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Considering the multiple effects of product greenness and carbon emission trading, this article constructs a differential game model to study the collaborative innovation between enterprises in a green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one supplier. This article examines the optimal green technology innovation strategies, optimal revenues of manufacturers and suppliers as well as the overall green supply chain revenues in the Nash non-cooperative game model, the Stackelberg master–slave game model, and cooperative game model, respectively. Through the comparative analysis of equilibrium results, it is found that the optimal strategies of suppliers and manufacturers as well as the total revenue of the green supply chain in the cooperative games are better than those in the non-cooperative game scenario. Meanwhile, undertaking part of suppliers' green innovation cost by manufacturers is the Pareto optimization mechanism that increases the total revenue of the green supply chain and their respective revenues. The research results of this article provide theoretical support for green supply chain enterprises to formulate incentive mechanisms for scientific strategy-making and reasonable revenue distribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering the multiple effects of product greenness and carbon emission trading, this article constructs a differential game model to study the collaborative innovation between enterprises in a green supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one supplier. This article examines the optimal green technology innovation strategies, optimal revenues of manufacturers and suppliers as well as the overall green supply chain revenues in the Nash non-cooperative game model, the Stackelberg master–slave game model, and cooperative game model, respectively. Through the comparative analysis of equilibrium results, it is found that the optimal strategies of suppliers and manufacturers as well as the total revenue of the green supply chain in the cooperative games are better than those in the non-cooperative game scenario. Meanwhile, undertaking part of suppliers' green innovation cost by manufacturers is the Pareto optimization mechanism that increases the total revenue of the green supply chain and their respective revenues. The research results of this article provide theoretical support for green supply chain enterprises to formulate incentive mechanisms for scientific strategy-making and reasonable revenue distribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]