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As one of very few authors in the Anglo-American tradition, Andrew Feenberg, has pointed out, the early development of critical theory and Lukacs’ philosophy cannot be understood without reflecting on the historically rich network between phenomenology, Neo-Kantianism, and social theory. Moreover, in contradistinction to many contemporary critical theorists, Feenberg, following Lukacs, is not hostile to epistemological and ontological questions in social theory. In this vein, the main term that Feenberg introduces in his interpretation of Lukacs is Gegenstandlichkeit (objectivity). Although I agree with Feenberg’s claim that this term is central for understanding Lukacs’ understanding of social entities as culturally meaningful entities, I argue that we can find this broader social meaning of entities already foreshadowed in Chap. 1 of Marx’s Capital if we read Capital as a theory of society. Unfortunately, traditional Marxist discourses tend to reduce Capital to an “economic” theory and Feenberg seems to follow this tradition, that is, he seems to dismiss the critique of political economy as the primary horizon for a critical theory of society. However, as I will demonstrate, Marx’s project cannot be reduced to a labor theory of value and, instead, it should, from the beginning, be understood as a social theory based on social categories; and Gegenstandlichkeit serves as the central element for translating epistemological concepts into social concepts.

STATEBUILDING IS WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS A CENTRAL CHALLENGE FOR THE international order today and the main response to a range of global problems from poverty to terrorism and international crime. However, there is no agreement about why and how international actors should engage in statebuilding processes. Donor governments and international agencies often justify and legitimize their statebuilding support by referring to international norms, such as human rights. Others, especially in the academic community but also some development professionals, question the relevance of these norms, in particular, in fragile states that are unable or unwilling to live up to them and have only limited means of exercising their sovereignty. They argue that statebuilding is essentially a local process that only works if it is based on local norms and values and led by national actors. For instance, an aid worker said in an interview on Deutsche Welle recently about the situation in Darfur: "We should listen to the local actors more. They know much better how to solve their own conflicts than anyone else. We must also accept the fact that we deal with very different societies who don't always want to develop in the direction we want them to or think they should." (1) By looking at this problem from a pragmatic perspective that emphasizes progress through practical engagement, it becomes clear that the two positions are not as different and irreconcilable as they first appear. On one hand, there is a growing body of evidence of the possible harm that excessive or untimely insistence on international norms may cause. This evidence demands a stronger realism and a clearer balance between the respect for international norms and an understanding and appreciation of the national context. However, the evidence does not contradict the fundamental relevance and importance of international norms. On the contrary, it shows how international actors can strengthen progress toward international norms on a pragmatic basis by being less principled and rigid. On the other hand, a pragmatic approach also makes it clear that international norms are already known and accepted by many national statebuilding actors and people in fragile situations. They are increasingly included as the basis for peace agreements and represent hope and opportunities. International interventions in fragile situations often run the risk of doing harm by causing tensions and fragmentation of societies if they are not sensitive enough to the political, historical, and cultural context. However, it can be questioned if international actors fully recognize the motivation that international norms provide for national statebuilding actors in fragile situations, and the opportunities for progress that they create. A pragmatic approach to statebuilding demands a discussion and a rethinking of current concepts and practices. We need to understand better what the sources of international norms are, what dilemmas and trade-offs are involved in their application, and how mechanisms for engaging national statebuilding actors work. This discussion should lead international statebuilding actors to clarify their own role in promoting normative standards in fragile situations in a number of ways that would help to strengthen progress. Are International Norms Relevant for Statebuilding? International norms are as old as the sovereign state itself, going back to the Peace of Westphalia, which contained provisions that states must respect religious freedom and remove barriers to trade as part of the settlement after the Thirty Years' War. Charles Tilly famously said that "war makes states" through internal processes of concentration of power and wealth in preparation for warfare. However, he also described how mutual recognition among states that are able to effectively challenge each other in war is an important source of state legitimacy, and how external compacts among states gradually led to stronger constraints on the form of states. …

In this paper I argue that we should not accept the normative turn that major contemporary critical theorists, such as Habermas, Honneth, and Jaeggi, have introduced to critical theory. On the one hand, the introduction of a communicative and ultimately ethical paradigm led to a loss of a dialectical concept of society. On the other hand, this turn led to a loss of a non-normative concept of critique. Accordingly, I argue that we should return to a Marxian concept of critique as analysis of (capitalist) social totality, which, in turn, enables us to re-introduce a concept of society that is not based on abstract moral or normative assumptions, but, instead, functions as their basis. For only a non-normative concept of critique can help us to see the finite and historical limits of capitalist society. Moreover, this return to Marx not only helps us understand that capitalist social totality is not established on ethical grounds but that it is constituted by money and labor. As a consequence, the return to a Marxist paradigm allows critical theory to include an analysis of the natural basis of capitalist sociality, of which it has lost sight due to its ethical idealism.

In this essay I briefly analyze why the concept of class has disappeared in recent social philosophy, such as in the philosophies of Badiou, Negri/Hardt, and Honneth. I argue that a change in the foundations of their social ontologies has led to the dismissal of the concept of class and, in addition, I argue that these changes are unwarranted, since they lead to a loss of a critical concept of society. Then, in a second part, I argue that the concept of class deserves a systematic status within a theory of capitalist sociality, especially since the concept of class can be traced back genetically to violent social relations that are derived from the capitalist social order.