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African states fight each other far more often by simultaneously supporting rebels in each other’s intrastate conflicts than by engaging in direct warfare. While nearly half of these mutual interventions between 1960 and 2010 were resolved via bilateral negotiated settlements, the majority of cases ended due to events in, or actions by, only one of the two states. What explains this variation? We argue that different combinations of combat outcomes in the two intrastate conflicts determine the severity of interstate commitment concerns and therefore the likelihood of a successful settlement. Specifically, we hypothesize that commitment problems are likely to be overcome only when both states experience stalemates or successes in their battles with rebels. By contrast, if both states suffer combat defeats, major commitment concerns on both sides make a settlement very unlikely. Lastly, a combination of defeats and stalemates or successes also makes a settlement unlikely, as the state with the upper hand is likely both unwilling and unable to commit credibly to a settlement. We use several cases to illustrate our theory and then demonstrate how its causal mechanism works by leveraging within-case variation from the Chad–Sudan mutual intervention. We show that the two states reached a settlement only once both were winning at home while their rebel clients were losing abroad. Three alternative explanations—third-party threats, pressure, and security guarantees—cannot explain the settlement. Overall, our study extends bargaining theory to a new empirical domain and contributes to theorizing how its information and commitment logics interact. Publisher PDF

This article explores the experience of the Afro-Colombian movement over the course of two peace processes, investigating the relationship between opportunities for participation and effective inclusion. The 1991 Constituent Assembly that emerged from the peace processes of the late 1980s presented a particularly open opportunity for civil society participation, and yet the Afro-Colombian movement was unable to gain representation in negotiations for a new constitution. In the 2016 peace process with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC, despite insistence from the government that its negotiations with FARC were exclusively bilateral, the Afro movement was able to gain a seat at the table along with its Indigenous counterparts and generate a commitment from both parties to protect ethnic rights, known as the Capítulo Étnico (Ethnic Chapter). In contrast to existing literature that focuses on international actors as drivers of inclusion, we argue that effective inclusion reflects in large part the internal capacity, coherence, and unity of the movements themselves. Este artículo explora la relación entre oportunidades de participación e inclusión efectiva del movimiento afrocolombiano a lo largo de dos procesos de paz en Colombia. La Asamblea Constituyente de 1991, que surgió de los procesos de paz de finales de la década de 1980, representó una oportunidad excepcional para la participación de la sociedad civil y, sin embargo, el movimiento afrocolombiano no pudo obtener representación en las negociaciones para una nueva constitución. En el proceso de paz con las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, o FARC, de 2016, a pesar de la insistencia del gobierno en que estas negociaciones fueran exclusivamente bilaterales, el movimiento afro consiguió un asiento en la mesa de diálogo, junto con sus contrapartes indígenas, y como resultado un compromiso único de ambas partes para proteger los derechos de los pueblos étnicos: el Capítulo Étnico. En contraste con la literatura existente que se enfoca en los actores internacionales como impulsores de la inclusión de la sociedad civil, en este artículo argumentamos que la inclusión efectiva es fruto en gran parte de la capacidad interna, la coherencia y la unidad de los propios movimientos. info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

The cases of peacemaking in Kosovo and Sudan/South Sudan yield insights into the interplay of international politics, relations among political elites, and reconciliation among identity groups. A durable, positive peace requires an approach by peacemakers that encompasses all these dimensions. Complicating matters, the readiness of states to adhere to rules and norms built up over decades has declined in recent years. Absent a concerted effort to (re)build them, the work of peace mediation will become more challenging and the odds of success incalculably longer. This, in turn, will corrode the ability of external powers, competing via proxy, to work together even on unrelated matters in different parts of the globe.

Armed conflict in Colombia with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) was only settled after 50 years and several attempts at negotiations. This sequence of events fits the pattern of "conflict ripeness" first proposed by William Zartman. But using a successful settlement as a way to determine ripeness can be tautological. To address this issue, we develop a formal model to identify the level of ripeness at which a conflict is settled. In an overripe conflict both parties end up spending resources in a military build-up that is out of proportion with what they obtain in the final settlement. We show that such overripeness is exacerbated by the access to resources and by the factional heterogeneity within the two sides. We illustrate these dynamics by looking in detail at the attempts at negotiation between Colombia's government and the FARC-EP. To that end, we combine statistical data, some previously undisclosed, and interviews with some key participants. This work was supported by Comunidad de Madrid and Complutense University of Madrid. Attraction of the Research Talent 2018 Program. Grant: 2018-T2/SOC-10508.

Scholars have pinpointed that women's underrepresentation in peacemaking results in gendered outcomes that do not address women's needs and interests. Despite recent increased representation at the negotiating table, women still have a limited influence on peacemaking outcomes. We propose that differences in female and male speeches reflected in the gendered patterns in discourse during peacemaking explain how women's influence is curtailed. We examine women's speaking behavior in transitional justice debates in the post-conflict Balkans. Applying multimethod quantitative text analysis to over half a million words in multiple languages, we analyze structural and thematic speech patterns. We find that men's domination of turn-taking and the absence of topics reflecting women's needs and interests lead to a gendered outcome. The sequences of men talking after men are longer than those of women talking after women, which restricts women's deliberative space and opportunities to develop and sustain arguments that reflect their concerns. We find no evidence that women's limited influence is driven by lower deliberative quality of their speeches. This study of gendered dynamics at the microlevel of discourse identifies a novel dimension of male domination during peacemaking.

Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the United States took a relatively passive approach to Middle East peacemaking. The passivity shown by the administration of President Lyndon Johnson stemmed primarily from its belief that the Arab states had failed to make reasonable proposals for an agreement and from the White House's awareness that pressuring Israel would likely have significant domestic political consequences. Thus, even though it felt the need to press Israel to withdraw to prewar boundaries as part of a settlement, the administration made little effort to achieve an agreement on that basis.

Although poetry has been used as a method of peacemaking since Homer’s Iliad, little research, theory, or analysis has been done evaluating precisely what role poetry holds in the realms of peacema...

The goal of ‘learning’ from peace processes is widely expressed in conflict resolution scholarship and practice but inadequately understood. This article investigates what kinds of knowledge can be learned from a peace process, the theoretical and methodological bases of such learning, and what impact it may have. The article begins with an interdisciplinary discussion of reasons to learn, the kinds of lessons proposed in the peace process literature and how theories of learning may be applied to a peace process. Following this is a case study of the sharing of the Northern Ireland peacemaking experience with other conflict-affected societies, especially through facilitated dialogues between decision-makers. This contributes to a comprehensive ideal model of learning from peace processes – something which, it is argued, may result in ‘transformative learning’ and a ‘policy paradigm shift’ towards de-escalatory conflict management. A definition of a peace process ‘lesson’ is offered to guide future research.

Can international peacemaking efforts succeed in an intractable conflict such as the one in Venezuela? In this paper we put forward a conceptualization of peacemaking processes that underlines their ability to creatively change the terms of a conflict. Then we look at the four dialogue and negotiation processes that have occurred during the government of Nicolas Maduro. Our review shows that while it is clear that the Maduro government uses dialogue processes as a delay tactic through which it can divide and demobilize the opposition, clear progress has been made in the mediators’ ability to generate concrete articulation and discussion of the conflicting parties’ demands. However, international allies on each side of the conflict are affecting the calculations of the two sides, working against an agreement. Resumen: Paz internacional en el conflicto intratable de Venezuela ?Pueden los esfuerzos internacionales de establecimiento de la paz tener exito en un conflicto intratable como el de Venezuela? En este articulo presentamos una conceptualizacion de los procesos de establecimiento de la paz que subraya su capacidad para cambiar creativamente los terminos de un conflicto. Luego observamos los cuatro procesos de dialogo y negociacion que ocurrieron durante el gobierno de Nicolas Maduro. Nuestra revision muestra que, si bien esta claro que el gobierno de Maduro usa los procesos de dialogo como una tactica de demora a traves de la cual puede dividir y desmovilizar a la oposicion, se ha logrado un claro progreso en la capacidad de los mediadores para generar una articulacion y discusion concretas de las partes en conflicto ' demandas. Sin embargo, los aliados internacionales en cada lado del conflicto estan afectando los calculos de las dos partes, trabajando en contra de un acuerdo.

Mediation refers to one or more individuals facilitating a negotiation among disputants to help them try to resolve, to their satisfaction, an issue or issues of concern. There is increasing interest in using mediation in a wide variety of circumstances (e.g., divorce, child custody, family disagreements, small claims issues, business matters, community problems, environmental issues and intrastate violent conflicts). Although professional women mediators in many countries are often involved in certain kinds of mediations as mediators or as members of mediation teams, this is not always the case. Examined here is the fact that few women mediators are involved as lead mediators or members of mediation teams in conflict zones - areas that are often large, involve complex issues and have been, or continue to be, violent. This article first discusses the concepts of inclusive peacebuilding and inclusive peacemaking. This is followed by a short discussion about mediation, and then further information is provided about women mediators. Finally, suggestions are made to increase the number of women mediators in complex, large-scale conflicts.

‘Inclusion’ has emerged as a prominent theme in peacemaking. However, its exact meaning remains vague, as do assumptions about the relationship between inclusion and peace. This article seeks to problematize the research, policy and practice of inclusion. Focusing on United Nations (UN) peacemaking, we ask how the object of inclusion has been framed, and based on what strategies and underlying rationales. We do so against the backdrop of emerging debates about an agonistic peace, which suggest that violent antagonistic relationships can be overcome if peace processes enable contestation between adversaries. This requires that peacemakers recognize the constitutive role of difference in political settlements. We identify three distinct strategies for inclusion, with corresponding framings of the included. Firstly, inclusion can be used to build a more legitimate peace; secondly, to empower and protect specific actor groups; and thirdly, to transform the sociopolitical structures that underlie conflict. The first strategy frames the included in open terms that can accommodate a heterogeneity of actors, the second in closed terms pertaining to specific identity traits, and the third in relational terms emerging within a specific social, cultural and political context. In practice, this leads to tensions in the operationalization of inclusion, which are evidence of an inchoate attempt to politicize peace processes. In response, we argue for an approach to relational inclusion that recognizes the power relations from which difference emerges; neither brushing over difference, nor essentializing single identity traits, but rather remaining flexible in navigating a larger web of relationships that require transformation.

Contemporary peacekeeping operations carry out many disparate tasks, which has triggered a debate about “Christmas Tree mandates.” Did the UN Secretariat or the UN Security Council drive this expansion? Using original data on nineteen UN peacekeeping missions, 1998–2014, this article compares peacekeeping tasks recommended by the Secretariat to those mandated by the Council. It finds that the two bodies expressed different preferences regarding the nature, number, and novelty of peacekeeping tasks. First, the Council dropped Secretariat-recommended tasks as often as it added new ones on its own initiative. Second, the two bodies disagreed more over peacebuilding and peacemaking tasks than over peacekeeping tasks. Third, the Council preferred to be the one to introduce novel tasks that had not appeared in previous mandates. Finally, among the countries that “held the pen” on peacekeeping resolutions, the United States was the most prone to dropping Secretariat-proposed tasks and the least willing to add tasks itself.

John Young’s recent book is a remarkable illustration of the difficulties of writing balanced yet topical works of contemporary history. It is a difficulty, which is particularly salient when one d...

International law’s affirmation of everyone’s right to have rights came into being through a peacemaking process. Its deprivation continues to typify the emergent context that brings peace processes into being – and for some cohorts of the people, namely children, the process itself. The right is intuitively seductive. It resonates as self-evident: an inexorable abstraction of having rights. Yet it is also enigmatic and challenging to concretise. What is its content? What substantive rights are expressive of this right? What is their scope in peacemaking? And why is it – above for example more corporeal rights – so fundamental? Guided by these questions, the paper begins by reflecting on the right as crystallised by Hannah Arendt: it then shifts to reflecting on, first, its expression in international law and, second, its interrelations with the law of peace. In doing so, it yields legal and political opportunities for ensuring the right in peacemaking, and imagines a framework of evolving measures for bringing the right to life in the staged process. The paper concludes by arguing renewing engagement with this understated right offers a beacon for guiding responses to the complex child rights challenges yielded by peacemaking – and our interdependent and fragile twenty-first century world more generally.

This article briefly reviews the faults and merits of peacemaking efforts anchored in liberal ideologies. It further calls for a shift in strategy and outlines an approach that seeks transformation of conflicts through acknowledging the ways in which contrasting worldviews undergird and sustain the political conflict.

How does government bias affect prospects for peace agreements in communal conflicts? Government bias has been shown to have a strong impact on the incidence and dynamics of localized ethnic conflict, but the way that it affects conflict resolution remains underexplored. I argue that government bias makes the conflict parties less likely to overcome the commitment problem, because they cannot trust the government’s willingness to guarantee or uphold any agreement they reach. Consequently, bias reduces the chances that the parties are able to reach a peace agreement. A systematic comparison of four cases in Kenya provides support for this argument. I also distinguish between bias related to strategic interest and bias related to relationships, and find that the former is more durable, whereas the latter is more likely to be influenced by political turnover, thereby opening up possibilities for peacemaking.

The failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict for many years has often been attributed in significant part to the absence of trust in the sincerity of the other side and, more specifically, to the recalcitrant nature of the opponent. Analyses of past proposals and actual negotiations have pointed out missed opportunities, possibly the result of misperceptions or misunderstandings. Recent archival research, publications, and interviews regarding the Israeli protagonists reveal that actual deception, as distinct from ‘misperception’, may have been at play. The article examines this phenomenon as it has appeared since 1967 in six instances of Israeli government dealings with its own public and with the US or the international community, even in recent months, due primarily to an unwillingness to withdraw from the Occupied Territories or agree to enter serious negotiations for ending the conflict with the Palestinians.

When thinking about crime, notions of deviance, delinquency, violence and moral turpitude most often come to mind. In somewhat more open-minded conceptions, crime may evoke critical questions of class and race, among other variables. In still more expansive spaces, crime may be evaluated through the lenses of exploitation of labor, maintenance of political power, and social control. From sociology to cinema studies, crime sometimes can be viewed in unvarnished dystopian terms—as the modality through which a society expresses the limits of its conscience and consciousness alike. Yet, in all of these critical interrogations, crime is rarely considered as a correlate of peace or an expression of justice. This article builds upon traditions in criminology that highlight the restorative, transformative, and peacemaking potentials inherent in constructions of crime and the processes used to address it, arguing for a proactive and constructive vision of peacebuilding that encompasses mechanisms for urgent implementation.

This article records the findings of a qualitative study in which circle dialogue sessions and questionnaires were used to explore and evaluate the experiences of victims who participated in peacemaking mediations offered at Khulisa Social Solutions victim empowerment centres in Gauteng, South Africa. The findings highlight that the overall facilitation of the peacemaking mediation offered at Khulisa victim empowerment centres was conducted in a fair and respectful manner. The participants expressed their satisfaction with the facilitators, the facilitation, and the peacemaking agreements. Reconciliation was achieved in some cases, but the most significant result was that the victims were empowered, informed and strengthened through their experiences. Moreover, the participants expressed their appreciation for the restorative approach owing to its support and protection of the family unit. The findings showed that reconciliation was hindered in some cases by a lack of accountability, voluntary participation and needs-based interventions which could have been foreseen or resolved through adequate preparation and follow-ups. Moreover, the need for intervention and awareness in the community context was highlighted. However, the findings revealed that Khulisa is limited in providing preparation, follow-ups and interventions owing to a lack of staff, resources and time, because of limited funding. A call is made for funding to be provided to Khulisa and similar organisations by government and/or private enterprises, so that outreach, awareness and needs-based interventions may be provided. Furthermore, research should be conducted focusing on broader scale experiences of all stakeholders participating in services offered at Khulisa victim empowerment centres.

This article examines implementation of national political agendas in two urban settings—Israel’s program aimed at sole sovereign control of Jerusalem and Northern Ireland’s effort to build peace in Belfast. It is based on seven months of in-country research and 122 interviews conducted in 2015 and 2016. Political goals of united Jerusalem in Israel and shared future in Northern Ireland are problematized as they confront micro-scale urban dynamics and resistant patterns of community power. A national policy agenda aimed at managing a city requires a political-spatial process of implementation having erratic effects. National-urban disjunctions were found in fundamentally different national programs, illuminating the inherent disruptive quality of urban dynamics in resisting national mandates. Findings inform theories of policy implementation and urban governance, highlighting problematic characteristics of national goals when implemented in urban space and the role of ethnic and cultural interests operating outside formal urban governance institutions in impeding national directives.

When bringing armed conflicts to a peaceful end, the inclusion of civil society in peacemaking is a vital task. However, whereas previous research on civil society inclusion has made significant advancements, surprisingly little attention has been paid to analyzing how civil resistance and mass action may interact with more elite-driven approaches during peace processes. This study addresses this research gap by examining the interplay between elite and mass-based civil society approaches in three different peace processes in civil wars in Africa in the post-Cold War period: Liberia, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Burundi. We advance the literature by developing a framework that focuses on coordination of these different efforts and we explore this interplay empirically. With this study, we aim to broaden the research agenda, allowing for future synergies at the research frontier of mass action and the inclusion of civil society in peace processes.

The Internationalistsargues that the outlawry of war in 1928 created the modern international order. This review essay critiques this single-cause account of world history. It shows howThe Internationalistsrelies on statistics that obfuscate the character of war and on a juridical model of international politics that makes liberal empire invisible. I argue that war making by Asian and African peasants played more of a role in bringing about decolonisation than peacemaking by Western lawyers.

The 1956 Suez conflict was not inevitable. The involvement of an impartial third party had offered an exit ramp for the main protagonists. Largely forgotten today, India strove to reconcile the int...

My only concern is that the museum will be a passive thing: I would like it to be [a] stimulant for Action, not something that people come and look at to pass time on a wet afternoon…—David R. Wool...

A paradigmatic shift from carbon-intensive to alternative and renewable energy prompts the question of whether lessons learned in one era are forgotten in the next. Carbon-intensive industries (oil, gas, and coal) have not performed well on mitigating negative impacts on host community conflict, but alternative energy corporate actors can learn from them. Focusing on alternative energy companies, and specifically companies in supply chains for new-generation lithium-ion battery systems, this article illustrates companies' connections to conflict minerals and critical materials, and how a corporate peacebuilding strategy can address a company's impacts on conflict whether on the ground or through the supply chain. Companies reframing their corporate social responsibility to corporate peacebuilding, which includes peacemaking, are better prepared for expanding international conflict minerals and critical materials governance and emerging action on resource sustainable governance.

Policy makers and scholars have shown increased interest in gendered approaches to peacemaking, even as evidence of women’s impact on peace processes has remained unclear. In this paper, we explore the influence of gender diversity among decision-making elites on the outcome of ongoing civil conflicts. Specifically, we argue that increased female representation within the national legislature increases the likelihood that a conflict terminates in a negotiated settlement. However, the impact of legislative female representation on conflict termination is conditioned by the power of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive, suggesting that gender diversity exerts a greater impact in states with more authoritative legislatures. We evaluate our hypotheses using data on the manner of conflict termination and the proportion of women in national legislatures between 1945 and 2009. Our results show support for the central argument, suggesting that increasing female representation within legislative bodies increases the likelihood of war termination via negotiated settlement.

One of the most persistent criticisms of the peacemaking perspective in criminology is that it lacks testable hypotheses and realistic policy implications. In this essay, we examine the applicability of peacemaking ideas to the mechanisms identified by scholars that are associated with desistance from crime. We argue that the process of desistance has many similarities with peacemaking ideas and may provide an avenue for testing some of the core propositions of the peacemaking perspective. We propose a model that depicts the relationships between variables that have been observed in the desistance literature and examine how they relate to the peacemaking perspective. Policy implications of these ideas are also discussed.

The literature on environmental peacemaking argues that cooperation in the face of shared environmental challenges can facilitate further cooperation, trust building, and eventually peace between states in conflict. Empirical research on environmental peacemaking, predominantly conducted in the form of single case studies, has so far been inconclusive. This article uses a cross-case, multimethod research design to test the environmental peacemaking proposition. More specifically, it argues that the conclusion of a cooperative environmental agreement can have a positive impact on reconciliation between rival states. Based on a new dataset on international rivalry termination, transboundary protected areas, and international freshwater agreements, this article first conducts a statistical analysis and a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The results are then verified and refined by six case studies. Triangulation of findings from the three studies suggests that the conclusion of a cooperative environmental agreement facilitates reconciliation in international rivalries. But this effect is contingent on a number of scope conditions, such as high environmental attention, internal political stability, wider patterns or traditions of environmental cooperation, and already ongoing processes of reconciliation. Still, the findings imply that environmental challenges do not only affect peace and security in a negative way. Addressing them jointly also opens opportunities for peacemaking and peacebuilding between states.

Pedagogy, Politics and Philosophy is a rich, somewhat eclectic mixture of chapters exploring the concept of peace in both practice and theory, with chapters focusing on philosophical reflections on...

For international and domestic actors, post-conflict peacebuilding is one of the most difficult policy arenas to understand and in which to operate. Environmental and natural resource governance have the potential to facilitate peacebuilding in such contexts, but existing research has not yet produced a cohesive theoretical understanding of the pathways by which natural resource management strategies can facilitate positive peace. This paper explores the wider benefits of natural resource management and discusses their potential for reducing political fragility in affected states and helping to build positive peace. The paper outlines three mechanisms through which improved natural resource governance in post-conflict contexts is theorized to have positive effects on peace: (a) the contact hypothesis, whereby the facilitation of intergroup cooperation reduces bias and prejudice; (b) the diffusion of transnational norms, where the introduction of environmental and other good governance norms supports human empowerment and strengthens civil society; and (c) state service provision, where the provision of access to public services addresses the instrumental needs of communities, thereby strengthening their belief in the state. Guided by an interest in the opportunities presented by natural resource management to support peacebuilding processes in post-conflict states, the paper seeks to revise and advance the current environmental peacebuilding research agenda.

Previous research on ceasefires in armed conflicts has primarily focused on the aggregated country-level of analysis. By contrast, this article contributes by examining the local-level dynamics of ...

This article analyses the broad shifts in the relationship between peace settlements and human rights from 1990 to the present day. The article points to three phases of development: from 1990 to 2000, which saw a rise in peace processes and agreements and creative engagement with human rights; from 2000 to 2010, when new approaches to human rights and peacemaking were rapidly ‘normativized’ in new international legal standards, but at a cost of a more nuanced political practice; and from 2010 to the current date, an ‘era of disillusionment’ as regards the apparent failures of peacebuilding efforts, where human rights also have a more precarious global position. In the current era I suggest that we are witnessing renewed attention to the ‘politics of the local’ which questions and even rejects formalized human rights approaches to peacebuilding. Counter to the pessimism of the current era, I suggest that this new context may in fact offer new opportunities to return to the idea of human rights as a political practice. Rather than approaching rights as a set of external normative standards to propel liberal institution-building, human rights-based peacebuilding would aim to support a political practice in which rights are given meaning through the process by which they are ‘negotiated’ into being as part of an ongoing politics of inclusion. Such an approach would not only assist engagement with peace processes but might also invigorate a radical conflict prevention approach.

Informal conflict management implicitly claims to value cultural difference and to be able to mediate relations between cultural minorities and states. This article considers this claim in challenging circumstances borne of settler-colonialism by examining the cultural politics of the establishment of a conflict resolution programme in an Australian Aboriginal community. In addition to settler-colonial maligning of Aboriginal capacities to manage conflict, the Gununa community has in recent decades faced the severe attenuation of customary processes and escalating uncontrolled violence. Nonetheless, the Mornington Island Restorative Justice Project involved a spontaneous appropriation of mediation as a customary initiative and an accompanying implicit negotiation between the customary sociolegal order of Mornington Islanders and that of the liberal settler-state. Analysis of these circumstances and relations leads us to argue that informalism can support cultural difference and mediate relations with the state, although it cannot be relied upon to transform the accompanying asymmetric relationship. Nonetheless, informalism may sustain and contribute to the possibilities for transformative change by improving delivery of justice services and through recognition of Indigenous capacities and approaches to sociopolitical order.

This article, largely based on archival research, highlights two contradictory outcomes of colonial state formation in central Borneo. The first is characterized by territorial consolidation and efforts to neatly sedentarize peoples within each colonial territory, while the second is characterized by pacification that unwittingly liberalized the flows and movements of people and commodities transgressing colonial state boundaries. The 1924 Kapit Peacemaking Agreement in colonial Sarawak is often noted for its significance in bringing a final end to the practice of inter-ethnic headhunting, principally between the Iban of Sarawak and the Kenyah from Dutch Borneo. While it marked the successful outcome of a long phase of colonial pacification and territorial consolidation for both colonial states in Borneo, the agreement's outcome simultaneously highlights the contradictory inter-colonial motives and expectations regarding the resulting increase of cross-border flows of people and commodities. The presented case highlights challenges facing Dutch colonial state formation when attempts to subjugate and sedentarize riverine peoples, who were geographically tied to fluid commodity chains and flows, directly undermined the former's own efforts to establish authority in its borderland frontier.

Does individual-level exposure to political violence prompt conciliatory attitudes? Does the answer vary by phase of conflict? The study uses longitudinal primary datasets to test the hypothesis that conflict-related experiences impact conciliation. Data were collected from Israeli Jews, Palestinians, and Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. Across both contexts, and among both parties to each conflict, psychological distress and threat perceptions had a polarizing effect on conciliatory preferences. The study highlights that experiences of political violence are potentially a crucial source of psychological distress, and consequently, a continuing barrier to peace. This has implications in peacemaking, implying that alongside removing the real threat of violence, peacemakers must also work toward the social and political inclusion of those most affected by previous violence.

De facto states—polities, such as Abkhazia (Georgia) or the Donetsk People’s Republic (Ukraine), that appropriate many trappings of statehood without securing the status of full states—have been a constant presence in the postwar international order. Some de facto states, such as Northern Cyprus, survive for a long period of time. Others, including Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, are forcefully reintegrated into their parent states. Still others, such as Aceh in Indonesia, disappear as a result of peacemaking. A few, such as Eritrea, successfully transition to full statehood. What explains these very different outcomes? I argue that four factors account for much of this variation: the extent of military assistance that separatists receive from outside actors, the governance activities conducted by separatist insurgents, the fragmentation of the rebel movement, and the influence of government veto players. My analysis relies on an original dataset that includes all breakaway enclaves from 1945 to 2011. The findings enhance our understanding of separatist institutional outcomes, rebel governance, and the conditions that sustain nonstate territorial actors.

In the dusty streets of Cesar and La Guajira in Colombia, it is unlikely that many of the inhabitants would believe that peacemaking was a role that can be assigned to the extractive industries. Th...

This article focuses on the dilemmas and trade-offs that third parties face when mediating violent political conflicts. Should they ignore human rights violations because pushing the issue could jeopardize relationships with political actors who grant access for humanitarian aid? Will bringing moderates and hardliners together help the peace process or radicalize moderate actors? What should dialogue facilitators do when the act of identifying non-mainstream groups to be included into dialogue increases division and polarization? The activity of peacemaking is inherently characterized by such process and strategy dilemmas where two equally compulsory imperatives seem not to be attainable at the same time. The article proposes a framework to break out of either-or thinking in these situations. We argue that: 1) making oneself aware of how a decision is perceived, and 2) systematically exploring a set of different strategies for creating new unexpected options helps to ease these decisions and avoid rotten compromises. The model reworks and combines existing problemsolving strategies to create a new explorative option generation approach to peacemaking dilemmas and trade-offs. Some of these strategies, such as sequencing and incrementalization, are already well-established in peacemaking. Others, such as compartmentalization and utilization, are rather unconsciously used. All identified strategies, however, are not yet systematically employed to manage third parties’ own dilemmas and trade-offs. Under the suggested framework, these strategies can act in complement to synthesize creativity and strategic thinking with surprising ease. Using examples from the authors’ peacemaking activities and observations in Myanmar, Thailand, and Ukraine, the article demonstrates the real-world benefits of the framework in terms of decision assessment and optional thinking., Politics and Governance, 7 (4)

Braithwaite and D’Costa’s (2018) Cascades of Violence deploys South Asian data to conclude that war tends to cascade across space and time to further war, crime to further crime, war to crime, and crime to war. This article sketches why it is analytically fertile to view crime as a cascade phenomenon. Once we see crime through the cascade lens, we can imagine how to more effectively cascade crime prevention. Like crime, crime prevention often cascades. Braithwaite and D’Costa (2018) show how peacemaking can cascade nonviolence, how it cascades nonviolent social movement politics, and vice versa. Seeing crime through the cascade lens opens up fertile ways of imagining a macrocriminology of crime control. Self-efficacy and collective efficacy are hypothesized as catalysts of crime prevention cascades in such a macrocriminology. Alcoholics Anonymous is one model for how to institutionalize the scaling up of cascades of prevention. Other movements for building recovery capital such as the social movement for restorative justice might follow the AA lead, rejigging their strategies toward institutionalizing the scaling up of self-efficacy into collective efficacy that prevents cascades of crime. Australian successes with gun control and drunk driving point to the importance of explicitly connecting evidence-based microcriminology to a macrocriminology of cultural transformation. More structurally, building collective efficacy in families, schools and primary work groups may cascade collective efficacy into neighborhoods and vice versa.

There is today a well-established consensus that belligerents must be disarmed in order to reconstruct shattered states and establish a robust and durable peace in the wake of internal armed conflict. Indeed, nearly every UN peacekeeping intervention since the end of the Cold War has included disarmament provisions in its mandate. Disarmament is guided by the arrestingly simple premise that weapons cause conflict and, therefore, must be eradicated for a civil conflict to end. If the means by which combatants fight are eliminated, it is thought, actors will have little choice but to commit to peace. Disarmament is, therefore, considered a necessary condition for establishing the lasting conditions for peace. To date, however, no systematic quantitative analysis has been undertaken of the practice of disarmament and the causal mechanisms remain underspecified. This paper is a preliminary attempt to fill that gap. In it we outline a series of hypotheses with which to run future statistical analyses on the effects of disarmament programs. The success of negotiations and the durability of peace are, perhaps, the single most salient issues concerning those engaged in conflict termination efforts. We therefore focus the bulk of this paper on a review of the supposed effects of disarmament on negotiating outcomes and war recurrence.

The four books under review focus on different aspects of war and conflict, but they all make it clear that women and children are more than their victims. They can be, and often are, active participants in all dimensions of conflict, from taking up arms to working for peace. While all four books paint an appropriately grim picture of war and its impact, there is also some optimism to be found in the resilience shown by women and children as they face the brutality of war and often actively seek to work for peace. Three of the books examine women's involvement in conflict, war, peace and peacemaking, and the aftermath of these events, albeit in very different ways-although all view women as active participants in the process rather than as victims. The fourth book included in this article, Children and global conflict, is not only relevant to the discussion, but also provides another important lens through which we can examine issues of conflict, war and peace. This review article provides insight into the contrition made to the field by these recent books individually, as well as when considered as parts of a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of the increasing unlikelihood of a two-state solution, several integrative solutions have been proposed as alternative visions for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Offering a nuanced conceptual map of the various proposals for inclusive, egalitarian political visions for all the inhabitants of Israel/Palestine, this article identifies three strands of integrative approaches: liberal, binational, and shared sovereignty. It critically assesses the strengths and weaknesses of these integrative strands and evaluates integrationists' preference for historical reconciliation as an alternative framework to the peacemaking discourse of the Oslo peace process

This article expands the study of the politics of international criminal justice, restoring the crucial but overlooked case of Bangladesh, today the largest population confronting the aftermath of genocide. Bangladesh is one of the most important cases where the prosecution of war criminals was foiled, resulting in a disturbing impunity for one of the bloodiest incidents of the Cold War. Using unexplored declassified Indian government documents from archives in Delhi, this article uses detailed process-tracing to reveal for the first time why India and Bangladesh abandoned their plans to put accused Pakistani war criminals on trial after the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. In the face of Pakistani defiance, the Indian and Bangladeshi governments reluctantly bargained away justice in order to pursue their national security, with peacemaking with Pakistan proving more important than war crimes trials. This episode furthers the general understanding of both the causes and results of impunity for mass atrocities, while extending the study of international justice into Asia. Bangladesh's tragic experience shows the primacy of international security, while also tentatively suggesting that even when amnesty is necessary for peacemaking, it can leave a toxic legacy for future politics.

Leaders guiding their groups through a peace process following a difficult conflict must address the unique challenges created by this process. This article describes the duality characterizing peace processes and offers an original conceptualization of the socio-psychological tasks leaders fulfill in this context, addressing security and control needs, changing collective beliefs and emotions, and mobilizing the group while simultaneously coping with social polarization. This paper reports on a case study of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's leadership during the Oslo Accords through his public speeches designed to mobilize his group's support. A content analysis of speeches following different types of events (positive, negative or neutral) and targeting different audiences (Israeli and international) highlights three major themes emerging from his rhetoric, which correlate to his tasks as a leader in peacemaking. The findings describe how Rabin coped with the challenges that arose from the complex peace process, while fulfilling the first two of his tasks and mobilizing his group, but not dealing with the deep social polarization that existed within Israeli society at that time. The triangular interaction between leader, society and context are discussed with regard to their impact on peace processes. Conclusions are drawn about the opportunities and setbacks of the Oslo Accords, considering Rabin's contribution to peacemaking.

This paper explores several paradigmatic approaches to understanding the causes of the intractability of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. It elaborates a perspective that illuminates how the traumatic histories of both peoples construct a victim state of mind, whose paranoid schizoid mechanisms are exacerbated by the ongoing traumatogenic environment of violence and war, thus foreclosing capacities for peacemaking. After critiquing the trauma paradigm’s assumptions of psychological symmetry and shared responsibility for the conflict, the paper develops an alternative social psychoanalytic model that situates the unconscious processes produced by trauma within the specificities of history, large group identity, ideological hegemony and power hierarchies that shape the psychological experience of both peoples and account for the complex systemic asymmetries that impede the possibilities for a just reconciliation of their tragic conflict.

After years of wishful thinking and failed efforts at Israeli–Palestinian peacemaking, the Obama administration has now finally acknowledged what most observers have been saying for some time—there...

There is growing interest among analysts in the increasing involvement of emerging powers in peace operations. As a larger share of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers are sourced from non-Western states, some have argued that these countries will increasingly demand more of a say in the deployment of those troops, including operational mandates and financing. (1) This, they claim, will challenge liberal norms around peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, including doctrines such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Protection of Civilians (POC), and robust measures such as the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) deployed as part of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). One influential analysis has described this as "the new geo-politics of peace operations", arguing that emerging powers "are likely to act as 'norm revisionists' increasingly influencing the make-up, design and conduct of future peace operations on the basis of their own interests and approaches". (2) This article examines the changing policy and interests of Indonesia against the backdrop of those claims. Indonesia is frequently mentioned as an emerging player in peacekeeping, but its role has been understudied compared to, for example, China, India, South Africa and Brazil. Several recent reports devoted to emerging powers and peace operations identify Indonesia as a relevant actor, but it receives little detailed attention when it comes to the actual analysis. (3) Drawing on interviews with foreign and defence ministry officials, and independent analysts in Jakarta, as well as statements by Indonesian representatives in the UN and other forums, this article seeks to fill the gap. In discussing Indonesia's growing role in peacekeeping operations (PKOs), the article makes three arguments. First, although Indonesia has a long history of involvement in UN PKOs, there has been a significant change in its policy in the last decade, with much greater importance attached to peacekeeping in particular since 2011. The article offers some explanations for this new emphasis and explores how it might play out in the future, including highlighting potential constraints. Second, although Indonesia retains a strong preference for traditional "blue helmet" missions mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC), and based on principles of host country consent, impartiality and limited use of force, these considerations are not static. While Indonesia is cautious about aspects of the "new" peacekeeping agenda, such as POC and peace enforcement missions, it cannot be considered a norm revisionist. Rather, Jakarta's views on peacekeeping reflect its wider concerns about global order. Indonesia wants to be involved in peacekeeping missions that have wide legitimacy, with greater clarity around mandates and resourcing, and with more consultation between the authorizing powers in the UNSC and troop contributing countries. In reality, Indonesia has also proved to be more pragmatic than some of its rhetoric would suggest. Third, to the extent that Indonesia has challenged norms, it has done so as an advocate for a more ambitious approach to peacekeeping in Southeast Asia. It was the first to argue for an ASEAN peacekeeping force and has supported the use of regional troops to monitor peace agreements. In doing so, it has challenged long-established ASEAN norms around non-interference and encountered resistance from some neighbouring states. (4) In sum, the Indonesian case supports some of the claims made about emerging powers and peace operations but challenges others, underlining the diversity of this group of states. The article is organized into four sections. The first part provides a brief overview of the literature on emerging powers and peace operations, identifying some of the core claims and situating the Indonesian case. Section two provides an overview of Indonesia's involvement in peacekeeping, including the important changes in policy and practice that have taken place in the last five years. …

Armed conflict can endanger natural resources through several channels such as direct predation from fighting groups, but it may also help preserve ecosystems by dissuading extractive economic activities through the fear of extortion. The effect of conflict on deforestation is thus an empirical question. This paper studies the effect on forest cover of Colombia’s recent peace negotiation between the government and the FARC insurgency. Using yearly deforestation data from satellite images and a difference-in-differences identification strategy, we show that areas controlled by FARC prior to the declaration of a permanent ceasefire experienced a differential increase in deforestation after the start of the ceasefire. The deforestation effect of peace is attenuated in municipalities with higher state presence and judicial capacity, and is exacerbated by land intensive economic activities. Our results highlight the importance of complementing peacemaking milestones with state building efforts to avoid environmental damage.