Search

This thesis uncovers how the application of tactical deception to special operations can improve the likelihood of achieving mission completion. By inducing hesitation, confusion, and chaos into the operational environment, special operations forces could potentially influence and manipulate the psyche of an adversary to amplify friendly capabilities on the objective. Three historical case studies are presented where tactical deception was successfully implemented during surgical strike operations, such as direct action or hostage rescue missions, to evaluate how deception affects the assault force's progress during the course of a mission. The author shows that the assault force's advantage over an adversary is highly dependent on the duration and effectiveness of the deception when it is applied at the initial point of vulnerability. Through the use of the special operations deception curve, this thesis illustrates how successful tactical deception in a mission can be used to achieve relative superiority earlier, maintain relative superiority longer, and reduce the area of vulnerability experienced by special operation forces. Lieutenant, United States Navy Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

Small European states such as the Netherlands and Denmark, which face increasingly complex security challenges, lack the capacity to meet increasing intelligence requirements. Since intelligence is vital to counter or prevent threats to national interests, small-state leaders must reduce these current intelligence gaps. This study focuses on how small European states’ SOF can contribute most efficiently and effectively to the national intelligence capacity to anticipate and counter threats from foreign regions. Based on literature and interviews with Dutch and Danish civil and military officials, this study identifies ways in which SOF can contribute to national intelligence capacity. The options include: SOF training the military intelligence service, SOF enabling military intelligence operations through integrated support, and SOF operating independently as an information provider for national decision making. This study, based on analysis of these options, suggests that a combination of integrating SOF into intelligence operations and allowing SOF to conduct information collection operations independently represents the most effective and efficient way to contribute to the national intelligence capacity. In that regard, the integrated option is more congruent with operations in non-permissive areas, and SOF as independent collectors with permissive areas. http://archive.org/details/thestrategicutil1094561378 Major, Army, Netherlands Commander, Navy, Denmark Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Military deception (MILDEC) operations have a long and illustrious place in America's battlefield history. To great effect, MILDEC has enabled countless victories in every U.S. conflict since the Revolutionary War. However, the United States has allowed its deception capability to atrophy. Possible explanations for our MILDEC divestiture range from structural insufficiencies to an ethical framework that emphasizes truth and transparency. Simultaneously, the onset of the Information Age has leveled the playing field between state and non-state actors (NSA) and proved that lasting victory cannot be achieved by force alone. Yet, due in part to the difficulty involved in quantifiably measuring information strategy, the contemporary military's acceptance and understanding of information warfare has been limited. This necessitates the re-examination of U.S. information strategy formulation to address more effectively the challenges and complexities encountered in the human domain. To overcome this impediment, this thesis examines the intangible aspects of information warfare and proposes a structured decision-making tool capable of generating precise computations of optimal information strategies. By Force or by Fraud is a quantitative assessment of MILDEC's utility on the modern battlefield that is qualitatively tested against historic cases of information warfare. http://archive.org/details/byforceorbyfraud1094549457 Major, United States Army Major, United States Army Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The problems Yemen faces today seem insurmountable. The geographic divisions widened by imperialism were cemented by Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. His heavy-handed suppression of the Houthi rebellion on the border with Saudi Arabia, the Southern secessionist movement, and the Arab Spring protesters delegitimized the regime in the eyes of the Yemeni people. With President Saleh at the helm, water and oil resources were squandered and mismanaged. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has found this volatile, ungoverned environment a welcome area in which to recruit, equip, train, and conduct operations. That their antagonistic narrative continues to find a welcome audience in the tribal areas of Yemen and their securing of safe havens is testament to the failed policies of the Saleh regime. The United States has focused on eradicating AQAP since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In its counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign against AQAP, the United States has focused almost all its effort in working with the Yemeni government. While enjoying a modicum of success, this success has been limited to the elimination of AQAP operatives through kinetic strikes. Moreover, the gains were tempered by President Saleh, who at times acted in direct opposition to America's goals of eradicating AQAP. His recent removal will likely do little to counter the array of problems Yemen faces. In this light, America's foreign policy toward Yemen and AQAP is inadequate in securing our regional interests and needs to be overhauled. To delineate which COIN practices may work best, an investigation of past COIN campaigns was conducted. Malaya, Nicaragua, and Somalia were chosen to provide the widest possible range of tactics used in fighting an insurgency where the host nation government is illegitimate, and represent both success and failure. These three case studies formed the basis of three courses of action: working with the government, circumventing the government and working directly with the tribes, and assisting in the state failure. While all three courses of action have merit, only the third course of action addresses the root causes of the problems in Yemen. For this reason, the only way to eliminate AQAP as a threat to the United States is to work through the Yemeni tribes without the central government acting as a roadblock. http://archive.org/details/theunitedstatesn1094510610 US Army (USA) author