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In this paper, we study a green product dual-channel supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. The service free-riding is considered, and the channel price difference is also introduced as a strategic tool to adjust the channel conflict. In centralized and decentralized models, we give the optimal decisions of the supply chain members and analyse the effects of the service free-riding and the price difference on the related decisions. In order to coordinate the dual-channel green supply chain, we also design a two-part tariff contract coordination model, which allows both the manufacturer and the retailer to obtain a win–win result. From the analytical and numerical results, we find that the proper service free-riding degree and price difference are beneficial to the decision makers and the greening of supply chain. And in the centralized model, when the degree of service free-riding is small, the increase of the channel price difference can stimulate the manufacturer to provide the lower price product with lower service and green degree, otherwise, it is the opposite. Besides, the result also shows that, except for consumers, the centralized model always performs better than the decentralized model in the profit and social welfare aspects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies alternative procurement modes for emergency supplies in the presence of a public sector and a private supplier. A key feature of such a supply chain is that the private supplier must consider commercial demand in addition to disaster demand. Three procurement modes are analysed: an option mode (OM), an order-before-disaster mode (OBDM) and a procurement-after-disaster mode (PADM). We provide the optimal decisions associated with these three modes. Theoretical results in the OM show that a large order is not always better for the private supplier. From theoretical and numerical comparative analyses, no mode is absolutely superior. For the public sector, there are two thresholds. When the disaster probability is less than the low threshold, the revenues of all procurement modes are the same; when the disaster probability is larger than the high threshold, the OBDM has the highest revenue; otherwise, the OM has the highest revenue. However, for the private supplier, the PADM always has the highest revenue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the coordination issue of a two-echelon fuzzy closed-loop supply chain. Two coordinating models with symmetric and asymmetric information about retailer's collecting scale parameter are established by using game theory, and the corresponding analytical solutions are obtained. Theoretical analysis and numerical example show that the maximal expected profits of the fuzzy closed-loop supply chain in two coordination situations are equal to that in the centralized decision case and greater than that in the decentralized decision scenario. Furthermore, under asymmetric information contract, the maximal expected profit obtained by the low-collecting-scale-level retailer is higher than that under symmetric information contract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the influence of cost-sharing mechanism on the disruption prevention investment in a supply chain with unreliable suppliers. When a supply chain faces considerable loss following a disruption, supply chain members are motivated toward investing in manners that reduce their disruption probability. In improving supply chain reliability, the cost-sharing mechanism must be set appropriately to realize the efficiency of the disruption prevention investment. In a supply chain where the focal manufacturing company has its own subsidiary supplier and an outsourcing supplier, we analyze different forms of cost-sharing mechanisms when both suppliers confront disruption risks. Through the cost-sharing mechanisms presented in this study, supply chain members can improve their reliability via disruption prevention investments without considerably increasing the total supply chain cost. We present two concepts, the cost-sharing structure and the cost-sharing ratio, in this study. As the two key components of cost-sharing mechanism, these two elements constitute a practicable cost allocation mechanism to facilitate disruption prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]