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Stay-behind networks in France were set up starting in 1948 and were aimed at responding to the possibility of a Soviet armed attack into Western Europe. Participants were identified, and arms and explosives cached, to be activated in case of hostilities. This activity became folded into a multilateral effort under the Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) of NATO. In France, the network was run as a highly compartmented activity under the French external intelligence service (DGSE). As the Soviet threat receded, the stay-behind activity became more and more dormant, and in 1990 it was quietly disbanded, immediately after the P-2 scandal broke in Italy.

The American administration was much influenced through the late 1950s by the consequences of decolonisation. Though a nation historically committed to anti-imperialism, members of the American administration became anxious at the extent to which recently independent states were coalescing into a large ‘neutralist’ bloc likely to threaten US interests, particularly in the UN. Washington feared in particular that this Afro-Asian grouping might fall under the sway of the Soviet Union. How best to solve this problem created divisions within the US government about dealing with the Algerian problem: some favoured closer contacts with the FLN; others wished to help the French. In the end by hedging their bets and wishing to broker a solution American governments displeased both sides.

Covert action, i.e. covert operations whose main object is not the collection of intelligence, is a child of the Cold War. Almost haphazardly, it came to be conducted by the CIA, the nation's principal foreign intelligence service. Covert action, in its early years surrounded by secrecy, did not become legally subjected to congressional oversight until the Hughes‐Ryan Amendment, 14 years after the Bay of Pigs. In this legislation, and in the follow‐on Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, covert action came under a separate oversight process than the collection of intelligence. In the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, in which covert action for the first time was officially admitted by name as an activity of the U.S. Government, certain loopholes were addressed which had been revealed by Iran‐Contra (the issues of timely notification of Congress, involvement of third parties, and involvement of other U.S. Government agencies). Issues still remain, including the conduct of liaison with foreign...

Introduction "The Russian Hope" and its Disappointments The Attempt at a Renewal of the Entente Cordiale The Turn toward Europe: The Brussels Treaty and the Western Union The Turn Toward Washington: The North Atlantic Treaty The Alliance Produces an Organization: NATO NATO Produces an Integrated Command The Return of the Supreme Commander Epilogue