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This research explores the moderating effect of institutional ownership on the relationship between audit committee attributes and audit report lag. The paper sampled data from 102 Saudi non-financial listed firms from 2012 to 2021. The data was analyzed using a fixed effect regression, while the generalized method of moments approach (GMM) was employed for robustness check. The research finding strongly suggests that the audit committee size may increase audit report lag. In contrast, it was found that audit committee independence and financial expertise may reduce audit report lag. In addition, the interaction effect reveals that the impact of audit committee financial expertise and the committee meetings on reducing audit report lag may be higher as institutional shareholding rises. Thus, the outcome validates the agency theory perspective that the active monitoring of institutional investors may shape firms' internal governance systems. More importantly, the finding implies that firms should prefer a smaller audit size with a higher ratio of independent directors and financial experts to improve financial reporting quality. They should also embrace institutional shareholding to reduce audit report lag. Thus, lowering audit report lag may mitigate information disparity between firms and prospective investors, reducing agency conflicts and boosting firm value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study seeks to influence the impact of stock liquidity on the excess financial leverage emphasizing the moderating role of institutional shareholders. The scope of the study includes the firms listed in the Tehran Securities Exchange over 2012-2018, among which 202 firms were selected through systematic elimination and data was analyzed using a regression model. The present study is considered among applied research and is a correlation study. Desk research has been used to collect information and data while financial statements, explanatory notes, and the stock exchange monthly have been used to collect research data. Variance heterogeneity pre-tests, the F-Limer test, the Hausman test, and the Jarque-Bra test were used first to analyze data, and a multiple regression test was then used to confirm or reject the research hypothesis (Eviews software). Results indicated that stock liquidity has a significant influence on surplus financial leverage, while institutional ownership influenced the relationship between stock liquidity and surplus financial leverage significantly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutional owners frequently invest in a diversified portfolio of firms to avoid firm-specific risks. I investigate the particular scenario in which the institutional owners have shares in both the acquiring and the acquired target firms of an M&A deal. Using a quasi-experimental approach, I find that the acquirer pays less premium and performs better after the M&A effectiveness when the ratio between the value owned by common institutional shareholders in the acquirer and the value held by the same shareholders in the target firm is higher. The value paid is higher, and the performance worsens when this ratio is lower. The results suggest the common institutional owners can obtain benefits from promoting and implementing such M&A deals as a secondary compensation for their lack of control, usually at the expense of the controlling shareholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I ask whether corporate communication programs influence shareholder base retention. I use spin-offs to study the communication programs of the spun-off business units that inherit their parent firms' shareholders. Unit firms that initiate a communication program maintain higher levels of post-spin-off institutional ownership and retain more of the inherited institutional shareholder base than firms that do not communicate. An important benefit of communication is that these firms avoid the stock price pressure commonly experienced by unit firms following a sell-off by the inherited institutional shareholder base. This paper extends our understanding of the role of communication in retaining institutional shareholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economists have long held that bringing firms under the umbrella of a common ownership structure creates monopolistic conditions that reduce competition. We challenge this view by investigating competition between firms in a nuanced manner. We examine the competitive and performance implications of "common institutional ownership," which occurs when an institutional investor owns a sizeable number of shares in two publicly traded firms. We argue that rival firms with common ownership structures will engage in dissimilar competitive action repertoires to avoid direct competition with each other. Competing aggressively, but with dissimilar action repertoires, allows rivals to maintain high levels of performance. Competing with dissimilar action repertoires also helps ensure that performance disparity between the two firms remains low. In other words, competitive aggressiveness with dissimilar action repertoires yields an optimal competitive solution for rival firms and their common owners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the impact of the foreign residency rights of controlling shareholders (foreign residency rights, or FRRs) on their firms' research and development (R&D) investment. The results are robust using a propensity score matching model and alternative metrics of FRRs and R&D investment. The findings suggest that firms with FRR controlling shareholders engage in less R&D investment than those without FRR controlling shareholders. Additional analysis indicates that high institutional investor ownership and a high‐quality internal control can restrain the adverse impact of FRRs on a firm's R&D investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taxes are one of the biggest sources of APBN revenue. This biggest income must continue to be properly increased so that the country's growth rate can run well. Taxpayer non-compliance is usually done in various ways such as tax evasion. Tax evasion is an effort to reduce the tax burden legally without violating tax regulations by taxpayers by trying to reduce the amount of tax owed by looking for loopholes in tax regulations. This research is a quantitative research with an associative approach. The data analysis tool uses the SPSS version 22 program. The locations taken in this study are listed non-financial sector companies listed on the IDX with the research period 2016 to 2018. Institutional ownership has no negative effect on tax evasion. The results of this study support previous research by Dewi and Jati (2014) who found that institutional ownership has no effect on tax control. However, it is different from the research results of Alviyani (2016) which proves that institutional ownership has a negative effect on tax avoidance. Auditor independence has no negative effect on tax evasion. This research is in line with research by Tandean (2016) which states that auditor independence has no effect on tax evasion, but this research is not in line with research by Kartiko & Martani (2013) which states that in the long term after auditor rotation, the quality of accounting earnings is getting better and indirectly directly affect the reduction of tax avoidance actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It often becomes desirable to change the ownership of a policy from a company to a business owner. If the policy has cash value, the income tax impact can be significant. There are four potential approaches to the effect of the transfer that we will discuss in this column: 1) the value of the policy can be treated as compensation; 2) the policy can be sold for its fair market value; 3) the value of the policy can be treated as a dividend or shareholder distribution; or 4) the policy could be part of the proceeds for a sale of the owner's interest in the business. We will look at each of these options and examine it for all three major entity types: S corporations, C corporations, and partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study how messages on Twitter by large non-governmental organizations (NGOs), targeting companies from the S&P500, affect these companies' stock prices. With a sample of 1,611 tweets between 2009 and 2017 by 18 large NGOs, we observe significant changes in the stock prices of the targeted firms. More specifically, NGO tweets stating a positive message about the environmental, social, or governance (ESG). Actions of the firm have a positive effect on stock prices, while negative tweets have a negative effect. Nevertheless, we find that the presence of institutional owners hampers this effect: firms with high institutional ownership value positive tweets more negatively, and negative tweets more positively. These results support the idea that shareholders react significantly to NGO tweets but they react differently depending on their time horizon: for shareholders who have a more short-term horizon, typically institutional owners, the reaction diverges societal expectations about how firms should contribute to society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This study aims to investigate the effect of the ownership structure types on the indicators of the external audit quality, in the light of the weak legal protection of the shareholders. Design/methodology/approach: This study used the panel data of 94 listed Jordanian companies from 2009–2018 and the fixed-effect method. Findings: The results revealed a significant relationship between the directors' ownership, family and institutional ownership with the audit quality. By contrast, the managerial ownership had an insignificant influence on audit quality. Research limitations/implications: The results show the important role played by the directors' and institutions' ownership in ensuring the audit quality in Jordan. The results have implications for the policymakers in Jordan, to encourage and support the participation of such types of the investors and provide an effective monitoring over other types of ownership in the Jordanian capital markets. Social implications: This study suggests that the ownership structures are an essential and effective determinants of the external audit quality, which ultimately affects the performance and financial statements. Originality/value: These results are consistent with prior studies, which have indicated a significant relation between ownership structure and the demand of the audit quality, even in a setting where legal protection of the shareholders plays essentially no role. To the best knowledge of the researchers, this study is one of the few studies that separates the ownership by the directors into two separate types. Further, this is the first study that used several indicators to measure the audit quality at the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that higher institutional ownership causes firms to pay more dividends. Our identification relies on a discontinuity in ownership around Russell index thresholds. Our estimates indicate that a one-percentage-point increase in institutional ownership causes a $7 million (8%) increase in dividends. We also find differences in shareholder proposals and voting patterns that suggest that even nonactivist institutions play an important role in monitoring firm behavior. The effect of institutional ownership on dividends is stronger for firms with higher expected agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-owners, investors who have stakes in both the acquiring and target firms, are likely to focus on the total portfolio wealth effects from mergers and acquisition transactions, rather than the wealth effects of the target or bidder. Cross-owners may be less concerned with value destroying deals because their lack of gains, or even losses, as ownership in the acquiring firm can be offset by benefits derived from their ownership in the target firm. In contrast, shareholders with no cross-ownership, but own shares in either the target or the acquiring firm only, consider the value prospects for the target, thus producing heterogeneous incentives among shareholders to accept an offer. We investigate this heterogeneity within targets of 481 US negative premium deals and find substantial heterogeneity in acquisition incentives within the target firm shareholder base. Target shareholders in negative premium acquisitions experience negative wealth effects, but institutional cross-owners of negative acquisition premium deals realize positive wealth effects. We also find strong evidence of a size effect, where the observed wealth effects are amplified in larger deals. The divergent interests within the target shareholder base, with the attendant heterogeneous incentives to support deals, limits the monitoring capacity of institutional owners in negative premium deals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While prior research holds the consensus that accounting conservatism can serve as an effective monitoring device, it is not clear whether shareholders can successfully enforce managers' adherence to accounting conservatism when directors fail to fulfill their fiduciary duties. We attempt to answer the question by exploiting staggered enactments of the universal demand (UD) laws in 23 US states. UD laws raise procedural hurdles for shareholders to file derivative lawsuits against managers and directors who allegedly breach their fiduciary duties. For firms incorporated in states that adopt UD laws, restrictions on shareholder litigation rights weaken directors' incentives to monitor managers. We predict and find a decrease in conditional conservatism following the enactment of UD laws. The decline in conditional conservatism exists only for firms with low institutional ownership, low external equity dependence, or high ex‐ante derivative lawsuit risk. The main result is attributable to both the direct channel (through restriction of shareholder litigation rights) and the indirect channel (through the deployment of management‐friendly governance provisions). Our findings suggest that shareholders cannot successfully demand accounting conservatism when directors lack the incentives to monitor managers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agency theory predicts that institutional ownership plays an important role in monitoring corporate risk-taking. This study examines this ownership-risk taking linkage in Japan over the period 2007 and 2019. We proxy risk through measures of idiosyncratic risk, total risk, and market beta. We show that (relational) foreign institutional shareholdings (do not) induce corporate risk-taking, thereby mitigating (preserving) the managerial 'quiet life' in Japanese corporations. Using 2SLS analysis, the roles of institutional shareholders are robust to endogeneity concerns. Finally, we also confirm robustness using alternative accounting-based risk proxies such as the standard deviation of Tobin's Q and ROA. Our study implies that the monitoring of institutional shareholders is important in Japanese corporations whose top executives might be prone to seek a 'quiet life'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the Securities and Exchange Commission's assertion in the pay ratio disclosure rule that the ratio of Chief Executive Officer to employee pay is useful to shareholders for say‐on‐pay (SOP) voting decisions. Using an estimated pay ratio for a broad panel of commercial banks from 2010 to 2017, we find that voting dissent on SOP proposals is significantly higher in the top pay ratio decile, particularly when institutional ownership is high. Results are robust to controlling for a number of other determinants of voting dissent, including proxy advisor recommendations and executive compensation. Additionally, inferences using the first year of disclosed pay ratios in 2017 for S&P 1500 firms are consistent. However, we do not find similar results in the other deciles of the pay ratio in either sample, calling into question whether a cost‐benefit analysis would support the disclosure requirement imposed by Dodd‐Frank and implemented by the SEC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes different forms of ownership across countries and how these forms influence the way companies are governed. In most stock markets in the world, listed companies frequently have a controlling shareholder, usually a family. However, Japan, the UK, and to a lesser extent the US, are exceptions. In these three countries, ownership is frequently highly fragmented, where share stakes are held by different institutional owners, including asset managers, both active and passive, and by shareholder activists. The paper focuses in particular on the governance structure of different institutional shareholders, how they engage with target firms, and their effectiveness. The paper concludes with recommendations for regulators to enhance different forms of ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To restrain 'excessive' executive pay, Australia introduced new legislation in 2011, commonly known as the 'two strikes' rule. This rule has predictable consequences for publicly listed firms and their directors. In this study, we investigate which firm characteristics are associated with the incidence of a 'first strike' under the two strikes rule. We find that the incidence of a first strike is positively associated with higher levels of CEO pay, lower ownership concentration, smaller firm size, higher level of institutional ownership and CEO duality. Additional analysis suggests that shareholders fail to differentiate between CEO pay, which is related to the economic characteristics of a firm, and the pay that is not related to firm characteristics. This finding suggests that, unlike US shareholders, Australian shareholders do not appear to have a sophisticated understanding of CEO pay structure. This paper investigates how firm characteristics influence incidences of receiving a "first strike" under Australia's "two‐strike rule" system. Results indicate that incidence of a first strike is associated with higher levels of CEO pay, institutional ownership, and CEO duality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research extends agency theory by exploring the influence of varied, competing, principal interests on executive actions. Findings reveal that ownership of a firm by dedicated institutional investors, who hold concentrated portfolios over time, is positively associated with firm use of strategic competitive actions. Ownership by transient institutional investors, who hold broad portfolios and make frequent trades based on current earnings, is negatively associated with strategic competitive actions and positively associated with tactical ones. Appreciable ownership of the same firm by these two classes of investors influences both strategic and tactical competitive actions. These results have broad implications for executives, investors, and policy makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we examine the effect of managerial ownership on financial reporting conservatism. Separation of ownership and control gives rise to agency problems between managers and shareholders. Financial reporting conservatism is one potential mechanism to address these agency problems. We hypothesize that, as managerial ownership declines, the severity of agency problem increases, increasing the demand for conservatism. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that conservatism as measured by the asymmetric timeliness of earnings declines with managerial ownership. The negative association between managerial ownership and asymmetric timeliness of earnings is robust to various controls, in particular, for the investment opportunity set. We thus provide evidence of a demand for conservatism from the firm's shareholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporate governance research emphasizes the influence of institutional owners on company outcomes such as strategic decisions, organizational structures, and executive compensation. However, little is known about the process companies use to gain support for management-sponsored compensation plan resolutions. This article reviews prior literature linking institutional ownership and compensation practices and investigates the little-studied process of how management tries to work with owners to secure shareholder approval of compensation plans. In addition, it provides brief cases of two Fortune 300 companies (General Mills and PepsiCo) that received positive votes on their compensation plans. The article ends with several recommendations for managers trying to gain institutional owners' approval of future compensation plans. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We examine whether institutional ownership composition is related to parameters of the market reaction to negative earnings announcements. When firms report earnings below analysts' expectations, the stock price response is more negative for firms with higher levels of ownership by momentum or aggressive growth investors. There is no evidence, however, that these institutions cause an "overreaction" to earnings news. Ownership structure is also related to trading volume and to stock price volatility on days around earnings announcements. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the composition of institutional shareholders effects stock price behavior around the release of corporate information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Going private transactions are often highly leveraged, and give rise to potential agency conflicts among existing shareholders. But who exactly are those shareholders, and under what legal conditions are these transactions more likely to occur? We examine ownership structure prior to going private transactions in 33 countries around the world from 2002 to 2014. The data indicate strong and consistent evidence that pre‐going private ownership is characterized by higher institutional and corporate ownership. Family ownership lowers the probability of a public to private transaction. Stronger creditor rights increase the probability of going private, particularly for whole company and institutional buyouts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, corporate law played a pivotal role in regulating corporations across the United States. Consequently, Delaware, the leading state of incorporation, and its courts came to occupy a central and influential position in corporate law and governance. This, however, is no longer the case: The compositional shift in equity markets from retail to institutional ownership has relocated regulatory power over corporations from courts to markets. Corporate law has, as a result, and as illustrated by the declined role of the Delaware courts, lost its pride of place and is now eclipsed by shareholder activism. What explains the connection between the rise of institutional ownership and the death of corporate law? We answer this question by unpacking the relationship between market dynamics and the role of corporate law. Our analysis uncovers a critical, yet hitherto unnoticed, insight: The more competent shareholders become, the less important corporate law will be. Increases in shareholder competence reduce management agency costs, intensify market actors' preference for private ordering outside of courts, and, ultimately, drive corporate law into the shadow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In making corporate governance (CG)‐related disclosure, firms may solely focus on shareholders or may broaden their scope of disclosure to serve other stakeholders as well. This study examines whether there are differences in the disclosure of shareholder and stakeholder CG practices. Based on a hand‐collected dataset of 1,110 firm years in South Africa and a disclosure index using 72 CG provisions from the King III report of CG, we find that the disclosure of stakeholder CG practices is higher than that of shareholder CG practices. Our evidence suggests that foreign ownership, institutional ownership, racial diversity, and gender diversity increase total voluntary disclosure. In contrast, chief executive officer (CEO) age decreases total voluntary disclosure. Also, although foreign ownership, institutional ownership, gender diversity, and racial diversity increase both shareholder and stakeholder CG disclosures, CEO age has a negative relationship with both shareholder and stakeholder CG disclosures. Further, board size reduces shareholder disclosure but not stakeholder disclosure. Our results further indicate that, ceteris paribus, the extent of shareholder CG disclosure relative to stakeholder CG disclosure is (a) lower with board size, gender diversity, and racial diversity and (b) higher with the level of institutional ownership. Our findings are robust across a raft of econometric techniques. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated by recent studies on political connections and stock price crash risk, this study investigates whether there is an association between politically connected (POLCON) firms and stock price crash risk. Further, we examine whether institutional investors' ownership can moderate this association. Using a dataset of Malaysian firms for the period 2002–2012, we show that POLCON firms are associated with higher risk of stock price crashes. However, the positive association between POLCON and stock crashes is attenuated by higher institutional ownership, implying effective monitoring. Finally, we find that only local institutional investors can significantly mitigate the positive association between POLCON firms and stock price crash risk. This suggests that different types of institutional investors can produce different monitoring outcomes in POLCON firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we hypothesize that institutions invest more heavily in companies with strong corporate social performance. Analysis indicated a significant, positive relationship between social performance and the number of institutions holding the shares of a company and a positive but insignificant relationship between social performance and the percentage of shares held by institutions. We conclude that improving a company's corporate social performance invokes no penalty in institutional ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relation between managerial ownership and the probability of being a target firm, and the impact of managerial ownership on target shareholder returns. The paper finds that targets have lower managerial ownership than either their industry counterparts or randomly selected nontargets. Managerial ownership is significantly lower in contested compared to uncontested offers, and in unsuccessful compared to successful cases. Managerial ownership is significantly related to abnormal returns in contested cases that are ultimately successful. The results are consistent with a positive impact of managerial ownership where it is used to negotiate, but not ultimately block, an acquisition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents evidence that the distribution of target ownership is related to the division of the takeover gain between the target and the bidder for a sample of successful tender offers. In the whole sample, the target's gain is negatively related to bidder and institutional ownership. In the sample of multiple-bidder contests, the target's gain increases with managerial ownership and falls with institutional ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use a natural experiment to identify a causal effect of the threat of shareholder litigation on ownership structure, governance, and firm performance.We find that when it becomes harder for small shareholders to litigate, ownership becomes more concentrated and shifts from individuals to institutions. Director and officer governance protections drop among these firms, and operating performance drops among firms whose ownership structure does not change. These results suggest that the ability of shareholders to coordinate and litigate against management is important for governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the association between controlling shareholders' networks (i.e., controlling shareholders' proxy (CSProxy) and controlling shareholders' multiple-directorships (CSMultiD)) and related-party transactions (RPTs), particularly involving controlling shareholders' interests (RPT-conflict). This study also examines the impact of interaction between CSProxy and CSMultiD on firm engagement with RPTs, and RPT-conflict. The hypotheses are tested using a sample of 548 listed companies in Malaysia over the period 2012-2014 with a total of 1,550 observations. The results show that CSProxy is not associated with RPTs, and RPT-conflict. The CSMultiD is also not associated with RPTs. However, it has a positive relationship with RPT-conflict. Additionally, an interaction between CSProxy and CSMultiD increases the likelihood of firms to engage and disclose more RPTs; in contrast, it discloses lower magnitude of RPT-conflict. The opportunistic controlling shareholders may exploit their conflict of interest for private benefits by hiding their intention behind the RPTs. Overall, these findings provide partial empirical support to the argument that controlling shareholders seek to use their network relationship to influence firms to engage with related parties. These findings raise concerns to the regulators and policy makers, specifically on the ability of the controlling shareholders in utilizing their position and networks opportunistically to expropriate firm resources for personal purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study how corporate social responsibility relates to investors, firms, and shareholder proposals. We examine shareholder proposals on environmental, social, and governance issues at the annual general meeting of shareholders with US Fortune 250 firms during 2011-2014. We find that the probability of receiving shareholder proposals on environmental issues is positively associated with responsible institutional ownership. We find no systematic evidence that the outperformance regarding social responsibility of the firms themselves would significantly matter regarding the likelihood of shareholders filing proposals about corporate social responsibility, except for employee wellbeing. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the link between institutional ownership stability and dividend payout ratio. Design/methodology/approach First, the authors estimate the propensity of a firm to pay dividend. Next, the authors perform panel fixed-effect regressions of dividend payouts on institutional ownership stability variables. The authors also compare institutional ownership between dividend paying and non-dividend paying investee firms. The authors analyze the dividend preferences of different types of institutional owners. Finally, the authors examine the cross-sectional variation in the volatility of dividend payouts. Findings The authors find that stable and large institutional owners favor dividend paying companies. There also exists a positive association between ownership persistence and dividend payout. Conversely, firms that change their dividend payout frequently are associated with larger deviations in institutional ownership. Additionally, the presence of pressure-sensitive institutional investors (i.e. investors that also hold business ties with the investee firm) is significantly linked to dividend payout policy. Conversely, pressure-insensitive investors use alternative forms of monitoring instead of requiring investee firms to pay dividends, which serve to reduce agency conflicts. Originality/value This paper considers the preferences of long-term stable institutional investors in their selection of dividend paying firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutional investors should not be treated as homogeneous group of investors. One of the contributions of the study to the existing literature on ownership structure is the empirical verification of the role played by different institutional shareholders in Pakistan. The study considers estimation of panel data model on a total sample of 247 non-financial firms over a period of ten years i.e. from 2006 to 2015. Empirical evidence from diversified industries that include textile, sugar and allied, food and personal care-products, chemical, cement, auto, power generation and distribution, and miscellaneous confirm that only NIT play a significant and positive role in enhancing firm-level governance mechanisms. The findings from this study assist the regulators and the policy makers in redesigning the provisions of code of corporate governance that can ensure better governance at corporate level in Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the relationship between institutional ownership stability and real earnings management. Our findings indicate that firms held by more stable institutional owners experience lower real activities manipulation by limiting overproduction. We further examine how the stability in the shareholdings of pressure-sensitive and insensitive institutional investors affect target firms' use of real earnings management, respectively. Unlike pressure-sensitive institutional investors, the stability in the share ownership of pressure-insensitive institutional investors (i.e., investment advisors, pension funds and endowments) mitigates target firms' use of real earnings management. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that institutional investors presence acts as a monitor on target firms' use of real earnings manipulation activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore the role of institutional investors as a source of market discipline in mitigating earning management (EMGT) by bank holding companies (BHCs). We propose that ownership by monitoring institutions (institutional investors with large and long-term stakes and independence from managers) is associated with less EMGT because they have greater incentives/skills for monitoring their investees than other shareholders. We find that EMGT by BHCs is negatively associated with ownership by monitoring institutions for larger and riskier banks and for the post-SunTrust decision period. Nonmonitoring institutional ownership is unassociated or in some cases weakly or even positively associated with EMGT. Our findings suggest that regulators should facilitate ownership by monitoring institutions as a complement to regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the relationship among ultimate ownership, risk-taking and firm value using firm-level data from Chinese companies. The results indicate that dominant ultimate controlling shareholders exacerbate the agency problem. The larger the divergence between ultimate shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights, the stronger motivation is to reduce corporate risk-taking (CRT) to safeguard private benefits. Furthermore, the presence of a dominant ultimate controlling shareholder is harmful to firm value, and the divergence between its control right and cash flow right has a significantly negative effect on firm value. Corporate risk-taking plays a significant mediating effect between ultimate controlling shareholder and firm value. Based on these results based on theory and practice, we propose a number of practical implications for managers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the relationship between the level of shareholdings and identities of the largest shareholders, and cash dividend policy. The study is conducted with a sample of 180 firms listed on Vietnam stock exchange markets from 2009 to 2013. The "xed e$ect model is employed to analyze the balanced panel data. The results show that the higher the level of holdings by the largest shareholders, the lower the dividend payout. Moreover, companies with the State and Foreign investors as the largest shareholders have higher dividend payout ratio than companies with local investors and managers as the largest shareholders. The study also finds that companies tend to pay higher dividends when profits decrease or growth opportunities increase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue We study more than 12,000 shareholder proposals that were filed to S&P1500 companies from 1997 to 2009, and investigate the determinants of proposal withdrawal by the sponsoring shareholder. We also study the effectiveness of withdrawn proposals as a corporate governance device. Research Findings/Insights We find that proposals filed by influential investors are more likely to be withdrawn than proposals filed by private investors. Our empirical results show that institutional ownership (in particular by long-term, passively investing institutions) is positively related to the likelihood of a proposal's withdrawal if the sponsoring shareholder is an institutional investor. We also document a negative relation between CEO ownership and the likelihood of withdrawal. This effect is most pronounced for corporate governance proposals. We also show that withdrawn proposals on executive compensation change subsequent corporate pay practices. Theoretical/Academic Implications Our paper provides the first comprehensive evidence on withdrawn shareholder proposals. We show that withdrawn proposals are a strong and important category of proposals because managers proactively prevent them from being put to a vote. Hence, our results imply that researchers should also account for withdrawn shareholder proposals when making inferences about the effectiveness of proxy proposals. Practitioner/Policy Implications Our empirical evidence points to the importance of withdrawn shareholder proposals as a governance mechanism. Managers try to protect their own power and reputation by preventing filed shareholder proposals from being put to a vote during the annual general meeting: They enter into private negotiations with the sponsors of the proposals to accomplish a withdrawal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership and the profitability of insider trading. A priori the relationship is not clear. On the one hand, institutions possess superior information that erodes insider advantages and are also active in monitoring. On the other hand, institutions could treat insider trading as an incentivizing mechanism to induce manager effort, leading to improved aggregate shareholder welfare. The results indicate that, on average, institutional ownership is negatively related to the profitability of insider trading, and this relationship derives from both direct monitoring and trading/pricing. Further analysis indicates that this relationship is concentrated for insider sales. In contrast, the findings reveal a positive relationship between institutions and the profitability of insider purchases, indicating an incentivizing role. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Using the rise of the Chinese 'shareholding state' as an example, this article attempts to extend the study of financialization from the economy to the state. It documents a historical and institutional process in which the Chinese state refashioned itself as a shareholder and institutional investor in the economy and resorted to financial means to manage its ownership, assets and public investments. I demonstrate that financialization of economic management in the Chinese state contain three processes: the introduction of shareholder values by the state to managing its asset, the expansion of state asset management bodies and the provision of structured investment vehicles by these institutions to fund fixed asset investment. By uncovering the mutually leveraging effect between sovereign power and finance, this study illustrates a politically endogenous model for the rise of finance in state-directed economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the effects of very highly concentrated ownership structures on the liquidity of stock markets in a context of weak protection for minority shareholders. Such structures are prevalent in a number of European markets as well as in various developing markets, as opposed to US markets. Two alternative hypotheses are tested. The shareholder expropriation hypothesis predicts an inverse relationship between liquidity and ownership concentration for the dominant shareholder. The dominant monitor- insider hypothesis contends that dominant shareholders are not detrimental to market liquidity, since they have incentives to reduce their costs of exit and/or to improve the information transfer of their value enhancing activities to markets. Our empirical results are more consistent with the latter. We find that alternative governance mechanisms also have liquidity enhancing effects for Brazilian and Chilean firms. In particular, cross-listing in the US market and the threat of outside takeovers serve as monitoring devices to reduce informational asymmetries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the impact of market pressures on the journalistic ideals at media conglomerate Nation Media Group (NMG) in Kenya. Topics discussed include the ownership and control, interlocking directorships, and tension between journalistic ideals and commercial interests at NMG. It also mentions the media corporatisation and financialisation and the top 10 shareholders of NMG including Amin Nanji Juma, National Social Security Fund, and John Kibunga Kimani.

Although US and European research has documented improvement in earnings quality associated with corporate governance characteristics, the situation in Latin America is questionable, given the business environment in which firms operate, which is characterized by controlling family ownership and weak legal protection. The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between the internal mechanisms of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management measured by discretionary accrual. We use a sample of listed Latin American non-financial companies from the period 2006-2009. Our results show how in the Latin American context the role of external directors is limited and that Boards which meet more frequently take a more active position in the monitoring of insiders, so showing a lower use of manipulative practices. In addition, we find a non-linear relation between insider ownership and discretionary accruals, also pointing to the fact that ownership concentration may be a manipulative practices constrictor mechanism only when the ownership of main shareholders is moderate. The findings have important policy implications since this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to analyze the relation between the effectiveness of the government and the earnings management behavior. As policy implications, we document how when a country implements controls aimed at reducing corruption, strengthening the rule of law or improving the effectiveness of government, this leads to a reduction in firm earnings management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a sample of publicly listed firm in Korea from 2002 to 2006, this article examines the impact of board monitoring on firm value and productivity. We use outsider's attendance of board meetings as a proxy for board monitoring. Consistent with the commitment hypothesis, we find that outsider's attendance rate increases firm value, suggesting that attending board meeting itself is a strong signal that reflects outsider's intention to monitor insiders. While ownership of controlling shareholders negatively affects firm value, this relationship is not moderated by increased monitoring by outsiders. Our findings provide further evidence that the outside director system is less effective in chaebol-affiliated firms. Results also indicate that the effect of outsider's board monitoring activity on investor's valuation of the firm is greater than on productivity improvement of the firm. Our conclusions are robust for possible endogeneity in the relationship between firm value and board attendance by outside directors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to examine effects of managerial and family ownership structure on the company performance. The sample consists of four hundred and twenty companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for the year from 2003 to 2007. The study shows that equity ownerships in Malaysia are concentrated on few owners mainly by the State government, families or large corporations. Results reveal that managerial ownership relates significantly to return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) while family ownership relates significantly to Tobin's Q, ROA and ROE. Results suggest that an increase in the proportion of insider ownerships enhances the company performance due to re-alignment of internal and external interests and reduction in conflict of interests among shareholders. The results further indicate that the firm performance decreases when the managers' share ownership increases. Managers with greater control and large shareholdings are more concerned with their own self-interests than the interests of the shareholders at large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how shareholder investment horizons influence payout policy choices. The authors infer institutional shareholders' investment horizons using the churn rate of their overall stock portfolios prior to the payout decision. The authors find that the frequency and amount of repurchases increases with ownership by short-term investors to the detriment of dividends. They also find that the market reacts less positively to repurchase announcements made by firms held by short-term institutions. These findings are consistent with a model in which undervalued firms signal their value through repurchases, but firms held by short-term investors make repurchases more often because those investors care mostly about the short-term price reaction. Hence, the market rationally discounts the signal provided by such repurchases. Our findings suggest that shorter shareholder investment horizons might be one contributing factor to the increasing popularity of buybacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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