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Modular integrated construction (MiC) becomes a promising solution to improve production efficiency in the construction industry. However, the off‐site production and on‐site installation processes of MiC pose challenges to collaboration efficiency among the multiple stakeholders involved, including subcontractors, contractors, and consumers. These challenges stem from information dispersion, which impedes effective collaboration and communication. Such problems can be solved by introducing a blockchain‐based cyber‐physical service platform, which can facilitate information sharing and collaboration across the supply chain. In this paper, we study the impacts of MiC and blockchain technology on construction supply chains and reveal several important insights. First, we find that there exists a first‐mover advantage in the traditional construction supply chain, where subcontractors engage in a sequential game, and the subcontractor who produces first obtains more profit than the counterparts. Moreover, the contractor's ability to increase profits by reducing the unit cost of construction time is limited, but it can improve the effectiveness of the time gap due to early delivery. Second, we show that MiC should not be introduced if it significantly reduces collaboration efficiency in the supply chain. Interestingly, increasing the unit cost of construction for subcontractors can actually result in greater profits for all members of the supply chain. Regarding adopting blockchain technology, our findings suggest that supply chain members generally hold similar attitudes. Specifically, when the value of blockchain in improving collaboration efficiency is below a certain threshold, its adoption may not be beneficial, despite its potential to enable rapid production and early delivery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vaccination is a well-known method to protect the public against an epidemic outbreak, e.g., COVID-19. To this end, the government of a country or region would strive to achieve its target of vaccination coverage. Limited by the total vaccine capacity of public hospitals, the government may need to cooperate with private hospitals or clinics for more vaccination. Exploring in this paper government coordination of public and private resources for vaccination, we model a vaccine system consisting of a public hospital, a profit-maximizing private clinic, and self-interested individuals, under three scenarios: (1) without information sharing (concerning vaccine inventory and vaccine price), (2) with information sharing and subsidy, and (3) with information sharing and allocation. We find that, under scenario (1), the vaccine demand is fully satisfied by the public hospital and the private clinic cannot make any profit. Under scenario (2), the private clinic is willing to enter the vaccine market with a positive profit-maximizing vaccination coverage. Under scenario (3), the socially optimal vaccination coverage may be lower than that under scenario (1). Moreover, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to generate practical implications of the research findings for vaccination policy-making. Our results provide both theoretical and managerial insights on vaccine supply decision, government intervention, and vaccination coverage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenon of copycats is common in a wide range of industries. Recently, to indicate product authenticity and combat copycats, many brand name companies (BNCs) have started selling products through retailers. These BNCs deploy a scalable protocol that is integrated into a permissioned blockchain technology (PBT) platform. We examine how PBT combats copycats in the supply chain and how it benefits BNCs. Although PBT implementation helps novice customers identify product authenticity and the real quality of products, that is, to take advantage of a quality disclosure effect, we show that, if and only if the number of novice customers is large enough, then selling through a PBT retailer can effectively combat copycats. Thus, PBT increases the profit of the BNC, consumer surplus, social welfare, and reduces the profit of a copycat. Moreover, conventional wisdom tells us that PBT ensures supply chain transparency and motivates a firm to improve its product quality. However, the BNC reduces the quality of its products when using PBT, because an improvement in product quality is not profitable if consumers can distinguish between genuine and imitation products. Furthermore, we extend the model by considering the case where the BNC itself implements PBT. Without the double marginalization effect, even if the number of novice customers is small, blockchain technology may exist in the market (the BNC self‐implements). In addition, if the unit production cost of a genuine product is large enough, social welfare increases when production cost increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sustainability is a prevalent topic as the consumers and the governments are much more concerned about the environmental pollution. To reduce the carbon emission, in real world practice, governments have executed different forms of policies to motivate the firms to operate in a sustainable manner. This paper aims to examine the value of bargaining contract when the supply chain member invests in the sustainability projects, and explore the effectiveness of the direct (e.g., cash grant) and indirect (e.g., an increased environmental tax rate) subsidies in reducing the total carbon emission. We first derive the optimal pricing and sustainability effort under the wholesale pricing contract when either the manufacturer or the retailer makes the sustainability investment. We then consider the supply chain coordination under the two-part tariff, revenue sharing, and bargaining contracts. We uncover that only the bargaining contract can coordinate the supply chain and a Pareto improvement is achieved when the bargaining power of the manufacturer is in a specific range. Finally, we reveal that both the direct and indirect subsidies can increase the sustainability effort but they are not always an effective tool to reduce the total carbon emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a dual-channel supply, the manufacturer sells the products by both a traditional channel via the retailer and an online channel directly. Comparing with the direct channel, the retailer may provide additional services to the traditional channel. This paper studies the quantity leadership for a dual-channel supply chain with retail service. The manufacturer decides the wholesale price of the products and its selling quantity via the online channel, and the retailer decides the service level and its selling quantity via the traditional channel. We consider three Cournot competition games: Manufacturer-as-leader game, retailer-as-leader game, and simultaneous game. Optimal solutions are derived for these games. Based on the optimal solutions, we investigate the quantity leadership/followership decisions for the manufacturer and retailer, associated with the changes of some parameters. We observe that when the service sensitivity parameters are low, being a follower is a dominant strategy for the retailer; otherwise, both strategies of manufacturer-as-leader (retailer as the follower) and retailer-as-leader (manufacturer as the follower) are Nash equilibriums. We further conduct the numerical studies to investigate the impacts of parameters related to the retail service, and discuss the insights of the findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The manufacturer investing in green product development (GPD) is dominating in the long term. • Investing GPD may not be optimal for both supply chain members in the short term. • Under certain conditions, the prices in the second period are lower than the first period. • The corresponding demand in the second period is always lower than the first period. • The products are greener when the manufacturer invests in GPD. We study the strategic investment for green product development (GPD) in a supply chain. We develop a stylized two-period model in which either the retailer or the manufacturer could decide to invest in GPD in the second period. We find that the manufacturer investing in GPD is dominating because both supply chain members could earn more and the manufacturer could save more on the environmental tax. Under certain conditions, the prices are lower in the second period. However, the corresponding demand in the second period is always lower than the first period when the products become green. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract The adoption of clean technology is crucial for sustainably achieving the carbon emission reduction. Investing in clean technology projects yields tax reduction and additional market demands. Previous attempts at undertaking such projects have shown that both the manufacturer and retailer receive incentives for investing in such projects during the manufacturing process. In this study, we investigate clean technology investment in a competitive environment for a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers. We consider three investment scenarios, i.e., the investment is made by the manufacturer, both the retailers, or only one retailer. By investigating these scenarios, we find that the manufacturer prefers to have both the retailers make the investment. However, the retailers may prefer not to let their supply chain partner, i.e., the manufacturer, make the investment. In addition, because of the spillover effect from the competitor's investment, a free rider can improve its profit, though the improvement is insignificant. Moreover, we find that it is possible to simultaneously achieve economic and environmental optimality in the scenario in which both the retailers make the investment, whereby all supply chain members' profits and the emission reduction are higher than those in other scenarios. Furthermore, analyzing the effects of the investment on consumers, we find that in most cases, the more eco-friendly the product is, the higher retail price the consumers must pay. Highlights • Manufacturer prefers to have both retailers invest in clean technology. • Retailers may prefer not to let their supply chain partner make the investment. • The spillover effect of the investment exists but is limited. • Profits and emission reduction are the highest when both retailers invest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Design innovation is the engine of fashion. Many fashion firms outsource design innovation to their suppliers. Design outsourcing is on the rise in the fashion supply chain, but research in this area lags behind industry practice. In this paper, we examine how design outsourcing affects the supply chain, and we compare supply chain performance under an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) strategy versus an Original Design Manufacturer (ODM) strategy. We evaluate a market size outsourcing model where design enhancement influences market size, and a success probability outsourcing model where design enhancement influences the success probability of innovation. We find that when the supplier trades with the retailer via a wholesale price contract under the ODM strategy, the supplier has no incentive to invest in innovation. In the market size outsourcing model, the design innovation in the centralized supply chain is higher than that under the OEM strategy. However, in the success probability outsourcing model, the success probability of innovation under the OEM strategy is higher than that in the centralized supply chain. Furthermore, we find that a profit sharing contract can achieve supply chain coordination under both OEM and ODM strategies; whereas, revenue sharing and buyback contracts cannot. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an important supply chain development strategy, green investment and sustainability are concerns of the government and enterprises. However, due to the high cost and low profit of green investment, a large number of small and medium-sized firms can be deterred from their implementation. Value co-creation has become a key measure to solve this problem. This article explores the relationship between the green supply chain (GSC) strategy, value co-creation, and corporate performance in the manufacturing environment, and considers the regulatory effects of internal environmental factors and external environmental pressures on this relationship. Based on data from 115 manufacturers in China, we tested the hypotheses, explained the statistical results, and identified key concerns for implementing GSC through value co-creation. The findings reveal that the GSC strategy can promote a high level of firms' value co-creation with their supply chain partners, and different value co-creation modes have different effects on firm performance (i.e., operational performance, innovation performance, and financial performance). In addition, the findings indicate that macro-level external pressure and micro-level internal support could enhance such effects. This study enriches the literature with value co-creation modes and GSC management by integrating GSC strategies and value co-creation strategies, providing confidence to the firms and their supply chain partners in value co-creation, thus helping them to better implement a GSC strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• New entrant will enter the market when the profit margin from selling is large. • The incumbent buyer chooses different CSR efforts as defensive strategies. • The supply chain becomes less responsible and reduces CSR efforts with competition. • The effect of competition is weakened when the competitive intensity increases. • Detection efficiency plays a crucial role in responsibility and strategy preference. Recently, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been received extensive attentions in emerging markets. In this paper, we explore the impact of competition on CSR in supply chains, where the buyers strategically make CSR efforts with their common supplier to capture consumers with CSR awareness. We derive conditions for each firm's optimal CSR efforts, strategy preferences and CSR implications in monopoly and duopoly scenarios. Compared with the monopoly scenario, the supply chain is more likely to be irresponsible and reduce the total CSR effort level in the duopoly scenario. However, the effect of competition is weakened when the competitive intensity increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]