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Modular production brings new opportunities for service provisions. We examine a supply chain consisting of two competing module suppliers and a common manufacturer, in which the manufacturer sources two differentiated modules from two suppliers and then produces two competing products for consumers. A delegation relationship is applied to explore the possibility of the module services offered by the suppliers. When the service commission fees are fixed, there exist optimal commission fees to maximize the manufacturer's profit. Service commission fees, service efficiencies, service sensitivity, and market types greatly affect the service levels, prices, and profitability of each member in the supply chain. The manufacturer should strategically adopt differentiated pricing strategies and service provisions from two suppliers rather than the best service abilities of the suppliers. In the service‐level sensitivity market, the improved service levels are more attractive to consumers so that the manufacturer will charge high prices by investing more in services. Product services with "high quality, high price" are more suitable for high‐end consumers. We also consider the variable service commission fees and find that there are still some robust results except that the effects of the service incentives and the commission fees will be enlarged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines contingent rerouting strategy for enhancing supply chain resilience taking a supplier's point of view. We consider a supply chain with multiple suppliers at each stage and establish a mathematical model for product allocation behavior among different suppliers. The allocation model is based on each supplier's production capacity, product quality, production cost, as well as possible decision maker's preferences. As a performance measure for rerouting strategy, we use the total outflow of the supply chain. We propose an optimization model and its solution determines the rerouting strategy for product flow through the supply chain under disruptions. Numerical examples demonstrate the effect of the rerouting strategy and show the resilience of the supply chain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers a supply chain for a single product involving one retailer and two independent suppliers, when the main supplier might fail to supply the products, the backup supplier can always supply the products at a higher price. The retailer could use the backup supplier as a regular provider or a stand-by source by reserving some products at the supplier. A backup agreement with penalty scheme is constructed between the retailer and the backup supplier to mitigate the supply disruptions and the demand uncertainty. The expected profit functions and the optimal decisions of the two players are derived through a sequential optimisation process. Then, the sensitivity of two players’ expected profits to various input factors is examined through numerical examples. The impacts of the disruption probability and the demand uncertainty on the backup agreement are also investigated, which could provide guideline for how to use each sourcing method. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract: This paper studies a buy-back contract between a buyer and a backup supplier when the buyer’s main supplier experiences disruptions. The expected profit functions and the optimal decisions of the contract players are derived through a sequential optimization process. The common properties of the contract as well as the differences under the demand uncertainty and the main supplier’s recurrent supply uncertainty are explored through comparative studies and numerical examples. The study contributes to the literature by providing a better understanding of the impacts of demand and supply uncertainties and by shedding insights on the value of a backup supply. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]