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A safe, efficient, and convenient transportation system is integral to the health of our economy and quality of life. Our nation's vast transportation system of airways, railways, roads, pipelines, transit, and waterways has served this need, yet it is under considerable strain from (1) increasing congestion, (2) the large costs to maintain and improve it, and (3) the human cost of over 44,000 people killed and over 2.5 million injured each year in transportation-related accidents. The Department of Transportation implements national transportation policy and administers most federal transportation programs. For fiscal year 2008, the department has requested $67 billion to carry out these and other activities. While the department carries out some activities directly, such as employing about 15,000 air traffic controllers to make certain that planes stay a safe distance apart, it does not have direct control over the vast majority of activities that it funds, such as local decisions on the priority and placement of airports, public transit, and roads. In other cases, such as railways and pipelines, the infrastructure is owned and operated by industry. This statement presents GAO's views on major transportation challenges facing Congress and the department. It is based on GAO products, including recommendations made, and the products of others. Financing mechanisms for the nation's transportation system are under stress. Our nation's transportation infrastructure is threatened by increasing demand for transportation services, and revenue from traditional funding mechanisms for the nation's highway and aviation systems may be unable to keep pace at current tax rates. In addition, freight traffic is projected to grow substantially, but current planning and financing mechanisms impede public strategies to address needs. Our nation's mobility is threatened because the nation's infrastructure is under great strain. Congestion across modes (e.g., aviation, highways, and rail) is expected to worsen. However, funding by mode and the lack of performance-related goals result in little assurance that funds are being channeled to the most critical mobility concerns and that intermodal approaches can be integrated into the transportation system. Improvements in transportation safety are needed to reduce the number of deaths and injuries from transportation accidents--about 95 percent of which occur on our nation's roads. Increases in congestion across modes as a result of population and economic growth could cause deterioration in transportation safety despite departmental and state efforts to reduce accidents. The transition from the current air traffic control system to a broader and modernized system will be one of the department's most complex undertakings. In previous years, FAA has faced systemic management and acquisition problems that led us to designate its air traffic control modernization program as high risk. While the agency has... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As requested, GAO reviewed coordination practices in various metropolitan areas to find regional programs with lessons learned that could be applied in the National Capital Region (NCR) and elsewhere. We addressed the following questions: (1) In selected metropolitan areas, what factors enhance regional coordination? (2) What features of federal programs enhance regional emergency preparedness coordination? (3) How does regional coordination for emergency preparedness in the NCR incorporate features from other areas and federal programs? For detailed analysis, we selected Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Tampa-St. Petersburg--considered by DHS to be high-threat urban areas because of their population and critical infrastructure, among other factors. We also analyzed regional coordination in the planning and implementation of transportation and environmental programs because of their history of requiring such collaboration. DHS and the District of Columbia's Deputy Mayor/City Administrator generally agreed with our report regarding the characteristics of regional coordination and that the NCR's Urban Area Security Initiative governance structure was relatively advanced. GAO's analysis of federal program documents and plans, and interviews with federal, state, and local officials in six metropolitan areas revealed several factors that characterize effective regional coordination of federally supported efforts. Regional coordination efforts are enhanced by the presence of a collaborative regional organization that includes representation from many different jurisdictions and different disciplines. Also, when regional civic and political traditions foster interjurisdictional coordination, flexibility in the membership and geographic area of the regional organization can enhance collaborative activities. In addition, a comprehensive strategic plan with measurable goals and objectives helps focus resources and efforts to address problems. Finally, funding regional organizations provides incentives for their collaborative planning activities. The federal government can provide support for regional coordination. In particular, through its grant design and requirements, it encourages structures and practices associated with effective regional efforts. For example, federal transportation law requires the existence of metropolitan planning organizations (MPO) before transportation funds can be awarded. Some programs have recognized the importance of flexibility by allowing local jurisdictions to organize themselves in ways consistent with their regional environment. For example, the DHS' Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program allowed three San Francisco Bay programs to pool some of their grant resources to establish a regionwide UASI effort. Moreover, some federal grants require regional organizations to prepare plans that guide funding decisions. Transportation law, for example, requires MPOs to prepare transportation improvement plans as a condition for awards. Finally, federal financial support can facilitate coordination activities. Several programs, including the MPO program, provide such support. The characteristics of effective regional coordination we identified are applicable to the NCR's efforts to coordinate emergency preparedness. If implemented as planned and as observed in its early stage, the NCR's UASI program would include a collaborative regional organization. However, as we reported in May 2004, the NCR did not include a full array of homeland security grants in its planning. The NCR's UASI program plans to address those issues by identifying non-UASI funding sources and collecting information about the funding allocations, expenditures, and purposes, as well as data on spending by NCR jurisdiction. DHS and UASI officials believe these data will enable program managers to avoid duplication of expenditures and to better utilize program funds. Regional approaches are changing quickly, and the nation is still in the early stages of building regional institutions across the country to deal with homeland security issues. Those important developments warrant continued congressional monitoring and oversight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

GAO was mandated to assess the effectiveness of defense agency performance contracts as management tools. As agreed, GAO also reviewed other tools (performance plans and balanced scorecards) and focused on three defense agencies--the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA). GAO addressed (1) the extent that the defense agencies initially used performance contracts, including whether this tool addressed attributes associated with results-oriented management; (2) defense agencies' efforts to implement performance plans using lessons learned from the initial contracts; and (3) the extent DOD established mechanisms to share lessons learned. GAO reviewed the content of these tools, but not the actual or reported performance. DISA has not yet finalized its scorecard, thus this report discusses only DISA's plans for its scorecard. Since fiscal year 1998, the Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented various tools to help manage and oversee the performance of defense agencies. Between fiscal year 1999 and 2003, DLA, DISA, and DODEA initially used "performance contracts"--internal management agreements--to bring specific problems to the attention of senior DOD and agency leadership. While the contracts produced some useful information for decision makers, this tool would have been more effective for assessing performance, making resource allocation decisions, and taking corrective actions if DOD had required the agencies to include certain attributes associated with results-oriented management. Such attributes include aligning agency performance goals and measures with agency strategic plans and departmentwide goals; identifying individuals accountable for achieving results; providing a comprehensive view of organizational performance; linking resource needs to performance; discussing data quality; and providing contextual information, including external factors that affect reported performance. Beginning in fiscal year 2003, DOD renamed the performance contracts as "performance plans" and gave the defense agencies the option to use a "balanced scorecard" approach, a tool used in the public and private sectors to assess organizational performance. Based on experiences using the initial contracts, DOD took steps to strengthen performance plans and scorecards by revising the oversight and review process, requiring performance measures to align with agency and departmentwide goals, and requiring measures to provide a more comprehensive view of agency performance. DLA's scorecard, DODEA's performance plan, and DISA's plans for the agency's scorecard incorporated these changes and other attributes to varying degrees. While these tools have the potential to provide information useful to decision makers, they would be strengthened if DOD had required the agencies to include additional attributes such as designating specific individuals responsible for achieving results; identifying the relationship between resource needs and performance; reporting on data quality; and providing contextual information to allow top leaders to understand the extent of progress made, take corrective actions to achieve goals, and establish realistic performance goals for future years. With these attributes, decision makers would potentially gain additional insights into agency performance and areas needing greater management attention. DOD has developed mechanisms, such as a performance management Web site and roundtables, to help agencies share lessons learned from implementing performance plans and scorecards. In response to GAO's suggestions during this review, DOD recognized the need to continue to hold roundtables more frequently. DLA and DISA have also proactively shared their experiences with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is the fifth consecutive year that we have reviewed the District of Columbia's performance accountability report as mandated by the Federal Payment Reauthorization Act of 1994. The act requires the Mayor of the District of Columbia to submit to the Congress a performance accountability plan containing a statement of measurable and objective performance goals for the coming fiscal year for all significant activities of the District government. After the end of the fiscal year, the District is to submit a performance accountability report on the extent to which the District achieved these goals. This requirement for the District government is similar to the requirements for executive branch federal agencies under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). GAO's report focuses on the continued progress the District has made in performance reporting. Specifically, the objectives of this report were to (1) examine the extent to which the performance accountability report is in compliance with statutory requirements, and (2) summarize some of the District's other significant performance management initiatives and identify additional opportunities for improvement. The District of Columbia's Fiscal Year 2003 Performance Accountability Report generally complied with the statutory reporting requirements and provided a comprehensive review of the District's performance. In general, the act required the District to provide performance goals for all significant activities of the District government in its proposed budget and financial plan. Then, at the end of the fiscal year, the District is required to report on its actual performance for each goal. First, the District provided a statement of the actual level of performance achieved compared to each of the goals stated in the performance accountability plan for the year for almost all significant activities. Second, the District provided the title of the management employee most directly responsible for the achievement of each goal and the title of the employee's immediate supervisor or superior for almost all significant activities. Finally, the District provided a statement of the status of significant court orders applicable to the government of the District of Columbia during the year and the steps it took to comply with such orders. In summarizing some of the District's performance management initiatives, we found that the 2003 performance report provided an update on the expansion and implementation of several performance management programs. The District reported on the expansion of the performance-based budgeting program to 27 additional agencies. The District also reported plans to expand the recommendations and court orders tracking system to begin tracking cost of implementing recommendations and court orders. In addition, the District reported plans to implement an online budgeting and performance program to link agency budgeting and performance reporting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) has been in effect for 10 years. In that context, the subcommittee asked GAO to discuss our recent report, Results- Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results. Our testimony addresses the effectiveness of GPRA in creating a focus on results in the federal government. GPRA's requirements have established a solid foundation of results-oriented performance planning, measurement, and reporting in the federal government. Federal managers surveyed by GAO reported having significantly more of the types of performance measures called for by GPRA. GPRA has also begun to facilitate the linking of resources to results, although much remains to be done in this area to increase the use of performance information to make decisions about resources. In our report, we also found agency strategic and annual performance plans and reports have improved over initial efforts. Although a foundation has been established, numerous significant challenges to GPRA implementation still exist. Inconsistent top leadership commitment to achieving results within agencies and OMB can hinder the development of results-oriented cultures in agencies. Furthermore, in certain areas, federal managers continue to have difficulty setting outcome-oriented goals, collecting useful data on results, and linking institutional, program, unit, and individual performance measurement and reward systems. Finally, there is an inadequate focus on addressing issues that cut across federal agencies. OMB, as the focal point for management in the federal government, is responsible for overall leadership and direction in addressing these challenges. OMB has clearly placed greater emphasis on management issues during the past several years. However, OMB has showed less commitment to GPRA implementation in its guidance to agencies and is not using the governmentwide performance plan requirement of GPRA to develop an integrated approach to crosscutting issues. In our view, governmentwide strategic planning could better facilitate the integration of federal activities to achieve national goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]