scores will be presented.This is the first objective ranking of research priorities for combat trauma care. The "Top 10" priorities were all from three focus areas, supporting prioritization of personnel/staffing of austere teams, resuscitation/hemorrhage control, and damage-control interventions. This data will help guide Department of Defense research programs and new areas for prioritized funding of both military and civilian researchers.Study design, level IV.

Background Death from injury occurs predominantly in prehospital settings. Injury prevention and prehospital care of military forces is the responsibility of combatant commanders. Medical examiner and trauma systems should routinely study fatalities and inform commanders of mortality trends. Methods Data reported on US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) fatalities who died while performing duties from September 11, 2001, to September 10, 2018, were reevaluated to compare subcommands, units, and trends. Injury was assessed by mechanism, severity, operational posture, and survivability. Death was assessed by manner, cause, classification, mechanism, and preventability. Results Of 614 USSOCOM fatalities (median age, 30 years; male, 98.5%), 67.6% occurred in the Army command, of which 49.2% occurred in the Special Forces command. Battle injury accounted for 60.1% of USSOCOM fatalities. Most battle-injured fatalities in each subcommand had nonsurvivable injuries and nonpreventable deaths. For each subcommand except Marine Corps, fatalities with nonsurvivable injuries sustained injuries primarily while mounted. By subcommand, the primary cause of death for fatalities with nonsurvivable injuries was blast for Army (57.6%), multiple/blunt force for Navy (60.0%), gunshot wound for Air Force (55.6%), and split between blast (50.0%) and gunshot wound (50.0%) for Marine Corps. For each subcommand except Air Force, fatalities with potentially survivable-survivable injuries sustained injuries primarily while dismounted, and the mechanism of death was primarily hemorrhage plus other mechanism or hemorrhage alone. Hemorrhage only mechanism of death was surpassed over time by complex multimechanism death. Potential for injury survivability and death preventability was greatest during early and later years of conflict. Conclusion Organizational differences in mortality characteristics and trends were identified from which commanders can refine efforts to prevent and treat injury and improve survival. Fatality analyses inform operational risk matrices and advance casualty prevention and response efforts. Prevention, assessment, and treatment strategies must evolve to reduce death from hemorrhage plus coexisting mechanisms. Level of evidence Performance Improvement and Epidemiological, level IV.

Observational/retrospective/historic controls, level IV.

BACKGROUNDAbdominal surgery constitutes approximately 13% of surgical procedures performed for combat injuries. This study examines the frequencies and type of abdominal surgical procedures performed during recent US Military operations.METHODSA retrospective analysis of the Department of Defense Tr

The purpose of this review was to evaluate past, present and emerging concepts in transfusion medicine as it pertains to combat casualty care. Transfusion practices have paramount historical significance in military medicine and battlefield care. An understanding of transfusion history during recent wars have helped inform some current practices and must not be forgotten, especially as we define the future of battlefield transfusion as it pertains to the importance and implementation of whole blood. The implementation of damage control resuscitation during the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has changed the face of modern transfusion practices in both military and civilian trauma. The value of whole blood has been recognized clinically and is considered the best fluid for hemorrhagic shock; however, despite being readily available during walking blood banks, widespread adoption and standardized availability remain a challenge. Transfusion is an essential capability and saves lives on the battlefield. Whole blood, followed by component therapy using the proper ratios, is the best fluid for hemorrhagic shock. There is a growing body of evidence regarding the detrimental effects of crystalloid use in hemorrhagic shock. The timing of blood product transfusion is critically important—minutes matter. Lessons learned in previous wars regarding the value of whole blood transfusion have been rediscovered and should be codified into military and civilian surgical practices.

Importance Armed conflict in the 21st century poses new challenges to a humanitarian surgical response, including changing security requirements, access to patients, and communities in need, limited deployable surgical assets, resource constraints, and the requirement to address both traumatic injuries as well as emergency surgical needs of the population. At the same time, recent improvements in trauma care and systems have reduced injury-related mortality. This combination of new challenges and medical capabilities warrants reconsideration of long-standing humanitarian surgery protocols. Objective To describe a consensus framework for surgical care designed to respond to this emerging need. Design, Setting, and Participants An international group of 35 representatives from humanitarian agencies, US military, and academic trauma programs was invited to the Stanford Humanitarian Surgical Response in Conflict Working Group to engage in a structured process to review extant trauma protocols and make recommendations for revision. Main Outcomes and Measures The working group’s method adapted core elements of a modified Delphi process combined with consensus development conference from August 3 to August 5, 2018. Results Lessons from civilian and military trauma systems as well as recent battlefield experiences in humanitarian settings were integrated into a tiered continuum of response from point of injury through rehabilitation. The framework addresses the security and medical requirements as well as ethical and legal principles that guide humanitarian action. The consensus framework includes trained, lay first responders; far-forward resuscitation/stabilization centers; rapid damage control surgical access; and definitive care facilities. The system also includes nontrauma surgical care, injury prevention, quality improvement, data collection, and predeployment training requirements. Conclusions and Relevance Evidence suggests that modern trauma systems save lives. However, the requirements of providing this standard of care in insecure conflict settings places new burdens on humanitarian systems that must provide both emergency and trauma surgical care. This consensus framework integrates advances in trauma care and surgical systems in response to a changing security environment. It is possible to reduce disparities and improve the standard of care in these settings.

This is a joint statement from the American College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma, the American College of Emergency Physicians, the National Association of Emergency Medical Services Physicians and the National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians regarding the clinical use of resuscitative endovascular balloon occlusion of the aorta (REBOA) in civilian trauma systems in the USA. This statement addresses the system of care needed to manage trauma patients requiring the use of REBOA, in light of the current evidence available in this patient population. This statement was developed by an expert panel following a comprehensive review of the literature with representation from all sponsoring organizations and the US Military. This is an update to the previous statement published in 2018. It has been formally endorsed by the four sponsoring organizations.

The purpose of this project was to evaluate the relationships between nutrition, physical activity levels (PALs), severity of illness (SOI), and survival in critically ill burn patients. We conducted a retrospective evaluation of consecutively admitted adult patients who had an intensive care unit stay ≥8 days after ≥20% TBSA burns. Linear regression was used to assess the association between SOI (sequential organ failure assessment scores) and PALs as well as between SOI and nutritional intake. After univariate analysis comparing survivors and nonsurvivors, factors with P < .10 were analyzed with multiple logistic regression. Characteristics of the 45 included patients were: 42 ± 15 years old, 37 ± 17% TBSA burns, 22% mortality. Factors independently associated with survival were burn size (negatively) (P = .018), height (positively) (P = .006), highest PAL during the first eight intensive care unit days (positively) (P = .016), and kcal balance during the fifth through the eighth intensive care unit days (positively) (P = .012). Sequential organ failure assessment scores had a significant (P < .001) but weak association with nutrition intake (R2 = 0.05) and PALs (R2 = 0.25). Higher nutritional intake and activity were significantly associated with lower mortality in critically ill burn patients. Given the weak associations between both nutritional intake and PALs with SOI, the primary barrier in achieving nutrition and activity goals was not SOI. We recommend that physical rehabilitation and nutritional intake be optimized in an effort to improve outcomes in critically ill burn patients.

Studies of fatalities from injury and disease guide prevention and treatment efforts for populations at risk. Findings can inform leadership and direct clinical practice guidelines, research, and personnel, training, and equipment requirements.A retrospective review and descriptive analysis was conducted of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) fatalities who died while performing duties from September 11, 2001, to September 10, 2018. Characteristics analyzed included subcommand, military activity, operational posture, and manner of death.Of 614 USSOCOM fatalities (median age, 30 years; male, 98.5%) the leading cause of death was injury (97.7%); specifically, multiple/blunt force injury (34.5%), blast injury (30.7%), gunshot wound (GSW; 30.3%), and other (4.5%). Most died outside the United States (87.1%), during combat operations (85.3%), in the prehospital environment (91.5%), and the same day of insult (90.4%). Most fatalities were with the US Army Special Operations Command (67.6%), followed by the Naval Special Warfare Command (16.0%), Air Force Special Operations Command (9.3%), and Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (7.2%). Of 54.6% who died of injuries incurred during mounted operations, most were on ground vehicles (53.7%), followed by rotary-wing (37.3%) and fixed-wing (9.0%) aircrafts. The manner of death was primarily homicide (66.0%) and accident (30.5%), followed by natural (2.1%), suicide (0.8%), and undetermined (0.7%). Specific homicide causes of death were GSW (43.7%), blast injury (42.2%), multiple/blunt force injury (13.8%), and other (0.2%). Specific accident causes of death were multiple/blunt force injury (80.7%), blast injury (6.4%), GSW (0.5%), and other (12.3%). Of accident fatalities with multiple/blunt force injury, the mechanism was mostly aircraft mishaps (62.9%), particularly rotary wing (68.4%).Most USSOCOM fatalities died abroad from injury in the prehospital setting. To improve survival from military activities worldwide, leaders must continue to optimize prehospital capability and develop strategies that rapidly connect patients to advanced resuscitative and surgical care.Epidemiological, level IV; Therapeutic level IV.

Background The purpose of this study was to examine risk factors for mortality in burned patients with inhalation injury (II). We further sought to compare a cohort of burned military service members to civilian patients with II. Methods We identified patients treated at our burn center over a 10-year period. Demographics, injury characteristics, and outcomes were compared between patients with and without II. Logistic regression analysis was performed to determine the impact of patient characteristics and II grade on mortality. Results 3791 patients treated at our burn center met study inclusion criteria. 424 (11.2%) patients were diagnosed with II [II(+)]. Age, % total body surface area (TBSA) burned, % full thickness burned, intensive care unit (ICU) days, hospital days, and mortality were all greater in II(+) patients. Separating the II(+) patients into military and civilian groups, there was a higher incidence of grade 4 II and higher mortality for grades 2–4 II in military patients. Analyses demonstrated that military service was associated with increased mortality in II(+) patients. The bronchoscopic grade of II did not have an association with mortality in this population. Conclusions II(+) patients were older, had larger burns, needed more ICU and hospital days, and had higher mortality rates. Among II(+) patients, military affiliation was associated with more severe II and increased mortality. Establishment of an objective grading system for II that is associated with mortality is a meaningful future research endeavor.

Hemorrhage continues to be the most common cause of death among service members wounded in combat. Injuries that were previously nonsurvivable in previous wars are now routinely seen by combat surgeons in forward surgical units, the result of improvements in body armor, the universal use of field tourniquets to control extremity hemorrhage at the point of injury, and rapid air evacuation strategies. Combat orthopaedic surgeons remain a vital aspect of the forward surgical unit, tasked with assisting general surgical colleagues in the resuscitation of patients in hemorrhagic shock while also addressing traumatic amputations, open and closed long bone fractures, and mechanically unstable pelvic trauma. Future military and civilian trauma research endeavors will seek to identify how the advances made in the past 15 years will translate toward the emerging battlefield of the future, one where forward surgical units must be lighter, smaller, and more mobile to address the changing scope of military combat operations.

In the current deployed environment, small teams are dispersed to provide damage control surgical capabilities within an hour of injury. Given the well-developed evacuation system, these teams do not typically have a significant patient hold capability. Improved understanding of the shortfalls and problems encountered when caring for combat casualties in prolonged care situations will facilitate improved manning, training, and equipping of these resource-limited teams. We present the case of two critically injured soldiers who were evacuated to a 10-person split Forward Surgical Team (FST) during a weather system that precluded further evacuation. The casualties underwent damage control procedures necessitating temporary abdominal closures. The FST had to organize itself to provide intensive care significantly longer than traditional timelines for this role of care. Additionally, most team members had scarce critical care experience. An after-action review confirmed that most team members felt that they had not received adequate pre-mission training in postoperative intensive care and were not comfortable managing ventilated patients. In the current mature theaters of operations, there are robust evacuation capabilities, and presentations of scenarios like that are rare. However, as combat casualty care becomes increasingly austere and remote, small surgical teams need to train and be equipped to provide care outside of normal operation and doctrinal limits, including robust team cross-training. Incorporating principles of the prolonged care of combat casualties into the training of military surgeons will improve preparedness for these challenging situations.